Typically, moral systems follow from broader belief frameworks, such as religion or metaphysics. But can the direction run the other way? If we commit to a particular moral outlook—whether absolute or relative—does this shape what we take to be ultimately real? Can ethics influence our understanding of the deep structure of the world? Philosopher Robert Audi explores whether moral theory has implications for ontology, the nature of persons, and the existence of God.
Robert N. Audi is an American philosopher whose major work has focused on epistemology, ethics, rationality and the theory of action. He is O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and previously held a chair in the business school there.
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0:00 Do Moral Systems Shape Our View of Reality? 0:32 Can Ethics Influence Ontology? 0:46 The Nature of Persons in Metaphysics 0:57 Promises, Identity, and Moral Responsibility 1:56 The Mars Teleportation Thought Experiment 2:34 Duplication vs Personal Identity 2:50 Ethical Implications of Duplication 3:31 Identity vs Well-Being in Ethics 3:50 Duplication as a Model for Resurrection 4:05 Rethinking the Ontology of Persons 4:32 First-Person Consciousness and Identity 5:02 Is Consciousness Only a Brain Process? 5:26 Can Morality Lead to God’s Existence? 6:25 Why Ethics Does Not Prove Theism 6:41 Does Absolute Morality Imply God? 6:57 Could Relative Morality Disprove God? 7:27 No Inference from Morality to God 7:52 Limits of Moral Arguments for Theism
Robert, it's quite common for different belief systems,
particularly religious ones, to prescribe
various moral activities, which can
be some absolute morality about doing good things
or some very specific religious-oriented things
about foods or dos or don'ts or days to believe it or not.
So different kinds of prescriptions.
But my question is, can it ever go in the opposite direction?
Can causality or inferential capacity
go the other way, that if you have a sense of moral theory,
be it absolute or relative, can that
affect what you think is the ultimate reality,
the deep ontology?
One of the difficult ontological questions in metaphysics
concerns the nature of persons.
This is between philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
And if you think about the morality of promising,
you can see where there's a connection between ethics
and ontology.
Many of us have promised to be faithful till death us depart.
Now, one is promising to do something
over a period of years on the presupposition
that one will be the very person now making the promise.
So I presuppose my identity as one and the same person
through time and change in making that promise.
Similarly, if I'm held responsible for not doing
what I ought for a student, I'm presupposed
to be the person who failed to render support to the student.
So we presuppose that a single person goes through time
as one and the same.
That's a major assumption.
Let me give you a contrast that shows
another way of looking at it.
Imagine that we have a way of easily visiting Mars
and a technology of the future.
You're on Mars, but you're in a hurry to get home.
And as it happens, we have a translocation machine.
You step into a chamber, which records the exact type
and position of all the molecules in your body.
And then you are disintegrated.
And immediately thereafter, or as close thereafter
is as possible, someone is materialized
who takes himself to be you, a perfect duplicate.
Even your spouse would not feel any difference.
But plainly, this is a duplication procedure.
The original is gone.
So personal identity has not been preserved.
Now, what does ethics have to say about that?
And what does that have to say about ethics?
Would there be a kind of adultery
so that there's a moral mistake?
These are very difficult questions,
and philosophers are still arguing
about questions like this.
Well, in that case, if you believe
that it's a pure duplication as opposed
to recreating the first-person consciousness,
I'd say there's no adultery in that case.
It's pretty clear to me.
Well, but if you don't think that the person
now with the spouse is the one who married her,
then I think you have to say there's something
that doesn't go with traditional ethics.
But there are ethical views on which what matters
is how well-off the people who exist are,
and so the duplicate is just as good as the original.
Now, what you could say here is,
if you wanted to look at this as a model for resurrection,
if you should love your neighbor as yourself,
you should certainly love
your resurrection replica as yourself.
So that is a view you could take.
That is not the view that goes with common-sense ethics
or with the ordinary ontology of persons,
but we have to be open to these possibilities.
So theism can actually be coupled
with a view that isn't very traditional
as to the nature of the human person,
or anyway, the value of survival of bodily death,
where survival could be on the part of a successor
who is a duplicate versus the exact person who died.
And the test there, I would say,
is the first-person inner experience,
first-person consciousness.
Is that preserved or not?
And that's not a question that I think ever
can be answered by third-person analysis.
That's only something that you would know.
But would you even know?
I mean, unfortunately, the consciousness of the duplicate,
if consciousness depends on the brain,
would be indistinguishable from the original consciousness.
He would take himself to be you,
and nobody would know the difference, including him.
But we can see there is an ontological difference.
So does this mean that consciousness
is nothing but a brain process?
No, it actually doesn't.
Saying that consciousness is dependent on the brain
does not entail taking consciousness
to be just a neurophysiological property.
So we don't have to be materialist
to make sense of these scenarios.
If we take either an absolute
or a relative approach to moral theory,
from either one, what can you then infer
about the existence of God, for example, if anything?
I really don't see any clear inferential path
from moral truths to the existence of God.
But certainly, it is possible
that there is a being with omniscience
that extends to moral knowledge.
And certainly, it's possible
that one could acquire some moral knowledge
through theological reflection
and reflection on religious texts
and the connection between
one's ordinary interpersonal experience
and one's religious outlook on the world.
But I don't think that ethics provides
an inferential pathway to theism.
Let me look at each one.
And theism doesn't need that either, I might add.
It's not as though there were nothing else.
Right, for sure.
But many people use the argument for moral law
to infer the existence of God.
And so, if you believe that moral law is absolute,
there's an absolute sense of moral law,
and therefore, you make what I think
is a very logical conclusion,
that therefore, you cannot infer the existence of God.
Let me ask you the converse of that.
If you believed that moral theory was not absolute,
that morals were relative,
could you then infer the nonexistence of God?
If you were 100% sure that morality was relative,
that there was no absolute morality in the cosmos?
No, I think the answer is no,
because then, rightness would be culturally relative,
but God would know that.
And God might actually command
that people conduct themselves
according to the best standards of their own culture.
So, I don't think you could get atheism out of that.
So, either way, you have no relationship,
either morality is absolute or morality is relative,
even though you believe it's absolute,
but either way, you can't infer anything
about the existence or nonexistence of God.
I would say that is true,
possibly with some qualifications,
but I actually think that it's easy to exaggerate
the number of serious thinkers
who've used the kind of argumentation you're thinking.
You certainly don't find
the Center for Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame
peopled by proponents of that argument,
and generally, it isn't discussed
in our seminars particularly.
There are things in Kant that go in that direction,
but they aren't the strongest things
in the literature that support theism, it seems to me.
I don't think I'm alone in that either.