Milton Friedman Speaks: Free Trade: Producer vs. Consumer
Dr. Freedman will speak this morning on free trade, producer versus consumer. Dr. Freedman.
Thank you. There is a standard cliche, which I'm sure you have all heard, that if you have
two economists in one room, you are bound to have at least three opinions. The subject I'm
going to talk about today, however, is one subject with respect to which that is not
true. With respect to the area of international trade, with respect to the question of whether
it is desirable for a country to have free trade or to have tariffs and other restrictions
on imports and exports, in that particular area economists have spoken with almost one voice
for some 200 years. Ever since the father of modern economics, Adam Smith, published his
great book, The Wealth of Nations, in 1776, the same year in which the Declaration of Independence
was issued in this country, ever since then the economics profession has been almost unanimous
on the subject of the desirability of free trade. Of course, complete unanimity is hardly ever
possible, and every once in a while there have been some deviations from the straight and narrow
path. Almost always those deviations have reflected not a disagreement with the fundamental
message of Adam Smith, not a disagreement that in the good world free trade would be the best
of all possible courses, but they have tended to reflect special circumstances of the time.
Perhaps the most famous such deviation was by the most noted, and some would say notorious,
of the modern economist John Maynard Keynes, the English economist who gave his name to the
Keynesian Revolution. In 1931, in the course of the Depression, John Maynard Keynes, who had been
a free trader all his life, came out in some articles in Britain in favor of departing from
free trade and of introducing tariffs. He did so not because he thought that was in and of itself
the best policy, but because he thought that the best policy was politically unfeasible.
In his view, the right policy for Britain at that time was to go off the gold standard,
end a fixed exchange rate, allow the pound sterling to be a free market currency whose
price would be determined in the market, as it now is, of course, in a world of floating
exchange rates today. But Keynes, an economist, made the political judgment that it was not
politically feasible for Britain to go off the gold standard. Tariffs are an alternative to
devaluation. After all, it comes roughly to the same thing if on the one hand the price of the
pound sterling was changed from the four dollars and eighty-some cents, which then was the price,
to, let's say, four dollars. That would make British goods cheaper to foreigners, it would
make foreign goods more expensive to Britain, and in that way would redress the problem of the
balance of payments they were facing. That's one way to do it and the best way. But he thought that
was politically unfeasible and it comes to the same thing to introduce a tariff on imports and
a subsidy to exports. That's an indirect and concealed form of devaluation. And so Keynes
came out for that concealed form. His political judgment was like that of many economists, flawed,
and about three weeks after he came out for a tariff on these grounds, Britain went off the
gold standard. I may say that this is not an isolated story. Time and again economists, in my
opinion, have erred when they have proposed second-best solutions in the area where they
are experts, namely economics, because of predictions they make about political feasibility
in an area where they are not experts. At any rate, Keynes had a very flexible mind,
and one week after Britain went off the gold standard he retracted his support for tariffs.
He published an article saying, now that we've gone off the gold standard, there is no longer
any point to tariffs. I return to my free trade principles. But later, when he reprinted that
retraction in a book of essays, he appended a footnote, which is a very revealing footnote
because it shows how much damage can be done by the tendency for people to preach the second-best
solutions. And he said in his footnote, and I quote, not all my free trade friends proved to
be as prejudiced as I had thought, for after a tariff was no longer necessary, many of them
were found voting for it. In other words, it's often easier to turn people in the wrong direction
than it is to reverse that and get them back on the right line.
Now it's often argued that the reason we have bad economic policy is because the experts disagree,
that if only the experts would agree, if only all economists were of the same mind,
then we would have an excellent and fine economic policy. The case of free trade and the tariff
is a clear counterexample. Here is one case where economists have all agreed,
or essentially so, as I say. You have the very minor deviations like Keynes, but very few others.
And yet, except for the case of Great Britain from the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846
to the First World War, when for nearly a century Britain had complete free trade
with no tariffs whatsoever on anything, except for that case tariffs have been widespread.
The United States had tariffs throughout the nineteenth century.
In 1929, one of the measures, the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill,
which raised tariffs sharply, has been given some of the responsibility for the subsequent
difficulties in the United States and the world. Today we have a widespread move for protection.
Pressures from the steel industry, I am sorry to say successful, to have the government take
measures to restrict the imports of steel, so-called voluntary agreements to restrict
the imports of TV sets from Japan and of textiles from Hong Kong and Korea and I know not where else,
and of shoes from Italy. We have a growing pressure for quotas on imports of oil
and of other products. We have widespread concern that somehow or other a weakening dollar,
the decline in the price of the dollar in terms of the mark or in terms of the Swiss franc or the
yen, that a weakening dollar in that respect requires the government to impose restrictions
on imports or to subsidize exports. And the interesting question and the question I want
to explore with you today is why is it that protection interference with international
trade has been so widespread despite the almost uniform condemnation of such measures by economists?
Why is it that you have the professional agreement on the one side
and observed practice on the other which departs so sharply from that agreement?
The political reason is fairly straightforward. The political reason is that the interests that
press for protection are concentrated. The people who are harmed by protection
are spread and diffused. Indeed, the very language shows the political pressure.
We call a tariff a protective measure. It does protect. It protects the consumer very well
against one thing. It protects the consumer against low prices, and yet we call it protection.
Each of us tends to produce a single product. We tend to buy a thousand and one products.
If we impose a tariff on steel or restrict imports of steel in other ways,
the people who benefit are visible and clear and available and apparent.
They have a very strong interest to press for restraints in that respect.
The interest of the rest of us is very diffuse. Each of us will pay a few pennies more.
We don't have the same interest to oppose it. If I may take a much more extreme case,
which you may think does not come under the heading of protection but yet
does, we have a program of subsidizing the merchant marine, the maritime industry.
That is really protection, because what we're doing is taking measures
to prevent the use of foreign ships, that is, of importing the services of transporting goods.
Those measures to benefit the merchant marine through shipbuilding subsidies,
through operating subsidies, and so on, involve a total expenditure each year of roughly $600 million.
That amounts to about $15,000 per year for each of the 25,000 people who is affected.
You may be sure that they have every incentive to spend a lot of money on lobbying,
on giving contributions to political candidates, and so on, to see that continue.
But $600 million, a population of 200 million people, that's $3 apiece for each of us.
Which one of us is going to go to Washington and lobby our congressman to avoid that extra
$3 of taxes? However, while in a superficial level it's very easy to see why we have had
tariffs and other restrictive measures such as a maritime subsidy, such as the recent import quotas,
because producer interest is concentrated and consumer interest is diffused,
that alone is not really a fully satisfactory answer.
Let me take another example of exactly the same thing. Why have we had price supports
of farm products? To take up a subject of special interest here, and where there are
special interests here concerned with that. We are all of a special interest. It's only
the other fellow who is a special interest. Why have we had farm price supports?
That's exactly the same argument. The farm price supports are again a measure that you
will find it hard, very, very hard to find any economist except a small number of agricultural
economists and schools in the farm belt, you will find it very hard to find any economist
who will support farm price supports. They are another case in which the consumer is simply
being protected against low prices. Why do we have them? Because the agricultural interest
has been concentrated and the consumer interest diffused and widespread, because you have a
relatively small group of people who regard themselves as having much at stake, and therefore
they are able to be more effective politically than the diffused consumer interest. We often
think that this is a country in which we have majority rule. That's true. It is a democracy.
We do elect people to Congress. We do have majority rule. But it's a very special kind
of majority. It's a majority that is formed by a coalition of minorities. If you want
to get elected to Congress, the way to do it is to find 3 percent of the people who
will say to you, if you vote for this, we'll vote for you, whatever else you do. And then
you find another 3 percent and another 3 percent, and you build up a 51 percent majority consisting
of a coalition of special interests. And yet that overstates the case, because it's also
true that special concentrated groups of that kind have never been able to get their way
unless they could make a plausible case that it was in the general interest of the country
as a whole to promote their special interest. The mercantile interest could not have gotten
their way unless they had been able to persuade at least a large fraction of the public that
there was a genuine national security reason for maintaining a merchant marine. The agricultural
interest, the farm price support proponents, could never have gotten their way unless they
had been able to establish a case that appeared plausible to a large fraction of the people
that there was a national interest in preserving a family farm or in some other aspect of agriculture.
So the question in some ways, if we go below this superficial level to a deeper level,
the question is why is it that the economists have not been able to persuade the public
of the virtues of a free trade policy? After all, the argument for free trade is basically
a very, very simple argument. Let me give you the argument which Adam Smith made two
hundred years ago. It's as persuasive now as it was then, and I quote,
In every country it always is and must be in the interest of the great body of the people
to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest
that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it, nor could it ever have been called
in question had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded
the common sense of mankind. Their interest is in this respect directly opposite to that
of the great body of the people. That was the argument as he put it two hundred years
ago, and there is very little that needs to be added to it.
The basic reason I believe why economists have not been able to persuade the public
is the one I have already alluded to. It's suggested by the title of a famous essay which
was written many years ago by a great economist, Wesley Mitchell. The title of his essay was
The Backward Art of Spending Money. And he asked, why is it that we are all of us so
sophisticated about the activities in which we earn our living and tend to be so unsophisticated
and backwards in the ways in which we spend our money? And his answer was the one I have
already mentioned, that each of us tends to be involved only generally in one kind of
productive activity. We spend our working life forty hours a week or sixty hours a
week, whatever it may be, as a worker producing a product, as a merchant distributing a good,
as a professor, well, forty hours a week. Teaching is a little long, but we are supposed
to be putting in some time like that in related ancillary activities, and most of us do.
On the other hand, each of us buy a thousand and one things, and it's perfectly understandable,
therefore, that we devote far more attention and far more interest to the way we get our
income than to the measures that affect how we spend it. But unfortunately this backward
art of spending money leads to erroneous views in many directions, and not only in the area
of the tariff and of protection. For example, public discourse tends to be carried out in
terms of jobs, as if a great objective was to create jobs. Now that's not our objective
at all. There's no problem about creating jobs. You can create any number of jobs in
having people dig holes and fill them up again. Do we want jobs like that? No. Jobs are a
price. We have to work to live, whereas if you listen to the terminology you would think
that we live to work. Now some of us do. There are workaholics, as there are alcoholics,
and some of us do live to work. But in the main, what we want are not jobs. We want productive
jobs. We want jobs which will enable us to produce the goods and services we consume
at a minimum expenditure of effort. In a way, the appropriate national objective is to have
the fewest possible jobs, that is to say, the least amount of work for the greatest
amount of product. In the international trade area, the language is almost always about
how we must export, and what's really good is an industry that produces exports, and
if we buy from abroad and import, that's bad. But surely that's just upside down as well.
What we send abroad we can't eat, we can't wear, we can't use for our houses. The goods
and services we send abroad are goods and services not available to us. On the other
hand, the goods and services we import, they provide us with TV sets we can watch, with
automobiles we can drive, with all sorts of nice things for us to use. The gain from foreign
trade is what we import. What we export is the cost of getting those imports, and the
proper objective for a nation, as Adam Smith put it, is to arrange things so we get as
large a volume of imports as possible for as small a volume of exports as possible.
This carries over to the terminology we use. I've already referred to the misleading terminology
of protection, but when people talk about a favorable balance of trade, what does that
term take into mean? It's taken to mean that we export more than we import. But from the
point of view of our well-being, that's an unfavorable balance. That means we're sending
out more goods and getting fewer in. Each of you in your private household would know
better than that. You don't regard it as a favorable balance when you have to send out
more goods to get less coming in. It's favorable when you can get more by sending out less.
This tendency to concentrate on the productive side of our lives and to neglect the side
of consumption is reinforced by the fact that even for the productive side of our lives,
the visible effects of tariffs are good, the invisible effects of tariffs are bad, even
on the productive side. I have already referred to the steel case. It's perfectly clear that
if you restrict the imports of steel, there are some workers in the steel industry who
will have jobs they otherwise would not have. The beneficial effects for them of a tariff
is perfectly clear. But if we import less steel, foreigners earn fewer dollars. And
they have fewer dollars to spend in this country. There are people around the country who will
not have jobs, not have productive jobs, because exports do not develop. Here, I should not
have to spell this out in great detail here in Kansas, this is a great agricultural state.
Agriculture products are one of our main exports. The harmful effects of steel imports are to
reduce jobs in agriculture, but that's invisible. The people who might have been producing goods
to sell abroad don't know they might have had that job. So, out of sight, out of mind.
And as a result, on both the side of consumption and the side of producers, you have the concentrated
special interest versus the diffused general interest. But then you will say to me, what's
wrong with all these fine arguments I hear? What's wrong with the arguments by George
Meany at the AFL-CIO convention that the high-wage American workers are being unfairly competed
against by the low-wage foreign workers, that we have to protect our American workers and
their standard of living from the competition of foreigners in Japan or Korea or somewhere
else who are willing to work for much less than the American worker? What's wrong with
that argument? Well, in the first place, what does a high wage and a low wage mean? The
Japanese worker is paid in yen, the American worker is paid in dollars. How do I know how
many dollars equals how many yen? Let me go at this a little more indirectly. You can
see the fallacy in this argument I think most clearly by taking a very, very extreme case.
Let's take the most extreme case of all. Let's suppose that at the existing exchange rate,
whatever it is, Japan, to take the example which is a favorite whipping boy, Japan could
undersell us in everything, that a Japanese can produce whatever you name across the board
from wheat and soybeans to television sets and automobiles more cheaply than we can.
And let's see what would happen. We'd rush to buy him. The Japanese sellers would be
paid for him in dollars. What would they do with the dollars? Nothing for them to buy
in the United States because by assumption everything is cheaper in Japan. What then
would they do with the dollars? If they would be willing to burn him up or to bury him in
the Pacific Ocean, that would be wonderful. After all, there is no product we can produce
more cheaply than green pieces of paper.
But of course the Japanese are not going to do that. They aren't going to work and produce
goods and send them over here in order to get pieces of paper which they are going to
burn up. They want to get goods and services, and when they discover that there are no American
goods and services that are cheaper than those in Japan, they will say, well gee, I'd better
convert these dollars back into yen. But who is going to sell them yen? Why would
anybody sell them yen? Because here if I have yen I can buy the Japanese goods by assumption
more cheaply, so nobody would be willing to sell yen. Well, let's suppose to begin with
the price, the rate of exchange between the dollar and the yen was as it was for a long
time, 360 yen to the dollar, or one dollar would buy 360 yen. Well then these people
who had all these dollars that were useless to them would say, gee, if you'll sell me
some yen I'll give you a dollar for 300 yen. No, says the owner of the yen, even at 300
yen to the dollar American goods are too expensive, they're not worth it. Okay, I'll give you
a dollar for 200 yen. And you can see what would happen. The price of the yen would be
bid up until what? Well, the fewer yen you get for a dollar, the more expensive Japanese
goods are to Americans. The more dollars you get for a yen, the cheaper American goods
are to Japanese. And so the effect of this would have to be that the yen would rise in
price until it was no longer true that all U.S. goods were more expensive than all Japanese
goods because as the yen became more expensive, Japanese goods would become more expensive
to U.S. citizens in dollars and American goods would become cheaper to Japanese in yen. And
that would continue until roughly, on the average, the dollar value of the goods that
the Japanese would buy in the United States would be roughly equal to the dollar value
of the goods that the U.S. would sell. And at that point the price of the yen in terms
of the dollar would be at an appropriate level.
Now I've simplified the story because over and above these bilateral transactions between
the United States and Japan, of course these flows of trade will take roundabout direction.
The Japanese will spend some of their dollars in Brazil and the Brazilians, in turn, will
spend their dollars in the U.S., and the dollars may flow in very roundabout circuits. But
the principle is the same. People want dollars not in order to have pieces of paper but in
order to have U.S. or other goods. And again, the actual situation is complicated by the
fact that in addition to the flows of goods and services, there are also capital flows,
also investments abroad. The United States throughout the nineteenth century, throughout
the period when we were building up and getting to be the economically most developed country
in the world, the United States had a balance of payments trade deficit every single year
almost. Why? Because the U.S. was a country in which foreigners wanted to invest capital.
The British were producing goods and sending them over to us in return for pieces of paper.
Not those green pieces of paper, but different pieces of paper, bonds, promising to pay back
some of money at a later time, plus interest on it. And the British regarded that as a
good investment, and they regarded it therefore as worth their while to send us goods in order
to get those pieces of paper. And there was nothing wrong with that. On the contrary,
we benefited by having foreign investment here that enabled us to develop more rapidly,
and the British benefited by getting a higher yield on their savings than they could have
gotten any other way. In the twentieth century that was reversed. We had what was called
a favorable balance of trade because the U.S. citizens were finding that they could get
a higher return for their money by investing abroad than they could at home, and as a result
we were sending goods abroad in return for those pieces of paper. Again, in the post-World
War II world, under American foreign aid and Marshall Plan programs, we were making
gifts abroad. We were sending goods and services abroad as an expression of our belief that
that was a contribution to a peaceful world. So the situation is more complicated. But
the fundamental point is the same. So long as you have a free exchange rate with the
U.S., which is free to determine in the market the price of the dollar in terms of the yen,
there is no balance of payments problem. There is no sense in which American industry is
in danger of being undercut by foreign industries and destroyed.
Let me put the matter to you a little differently. Suppose on the average an American worker
is roughly twice as productive as the average Japanese worker. That's roughly what the situation
is. On the average the American worker takes home from his work as pay for his activities
a sum of money which will buy about twice as large a basket of goods as his Japanese
counterpart can buy. If that's the case, we cannot afford-well, that's a little exaggeration-we
should not afford, we should not, use any American worker in an activity in which he's
less than twice as efficient. This is what was dubbed 150 years ago in the jargon of
economics the principle of comparative advantage. We may be more efficient in everything than
the Japanese. That doesn't mean it pays us to produce everything at home. We should concentrate
on our efforts, on those activities in which we are the most efficient.
Let me put it to you in a simple way, in a domestic illustration. I have a lawyer who
is a very good typist. Does that mean he should dispense with his secretary and type his own
letters? He may be a better typist than his secretary, but if he's only one and a half
times as good a typist but five times as good a lawyer, both he and his secretary are better
off if he concentrates on doing the law and she concentrates on typing the letters. Or
in this day and age, I should say, she concentrates on doing the law and he concentrates on typing
the letters. As it happens, I have a daughter who is an attorney, so that's personal as
well as general.
In the light of all this analysis, let us consider some current issues. Take the case
of steel. What about the argument of steel that we need a steel industry for our national
defense? Well, you know, there was a famous statement by Emerson that patriotism is the
last resort of the scoundrel. I don't want to call the steel people scoundrels. They
are not. They are perfectly decent human beings. They are like you and me, and like
you and me, they know very well that what's good for them is good for the country. And
we're all sincere about that. It's the greatest human capacity we have. It's not to reason,
but to rationalize. But what of the validity of that argument? Well, there are two things
to be said about it. Have complete free trade in steel, there is not the slightest chance
in the world that the U.S. steel industry would disappear. The advantages of being close
to sources of supply, to sources of fuel, to market, would certainly guarantee that
we would have a very large steel industry. It might be that foreign imports would amount
to 15, 20, 30 percent of the total. But so far as our national defense needs are concerned,
insofar as we cannot satisfy them by importing steel from abroad, we would always have a
domestic steel industry. But second, ask a steelman whether before he builds a factory
he gets estimates of the cost of building it. He'll look at you as if you're mad and
say, of course I get estimates. And I will say to him, well now tell me, do you get estimates
of building it just one way? Oh no, we get estimates of building it in a variety of alternative
ways and then pick the best. And my standard answer to the steelman who gives a national
defense argument is to say that when the steel industry presents to this country cost estimates
of alternative ways of providing for our national security, I will believe that your argument
is sincere and not simply an excuse for self-interest, because there are many ways. If the problem
is of steel, you can stockpile steel. It's the easiest thing in the world to stockpile.
Some of it may rust, but that's not a very serious problem. Aside from stockpiling it,
you can maintain some steel plants in mothballs, the way we maintain ships in mothballs, and
so on. There are lots of alternatives. Have you ever seen a cost estimate by the steel
industry of how much it would cost to protect our national security one way or the other?
The same thing has been true over the years of the continuous argument by the oil interests
that we ought to have. At one point it was an oil import quota, percentage depletion,
all sorts of other things, on national security lines. I believe it is an excuse and not a
reason. What about this argument of unfair competition? What about the argument that
the Japanese dump their goods below cost? Well, as a consumer, all I can say is, the
more dumping the better. If the Japanese government is so ill-advised as to tax its taxpayers
in order to send us at below cost TV sets and other things, why should we as a nation
refuse reverse foreign aid? What about this problem of the price of the U.S. dollar, the
weakening of the dollar abroad? It is an artificial problem to which we should pay no attention.
The market will set a price, let it. So far as we as a nation are concerned, the important
thing is to get our internal house in order. If we followed policies at home which would
eliminate inflation and provide the basis for a sound and healthy economic growth, the
price of the dollar in foreign exchange markets would take care of itself. And if we follow
policies as we have been of steadily rising inflation, or unsteadily rising inflation
I should say, ups and downs, well then of course the dollar is going to become worth
less at home and it will be worth less abroad than it otherwise would be. It is not a problem.
I come again to the problem of foreign policy here, agricultural policy. That is an area
which has been very intimately related to foreign trade. You will remember some years
back when there was a great scandal about the extent to which the American taxpayers
subsidized the Soviet Union by selling agricultural products at a price below the domestic price.
But take the problem of foreign policy. I have already expressed the view that there
is no national interest whatsoever in foreign price supports or in government attempts to
manipulate the price of foreign products any more than there is in government attempts
to manipulate the price of steel or of any other product. But it's much more fundamental
than that. Agriculture is one of our major export industries. It is an area in which
we have been incredibly efficient, in which we can produce goods and outcompete almost
everybody in the rest of the world. There is nothing that would be in the greater self-interest
of the agricultural producer than for the U.S. to have complete free trade. That would
generate a greater supply of dollars abroad to produce a better market for U.S. products.
I submit to you that the movement toward having foreign price supports is a very short-sighted
movement. What will be its results? It can only have the effect of either destroying
export markets or requiring the government once again to subsidize exports. If we have
a high artificial price at home which is above the world price, nobody in the world is going
to buy American products unless somebody or other sells it to them at the world price.
And hence, a system of artificially high domestic agricultural prices necessarily requires
a system of government subsidies for the export of wheat abroad. I submit to you that that's
not in the interest of the American consumer, it's not in the interest of the American taxpayer,
and in the longer run it is not in the interest of the American farmer.
What do we do from here? What's the answer? Suppose we could be as successful as the British
were in the 1820s and 30s and get a national crusade going to move toward free trade. What
should we do? Many people say that what we should do is to try to engage in reciprocal
tariff reduction, that true enough they will say, our tariffs hurt us. But look at what
those foreign countries are doing. Japan has tariffs on imports. How can we compete without
tariffs while they restrict trade with tariffs? The answer to that is very straightforward.
The Japanese, by imposing tariffs and other restraints on their international trade, hurt
themselves, but they hurt us and they hurt us too, no doubt. They diminish the efficiency
of the international division of labor. They hurt us and themselves. But if we impose tariffs
in return, we only hurt them and ourselves still further. It's hard for me to see any
justification in harming ourselves in order to harm somebody else. That's not a very sensible
policy. Moreover, it doesn't work. We have been trying for many years to engage in reciprocal
tariff reductions. Every now and then one comes through. But on the whole, it has been
a very unsuccessful policy. Now I believe that we should- the right policy for us- I'm
not saying we'll do it, but the right policy for us would be to act like the great nation
we are, to say we are not going to determine what we do on the basis of what Hong Kong
and Korea and Japan do. We are a great nation and we are unilaterally and on our own going
to move to remove every barrier to international trade. We're not going to do it overnight.
People have made plans on the basis of existing tariffs. Let's take a five-year period or
a ten-year period. That's less important. But let's each year reduce by one-fifth every
tariff barrier, eliminate every subsidy to exports by one-fifth, and over a five-year
period get to a period in which we have no tariffs and no subsidies to exports. We should
do that and we should also completely stay out of the market of foreign exchange. Your
government on your behalf has been speculating in the foreign exchange market for the last
seven years and has cost you, up until last year and not counting the speculation of this
year, $550 million of losses on those transactions. Money down the drain. Let's stop that. What
is the chance that we shall follow these measures? Well, candidly, I think the chance is zero.
And yet, hope springs eternal. If we know the ultimate direction we want to go in, then
that will improve the chances that the separate steps we take will move in that direction
rather than away from it.
Moreover, I go back to my mentor Adam Smith. In 1776, when he wrote his great book, The
Wealth of Nations, he wrote, and I quote, to expect indeed that the freedom of trade
should ever be restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceania or
utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what
is even more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose it.
He wrote that in 1776. Seventy years later, Britain had complete free trade. What he had
said was impossible and absurd had been accomplished, one of the few places in which he was wrong.
That move toward complete free trade ushered in the great period of Britain's prosperity
and glory, and ever since Britain has departed from free trade she has been declining in
prosperity and glory. I don't mean to say that that's the only source of her decline.
It certainly is not, but it is not an unimportant source. In the same way, the U.S. has been
a great nation and we have prospered despite the tariffs and despite the restrictions on
trade. But we could set a great example to the world and benefit the world as a whole,
contribute not only to prosperity but to peace around the world by moving in the direction
of free trade. Because once again, go back to the British experience, the century of
free trade was also the century of the greatest international peace. Why? Because if you eliminate
government from these matters, you enable individuals to deal with one another. If you
introduce protection, tariffs, restrictions on trade, they become matters for government-to-government
wrangling and they are an enormous source of division. So in the name of both prosperity
and world peace, there are few steps that we could take which would contribute more
than a complete move toward free trade. Thank you.

