Karl Friston, Susan Schneider, Jan Westerhoff and Alex O'Connor debate consciousness.
How does the brain interact with reality to create experience?
The nature of human experience, or consciousness, has divided thinkers for centuries. The Scottish philosopher Hume saw experience as nothing more than a bundle of perceptions, and denied the existence of a self holding them all together. Kant disagreed, arguing that sensation had to be organised by concepts for there to be experience. It is a debate that has echoed through the Western tradition. You might think science would have settled the matter, but the same dispute is still present amongst neuroscientists. Some argue that sensation is independent of how we think, a neutral bedrock of data which enables us to experience reality. While others claim what we take to be reality is an illusion created by our brain.
Do our thoughts and concepts shape and structure experience and what we take to be reality? Are current theories of neuroscience taking sides in this deeper underlying philosophical dispute? Does the existence of the self and the nature of reality depend on our philosophical outlook, or is there a fact of the matter that we might uncover?
Karl Friston is a Professor of Imaging Neuroscience at University College London and Principle Research Fellow for the Wellcome Trust. Jan Westerhoff is a professor of Buddhist philosophy at Oxford University. He researches the philosophical aspects of the religious traditions of ancient India, and contemporary analytic metaphysics. Susan Schneider is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist, known for her work on the nature of consciousness, artificial intelligence, and the future of mind.
The Institute of Art and Ideas features videos and articles from cutting edge thinkers discussing the ideas that are shaping the world, from metaphysics to string theory, technology to democracy, aesthetics to genetics.
00:00 Introduction 01:53 How does the brain interact with reality to create the human experience? 02:30 Karl Friston 06:00 Jan Westerhoff 09:07 Susan Schneider 11:50 Is the question of consciousness a neuroscientific question? 12:29 Susan Schneider 14:17 Karl Friston
This notion of unconscious inference requires the brain now to be in some kind of synchrony,
technically synchronization of chaos, with the world out there. And that means that the cause
effect structure out there, should it exist, has to be in some way synchronized and replicated
in the anatomy and the physiology of a conscious brain.
Good afternoon. The nature of human experience or consciousness has divided thinkers for centuries.
Hume sees it as nothing more than a bundle of perceptions, denying the existence of a self,
holding them together. Kant thinks that sensation has to be organized through concepts
for there to be experience. You might think that science had settled the matter, but there is still
the same dispute present among neuroscientists as well, some arguing that sensation is independent
of how we think, others claiming that reality is a kind of illusion created by the brain.
So do our thoughts and concepts shape and structure experience and what we take to be reality?
Are current theories of neuroscience taking sides and does the existence of the self and the nature
of reality depend on our philosophical outlook? Joining me to work some of this out, although
probably not all, are Karl Friston, a Professor of Imaging Neuroscience at University College
London, Jan Westerhof, a Professor of Buddhist Philosophy at Oxford University, and Susan
Schneider, an American Philosopher and Cognitive Neuroscience. Please help me in welcoming our
panel. So our first theme was supposed to be the question of whether we interact with reality
directly, whether we have direct access to the world around us, or if it's somehow filtered
through our perceptions. And sitting backstage, we all realise that there aren't many people who
do think that we directly experience reality exactly for what it is, and our brain or mind
is at least doing something. So to begin this discussion, I want to talk about how it is,
or maybe even why it is, that the brain or the mind would do that. So I'll start with you, Karl.
How do you think the brain interacts with reality to produce our experience of the world around us?
Well, my philosopher friends tell me I'm a transcendental idealist, but they don't tell me
what that means. I think I would subscribe to Helmholtz, so I think that that basically
takes you from Kant into a slightly different world. But if we just restrict ourselves to
perception, experiencing the world through our sensations, then I think Helmholtz's notion of
unconscious inference is probably spot on and certainly has an enormous amount of empirical
evidence in the way that our sensory organs and our brains work. And that view posits the brain
as a reconstructive organism, a statistical organ, a literary, a purveyor of fantasies,
hypotheses, explanations on the inside that provide the best explanation for the sensory
sampling, the sensory impressions afforded by the world. So this notion, championed by lots of
people including people like Neil Ceph and Andy Clark, emphasizes that this is very much an inside
out process. It's basically building explanations for our sensory inputs and then using the mismatch
to update, revise technically. You can describe this in terms of Bayesian belief updating,
speaking to the inference aspect. I'll just put one little twist on that though.
I don't think I am a transcendental idealist because what Helmholtz brought to the table,
which I think was missing from Kant, was the fact that perception is a very active process.
We are embodied, we are situated, we are in reciprocal exchange with the world,
which means we have to choose how to sample the sensory impressions that we make sense of
and engage our unconscious inference. And that, I think, speaks to things like active vision,
active perception, active inference. I think that sort of bilateral exchange with something out
there puts a very different stance on the way that we couple to reality, if it exists.
And does that mean that we don't have direct access to reality and that, to some degree,
our brains are producing perceptions? If that's the case, to what extent do you think we can
meaningfully say that we are accurately interacting with the real world?
Well, we're certainly coupled to the real world, but vicariously. So our constructs,
the reality that we build in our head, is a construct. Mathematically, you would call this
inference, very much in the same way that if you give a scientist some data and they want to
understand the cause-effect structure behind those data, which is unknowable, all they have is the
data, then they have to make an inference about that, do some statistical analysis under some
model. In my world, this is called a generative model. Some people in machine learning would call
this a world model. Under that model, you then make an inference about the best explanation
that explains these data. Is that reality? Well, no. Is it related to reality? Well,
it depends. Yes, if you believe that those data were generated by some real cause-effect
structure out there. Will you ever see that? Are you ever in direct contact with that? Well,
no, because all you have is your sensorium. Yeah, and what do you think of this? Do we have
an ability to interact with the real world? Are we too limited to really even talk about the subject?
Yeah, no, I think this is a very interesting point that Karl just raised, the question whether he is
a transcendental idealist or not. I've been wondering that myself, actually, reading your
works. I think the crucial division between the view we find in much of the predictive processing
approach and the Kantian framework is precisely the question whether there is any way of accessing
the causal structure behind the appearances. If you have the Kantian line, then you say,
the world of things in themselves is entirely unknowable. We know that it must be there,
at least that's the Kantian position. We know there has to be something, but there isn't
anything we can say about that. In particular, all the structuring that our mind projects onto
the world, including space and time and causation, is something which is only at the level of
appearance but not at the level of things in themselves. If you now think, okay, so we can
somehow get to the structure of reality through the causal updating that we do when we interact
with the world, then you have a position where you say, okay, well, we can actually get some
glimpses of the causal structure of the way reality is independent of human minds and human
endeavors and so on. This is something which Kant wouldn't agree with, and I think Karl probably
thinks we can. Do you think we can get to the causal structure of things in themselves?
In an indirect way, yeah.
Exactly. So there you have the division then, right? So it is, in a way, a lot more epistemically
optimistic than the Kantian picture because it claims that there are some things about the world
that we can know, about the world that is independent of human perceivers and independent
of human minds. Just before I bring Susan in, we've mentioned Kant and transcendental idealism
a couple of times. Can we just make clear what that is?
Right. Okay. So within two minutes.
If possible.
Okay. So I think the key idea that we want to focus on here is that the structure of
appearances that we see around us is something which is not to be found as in coming in from
the outside and then being sort of read off by our minds. It's rather something that without
us knowing is projecting it outside into the world. So if we are conducting an inquiry into,
say, the spatial structure of the world or the causal structure of the world and so on,
what we're actually looking at is the structure of our own minds, our own mental projections.
Now for Kant, there is a sort of objectivity to that because that's the same for all rational
beings or for all perceivers, right? So it's not just about me or you, but it's about human
beings in general. So when I investigate causality and when I investigate the structure of time and
so on, I investigate something which has that level of objectivity, but it's not anything
that is out there independent of us as human perceivers and cognisers.
Susan, again, just sort of setting the stage here, as it were, what do you think about our
interactions with reality? Do we have interactions with reality and if so, to what degree can we
trust them? I hope so.
So we don't know what reality is. Today's physics is actually contradictory and we're trying to
settle debates right now concerning the tension between quantum mechanics and relativity theory
and understand what is there. What is there could be something that's radically different than the
way we cognize the world. It could be that space and time are emergent features and that instead
of space and time, we have some sort of pseudo-topological structure that's aspatial and
atemporal. Now this brings up precisely the issue today, actually, the reality of Kant's picture of
the universe. So Kant thought first off that there was a thing in itself. So no matter how much we
try in science and philosophy to understand reality, there will be by definition an unknowable
aspect of reality. I'm going to set that aside today because it could be true, sure, but I think
there are other fish to fry as well here. Kant also offered something quite incredible. He thought
that we had certain structures of reason that limited our capacity to understand reality. So
even setting aside his unknowability component, he thought our concepts of space and time and
causation, God and substance, were all innate and that they were there because we had innate
structures to the brain. Now Hume repudiated that. Now I think it's important that we try to figure
out what our cognitive limits are, especially in a world where we're creating machines that may one
day think of the world very differently than we do. I mean we already know they think very
differently than we do and they could actually rival us in intelligence and we will need to be
able to judge the claims that they make and also we will need to be able to understand fundamental
physics. Kant would say we wouldn't be able to understand fundamental physics to the extent that
it is aspatial and atemporal because that would go against the posited structures of reason.
It's quite philosophical here and one of the themes that we're discussing today is about
the impact that neuroscience might be able to have on this question. Some people look
at scientists studying consciousness and see them as essentially studying the brain and prodding
around and finding interesting things out about the brain but not actually moving the needle very
much on consciousness, on why it is that the brain doing those particular things is correlated with
experiences of the world. Susan, to what extent do you think the question of consciousness is
a neuroscientific question or is that just about the brain? Oh no, it's not just about the brain.
I'm brain friendly. Consciousness could extend beyond the brain though. I mean maybe one day
we'll augment consciousness. I mean the philosopher Andy Clark has had an extended mind approach and
you know some of the adherents to that approach even think consciousness could be augmented
and I look toward neuroscience to try to uncover an account of the neural basis of conscious
experience because we know consciousness is implemented in the brain. Now that doesn't
preclude however all sorts of philosophical views surprisingly. So for example you could even be a
substance dualist and see there as being an intimate connection between the neuroscientific
details of how consciousness is embodied and still be a substance dualist and similarly you can be a
panpsychist. Now panpsychists they say that all of reality is fundamentally conscious. Now that
might seem funny but believe it or not a lot of people who used to adhere to physicalist or
materialist stories even neuroscientists like Christoph Koch for example are actually panpsychists.
So I think the kind of word on the street like if you debate this stuff daily you know which some of
do is that you can let many flowers bloom. It's not as if the role of the brain is being repudiated
by people who seek non-materialist positions. Carl what do you think about this question about
neuroscience as studying the brain rather than studying consciousness? Do you think
that neuroscience can get at consciousness itself? Yes I think it can. I think there are a couple of
points which have come up which will illustrate how you can use neuroscience to tie down some
questions. So you know we were just talking about the cause-effect structure of the world
and how that may or may not have any bearing on the cause-effect structure of our brains,
the neuroanatomy and the physiology in space and time. I think one interesting notion here
is that this notion of unconscious inference taken into the inactive and extended domain
via active inference requires the brain now to be in some kind of synchrony technically
synchronization of chaos with the world out there and that means that the cause-effect structure
out there should it exist has to be in some way synchronized and replicated in the anatomy and
physiology of a conscious brain and that means that you're installing a version of that reality.
Now that version is not natural reality, this is not truth pointing, this is just
getting good enough explanations and understandings with your structure in order to account for your
sensory exchange with the world and your active exchange with the world. So there's no truth
pointing here but there is a synchrony in a resonance and this you see this notion emerge
throughout the history of not philosophy but say cybernetics so things like the good regulator
theorem simply so that to exist in a world requires you to be a model of those controllable aspects
which means that if you now look at the anatomy of your brain you should be able to discern
some aspects of the cause-effect structure in your lived world and my favorite example is the fact
that the anatomy of the brain can be macroscopically or loosely described so the back of the brain
in terms of the ventral or the bottom half of the streams from the visual part of the brain
being concerned with what things are the ventral stream and the top half being concerned with where
things are. Now that tells you immediately that this brain came from a universe in which there
were objects and furthermore knowing what an object was didn't tell you where it was and
knowing where something is didn't tell you what it was. This is a purely statistical information
cause-effect structure and particularly in dependence that now becomes evident in neuroanatomy
so you know that was one very very simple example there are a whole host of other examples that you
know we could drill you know dive into in terms of the actual process of consciousness but I just
want to conclude um well perhaps I know perhaps I should conclude that. Well plenty more time yet
and perhaps we can hear about some of those I did want to ask Jan you're a professor of Buddhist
philosophy at Oxford I don't know if you have strong views about the impact of neuroscience
on the brain but I am interested in whether you think that at least in like the modern western
understanding that all is explained through a scientific method that crops up in the enlightenment
in Europe is missing something with its agnosticism or ignorance about eastern traditions.
Well I think that actually that question connects in an interesting way with the problem of the self
that we've had. To continue watching this video click the link in the top left or in the description
below. With a free trial you can enjoy the full talk and thousands more. Thank you for being part
of the conversation.