Werner Heisenberg und Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker

Werner Heisenberg (1901 - 1976)
3 followers
I would like to come back to our conversation yesterday.
I noticed that in some places the ideas that you develop
actually do not agree with mine.
And now I would like to say my own.
No, maybe first a criticism of yours.
With you it looks to me, maybe I'm wrong,
as if, so to speak, the dear God in the creation of the world
starts with a certain number of basic decisions
and says, I want to build a world out of 10 to 120 basic decisions.
And he could have said the same thing out of 10 to 2
and you don't really know why.
Well, I had originally thought of it a little differently.
I don't even start with a fifth basic decision.
But for me it looks like this.
First there is a certain number of groups written down in a equation.
Then, as far as the conformal group is concerned,
it turns out that this does not work with quantum theory.
So with the anharmonic oscillator, you know,
if you write it down in a conformal group,
but if you want to quantize it, the conformal group breaks.
So you are forced to write a mass in when quantizing.
So it doesn't actually come in through the basic state,
but rather because you do quantum theory at all.
With the anharmonic oscillator,
at this point a size with the name h is introduced.
And here it is something similar, so a mass.
Then you see, so I would have said,
well, now I have to start to construct the basic state.
I can't do it quite symmetrically,
you get this isospin decision.
In doing so, a number, namely the Sommerfeld structure constant,
is determined.
Now, of course, I thought to myself,
that might go on like this.
I don't know if I really know.
And so I would hope to finally come to gravitation
and then get a very small number,
which in the end, of course,
is the ratio between the mass of the sign
that the earth in the world should indicate.
And of course you are right,
that at this point the topology has to be changed,
if I take the equation seriously.
Yes, that's how I see it.
No, that's not it.
I don't see it that way.
Yes, that's clear.
But I just want to finish this once,
and then you have to tell me what's wrong with it.
So in the end, a very small number comes out,
which then gives the gravitation.
And then you can make this theoretical game,
that you switch from one to the other,
where you use the space and time terms
that are given by measurements and clocks.
And I would have hoped that at this point
a switching topology would take place,
that one would say,
yes, now I would always go from an open to a closed world.
For this I basically have to switch from a non-compact
to a compact group,
which can perhaps simply arise
through a decision about another neighborhood.
And then I would have borrowed this number,
the 10 to the power of 120,
in principle.
That was my hope.
And how does it stand with you now?
I would say it like this.
I would say,
first of all,
I spoke about this again with Dirk yesterday.
He said it was exactly his opinion,
what I'm saying.
The topology of the world
has nothing to do with gravitation.
But the topology of the world,
I say,
has to do with quantum theory.
Namely,
if you say,
you cannot do the equations
that you do,
without introducing a length,
then I say,
this can only arise,
the quantum theory demands a compact group.
Aha.
But how does it come,
that this compact group,
in the equation,
this gamma e power,
which Stumpf wrote down,
that this,
in order of magnitude,
can still be related to the gravitational constant?
Yes,
that is correct.
But I would say,
this is only a question of the theory of gravitation,
why the gravitation is so small,
like this compact group.
That is,
why the gravitation adapts
to the ratio of particle radius to world radius.
But the problem,
the definition of particle radius and world radius,
can already be given,
without knowing anything about gravitation.
Aha.
I would say...
So you would say,
you can never hope,
to derive this number 10 to the power of 120,
you have to set it.
Yes,
no,
that is just another question.
Then I would say,
in the theory,
as we discuss it at the moment,
you can only set 10 to the power of 120.
The real answer is,
10 to the power of 120
is the third potential of the age of the world,
and the Jordanian law.
Ah,
so,
that one would say,
the age of the world in which unit?
The age of the world in reasonable units.
That is,
in atomic units,
and measured in such a way,
that we say,
this unit remains constant,
isn't it?
Yes.
It is so,
the age of the world in atomic units,
measured,
is 10 to the power of 40.
Yes,
yes.
And then I say,
the number of the clock is 10 to the power of 120,
and I can justify,
or I hope to justify,
why the third potential of the age of the world
in such units
has to be measured.
Yes,
so,
this justification,
we can discuss it later.
Yes,
and that's why I say,
as long as we don't talk about the age of the world,
as long as we don't take the time seriously,
but as long as we do so,
as long as the world is static in time,
as long as we have to set the number 10 to the power of 120.
Yes.
If you want to explain this,
you have to make a real history of nature.
As long as you don't do that,
you will set it,
but the question you ask here
is,
so to speak,
independent of how big you set this number.
In any case,
there can only be a quantum theory
if this number is finite.
Yes,
between my statements,
I find a contradiction.
So,
on the one hand,
you say,
this number comes through the history of nature.
Yes,
yes.
Now,
I would say,
cosmology always means history of nature,
because cosmology should always refer to time.
Yes,
but I would say,
I make a difference
between the Einsteinian cosmos
and the Friedmann-Lemaitrean cosmos.
Aha.
And only in something
that corresponds to the Friedmann-Lemaitrean cosmos
can this number be justified.
Although, of course,
I will not make the Friedmann-Lemaitrean theory
the Saint-Hilaire theory.
Yes,
yes.
Aha,
so in this cosmology,
I am not at all ...
Yes,
yes,
I mean,
it's just like this,
the Einsteinian cosmos
and probably also the Reissiterian cosmos,
which is so difficult to interpret,
mean a stationary world,
yes,
so in my language,
a constant number of primordial decisions.
Yes.
And then I would say,
this certainly does not work at all,
because it does not work thermodynamically,
because that would mean
that the world already exists from the past,
and then the equation would already be there.
Yes,
yes.
But if there should be a possible physics at all,
which looks like the one we are discussing here,
then this physics must be such that
the world started at some point.
And there I want to make the hypothesis,
which I would also justify,
that it is as Jordan thinks,
I would express it as
the number of primordial decisions grows with time.
Ah, yes.
Namely,
if you measure time purposefully,
then with the third patents of time.
Yes,
that would mean
that the scale,
which is used to measure,
was initially given by the atomic units,
that is,
for example,
the mass of the proton,
divided by hc,
or whatever it is,
and with that I already have a time scale,
and that should of course not mean
that this time runs discontinuously.
No,
no,
I would not say that either.
Only,
I mean,
I have not yet tried to make such a theory.
I mean,
what I try to write mathematically
is only the theory of constant number of primordial objects.
Yes.
The variable number of primordial objects,
I simply cannot do that.
I have not tried that yet.
Yes.
There I can only, so to speak,
give the answer as I would like to.
Hmm.
On the other hand,
the variable number of primordial objects
is in your sense
what you actually want.
What you actually want, yes.
Because then you no longer have a choice in the picture.
Otherwise it would be a choice.
But my claim against yesterday afternoon
is only that the topology of the wave form
is already determined by quantum theory
and not by gravitation.
Yes.
You start with an equation
that looks like a classical equation.
Yes.
And then you say,
it has a conformal group,
but quantum theoretically that does not work at all.
Then you have to destroy the conformal group.
Yes.
And then I say,
I do not even start with a classical boundary case,
but quantum theoretically.
Yes.
So I get first of all the compact space
that you actually get
and then you have to destroy the conformal group.
Yes.
But you do not see the equation
that it will later become a compact space.
No, you do not see it that way.
But I think that is only because
that from this point of view
your construction is relatively unclear.
It was not made to answer this question.
Of course not.
But what you said yesterday
was also that if you have a proton mass,
then you have a world mass.
Yes.
And then, as Stumpf said yesterday,
if you want to make a state of the world
that is a balance,
then it cannot be a balance
if you have an infinite world form
and an infinite world mass.
Yes.
But you have actually now come up with a thought
that is different from yesterday's
and that I actually even like better.
Yes.
It is like this,
if I have a proton mass,
then I also need an infinite world,
but that depends on the time.
That is,
I then get a relationship
between time and the world.
Yes, that is right.
And that is reasonable.
Yes, that is right.
I mean, if you missed that,
then I would say,
I just did not say that yesterday
because we are not finished.
That is my opinion.
And besides, I did not say it
because Stumpf is not in this thought
and I think Stumpf confuses.
Confuses.
Yes.
What I have written here,
that is only the time-constant world.
Yes.
And can you at least sketch
how you think of the Jordanian world?
Yes.
So, assuming,
because we both do not know math,
and so on,
nevertheless,
you can just imagine
what it would look like then.
Especially also,
what kind of metric would then be
at the point of the Euclidean metric,
what would our equation look like then,
how would it express itself in the equation,
and so on.
So, I mean,
you actually ask more than I know.
I can only say
how I think
that in my picture with the prime objects
this whole Jordanian story
has space.
But how the metric will look like
that you add to it,
I do not know either.
Yes.
I mean,
it is probably not a difficult problem
if you know all these cosmologies,
but I have not thought about that yet.
Yes,
but to the point,
which is of course particularly important for me,
how does your philosophy of these basic decisions
the idea that one would have to calculate
with a time-variable number of basic decisions,
which almost does so,
as if there were always new basic decisions.
Yes,
it does so.
And that is somehow a strange idea.
No,
so it is like this,
you basically ask me now,
or I would like to be asked,
not about the mathematics of this matter,
which I do not know at all,
but about the philosophy of this matter.
Yes,
of course.
And I would say
that you actually have to take another step back
and have to ask
what this whole theory of basic decisions
has to do with time at all.
Yes.
And if I may develop this in this way,
then I would say
I do not even start with the basic decisions,
but I only start with time.
Yes,
that was always the intention.
Yes,
always the intention.
And then I say,
the time,
of course,
I mean in the sense of present,
past and future.
Yes.
And now I say,
what does future mean?
The future is what will be once,
but you do not know what will be.
So there are possibilities.
The term possibility is essentially part of the future.
The simplest way
to schematize the future at all
is to say,
now a state exists
and in a certain time
one of two states can exist.
Yes.
That means
the simplest schematization of the future
is the simple alternative.
Yes,
good.
If now one of the two has entered,
then there will be a future again.
Yes.
That means
then there will be two possibilities again.
And if the other has entered,
there will also be two possibilities.
Yes,
there I now have the uncomfortable feeling
that one comes into the question,
how long does it take
until the next decision?
Not that it is a continuous time
or a discrete decision.
Yes,
yes,
but there I would say,
that is the question
whether the time is at all
continuous or discrete.
Yes.
And I would say
as long as you only talk about
two or four hour decisions,
that is a very pointless question.
That is the question
that dear God made at the beginning.
So that is too difficult to know.
But I want to say
whether the time is continuous or discrete
is now.
Yes.
For us.
And there I would say
the past is in a certain sense discrete
and the future is continuous.
Aha,
the past is discrete
through the documentation.
Yes,
through the documentation.
Because it is either in the memory
or on a photo album
or somehow discrete.
somehow,
yes.
The amount of facts is endless.
Yes.
And if someone claims
a continuum.
What does a continuum mean?
A continuum means
if I take a line
and I have marked
two points on it
I can mark another one
Yes,
but the marker
can be.
Yes,
can be.
And now I ask
what does it mean
that the past time
is continuous?
That means
if the time point A
has passed
and the time point B
has passed later
then you can
mark a time point
between A and B.
Yes.
But you can
the word can
always only refers
to the future.
Yes.
You can only
be able to
in the future.
That means
you can mark
a past event
in the future.
Yes.
You can only do that
if there is a document.
Yes, yes.
In this respect
I would say
that the past
is only in the sense
that it is potentially
continuous
that you cannot know
which past time
possibly
is still
shown as
with a document.
Yes, of course
you speak
differently
about the past.
Yes, yes.
I would say
you should
actually speak like that.
And the claim is
I mean the continuum
is defined
as Aristotle said
that you can
divide it
in continua
indefinitely.
Yes.
And this does not
apply to the past.
But you can say
that documents
can still come out.
But at least
many documents
can finally come out.
Yes.
And the number
of documents
that can come out
I can indicate.
Namely
the number of clocks.
Yes.
And the number
of clocks now.
Ah, yes.
But in the future
completely new things
can happen.
Ah, the number
of all basic decisions
that have happened.
Yes, yes.
Yes.
So you can also
express it
in such a way
that actually
the growth
of the number
of clock decisions
is only an expression
for the fact
that the past
is factual
but the future
always has new possibilities.
Yes.
This has a
strange aspect
in the following way.
The quantum theory
always deals
with the mathematics
and so on
always deals
with the possible.
This and that is possible.
Yes, yes.
And the factual
is not actually
in this mathematics
and somehow
goes in a strange way
side by side.
It comes before
this famous reduction
of the wave packets
and so on.
Yes, yes.
But your basic decision
is now
on the side
of the factual
so not so much
on the side
of the mathematics
of the quantum theory
but more on the side
of how this mathematics
is then applied.
Yes.
I wouldn't say
So I would have
to start with
the philosophy
of the quantum theory.
I would say
that the quantum theory
deals insofar
as possible
as it establishes
probabilities.
So it establishes
possible events.
Yes.
I would call it
formally possible.
So it establishes
possible events
and then
gives them
probabilities.
Yes.
And insofar
as possible
the quantum theory
only speaks
of the future.
But it speaks
of the past,
of the factual.
First of all
in the sense
that nothing
can be factual
that was not
possible.
Yes.
That means
the quantum theory
restricts
the amount
of possibilities.
Then comes
the question
of what really
came from
these possibilities
so what is
familial.
And the quantum theory
does not say
that.
Yes.
It really does not say
that.
That was always
a point that
Einstein bothered
so much.
Einstein said
that physics
must speak
of the factual
and you
introduced
a mockery
that you
the factual.
Yes, yes.
But I would
say that
Einstein really
made a mistake
because physics
speaks of laws
and laws
are always
possible.
Yes.
Einstein should
Kant better.
He did not.
But I would
say that
for our problem
it is like this.
What I have
said now
also applies
for a quantum
theory with
a constant
dimension
of the
space of
state.
So also for
the quantum theory
of the
individual
primal decisions.
That means
you have to
differentiate
between
an
alternative
as a
time bridge.
That means
you can
the same
decision.
That is my
clock.
Yes.
And secondly
between a
one-time
decision.
For example
in the past
this alternative
was decided
in such a way
that this
pin was
like this.
Yes.
And what
I said
before
when I
was
fact
that
is
a
recoupling
in this
theory which
does not
the normal
quantum
theory.
Yes.
And I
do this
recoupling
by going
back behind
the quantum
theory and
the
elementary
theory and
the
cosmology
in a
pure
theory of
time.
Yes.
And then
I say the
theory of
time is
so that
actually the
amount of
possibilities
grows.
If you
take a
certain amount
out of
and look
at it
for yourself
that is
the quantum
theory.
How does
this relate
to the
cosmology?
You often
have the
assumption that
one could not
do cosmology
with the quantum
theory for
the following
reason.
It could be
that the quantum
theory gives
a scheme for
possible
achievements.
So if I
apply it
to the
world as a
whole,
a scheme
for many
possible
worlds,
but that
does not
interest
cosmology at
all,
then I
have to
formally
apply it
to the
So it
is a problem
against
the mathematics
of the
quantum
theory.
Yes.
Of course
there is
something
right about
but I
think the
conclusion
is wrong.
I would
say that
first of all
I think
that the
whole scheme
of possible
worlds,
of which
one is
realized,
this Leibniz
scheme,
is basically
not good.
Because I
do not know
what I should
under a
possible world.
I can
imagine
a possible
world in
That
means a
world that
could
from the
present
possible
world
could
emerge.
But I
cannot imagine
under a possible
world,
as it is
with Leibniz,
the amount
of possible
worlds that
are in
God's
eye
and then
he chooses
one.
Yes.
That
seems to me
somehow
difficult.
But if
I speak
as I
think
that
one
should
speak,
then I
would say
that the
cosmology
that we
operate here
is the
theory of
all possible
worlds in
my sense.
Possible
from the
present
world.
Yes.
All worlds
that can
from the
existing
or even
one
once
existing
world
can
emerge.
And
I say
that this
is a
legitimate
claim of
quantum
theory.
