جی دی ونس مذاکرات آتش بس را به کدام سو می برد | گفت و گو با دکتر امیر حمیدی

Epoch Times Persian
88 followers
22 Video Views·Apr 14, 2026
آقای دکتر امیر حمیدی، کارشناس امنیت ملی و مقابله با تروریسم، در گفتوگو با شهرزاد قانعی درباره نقش جیدی ونس در مذاکرات آتشبس با جمهوری اسلامی، تفاوت دیدگاه او با دونالد ترامپ و برنامه ترامپ برای آینده خاورمیانه میپردازد.
مخاطبین عزیز لطفا نظرات و پیشنهادات خود را برای ما بنویسید
سایت اصلی اپک تایمز فارسی
http://persianepochtimes.com
لطفا ما را در شبکه های اجتماعی دنبال کنید
اینستاگرام:
https://www.instagram.com/epochtimes_persian/
تلگرام :
https://telegram.me/EpochTimesPersian
توئیتر:
https://twitter.com/EpochTimesPer
فیسبوک:
https://www.facebook.com/EpochTimesPersian
Welcome to the program "Epoque Times Persian Edition." I'm Shahrzad Ghanai, and today's guest is Mr. Dr. Amir Hamidi, a national security and counter-terrorism expert from California, USA. Mr. Hamidi, welcome.
Greetings to you, Madam Ghanah, and to your dynamic audience around the world, with boundless gratitude for your invitation.
Thank you. Mr. Hamidi appears to be the individual referred to as the U.S. Deputy Assistant to the President for Iran, Jason Green.
Given that individuals such as Mr. Jiddi Vens have somewhat different perspectives on the war compared to the viewpoint held by Marco Rubio.
Mr. Jiddi Vens were not particularly in favor of the war either, but given that they follow what Mr. Trump does, well...
How optimistic can we be that the rest, including Mr. Vens Warden, will engage in negotiations with the Islamic Republic?
He may not merely consider ending the war, but also take into account a policy that could push the Islamic Republic further toward the stage of overthrow.
You see, this is a critical issue—we've reached a particularly sensitive point in our history today. In the midst of the sisterly conflict, fire has been declared; it may not mark the end of a war, but it certainly signals the beginning of a more dangerous phase.
Washington is shaping up differences in tactics, but in Tehran, signs of internal power struggles are more pronounced than ever, and ultimately, it will be the Iranian people who will determine the real equation.
We must view Jidí Vens through the framework of a security-oriented conservative, with a tendency toward suppressing Hezbollah. He is neither a classical intervener nor a simple zealot; we must understand him thoroughly.
Their perspective is based on the principle that American power should be purposeful, limited, and yield clear strategic returns. Within this framework, they oppose endless wars and costly occupations.
However, using hard power and the Friday prayers of the Zarrabat, I believe the destruction of the enemy's vital infrastructures and full deterrence are fully justified.
In my view, the relationship between him and President Chambe is not a fundamental disagreement, but rather a difference in the level of strategic implementation.
Chambe Chachub is being pressured, but unlike the previous pressure, most of the burden falls on the hands of the power distributor. However, the Wais is also being pressured, and in this situation, Chachub tries to control costs and avoid getting entangled in a prolonged conflict.
If we look closely, we see that Weiss was not actually opposed to J.D. Vance; rather, he is the representative of the power lever within this very strategy—someone who wants to harness power for the working class without strategic exhaustion.
Since J.D. Vance is a representative of a generation in American politics that has drawn significant lessons from the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, power without strategy—leading to withdrawal and eventual exhaustion—must be avoided, as this would mean failing to achieve lasting results, much like the failure to secure victory in the Iraq War.
This does not mean that they are abandoning the Chamb Tazad initiative; rather, within the framework of these discussions, they are proceeding with a very important difference. They aim to ensure that the incoming Yalat Mu'tadah does not lead to an uncontrolled, prolonged conflict.
So, if we want to say, this difference is not a difference in elimination, but rather a difference in the management approach of the party.
What matters to the people of Iran as a result of this negotiation—whether it holds significance for them—or whether Mr. Jeyhouni's presence in these talks might yield advantages, or perhaps even shape circumstances in a way that enables the Islamic Republic to endure for a longer period of time?
Look, if I respond quickly and clearly, I can say yes, this threat is entirely real. But we must examine whether foreign policy or entrenched attitudes, even during this very period of Trump's presidency, are shaped by ideology.
After taking a closer look, we see that it takes shape based on calculating national interests, cost-benefit analysis, and risk management. Once these aspects become completely clear, we realize that the flow, which at times appears to be a dead end in representation, might eventually lead to the conclusion that, if we reach a tough agreement,
Halt the nuclear program, reduce the level of logical escalation, and prevent a hidden war. This option may entail regime change, possibly involving the use of force.
However, there is a very important and decisive point here that is often overlooked, and that is: any agreement that contradicts the social reality within Iran will not be sustainable.
If the people of Iran consistently demonstrate organized unity, with determination and by taking action themselves, they can bring about fundamental change, rendering the Washington deal meaningless.
Thus, the risk cannot be ignored, but the final outcome will not be decided in Washington—it will be determined in the streets and within Iran itself. This is a fixed principle in geopolitical developments. The final decision must be made by the people of Iran.
Here we are, these two institutions still exist among the remaining authorities of the Islamic Republic, and these authorities of the Islamic Republic still exist.
We also see street demonstrations coming from inside Iran, these people are demanding the continuation of the war and are opposed to any negotiations or compromise with America and Israel. On the other hand, we also see Mr. Aghaie and Qalibaf continuing their negotiations.
Do you think this difference in thinking among the officials of the Islamic Republic could have any impact on these negotiations?
This gap is visible across different layers—there is a security and military layer characterized by a divergence in risk assessment, the definition of escalation, and the approach to responding, among those who believe in continuing confrontation and those who perceive the danger of collapse as more seriously, clearly, and accurately than before.
After the layer of ideological confrontation, it has the tendency to reduce tensions in order to preserve the minimum necessary conditions for the Islamic Republic's system.
After a certain point, that social layer, deeply embedded within the structures of governance and society, severely erodes legitimacy. When these several layers simultaneously become active, the result is a single outcome: a decline in centralized decision-making capacity and an increase in reporting errors among those who continue to survive.
Therefore, under such conditions, even a limited external pressure combined with an internal crack can drive these cracks to a critical point, and we already know that the system is not cohesive—there are also inconsistencies within it. At that moment, the structure, simultaneously承受ing pressure from inside and outside, becomes unstable and begins to fail.
Look, in my opinion, the Islamic Republic is gone—the Islamic Republic that once emerged, plagued by the chaos it itself created.
From the massacres, from the wars, from their proxy structures, from their black structures, from their nuclear energy, and from their entire economy, they have made victims of these actions.
But it has reached a point where all its leaders, who were ideologically committed, disappeared almost entirely within a matter of days. Thus, in effect, it is now fragmented pieces of the Islamic Republic, each acting on its own initiative or even recklessly.
Can they really afford to take a break for two weeks, or do you think Trump is only considering this two-week ceasefire as a temporary measure, with negotiations possibly leading nowhere, thus failing to prevent a resumption of war or renewed attacks from the U.S. and Israel?
The main question is whether you think Trump intends to continue this course or is genuinely seeking a ceasefire, and once he achieves what he wants from the Islamic Republic, does the rest no longer matter to him?
Yes, you see, the ceasefire announced by Trump should not be interpreted as the end of the matter; it is a tactical tool within a larger strategy, and Trump is using the ceasefire for specific objectives.
Such measures as re-establishing the Nord and land survey, assessing damages, creating opportunities for negotiation from a position of strength, and managing public opinion and international perceptions are highly significant points that this conditional ceasefire lacks.
If the Islamic Republic uses this arrangement to rebuild its military capabilities and continue its nuclear activities through proxy actions, a return to military operations will not only be likely but virtually certain and almost 100 percent guaranteed.
Therefore, this ceasefire appears to me not as an agreement, but as a tactical pause, directly dependent on the behavior of the Islamic Republic, which remains tied to this temporal game; a mistake on their part would mean, in effect, that they have now made their decision.
What is Trump's long-term plan for the Middle East?
Either through targeting them or by destroying key capabilities, but we must recognize that missile cores and proxy networks are among those key capabilities.
And establishing a new logical security architecture, relying on its own partners—from Israel to the states of the Persian Gulf region—to shape a multi-layered deterrence system, is being carried out in this way.
And the transfer of security burdens to rational actors—why does it want to give it to regional partners, thereby reducing direct commitments and shifting the bulk of responsibility to regional allies?
This point is very important because the doctor's stance on this issue is not an announced objective; rather, we are merely focusing on the term "regime change," which remains a possibility.
If the economic, military, and social pressure reaches the point of collapse, Washington will fully support it, but it will inevitably not initially define it as a routine official matter, because it is not the role of a foreign government to attempt regime change.
But this means we are facing a strategy whose outcome stems not from the ideology itself, but from the leader's personal influence—and precisely this is what makes it powerful and utterly unpredictable. When it arrives at the right moment, the entire world will be in awe of its impact.
It will bring about a regime change for the future structure of Iran and the sports of the Iranian people.
Then, Doctor Amir Hamid, I've been waiting since you left.
Then, thank you for having me, I am at your service.
