ExclusiveWHY HAS "DR. COPPER" FAILED? THE RISKY BOND BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL METALS AND THE AI BOOM

Unseen Ledger
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22 Video Views·Oct 30, 2026
00:56 I. ÁP LỰC NỢ CÔNG VÀ BẾ TẮC CHÍNH TRỊ TẠI BRAZIL SAU BẦU CỬ
4:35 II. BÁC SĨ ĐỒNG" MẤT THIÊNG: TÍN HIỆU KINH TẾ TOÀN CẦU BỊ AI VÀ LÃI SUẤT LÀM MÉO MÓ?
8:16 III. KHỦNG HOẢNG NHÀ ĐẤT TRUNG QUỐC SANG NĂM THỨ 6
The global economy is facing profound shifts
from public debt pressures in emerging economies
to the weakening of the real estate market
and unpredictable fluctuations in commodity markets.
In Brazil, fiscal pressure
and political polarization raise concerns about the ability
to control public debt.
If current policies remain unadjusted, the debt-to-GDP ratio could
approach 118% by 2036.
In China, the prolonged real estate crisis continues to stifle growth.
With its negative impact projected
to reach 1.8 percentage points of GDP in 2026.
As domestic demand weakens,
excess goods may be aggressively pushed onto the international market,
intensifying competitive pressures and deflation.
In this context, copper prices are also losing
their role as a mere indicator of industrial health.
The metal is increasingly influenced by interest rates,
capital flows into artificial intelligence,
and China's growth prospects.
Public debt pressures
and political gridlock in Brazil post-election, based on source
Zero Hedge.
Developments in Brazil's financial markets indicate
that political risks did not end
when the elections concluded.
Fundamental economic issues are the ultimate determinants
of long-term investor confidence.
According to the analysis cited in the source,
the EWZ ETF, which represents the Brazilian
stock market, fell sharply and breached its 200-day moving average,
an indicator typically
used to gauge long-term trends.
The fund's price subsequently found a support level around $34,
but this movement is insufficient
to confirm that the market is stabilized.
Concurrently, the real weakened by more than
10 percent, while long-term bond yields surged
by nearly 200 basis points. These simultaneous
fluctuations suggest that investors are anxious about
the government's ability to control the
budget deficit and maintain fiscal discipline.
As confidence wanes, Brazilian assets may
continue to face pressure even after immediate
political uncertainties have subsided.
The greatest risk lies in the trajectory of public debt.
According to TS Lombard data cited,
Brazil's public debt to GDP ratio has risen to 81.9% compared to 71.7%
when President Lula took
office in 2023. If the government maintains
its current spending trajectory without significant
adjustments, this ratio could approach 118% of GDP by 2036.
This is a forecasted scenario,
yet it illustrates the sheer scale of the fiscal conundrum.
The issue is not merely the total debt load,
but also the budgetary structure.
Mandatory spending is accounting
for an increasingly large proportion, shrinking the resources
the government can proactively allocate.
TS Lombard warns that without substantive reforms,
Brazil could face the risk of a
partial government shutdown by 2028,
when discretionary funding will no longer be
sufficient to maintain certain state functions.
Therefore, fiscal consolidation may become an
imperative rather than just a political choice.
Budgetary pressures also make it difficult for
the Central Bank of Brazil to cut interest rates.
A weaker real could make imports more expensive
and generate additional inflationary pressures,
while rising bond yields reflect higher borrowing costs
According to TS Lombard's projections in the analysis,
the Selic policy rate may remain
at 13.75% in November.
The likelihood of a cut in December will depend heavily
on whether the government can convince
the market that fiscal discipline is improving.
However, implementing reforms is no easy feat.
The right wing is projected to increase its Senate seats from 15 to 31,
forcing the government
to seek consensus in a more polarized Congress.
Consequently, measures related to taxation,
spending, and the budget may encounter numerous
hurdles.
The government must simultaneously manage
fiscal pressures and negotiate with political
factions holding divergent views.
If gridlock persists, market confidence could further erode.
TS Lombard also constructed a reform scenario
that could generate nearly 600 billion reals
in annual savings by 2036,
primarily through slashing tax incentives and controlling expenditures.
Nevertheless, this is a model-based target.
The feasibility of its realization hinges on the
degree of consensus and the government's execution capacity.
The market will therefore closely
monitor the selection of the finance minister.
Rafael Fonteles, the governor of Piauí state,
has been mentioned as a potential candidate due
to his image associated with fiscal discipline.
At the same time, foreign policy could impact the economic outlook.
The Lula administration might complicate
Washington's efforts to expand its influence
in Latin America, while the possibility
of the U.S. imposing additional tariffs or
restrictive measures remains a risk to monitor.
Brazil may seek to broaden trade relations with
Europe, Canada, and East Asia to diversify its partners.
In the short term, the performance
of the EWZ suggests that investors should exercise
caution before betting on a sustainable recovery.
Rather than assuming prices will rise in a straight line,
risk management and hedging
against volatility may prove more crucial.
Has Dr. Copper lost its predictive power?
Global economic signals distorted by AI and interest rates.
Based on source, Zero Hedge.
For decades, copper has been dubbed Dr. Copper,
as the metal's price typically moves in tandem
with manufacturing activity
and is regarded as an indicator of global economic health.
However, according to an analysis by Frank Munkum, a macro strategist
at Bloomberg, this traditional relationship is visibly weakening.
The correlation between copper futures
and the ISM manufacturing PMI is cited at 0.25,
while the R-squared coefficient of determination is merely 0.06.
In other words, fluctuations in the PMI currently explain only
a tiny fraction of copper price movements in the referenced model.
This does not mean copper prices have entirely lost
their connection to manufacturing,
but it indicates that relying on this metal
as a simple economic barometer has become less reliable
than before. Copper prices are now simultaneously impacted
by high interest rates, weak demand in
China, and shifting expectations regarding
the artificial intelligence investment wave.
A new driver is the increasingly tight
linkage between copper and AI-related stocks.
Building data centers, expanding power infrastructure,
and investing in semiconductors
all require substantial amounts of copper,
tying the metals outlook more closely to the tech cycle.
According to the source analysis,
the correlation between copper and AI-linked
trades has reached a three-year high.
Yet, this linkage also creates a new vulnerability.
AI projects demand massive capital investments.
When real yields rise or credit becomes more expensive,
businesses may delay expansion
plans.
If the profit expectations of AI companies wane
and their stocks are sold off, the negative
sentiment can spill over into copper prices,
even if physical demand has not significantly
altered.
Thus, copper prices reflect not only the prospects
of new infrastructure construction, but may
also react to shifts in investor risk appetite.
Copper's sensitivity to interest rate fluctuations is also changing,
leaving the metal prone to being swept up
in financial asset repricing cycles.
Although financial factors are increasingly important,
physical supply and demand remain
the bedrock of the copper market,
and China plays an exceptionally outsized role. The country
accounts for roughly 56% of global refined copper demand,
according to data in the draft.
Copper premiums are reportedly near record
highs after parties replenished inventories
around the Golden Week holiday.
However, this signal must be juxtaposed with the
struggles of the Chinese economy.
A stagnant real estate market, erratic industrial production,
and weakening credit impulses could all constrain metal demand.
Meanwhile, electrification, power grids,
and data centers are generating new long-term demand,
but this may not be sufficient to offset
the waning purchasing power from traditional sectors.
The copper market is therefore balancing between
two opposing forces, long-term demand from
technology and infrastructure,
coupled with short-term pressure from slowing growth and
high capital costs.
The technical indicators cited in the analysis
also suggest that copper's upward momentum
has become less pronounced.
Implied volatility, the level of volatility
that the options market is pricing in, is
reportedly near a one-year low.
Low volatility does not equate to an impending major price drop.
It simply indicates that the market
is not currently pricing in aggressive large swings,
despite lingering macroeconomic uncertainties.
In this environment, an unexpected shift in interest rates,
AI investment expectations,
or Chinese demand could trigger
a sharper-than-anticipated price correction.
In short, copper stands between two scenarios.
If tech investments and industrial demand continue to rise,
the metal still has fundamental support.
Conversely, if tightening credit slows the AI investment cycle
and China lacks the strength
to offset the demand shortfall,
copper may behave more like a financial risk asset than a reliable
gauge of industrial growth.
This is a crucial point to consider when assessing the copper price
outlook in the current period.
China's housing bust enters its sixth year, based on source Zero Hedge.
Goldman Sachs has revised its assessment
of China's real estate crisis, suggesting the
situation is more severe than previously forecast.
Entering its sixth year of downturn, the sector is
projected to shave 1.8 percentage points off
China's real GDP growth in 2026, higher than
the 1.7 percentage point impact cited for 2025
and the earlier estimate of 1.5 percentage points.
This figure illustrates that real estate remains
a massive drag on the economy.
According to the analysis,
Q3 GDP growth only ticked up to around 4.5 percent, recuperating
from a three-year low.
If real estate alone deducts 1.8 percentage points
from growth, the remaining sectors
must expand significantly faster to sustain the overall growth rate.
This also underscores that the role of exports
is becoming increasingly vital amid domestic
demand that has yet to mount a robust recovery.
Activity indicators show that the market lacks clear signs of recovery.
In the first nine months of the year,
Local government land sales revenue plummeted by 28% year over year,
new housing starts dropped by
25%, and fixed asset investment in real estate declined by 21%.
Compared to the 2020-2021 peak,
numerous indicators such as starts, sales,
and investments have plunged by 60% to 90%.
New housing starts alone are down more than 80%.
Beyond weak demand, regulatory policies governing
the sale of off-plan homes
are also reportedly altering how developers raise capital.
According to the source material,
regulations issued on August 28 mandate that projects
reach the structural completion phase,
such as topping out, before they can be pre-sold.
Simultaneously, mortgage loans must
be deposited into supervised escrow accounts.
Shenzhen, the last tier one city mentioned in the analysis,
implemented the policy details
on October 15 and capped down payments at 3% of the purchase price.
According to Nomura's assessment cited,
this tightening significantly impairs the role of pre-sales revenue,
traditionally a crucial, low-cost funding source for developers.
The analysis also noted that land transaction volumes across 70
major cities slumped by 36% in the week following the directive.
These figures indicate that policies aimed at protecting
buyers may concurrently inflict additional cash flow pressures
on real estate enterprises during the transition period.
As funding from pre-sales contracts contracts,
developers will struggle to maintain their
previous pace of project execution.
Consequently, Goldman Sachs has issued deeply revised downward
projections for the 2025-2035 period.
New housing starts could plunge by an additional 30%,
housing completions by 46%,
fixed asset investment in real estate by 61%,
and new home sales by up to 70%.
Residential land transaction volumes
are forecast to potentially collapse by more
than 90% in the long term.
In the baseline scenario for 2027 alone, land sales revenue,
new housing starts, home sales,
and real estate investment are projected to decline by 20%,
20%, 10%, and 17% respectively,
following corresponding drops of 30%, 22%, 8%,
and 20% in the preceding year, according to the analysis.
These are all forecasts, not certainties,
yet they reflect the risk that the adjustment process
will drag on for many years.
Land sales revenue, which once exceeded 8 trillion yuan in 2021,
is believed to have halved by 2025
and may fall to just over 1 trillion yuan by 2030.
This shrinking revenue stream
also makes it difficult for local governments to finance
infrastructure investments.
The draft notes a 7.2 percent decline in local
government fixed asset investment during
the first nine months of the year.
In the long run, fiscal pressures could compel Beijing
to consider a broader property tax
toward the end of the 15th five-year plan
or during the 16th five-year plan, though the timing
and scale of implementation remain speculative scenarios.
The crisis's impact is not confined
to the real estate industry. According
to the estimates cited, this sector once accounted
for roughly 30% of China's GDP during its 2010-2022 peak,
diminishing to about 15% in 2025
and could stabilize around 8% from 2030 onward.
Goldman Sachs argues that, as the industry's footprint shrinks,
the magnitude of its direct drag on growth may gradually recede.
Nevertheless, household wealth destruction remains a substantial issue,
as housing constitutes more than half
of the total wealth of Chinese citizens.
Following Goldman Sachs' rule of thumb
in the analysis, every one yuan of lost
real estate value could drag down annual
household consumption by 0.01 yuan.
Combining the direct impact of investment
with the indirect impact from the wealth effect,
the drag on GDP was estimated to reach up
to 3.4 percentage points at the 2024 trough.
Home price trends are also uneven. Secondary home prices in Shanghai
were reported to have risen
by 0.8% year-over-year in September thanks to
low inventory levels, but many lower-tier cities continue
to grapple with the supply glut.
Therefore, stability in a few major markets
is insufficient to conclude that the entire
Chinese housing market has bottomed out.
According to the cited forecast,
broad-based home prices could remain under pressure until 2030.
The weakness in real estate could
also generate repercussions well beyond China's borders.
As households cautiously tighten spending,
property developers struggle to access capital,
and local governments lose land sales revenue.
Shrinking domestic demand will
mean excess production capacity cannot be easily absorbed at home.
A portion of this supply may thus be offloaded onto
the international market at more competitive
prices.
The draft cites data indicating
that China's high-tech exports reached $147 billion in
September, up 63% year-over-year,
while total export turnover grew by 36%.
These figures are utilized to illustrate
the growing role of exports in growth, though
they are insufficient on their own to prove
that the entire surge in exports stems from
the real estate crisis.
The analysis also mentions
the CSI 300 index's 20 percent decline since June as a sign that
domestic market sentiment remains frail.
Strategists at BofA warn that China could
export deflationary pressures through
surplus goods and price competition,
squeezing the revenues
and profit margins of enterprises in other economies.
For countries with manufacturing sectors directly competing
with China, the risk lies not only in
lower import prices but also
in the potential compression of domestic profit margins.
Consequently, the adjustment process
of China's housing market may continue to affect global
growth, trade flows, and corporate valuations in the years ahead.
Costs remains a complex puzzle
for medium-term economic growth prospects.
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