Hu Jintao’s Family ‘Poisoned to Death’? October 5th Plenum: Is Xi Losing Power?

China Insider
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36 Video Views·Aug 4, 2026
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI GeneratedA fabricated report claiming that former Chinese leader Hu Jintao and his family died of food poisoning caused significant turmoil in overseas Chinese communities. The video analyzes why this disinformation spread, provides evidence debunking the claim, and explores the potential political motives behind the rumor's creation.
A photo claiming that Hu Jintao and his entire family died from food poisoning has sent shockwaves
through overseas Chinese communities.
Why did it trigger such an uproar?
Less than a day after the date was finalized for the 5th plenary session of the 20th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, this dramatic report concerning Hu Jintao's
life and death suddenly surfaced.
Was it a carefully orchestrated piece of disinformation, or was someone deliberately testing how different
sides would react?
And what is Hu Jintao's actual condition today?
The truth may be even more unsettling than the rumor itself.
Hu Jintao's entire family poisoned?
On July 31st, a fabricated Weibo screenshot sent the internet into a frenzy.
The post read,
The former leader, together with his wife LYQ and HHF, suffered food poisoning during
dinner.
Despite emergency treatment, they died at 4am.
The post appeared to have been published by someone named Qin Feng at 4.11am on July 31st.
After the screenshot went viral, Qin Feng herself responded.
According to Jing News, Qin told friends that she had not published the post and that someone
had used her social media account to fabricate the screenshot.
She suggested that the rumor spread so widely because of her own public influence.
Commentator Li Muyang said the image had been digitally altered.
First of all, anyone who frequently uses Weibo would immediately notice that the layout of
an actual Weibo post differs significantly from the screenshot circulating online.
At the top of a genuine post, the name Qin Feng would appear in black text.
Beside it would be a crown icon indicating Level 2 membership, along with the Roman numeral
Su.
Beneath the username would be the posting time and the source or device from which the
post was published.
The text on this line would be lighter in color and slightly smaller.
The main body of the post, along with any accompanying images, would appear in the center.
The font size of the main text would be roughly the same as that of the username.
At the bottom would be three engagement options, Repost, Comment, and Like.
The screenshot circulating online, however, looks different.
The name Qin Feng appears in gold, and next to the crown icon are the Chinese characters
meaning Blogger, rather than the Roman numeral Su.
The body text is also larger than the username, and the fonts used for the two appear different.
There is another discrepancy at the bottom of the image.
On the left, it shows the time as 4.11am, July 31st, followed by an emoji.
The Repost, Comment, and Like icons appear on the right.
This, too, differs from the normal Weibo layout.
According to the viral screenshot, Hu Jintao, his wife Liu Yongqing, and his son Hu Haifeng
were poisoned while having dinner together on July 31st and died in the early hours of
the same day after emergency treatment failed.
But look at the posting time, 4.11am.
In other words, according to the story, the three had only just died when the post was
already published.
If the information were genuine, it would most likely have had to come from someone
close to Hu Jintao.
Hu Jintao is a former paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party.
If he had actually died, those around him would almost certainly have reported the matter
to the Party leadership first, while dealing with a range of other urgent arrangements.
Moreover, information of this sensitivity would almost certainly be tightly controlled.
It would be highly unlikely for news to leak out immediately after his death.
The claim that Hu Jintao and two members of his family suffered food poisoning is another
reason for skepticism.
As a former top leader of the CCP, Hu was protected not only by personnel from the Central
Guard Bureau, but also by personal physicians and a dedicated medical team.
What he eats and drinks would normally be subject to strict supervision and oversight.
If food poisoning were to occur, the security personnel and medical staff responsible for
his care would all face serious scrutiny and accountability.
In addition, if Hu Jintao truly were poisoned, many people would likely suspect that Xi Jinping
had ordered someone to arrange it.
That suspicion would stem in part from the widely discussed scene at the closing ceremony
of the CCP's 20th National Congress, when Hu Jintao was escorted out of the hall while
Xi Jinping remained seated nearby.
Critics of Xi have interpreted that episode as evidence of his ruthlessness and willingness
to disregard personal relationships.
For that reason, if Hu Jintao were to die from poisoning, Xi Jinping would almost certainly
face intense accusations and criticism.
Although some commentators do not rule out the possibility that Xi might want Hu Jintao
removed from the political picture, they argue that he would be unlikely to choose something
as conspicuous as poisoning to do so.
Why did so many people believe and spread this fake image?
According to Li Muyang, there are at least four reasons.
First, Qin Feng is not an obscure figure, nor is she an ordinary Weibo blogger.
She is a former general manager of Phoenix TV and currently serves as director of the
General Programming Channel at Hong Kong Satellite TV.
She has more than 14 million followers.
More importantly, Qin Feng comes from what is often described in China as a red family,
with deep roots in the Chinese Communist Party's diplomatic establishment.
Her paternal grandfather, Qin Lijian, was one of the first-generation diplomats of the
People's Republic of China and once served as director of the Consular Department of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Her maternal grandfather, Yang Qiliang, was also a veteran Chinese diplomat.
Qin Feng's father, Qin Xiaoying, previously worked in the CCP's external propaganda system
and later served as chairman of China Financial and Economic News.
Her aunt, Qin Xiaomei, also worked in China's diplomatic system.
Her uncle by marriage is even better known, former Chinese Foreign Minister Li Jiaoxing.
Given this family background, Qin Feng would naturally have had opportunities to come into
contact with a considerable amount of inside information concerning Chinese politics and
diplomacy.
The person who fabricated the rumor may have deliberately exploited this point, leading
people to assume that Qin Feng had access to privileged information.
In a sense, it was a form of borrowing credibility.
Second, Qin Feng has previously broken information that later proved to be fairly accurate.
Two cases are especially notable.
One involves Xi Yongxin of the Shaolin Temple.
Qin Feng was among the earliest people to focus exclusively on allegations and controversies
surrounding Xi, some of which were later confirmed.
Another involved the death of Jiang Zemin.
On November 13, 2022, Qin Feng was reportedly the first to disclose that Jiang had died,
a full 20 days before the Chinese authorities made the official announcement.
After reports of Jiang's death began circulating, the authorities did not officially announce
Third, Xi Jinping has indeed been purging officials and political figures associated
with previous administrations, particularly those seen as holding views different from
his own.
When former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was still working alongside Xi Jinping, the two
were often said to disagree on policy.
After Li left office, he suddenly died while staying in Shanghai.
Authorities said he suffered a sudden heart attack while swimming.
However, many members of the public have continued to suspect that Li was killed and that Xi Jinping
had someone poison him.
In addition, close secretaries and aides associated with senior figures such as Li Ruihuan, Wen
Jiabao, Wang Qishan, and Zhu Rongji have, according to this commentary, been detained
one after another under Xi Jinping.
For this reason, many people believe it is not entirely impossible that Xi could also
take harsh action against Hu Jintao.
Fourth, Hu Jintao has not appeared publicly for a very long time.
He did not attend last year's military parade, and in March of this year he was also absent
from the funeral of veteran CCP elder Song Ping.
Outsiders have virtually no reliable information about Hu Jintao's current condition.
Because so little is known about his health and circumstances, some people were more willing
to believe the false rumor.
However, according to Jiang Guangzheng, Hu Jintao has reportedly been staying at Beijing's
301 hospital for a long period because of health problems, with daily medical expenses
said to be around 1.5 million to 1.8 million yuan.
Jiang also claimed that Hu's condition has recently worsened and that he could pass away
at any time.
I am sharing this information only as an unverified source for reference.
I have no way to independently confirm it.
Who spread this false rumor?
At this point, there is no reliable way to trace or verify who first started the rumor.
But based on the available clues, there are several possibilities.
The first possibility is that an online blogger deliberately fabricated and spread the story
simply to attract attention and generate traffic.
The second is that people within the Chinese political system who are dissatisfied with
Xi Jinping may have circulated the rumor in an attempt to stir up public resentment
against him and damage his reputation.
While such a tactic would probably have only a limited direct impact on Xi, it could still
reinforce negative perceptions of him and create a certain degree of public opinion
pressure.
A third possibility is that the rumor may have come from someone close to Xi Jinping
himself.
For example, Cai Qi, one of Xi's most trusted hardline allies and a senior official involved
in ideological affairs.
Releasing such a rumor could have been intended to test how different groups would react,
observe and distinguish people's attitudes, and potentially identify anti-Xi figures within
the system.
There is also another possibility that the Chinese Communist Party was attempting to
undermine overseas media outlets and independent Chinese-language media.
Under this scenario, the CCP would first release a false rumor, allow public discussion to
build, and wait for overseas media organizations and independent online channels to amplify
it.
Qin Fen would then step forward personally to deny the story.
Such an operation could be used to damage the credibility of overseas media and independent
media outlets.
According to this line of argument, the CCP has used similar tactics many times before.
But the timing of this particular rumor is especially noteworthy.
At a Politburo meeting on July 30th, the CCP announced that the fifth plenary session of
the 20th Central Committee would be held in October.
According to internal information attributed to Mr. Jiang, however, the specific dates
had actually been decided much earlier.
The preferred schedule is reportedly October 19th through October 23rd, with the plenary
lasting five days.
A backup window has also reportedly been set for October 26th through October 30th.
In addition, the Politburo is said to be planning another meeting on either October 15th or
16th.
Mr. Jiang claims that the reason for setting a backup schedule is Xi Jinping's planned
visit to the United States on September 24th.
According to this account, the CCP intends to evaluate the outcome of Xi's talks with
Trump and the overall results of the U.S. visit before finalizing the plenary dates.
In other words, if the talks between Xi Jinping and Trump go well, the meeting would reportedly
be held from October 19th to 23rd.
If the talks do not go well, it could be postponed to October 26th through 30th.
So could a particular faction be deliberately creating confusion, testing reactions, and
trying to gain an advantage ahead of the fifth plenary session?
Let me know what you think in the comments.
Thanks for watching and see you next time.
