Severe clash of Russian helicopters with Ukrainian drones; hell in the sky

Name: Severe clash of Russian helicopters with Ukrainian drones; hell in the sky
Uploaded: 2026-11-03T04:26:02.161Z
Duration: 3 min 16 s
Channel: Kanal13

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Footage appears publicly available with some regularity, showing Russians using their attack helicopters to counter Ukrainian long-range UAVs . This is what analysts at Defense Express write .

They said this provided food for thought as to why the Russian Ka-52 helicopter failed to shoot down the Ukrainian FP-1 drone with a missile and what alternatives the Russians had.

"And now we have some interesting material from the Jamestown Foundation, an analytical organization that, based on one of the episodes, allows us to draw certain generalizations on the topic of which helicopter is more dangerous to our UAVs—the Mi-28 or the Ka-52M—and what countermeasures might be employed," the analysts write. This material describes how, as early as the fall of 2023, the Russian Army command formed several tactical groups with helicopters, which were assigned exclusively to intercept long-range Ukrainian UAVs and which reported directly to the command of air defense divisions directly on Russian territory.

Each of these groups consisted of two attack and one support helicopter, which were to be constantly in a state of “readiness No. 2”.

They claim that, based on data from the Jamestown Foundation, the first alleged successful interception of our UAVs by Russian helicopters occurred in August 2023, involving an Mi-28N. The next incident occurred in November 2024, and involved a Ka-52M, which required two Igla-S air-to-air missiles and 65 30mm rounds to destroy three aerial targets.

The report also cites statistics according to which Russian tactical groups using Mi-28 and Ka-52M helicopters allegedly intercepted a total of 59 aerial targets in November-December 2024. It is also stated that the overwhelming majority of targets were intercepted by Igla-S missiles, while onboard cannons accounted for only 29% of intercepted targets. The interception range allegedly was approximately 50 kilometers from the protected facility.

It is also noted that the Ka-52M demonstrated greater effectiveness due to its more sophisticated onboard equipment. Furthermore, operational efficiency was directly impacted by weather conditions, which limited visibility and led to icing of the helicopter's working surfaces.

The experts emphasized that the above data is fragmentary and likely reflects how Russians themselves assess the effectiveness of their Mi-28 and Ka-52M aircraft in countering our attack UAVs. They added:

"At the same time, if the statement about the predominant use of Igla-S missiles is true, then in theory this raises the question of the need to integrate devices for deploying heat flares onto Ukrainian long-range UAVs, similar to how this was implemented on the Kh-101 in the "Product 504AP" variant, which incorporated the SP-504 jamming station. But then the question arises as to whether such an "upgrade" could be implemented on Ukrainian Deepstrikes in practice."

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Tags: #Ukriane, #Russia, #Putin, #Putler, #Russian invasion of Ukraine, #Zelenski, #Kiev, #Kyiv, #Kadirov army, #Kadirov, #Kherson, #Bucha, #Kharkiv, #Ukrainian pilots, #vagners, #Russian tanks, #NATO, #drones, #Moscow, #Kreml, #war victims #Ukraina, News, The Washington Post, waPo Video, Washington Post Video, Washington Post YouTube, a:politics, aid, biden, putin, s:Politics, support, t:Other, Ukraine, war, fact check, news coverage, Donald Trump, news, wp video, forbes, nytimes, newspaper, media, journalism, Ilham Aliyev, Baku, Azerbaijan, Israel, Gaza, Palestine, Tel-Aviv, Garabag, Karabakh, football, ronaldo, messi, brian tyler cohen

Footage appears publicly available with some regularity, showing Russians using their attack helicopters to counter Ukrainian long-range UAVs. This is what analysts at Defense Express write. They said this provided food for thought as to why the Russian Ka-52 helicopter failed to shoot down the Ukrainian FP-1 drone with a missile and what alternatives the Russians had. And now we have some interesting material from the Jamestown Foundation, an analytical organization that, based on one of the episodes, allows us to draw certain generalizations on the topic of which helicopter is more dangerous to our UAVs, the Mi-28 or the Ka-52M, and what countermeasures might be employed, the analysts write. This material describes how, as early as the fall of 2023, the Russian army command formed several tactical groups with helicopters, which were assigned exclusively to intercept long-range Ukrainian UAVs and which reported directly to the command of air defense divisions directly on Russian territory. Each of these groups consisted of two attack and one support helicopter, which were to be constantly in a state of readiness number two. They claim that, based on data from the Jamestown Foundation, the first alleged successful interception of our UAVs by Russian helicopters occurred in August 2023, involving Mi-28N. The next incident occurred in November 2024, and involved a Ka-52M, which required two Two Igla air-to-air missiles and 65 30mm rounds to destroy three aerial targets. The report also cites statistics according to which Russian tactical groups using Mi-28 and Ka-52M helicopters allegedly intercepted a total of 59 aerial targets in November-December 2024. It is also stated that the overwhelming majority of targets were intercepted by Igla missiles, while onboard cannons accounted for only 29 percent of intercepted targets. The interception range allegedly was approximately 50 kilometers from the protected facility. It is also noted that the Ka-52M demonstrated greater effectiveness due to its more sophisticated onboard equipment. Furthermore, operational efficiency was directly impacted by weather conditions, which limited visibility and led to icing of the helicopter's working surfaces. The experts emphasized that the above data is fragmentary and likely reflects how Russians themselves assess the effectiveness of their Mi-28 and Ka-52M aircraft in countering our attack UAVs. They added, at the same time, if the statement about the predominant use of Igla-S missiles is true, then in theory this raises the question of the need to integrate devices for deploying heat flares onto Ukrainian long-range UAVs, similar to how this was implemented on the Kh-101 and the Product 504AP variant, which incorporated the SP-504 jamming station. But then the question arises as to whether such an upgrade could be implemented on Ukrainian deep strikes in practice.