Zhang Youxia Case Closed? CMC in Chaos, Xi Prepares for the Worst

Recent reports say China's top leadership has completed investigations into Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli, but is still hesitating over when to announce the results. Xi Jinping is reportedly prioritizing the promotion of the military discipline chief instead of filling vacant command posts in the Central Military Commission, causing discontent within the armed forces. For more than six months, the commission's command system has been in chaos, so much Meanwhile, Xi was absent for the first time from the 50th anniversary commemoration of the Tangshan earthquake. Is he afraid to leave Beijing for fear of trouble at home? And does Premier Li Chang's talk of extreme scenario thinking suggest the CCP is preparing for the worst? Let's take a look. Has Xi Jinping closed the Zhang Yuxia case, fueling discontent in the military? On January 24, 2026, the Chinese Communist Party officially announced the downfall of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department. Since then, the seven-member Central Military Commission has been reduced to just two people – CMC Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin. Some observers believe the commission has effectively become paralyzed. According to Xinhua, the Chinese Communist Party's official news agency, Xi Jinping promoted Zhang Shiguang, secretary of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection and director of the CMC Supervisory Commission, and Air Force Commander Wang Gang to the rank of general on July 3, 2026. The announcement indicates that Zhang Shiguang, formerly secretary of the Army Commission has replaced Zhang Shengmin as head of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Under CCP practice, this position is usually held concurrently by a member of the Central Military Commission. Outside observers therefore expect Zhang Shiguang to be appointed to the commission. However, with the Central Military Commission already described as paralyzed, the latest promotions and personnel arrangements have done little to ease discontent within the military. A source surnamed Bi told the overseas Chinese-language media outlet the Epoch Times that since John Yoshia and Liu Zhenli were placed under investigation, the CCP has yet to name successors for the posts of CMC Vice Chairman and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department. Meanwhile, many key positions in the commission's decision-making structure and Joint Operations Command System remain vacant. At this point, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping is prioritizing the promotion of the head of the CMC Discipline Inspection Body instead of filling vacant military command posts, Bi said. This has caused widespread dissatisfaction and added further uncertainty over the announcement of the Zhang Yoshia case. On July 3, 2026, the ex-account China Personnel Observer posted an image showing the status of senior general-level appointments in the Chinese military. Under CCP military rank regulations, positions at full theater command level and above in both the armed forces and the People's Armed Police, including CMC Vice Chairman, theater commanders and political commissars, and the heads of military services and branches must be held by generals. There are 26 such positions in total, but only 6 are currently filled. They are held by CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin, Defense Minister Dong Zhun, CMC Discipline Inspection Chief Zhang Shuguang, Eastern Theater Command Commander Yang Jibin, Central Theater Command Commander Han Shengyin, and Air Force Commander Wang Gang. The remaining 20 vacant positions are CMC Vice Chairman Responsible for Military Affairs, Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, Director of the CMC Political Work Department, Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command, Commander and Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command, Commander and Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command, Commander and Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command, Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command, Commander and Political Commissar of the Army, Commander and Political Commissar of the Navy, Political Commissar of the Air Force, Commander and Political Commissar of the Rocket Force and Commander and Political Commissar of the People's Armed Police Force. This shows that three key posts—the CMC Vice Chairman responsible for Military Affairs, Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, and Director of the CMC Political Work Department—remain unfilled. Instead, the CCP leadership moved quickly to appoint Zhang Shiguang as head of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. This suggests that the leadership's main priority remains tightening control and discipline within the military, rather than quickly restoring the armed forces' normal operations. On the surface, the cases involving Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli appear to be deadlocked, with little progress. However, the CCP has long handled internal affairs behind closed doors and with little transparency. Central Military Commission command system in chaos, no one dares to sign. A source close to the Chinese military, using the alias Tang Zhejiang, told the Epoch Times that the investigations into Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Military Disciplinary Authorities were completed two months ago. However, the investigations have caused discontent among senior officers, while the Central Military Commission's command system has been in chaos for more than six months. A retired Chinese military general, identified as Mr. Ji, said in the past, whenever a major case occurred in the military, the CMC would brief retired generals, explain the situation, and seek support from veteran officials. But in Zhang Yuxia's case, no one has told us anything, and we cannot get any answers. Senior military promotions have also been made without consulting veteran officials, which breaks with a practice maintained for decades. We have heard that the case is over, but they are still hesitating over when to announce it. This suggests that the cases involving Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli have been concluded, with only the timing of the public announcement still undecided. Yet this is also causing hesitation among the CCP's top leadership, as both men retain considerable influence within the military. Tang Zhejiang described the military's attitude. Generals in the theater commands believe Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli were the CMC leaders they could trust, because both had directly commanded troops. Zhang, in particular, had combat experience, cared about soldiers' welfare, was approachable, and had personal charisma. For more than six months, the CMC command system has been in complete disarray. Documents are issued, but no one is willing to sign them. Military morale has hit rock bottom. He also said that theater command generals have little confidence in the CMC's new command arrangements. Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli had credibility in the military. They understood how it operated and what lower-ranking officers and soldiers were thinking. Today, no one in the CMC's senior leadership truly commands the respect of subordinates. Documents are sent down, but no one wants to sign them because everyone fears being held responsible. It is not that the military lacks capable people. No one dares to make decisions. Some online commentators believe Xi Jinping's main concern remains preserving his own power. Therefore, with the CMC effectively paralyzed and discontent spreading through the military, the decision to prioritize newly promoted General Zhang Shiguang as head of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection clearly suggests that Xi intends to continue purging and tightening control over the armed forces. Senior generals who have served for decades cannot fail to recognize this. This has only deepened their dissatisfaction with Xi. Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli, two senior generals familiar with the military's daily operations and widely respected within its ranks, have been detained while their fate remains unknown. This has further fueled anger towards Xi among military leaders. Xi himself appears aware of this, which may explain why he has not yet announced the conclusions of the investigations. The delay is likely to deepen the internal conflict between him and the Chinese military. Moreover, Xi Jinping's family and Zhang Yuxia's family have maintained close ties for generations, and Zhang helped Xi secure a third consecutive term. If even someone like Zhang could be arrested, what message does that send to all the generals in the military? It tells them that loyalty matters more than the ability to fight a war. This inevitably creates a mentality that the less one does, the fewer mistakes one makes, and that doing nothing means making no mistakes at all. Second, both Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli are generals with combat experience who have personally commanded troops. Their subordinates therefore placed a certain degree of trust in them and had developed a habit of following their orders. By contrast, the figures newly promoted to the senior ranks of the Central Military Commission clearly do not command the same level of prestige within the military as Zhang and Liu. The fact that no one is willing to sign official documents reflects the generals' doubts about the CMC's new leadership. Although there is no evidence that the theater commands have openly defied orders, refusing to sign documents means that no one is willing to take responsibility. When military generals are all calculating how to protect themselves and avoid getting into trouble, it may appear on the surface that Xi Jinping has a firm grip on power. In reality, however, this represents a serious governance crisis for Xi, one that is now turning back to threaten him personally. Once lower-ranking generals feel that the threat is closing in on them, could they decide to risk everything and engage in a life-or-death struggle with Xi Jinping, even if it means mutual destruction? Has the CCP begun preparing for the worst-case scenario? July 28 marked the 50th anniversary of the Tangshan earthquake. Xi Jinping did not attend, instead sending Premier Li Qian to Tangshan to lay a wreath. Xi remained in Beijing to receive the visiting Slovak president. Although no rule requires China's top leader to attend, political tradition has usually seen the CCP leader visit Tangshan on major anniversaries. Jiang Zemin went for the 20th anniversary in 1996, Hu Jintao for the 30th in 2006, and Xi Jinping for the 40th in 2016. Yet Xi was notably absent from the 50th anniversary ceremony, remaining in Beijing. Some believe he feared an assassination attempt and lost his nerve. Others say the power struggle within the CCP leadership has become so intense that he did not dare leave Beijing for fear of trouble erupting behind him. Whether he feared for his life or feared losing control at home, both possibilities point directly to deep internal conflict within the CCP. In Tangshan, Premier Li Qian used the phrase extreme scenario thinking, revealing the CCP's growing sense of crisis. His remarks sent an unprecedented signal. The regime may already be preparing for the worst-case scenario. In 2023, Xi warned at a meeting of the CCP's National Security Commission that officials must uphold bottom-line thinking and extreme scenario thinking, and prepare for major challenges amid rough seas and even violent storms. For the Chinese people and countries around the world, the consequences could be devastating for the CCP once they fully realize that confidence within the regime has collapsed. From top to bottom, officials are considering situations beyond their control and preparing for the worst. Once that becomes clear, the CCP's aggressive posturing will no longer intimidate others. Whether in Taiwan, the Philippines, or among ordinary Chinese citizens, people will see that the forces of justice have gained the upper hand, and that the CCP is entering a process of broad decline. They will have far greater confidence to resist the regime with courage and determination in defense of their homes and their lives. If the CCP says it must prepare for the worst-case scenario, should the Chinese people begin preparing for the best possible future? Please leave your thoughts in the comments. Thank you for watching, and we will see you in the next program.