Dualism and René Descartes' Legacy on the Philosophy of Mind | John Searle

Human & Consciousness
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John Searle, born July 31, 1932, is an American philosopher and a Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. Known for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy, Searle has had a lasting impact on contemporary thought. This video explores his life, major works, and influence on modern philosophy.
In any given intellectual era, there are certain problems that are so large that they form not so much questions,
but a kind of horizon in which a large number of other questions can be asked.
These problems are few in number, and they tend to be so big that they are the kind of thing that you can go through a university for four years and never be told that it is a problem.
In any case, I think the number one problem in our era could be expressed as follows.
How do we get an account of ourselves as conscious, mindful, free, rational beings that we can make consistent with our conception of the rest of the universe
as consisting entirely of mindless, meaningless, physical particles in fields of force?
How do we reconcile, how do we make consistent what we know or think about ourselves with what we know or think we know about the rest of the universe?
Now, this larger horizon manifests itself in a whole lot of specific questions that I'm sure you'll be familiar with.
What exactly is mental illness? How does mental illness relate to physical illness?
What kind of sciences are the social sciences? How do the social sciences fit in with the natural sciences?
And more poignantly, how come we don't have the kind of progress in the social sciences that we've had in the natural sciences?
How come so many of the social sciences are so boring, to put it more pungently?
And then there are a whole lot of other things.
What is the nature of the human mind, and how can we study the human mind?
What's the best way to study the human mind?
All of these are subsidiary questions within this larger question.
The larger question is the central question in what is called the philosophy of mind.
And these lectures are going to be about the philosophy of mind.
Now, I hardly need tell you that at the present time, the dominant view in the philosophy of mind is that we've really got a solution to these problems.
We've got this wonderful, magical, technological device that provides us with precisely the right model for ourselves.
It's the computer.
We are all digital computers, and our minds are computer programs.
On this view, which I've baptized strong artificial intelligence, the mind is to the brain as the computer software is to the computer hardware.
Now, later on, I'm going to have a great deal to say about that theory.
But in this lecture, we're going to discuss the historical background of our present situation.
How did we get into this situation?
And I'm going to start with the works of René Descartes, a French philosopher in the 17th century.
Born in 1596, died in 1650.
And one of the dominant intellectual figures, not only of the 17th but of really succeeding centuries.
The 17th century was a century of genius.
A great deal of our most fundamental assumptions and conceptions about ourselves and about reality come from the 17th century.
Now, why was Descartes so important?
Well, Descartes articulated a crucial distinction that's still with us.
We think of it in common sense as the distinction between the mind and the body.
And we tend to think of ourselves as consisting of two parts, a mental part and a physical part.
Now, all of that is very much like Descartes and heavily influenced by Descartes.
Descartes didn't, of course, invent this.
I mean, this idea goes back to the Greeks.
But it was the Cartesian formulation of this in the 17th century that has been so influential for subsequent thinking.
And it is an oddity, I think, when I teach these courses in universities and I lecture on these subjects,
I'm always struck by the fact that most of what I have to say and most of the debates would be completely intelligible to Descartes.
I think he'd have no difficulty understanding the issues in the way we pose them because we're essentially using his vocabulary.
So let me tell you a bit about his doctrines and how they have fared in the subsequent, in the centuries after his death.
Descartes thought of the universe as dividing into two types of entities.
Mental entities, or minds, and physical entities, bodies.
And though he was in his way a revolutionary, Descartes accepted the Aristotelian idea that the universe consists of substances.
And these substances have essential properties.
So in the Cartesian vocabulary, there are two types of substances in the universe.
Mental substances and physical substances.
And each of these substances has an essence or an essential trait that makes it the kind of substance it is.
Now, for Descartes, the essence of the physical is extension.
All bodies, he thinks of, are extended in space.
Spatial extension is the essence of physical reality.
But in addition to physical reality, there is another kind of reality, and that's us, mental reality.
And the essence of the mind, says Descartes, is thinking.
And by thinking, he means any state of consciousness, not just cogitating, not just worrying about how to figure out your income tax,
but any conscious state, whatever Descartes calls thinking.
So we're to think of the universe on the Cartesian model as consisting of two metaphysically, fundamentally different kinds of entities.
Mental entities whose essence is thinking, or consciousness, and physical entities whose essence is extension.
Now, what are we?
Well, we are essentially mental entities.
That is to say, we are thinking, conscious entities.
But we also have bodies.
And one of the central problems for Descartes is how does our essence as a thinking substance relate to our physical existence as material bodies.
Now, these essential traits of thinking and extension lead to other differences,
which, again, in this sort of Aristotelian way of thinking that Descartes had, he thinks of as modifications of the essential traits.
In addition to being conscious, we are, as a form of our consciousness, we're free.
The mind is free where the body is determined.
So we're to think of the body as our bodies, as our physical body, as like other physical bodies in space, entirely determined by the laws of physics.
But where our mind is concerned, we have free will.
Furthermore, our minds are indivisible.
There's no way that we can chop up our minds into different parts.
Whereas bodies, our bodies or any other physical body, says Descartes, is divisible.
It's infinitely divisible, in fact, according to him.
Now, this already has an important consequence for Descartes' overall view, and that is, it's going to turn out, minds are indestructible.
Bodies can be destroyed, but the mind or soul is indestructible.
The mind is something that cannot be destroyed by physical forces.
Of course, it's not a physical entity.
Minds are eternal, or in the Christian terminology, the soul is immortal.
Furthermore, there's a special relation, a special knowledge relation that we stand in to our own mind, which is quite different from the sort of knowledge that we can have of physical reality.
We know our own mind by a kind of inner awareness.
And Descartes articulated this in what is his most famous sentence.
He said, I think, therefore, I exist.
Cogito ergo sum.
Of all the things that we remember from Descartes, this is the one that first comes to mind.
I think, therefore, I exist.
And Descartes originally presented that as a proof of his own existence, as something that could not be doubted.
For the very fact of doubting was itself a form of thinking.
And the fact of doubting by itself, in the case of his own existence, was sufficient to prove his own existence.
So he couldn't doubt his own existence.
But that's the main part of the cogito ergo sum.
It's the proof that each person can give of himself that he is a thinking being.
For the mere act of attempting to doubt that is sufficient to demonstrate its truth.
But there's another aspect of the cogito, which follows from that.
And that is that each of us is aware of ourselves.
Each of us is aware of himself or herself as a thinking being by a kind of immediate, unmediated, non-inferential awareness.
We know with certainty about the contents of our own mind by the act of cogitation, by the act of the cogito, by the act of I think.
So in Descartes then you get three consequences of the mind as a thinking essence, of the mind as a conscious essence.
It's indestructible, it's completely free, and we have certain and indubitable knowledge of its contents.
We can't doubt the contents of our own minds.
Well, so far, you might say, so good.
I mean, this fitted in very nicely with Descartes' Christian beliefs.
It gave him a doctrine of an immortal soul, and the distinction between the mind and the body was very useful in the 17th century
because it appeared to give one domain to science, the domain of the physical,
and preserve another domain for religion, the realm of the mental or the spiritual.
But there are problems.
I mean, the Cartesian doctrine, which is part of our popular culture.
We think of ourselves as a mind and a body, and we sing songs about body and soul,
and we have slogans about how the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak,
or maybe it's the other way around, I forget which is which.
But in any case, Cartesianism is part of popular culture.
I mean, as a famous French philosopher once said,
He buys the Cartesian doctrines more or less whole but without the elaborate metaphysics.
Okay, so far, so good, but now we've got some problems.
And let me tell you, the problems that Cartesianism naturally gives rise to.
And I have to tell you, most of these problems are still with us.
They form part and parcel of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science today.
The first problem is, if there are these two different realms, the mental and the physical,
how are they supposed to relate to each other?
And in particular, how can there be any causal relation between one and another?
And this has a certain poignancy to it because, at one level, we're inclined to think,
if there's anything we know, it's that our own minds affect our bodies,
and our bodies affect the contents of our minds.
But if we're to think of these as separate metaphysical realms,
I mean, there's this realm of the mental and the realm of the physical.
If there are these two separate realms, how can they ever relate to each other?
How can they ever cause each other?
But all the same, we know it happens, right?
I mean, look, there's always some philosopher who tells us the mind doesn't affect the body,
but you just watch.
I decide to raise my arm and the damn thing goes up.
I mean, it's just a fact.
And anytime I have doubts about this, watch.
I can just raise it at will.
I make up my mind to raise it.
That's a mental event.
It goes on in a mental realm, and that damn thing keeps going up.
You can get a tired arm, if you think about Descartes, long enough.
And it works the other way, too.
I mean, I hit my thumb with a hammer.
It's just a physical event in the physical world.
I mean, it's just any old thumb and any old hammer.
But all the same, something happens, right, in the realm of my mind.
I feel a pain.
It isn't just, well, there was this physical transaction.
There was indeed.
But on the other end of that physical transaction, something happened.
It hurt.
I felt it hurt.
So we know that there is a causal connection.
But in Descartes' terms, where you have two different kinds of things,
it's very hard to see how there could be a causal connection.
And I have to say, Descartes never really got a satisfactory answer to this.
How does the mind and the body relate to each other causally?
How can one cause the other?
This, by the way, has come to be called the mind-body problem.
When people talk about the mind-body problem,
well, in large part, they don't know what they're talking about.
But insofar as they do know, this is it.
How can there be any causal connection between the two?
And it's fair to say that Descartes never got a satisfactory answer,
but he did make some heroic efforts.
You've got to give the guy a lot of credit.
He went down to the morgue in Paris and cut up cadavers to try to figure out,
well, where's the point?
I mean, I've got a soul in here, and I've got a body out here.
Now, where does the soul latch on to the body?
And having cut up these cadavers at the morgue,
he thought it must be in the pineal gland.
Now, the pineal gland is a little P-shaped job, more or less at the base of your brain.
And why did he pick the pineal gland?
And the answer is he picked the pineal gland because as he took the head apart,
he could only find one thing, which was, so to speak, by itself.
Everything else was double.
There are two eyes and two ears and two hemispheres to the brain.
But the pineal gland is this single unity.
And he thought, in order to account for the fact that our experiences are unified,
I mean, I have them coming in from two eyes and two ears and two nostrils,
but all the same, they're unified into a single experience.
The point at which the soul attaches to the body must be a single entity.
A desperate move, but you can see he had a real problem,
and he tried to find a solution to it.
Now, we smile a bit when we hear that,
that the pineal gland is where the soul affects the body.
But it's not so obsolete.
I debated Sir John Eccles on British television,
and he's a Nobel Prize-winning biologist.
And Eccles says his researches show that the point where the mind affects the body
must be in the supplementary motor area.
I have to tell you his argument, because, again,
it reveals the depth of our Cartesian assumptions.
Jack Eccles has the following experiment.
You ask people to do a simple thing like this.
Touch your finger with your thumb.
Touch each finger with your thumb.
Going through a simple motor act.
Start with the thumb against the little finger,
and then go through the other fingers.
Now, if you do a PET scan, if you do a brain scan of people doing that,
you get the motor cortex firing away like gangbusters.
Now, you tell them, don't actually do it.
Just think it.
Think thumb against pinky, thumb against ring finger, and so on, going through.
Don't actually move any fingers, but just think it.
Now, what then happens is the motor cortex shuts down.
The rate of firing goes down.
But the supplementary motor area of the brain is still blasting away like machine guns.
And that, says Eccles, shows that the point where the soul attaches to the body
must be in the supplementary motor area.
Now, I mention this example as the persistence of the Cartesian assumptions.
Later on, I'm going to be attacking those assumptions head on.
But we're all brought up on these assumptions.
We're all brought up on the idea we got a mind,
and the mind is somehow attached to the body,
and now we got a problem for the psychologists and the physiologists and the philosophers.
How do they ever connect?
What's the linkage between the mind and the body?
Later on, I'm going to argue we need to reject the Cartesian assumptions that give rise to that.
And by the way, Descartes' followers had some interesting approaches to the mind-body problem.
Some of them said, well, strictly speaking, the mind and the body cannot affect each other.
Strictly speaking, what happens is there's a kind of pre-established harmony.
So God has arranged the world so that when I decide to raise my arm, he raises it.
And he has arranged the world so that when I hit my thumb with a hammer,
God puts a pain in my thumb.
So, strictly speaking, there is no causal relation.
There couldn't be a causal relation.
But all the same, events in one realm are the occasion for events in another realm.
These guys are called occasionalists, and some of their stars are people like Gulinks and Malabonge.
Gulinks had a nice analogy with clocks.
He said, think of two clocks that keep exactly the same time.
Now, they match each other perfectly, but there's no causal connection between them.
That's how it is with the mind and the body.
There's a perfect harmony. There's a perfect coordination.
I mean, pathologies apart.
But the coordination has to do entirely with the fact that God has arranged the world that way.
It's not because there's any direct causal connection.
Okay, so that's the first and, in a way, the worst problem that Descartes left us with.
The mind-body problem.
How can there be any connection between the mental and the physical?
And just to give a hint ahead, one of the appeals of the computational model,
it's got a neat solution to that.
We know how the program relates to the hardware.
In fact, there are lots of people within a stone's throw of where we are now
who make their living relating programs to hardware.
It goes on in every major intellectual center of the United States.
They're called computer programmers and electrical engineers.
So it's not a mystery if you adopt the computational conception of the mind.
Okay, problem number two for Descartes is, in a way, an extension of problem number one.
And that is, remember, Descartes told us comfortingly, well, we've got free will.
See, the mind is free, but now we wonder, well, what's the cash value of that free will
if the body's completely determined?
That is, if everything that happens to my body was written in the book of history
when the Big Bang came or when God created the universe,
if everything that ever happens is entirely determined by the laws of nature,
so that the lecture I give now, the sounds coming out of my mouth,
are entirely determined by purely physical causes,
then what possible cash value can there be to the doctrine of human freedom?
And in the most poignant version of this problem,
the doctrine would be, essentially, minds don't make any difference to the physical world.
They can't make any difference to the physical world because they're not physical.
They're this sort of extra stuff tacked on.
And there's a name for that view. That view is called epiphenomenalism.
And the idea is that the mind, mental states, consciousness, though they do really exist,
they have a kind of honest-to-John existence,
they're like the froth on the wave that comes into the beach,
or they're like the light reflected off the surface of the water.
It doesn't really matter. It doesn't make any difference.
If we were conscious froth, I mean, we're there, the froth on the wave coming into the beach,
I'm sure we would be thinking, boy, it's a tough job bringing these damn waves in,
and you never get a day off, and we have to haul them into the beach and then haul them back out again.
But that's not how it works.
I mean, the froth might have the illusion that it makes a difference, the physical reality,
but we who know how the world works know that the effect of the froth on the wave is trivial, marginal.
And that's the doctrine of epiphenomenalism,
that our minds are just a froth on the wave of physical reality.
Yes, we do have minds, but they don't matter.
So free will is entirely an illusion.
And I think it's fair to say Descartes never got a satisfactory answer to this question either.
What he says is, in the meditations, he says,
well, look, we're free when we feel ourselves to be free.
We're free when we think, oh, well, I'm acting freely.
I decide to raise my arm, my arm goes up, so that's that.
But that's not much help, because what we want to know,
I mean, Descartes doesn't answer this question for us,
is if my arm going up is entirely determined by physical forces that were present at the creation of the universe,
such that it's written in the book of history that my arm is going to go up right then and there,
then it looks like my mind doesn't make any difference to the world.
My mind is just going along for the ride.
Okay, now another set of questions, and this is our third question that Descartes left us with,
is if I am locked in my own consciousness,
if I am a conscious being locked into this prison of my own consciousness,
aware of myself by way of the cogito,
then how do I know all these other people have anything going on inside?
I mean, all I see is a physical body.
What makes me think there's anything going on by way of mental states inside these other bodies?
What I see are physical bodies,
and you say things to them,
and they make a noise through a hole in the lower half of their face when they answer you,
but I have no evidence at all that they have any consciousness.
And this problem also has a name.
It's called the problem of other minds.
How do I know anybody else has got a mind?
Now, the Cartesians thought they had a solution to that,
a kind of common sense solution to it,
and that is, well, we know of other minds by analogy.
So I hit my thumb with a hammer,
and I feel a pain, and I cry out.
So there are three steps.
The hammer hits thumb, feel pain, cry out.
Then I hit your thumb with a hammer,
and you cry out,
so I infer, oh, well, by analogy,
then there must be this conscious state going on inside.
You must be feeling a pain just like me.
But if you think about that, that's a poor argument.
I mean, suppose we actually try to treat this as a scientific experiment,
and I want to know who has pains and who doesn't.
So we all put our thumb on the table,
and I take a hammer and pound around.
What does science show me?
This one hurts.
Those others didn't feel a thing.
I can hammer them all day, and I don't feel anything.
So it looks like I don't have any good reason for believing
that any of you has any mental states at all.
It looks to me like if you were all cleverly designed robots,
totally incapable of thoughts and feelings,
you would be indistinguishable from what I'm seeing.
So as far as I can tell,
there's only one conscious person in the universe, this one.
That is, there's only one person
who actually has conscious thoughts and feelings.
And the evidence that there's any other conscious thoughts and feelings
is, roughly speaking, zero,
because I never observe anybody else's consciousness.
Now, this view tends to lead to a doctrine
which Descartes, of course, did not accept.
But it's hard to see how we avoid it,
and that's the doctrine that essentially
I am the only conscious being in the universe,
and that doctrine has a name.
It's called solipsism.
Solipsism is peculiar among philosophical theories
in that, as far as I know, no famous philosopher ever held it.
I mean, just about every crazy doctrine
has been held by some famous genius somewhere at some time.
But I can't find anybody who actually comes out and says,
I am a solipsist.
Now, there may be a good reason for that
because, of course, if somebody was a solipsist,
no point in his bothering to tell us
because we don't exist.
Solipsism is also peculiar in this respect.
If you're a solipsist,
I immediately refute you to my own satisfaction.
That is, if you come to me and you say these words,
I am a solipsist, only my conscious states exist,
I don't think, well, gosh, maybe she's right.
I don't think that.
I know perfectly well that she's mistaken.
On the other hand, my solipsism
cannot be in that way refuted by me,
though my solipsism is instantly refuted by you,
assuming you really do exist.
So there's a peculiar asymmetry in solipsism
which is not typical of philosophical views.
Your solipsism is no threat to me at all.
I know you're mistaken.
My solipsism, on the other hand,
cannot be similarly refuted by me,
but can be refuted by you
on the daring assumption that you really do exist.
I said a minute ago that I couldn't think of any actual solipsists.
Bertrand Russell reports one case.
You've got to be careful about Russell in these matters,
but in any case, here's what he says.
There was a famous logician, Christine Ladd Franklin,
who was the first woman Ph.D. in philosophy,
I think the first woman Ph.D. in the United States,
and a very brilliant logician.
And Christine Ladd Franklin wrote a letter to Bertrand Russell
in which she said,
Dear Russell, I have become a solipsist.
I am enjoying it immensely.
I wonder why more people don't take it up.
And this is the problem that solipsists always have.
It does seem to be self-refuting.
Okay, well now we've got three problems with Descartes.
We've got the famous mind-body problem.
My students like to call it the mind-boggle problem.
We've got the problem of freedom
and the problem of other minds.
But it gets worse, or at any rate,
it doesn't get much better in the immediate future.
It looks like just as we had skepticism about other minds,
how do I know that other people have minds at all?
So there's going to be a problem about knowledge of the external world.
That is, how do I know there are material objects out there?
How do I know there's a physical world out there?
Because remember, on the cogito,
all that I'm ever directly aware of are the contents of my own mind.
All that I can ever actually directly perceive
are what's going on inside my own mental space.
Now, this is a peculiar doctrine of perception.
And Descartes hardly bothers to argue for it
because he thinks it's obvious.
But I want to call your attention to how special it is.
The problem of perception is
how exactly do our perceptual experiences relate to reality?
And Descartes takes his account as the only possible account.
But I want to explain to you that there are other possible accounts.
The most naive view of perception
is this one that says the perceiver directly perceives an object.
So there's a tripartite conception of perception.
There is the perceiver, the act of perceiving,
or the conscious experience of perception,
and the object perceived.
So if I hold up my watch,
I, a perceiver, perceive the watch,
and there is a conscious experience which has the watch as its object.
The object of my experience is the watch,
but I am directly aware of the watch itself.
And that view is called realism or perceptual realism.
I like to call my version naive realism
because a lot of the people who attack me on this
think they're very sophisticated.
So I like to emphasize the naivete of my realism.
Yes, in the normal situation,
if you look at an object, you just see the damned object.
That's it.
I mean, there are special problems about illusions and hallucinations and so on,
but in the normal case,
when you look at something, you really see it.
That's not Descartes' view.
Descartes' view is that all you can ever really perceive
are the contents of your own mind.
All you can ever perceive are your own ideas.
But then that raises the question,
what's the relationship between the ideas you really do perceive
and the object that you don't perceive?
So I look at my watch.
All I can ever perceive are my ideas of a watch.
And then on the other side of my ideas,
on the other side of my experiences,
I suppose there's a watch there.
But how do I know there really is a watch there?
So you've got a radical skeptical question.
How do I get from my ideas to the external world?
How do I know on the basis of the perception of my ideas
that there really are objects there?
That theory of perception,
that we perceive kind of pictures of the world,
where it's as if we're locked in a movie house
and all we can see is the movie screen that's going on in our head
or in our mind.
But we want to know if there's a real world on the other side.
That's called the representative theory of perception,
or sometimes it's called representative realism.
It's the doctrine that you don't perceive reality itself,
you only perceive representations of reality.
You perceive your own mental representations.
Now Descartes, again, I think,
did not have a satisfactory answer to the question,
how do you get from the idea you do perceive
to the object you don't perceive?
What justifies you in inferring the presence of a watch
when all you actually see is your own experience of the watch?
Descartes' move was fairly desperate.
He says, look, I've proved the existence of God already
and on the basis of the assumption
that God is by definition not a deceiver,
that God wouldn't lie to us,
that God wouldn't systematically deceive us,
then I've got to assume that when I clearly and distinctly
think I'm seeing a watch,
then there really is a watch there,
otherwise God would be a liar, right?
Otherwise he'd be deceiving us.
Well, that's a fairly desperate move.
I mean, if I've got to have God helping out
in order for me to see my watch,
then it does look like I haven't got a satisfactory answer
to skepticism, but that was the best Descartes could do.
Now, once again, I want to remind you,
these issues are still with us.
In a recent book by Francis Crick,
a very good book called The Astonishing Hypothesis,
Crick accepts pretty much a Cartesian conception.
What he says is we don't have direct awareness
of objects that we see.
All we actually are directly aware of
is a mental representation in our heads.
And sometimes he even said it's a little worse than Descartes
because he says what we actually are directly aware of,
what we directly perceive is a symbolic description.
So what I really have that I'm perceiving
when I look at my watch is a kind of description of my watch
and then somehow or other I've got to infer
the presence of the watch from the description of it.
So this idea that you don't actually see the real world
but only your own experiences
and then you've got to make an inference to the real world,
that looks like it's going to create very severe skeptical problems.
And it does.
How do you know there's a world there?
What sense does it make to say the idea which you do perceive
resembles an object which is invisible?
I mean, Berkeley made fun of this.
Bishop Berkeley, the Irish philosopher
who articulated a very influential view opposed to this
called idealism, we'll get to that in a minute,
said this notion of a resemblance between the idea that you perceive
and the object which is invisible, that's unintelligible.
It's like saying you've got two cars in your garage
that look exactly alike, only one is totally invisible.
I mean, it can't make any sense to say
you've got one thing that looks like something else
only the thing that it looks like is absolutely and totally invisible,
totally inaccessible to any perceptual faculty.
Berkeley didn't use the example of cars,
but anyway, he gives good examples like that.
So, the radical solution,
if we think naive realism is just too naive,
and we've got the representative theory that says
all we can ever see are our own ideas
and then we have to infer reality
on the basis of having perceived only our ideas,
the radical solution is to try to get rid of the object
and say, well, all there is really is just ideas
and that view also has a name, that's called idealism.
And the idea then is, strictly speaking,
all we're ever aware of are the contents of our own minds,
but that's really what reality consists in.
Reality consists in mental phenomena,
in ideas, in mental entities.
By the way, these are called sense data in the 20th century,
but I think the old-time jargon is perfectly good.
And idealism leads to the 20th century doctrine
which says physical reality can be
entirely exhaustively accounted for
in terms of sense data or phenomena.
So, idealism is sometimes, in its 20th century version,
is called phenomenalism.
Okay, just to give you some names and numbers of the players here,
the superstars of the representative theory
are Descartes and Locke.
The classical idealist is Berkeley,
though I think if we read Hume carefully,
we can see he's committed to it,
though, as is usually the case with Hume, he's ironical.
And the most influential idealist was Hegel.
And then, of course, we have special problems with Kant,
which I may mention later on.
In any case, now, we're going through the Cartesian problems,
and we've so far got four serious problems
that he hasn't got an answer to.
They are the interaction between the mind and the body,
the nature of free will and epiphenomenalism,
the problem of other minds,
and the problem of skepticism about the external world.
Now, there are two other problems in Descartes
that I want to mention.
They're less important than these four,
but still, I think they're revealing.
I mean, the fact that he had these as problems,
I think tells us that there are some really serious difficulties
with his theory.
One is the problem of sleep.
Descartes, you remember, says,
minds are always conscious,
and we are essentially a mind.
So if we should stop being conscious,
we would cease to exist,
because that is our existence.
Our mode of existence is thinking, or consciousness.
Well, how's he going to account for the fact
that pretty much every day,
we have long periods of unconsciousness,
every time we go to sleep?
And his answer, I think, is revealing.
He says, you're always dreaming a little bit.
You've got to have some little bitty dream going on.
Now, that's a pretty desperate speculation,
but there is at least a certain amount
of fragmentary psychological evidence for it.
When they do these unfortunate experiments on their freshmen,
and they make them sleep with all this apparatus on them,
whenever they wake them up,
the kid will always report there was some dream going on.
Even when they're not in REM sleep,
rapid eye movement sleep,
you get some report of a dream.
Of course, I don't believe Descartes is right,
that there is no such thing as a state of total unconsciousness.
But dreams are more pervasive than had been supposed.
So Descartes' speculation had some strength to it.
Another, and the final, problem I want to list for Descartes
is the problem of animals.
Now remember, you see, there is a religious subtext to Descartes.
It isn't just that we've got a soul and a body,
but the soul gives us the domain of religious faith
and religious doctrine,
and bodies are the area of scientific investigation.
But now, what are we going to say about animals?
If animals also have souls,
then it looks like, to put it very crudely,
heaven is going to be very overpopulated.
I mean, if every flea and every ant has an immortal soul,
then it looks like there are going to be an awful lot of immortal souls.
And it does seem uncomfortable, to say the least,
to think that every animal has an immortal soul.
Descartes courageously adopted a radical solution to this difficulty,
and his followers were even more radical.
Malavosh, in particular.
What they said was, animals are just very cleverly constructed machines.
Animals do not have conscious states.
When you see an animal hit,
you see a dog hit by a car,
and a dog is making a lot of noise,
and you think, oh, it must be terrible, poor doggy.
Your sympathy is wasted, say the Cartesians,
because the animal has no feelings at all.
It couldn't.
It's just a very cleverly constructed machine.
Now, Descartes wasn't dogmatic about this.
He didn't say certain animals have no conscious feelings,
but he thought it's pretty sure that they have no conscious feelings.
They just respond like plants or stones.
They respond in a complicated way,
but they're like machines in that they don't literally have any conscious states.
And his argument for this is also revealing and influential in subsequent philosophy.
What he said is, the crucial distinction between us and animals is language.
The proof that we have conscious states and animals don't
is that we have language and they do not.
Now, frankly, I've always thought this was a desperate and preposterous view.
I mean, Descartes cannot have been a dog owner.
There's always somebody who says animals don't have consciousness,
and I want to take them to my house and introduce them to my dog, Ludwig.
Nobody can talk to Ludwig for more than a few minutes and still think animals are not conscious.
But in any case, I would not have convinced Descartes of this point.
Okay, so what have we got?
Well, it looked like Descartes was wonderfully liberating.
I mean, here we were after centuries of boring Aristotelianism,
and medieval philosophy was a pretty dusty, scholastic enterprise.
Here comes Descartes, and he liberates us.
And he liberates us by giving us this separation between the mental and the physical.
We're essentially conscious beings.
And it looks like everybody can be happy,
because the church authorities have the soul as their domain of investigation.
The physicists can happily pursue their mathematical analysis of physical reality.
It looks like we're going to have everything under control.
But we've got problems.
And I listed six problems that I think Descartes did not have a solution to.
And it's fair to say that much of the subsequent philosophy for the three centuries after,
three and a half centuries after Descartes,
is an attempt to come to terms with those problems.
In our era, as in other eras, there's always the feeling,
at last we have the solution.
At last we've got it.
And in subsequent lectures I will be telling you
to what extent maybe we've made some progress,
and to what extent we're still in very deep trouble.
