What Kind Of Missiles Does Russia Use To Shell Ukraine? Do They Achieve Their Targets?

Welcome to the TDTV channel. Like and subscribe to support us. Ukraine today is a country experiencing the largest strategic missile bombing in recent world history. But is Russia achieving its goals with these strikes? 5,000 missiles. Since the fall of 2022, Russians have launched over 900 cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as about 700 Shahid Baraj ammunition, only at critical infrastructure, power generation and municipal objects. In total, Russians have practiced with an arsenal of up to 5,000 missiles of almost all their nomenclature throughout Ukraine. From the palliative in the form of 5 V-55 missiles to the S-300PS anti-aircraft missile systems, which Russians have adapted for shooting at ground targets instead of their profile work in the air, with a 130 kg warhead to the ancient aircraft carrier killers X-22s of Brezhnev's era with combat loads up to a ton. In both cases, accuracy is not the issue, though plus or minus quarter deviation is acceptable for Russians. This is exactly what flew into a house in Dnipro, and this is how visits regularly come to civilians in Kharkiv and Kursan. From the latest high-speed Kensals, essentially a missile acceleration unit from the Iskander that is launched from an air platform, to subsonic Onixes that were supposed to work on ships but regularly fly over the Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kursan regions. All of this is mixed with 4-5 anti-radiation missiles in each salvo, hoping to hit or at least blind Ukrainian radars. Of course, for a country the size of Ukraine, which has transferred over 100 modernized radars to the military before the full-scale war began, and has received dozens more from partners since its inception, all of this is not critical. Some radars are turned off and moved to different positions, while others are turned on in other sectors. Anti-caliber missiles and barrage ammunition are well detected by optical channels, posts, and mobile air defense units. Shahids are often used as decoys, and Russians launch carriers of special combat units without combat loads to expose the positions of Ukrainian air defense or simply overload the channel capacity of the anti-aircraft missile systems along the route. By the way, this also indicates that the Russian industry is suffocating to convert the same X-55 old Soviet strategic cruise missiles that the Russians are upgrading to more modern X-555s, and they are hitting with what they have. At one time, this was the case with the Luna missiles in Afghanistan, the Soviet factories did not have time to reprocess them, and the pro-Soviet Kabul received missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, although, of course, they were fired with conventional warheads. And now the Russians use some of their missiles as target simulators, they wanted to repeat what their predecessors did, and that's what happened. However, they forgot that back then, their predecessors did not reach their targets in Afghanistan with operational tactical missiles, but instead depleted their stocks until the end they used the Elbrus, Soviet operational tactical complexes developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and began using missiles from the previous generation, but just as unsuccessfully. Today, missile strikes occur approximately every two weeks. This time is necessary for reconnaissance and analysis of flight routes, counteraction to the Ukrainian Armed Forces air defense systems, and obtaining intelligence data. But the issue also lies in the fact that, for example, the X-22 missiles are fairly old products that are stored in warehouses. They need to be selected by year of production, transported by planes to a centralized base where personnel are competent enough to repair them, equip them with batteries, fill them with toxic liquid fuel, oxidizers, and check their electronics. New products on wheels also need to pass through the filter of the military reception, be sent to a conditional Novorossiysk where they will be loaded onto ships, charged in launch shafts, and sent out to sea. All of this takes a long time, is expensive, and requires serious logistical efforts. Rocket Production Can Russians manufacture rockets instead of using stockpiles? Calibers, Iskanders, Kenzels, products for the S-300, two types of anti-radar missiles, all of them. The only question is the speed and scale of production. In addition, the majority of missiles in the salvo weight are still storage missiles. On the missile wave of March 9th, there were 81 missiles. Of these, 20 were new calibers and 6 X-47 Kenzels. The rest, which is more than half, are from the Soviet Union's reserves. The X-55 is a deep modernization of the Soviet missile bodies. The X-22 is a missile in long-term storage. The X-59 Ovad is late Soviet. And finally, the 5V55 is also from storage. They were discontinued in the hot 1980s. Can Russians quickly increase production instead of depleting reserves? No. And no one can. It doesn't work that way. In the 1990s, the US could produce 400,000 shells per year. Later, volumes were reduced, and now, after two years of investment in hiring people to restore the scale of this production, Americans' plans for next year are only 280,000 shells. Thus, a post-industrial economy hegemon cannot quickly find people and set up related production. This cannot be done by a much weaker Russia under sanctions. Bombing Strategy The main thing is that strategic bombing is an extremely resource-intensive matter that requires constant effort to increase. During World War II, the Allies targeted German city centers not just out of a desire to destroy them. During the day, losses among bomber crews due to anti-aircraft fire were terrible, and at night, in the smoke from factories over northern Europe, only clusters of fires in the historic center, tied to coordinates, could be hit. But they did it because that's where construction firms, trusts, workshops, various manufacturers of reinforced concrete products, and machine tools were located. Everything that allows for quick restoration of sorting stations, bearing production, or synthetic fuel had to be put out of order despite all accompanying losses. One of the largest attacks on oil production in Romania's Ploiești, one of the main sources of oil for Nazi Germany, Operation Tidal Wave in 1943, cost the US Army Air Forces over 60 shot down or written-off aircraft. Overall, Romania's oil industry lost 35% of its production for only 7 weeks, after which the volumes of extraction exceeded those before the strikes. And this is despite dozens of direct hits by half-ton bombs on oil cubes and oil towers. In other words, effective strategic bombing is very difficult. This is how the Russian shelling of Ukraine has played out. From the very beginning, Moscow has been conducting a campaign of strikes against military headquarters and troop locations. There have been accurate hits with severe consequences, such as in Ochakov during the first day of aggression, or in Lipetsk in Odessa region, where a part of the radio reconnaissance was hit. As a result, Ukrainian military units dispersed. Russia also shifted its focus to hitting test ranges in Dezna and Yavariv, or the location of the 72nd Brigade in Byelotsk-Serkva. Again, Ukrainian troops dispersed. As a result, the armed forces of Ukraine to some extent lowered the pace and quality of personnel training, but made rocket strikes ineffective. Then there was a series of attacks on bridges. This included not only the famous bridge in Zatoka over the Dniester Liman, but also at least two waves of attacks on Cherkasy, as well as strikes on the Amur Bridge in Dnipro. However, this did not work and did not produce any results. There was a series of attacks on traction substations on the railway, which resulted in railway workers switching to diesel locomotives and trains being delayed for a maximum of 12 to 13 hours on affected branches. Eventually, there was a months-long missile campaign targeting the electricity generation and distribution system. The result is displayed on the scoreboard, there has been no deficit in the unified energy system for more than a month, and there is no forecast for one. Each time, the Russians set themselves different goals, to destroy Ukrainian air defense, disrupt mobilization, or strategic deployment, block weapons supplies, cause an economic and rear collapse. And each time they failed. Because it didn't always work, even in much stronger economies that used thousands of tons of bombs in a single raid on several factories. Not 40 tons once every two weeks in a state the size of France. If a country wants to resist and also receives massive external support, then no bombing or missile strikes can bring it to its knees. The enemy will retain the ability to strike Ukraine until the last day of the war, so it is necessary to invest heavily in air defense, shelters, camouflage, dispersal, rear services, and emergency services. But these strikes will not even affect the operational level of the war. Thank you for tuning in to our video. You can click the like to support our TDTV global team and hit that subscribe button now for more great content. Thanks for your support. We'll catch you at the next one.