"Before the meetings began, local governments were notified to strictly control public opinion, and more than 500 petitioners were reportedly taken away. Data suggests there were reasons for such tension. A military report released on March 4, 2026 no longer mentioned individual members of the Central Military Commission by name as it had in the past, instead referring to them collectively—reportedly because too many officers had recently fallen from power. NOTE: Thumbnail for illustration purpose only! Be sure to subscribe for more in-depth content about China! https://www.youtube.com/@ChinaInsider-tv/?sub_confirmation=1 00:00 - Intro 01:31 - Is Wang Huning Acting Unusually? 04:38 - Two Key Figures Missing? 06:57 - Xi Jinping: The One Destroying the CCP? #xijinping#twosessions"
According to Epoch Times, on the morning of March 5th,
delegates attending the two sessions stepped off buses
and entered the Great Hall of the People,
surrounded by people in black,
closely monitoring every movement.
From Chang'an Avenue to Tian'anmen,
security checkpoints lined the route.
Police stood at every intersection,
checking IDs, searching bags,
and even requiring people to remove their phone cases for inspection.
Some sources said the scene resembled wartime Japan's
inspection of civilians' identification papers.
At the same time, public opinion control was tightened.
Many WeChat accounts were shut down for posting sensitive content.
Before the meetings began,
local governments were notified to strictly control public opinion,
and more than 500 petitioners were reportedly taken away.
Data suggests there were reasons for such tension.
A military report released on March 4th, 2026
no longer mentioned individual members of the Central Military Commission by name,
as it had in the past,
instead referring to them collectively,
reportedly because too many officers had recently fallen from power.
According to Secret China,
Xi Jinping had detained more than 500 delegates
to the National People's Congress
and members of the CPPCC in the two months prior.
What messages will this year's two sessions ultimately convey
and what lies ahead for the Chinese Communist Party?
Is Wang Huning acting unusually?
A video from this year's Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
CPPCC session, is spreading rapidly on overseas social media.
After finishing his speech, Wang Huning walked back to his seat.
As he passed near Xi Jinping's position,
he suddenly paused and bowed slightly toward Xi
In the video, Wang briefly turns toward Xi,
lets his arms hang naturally at his sides,
and gives a small nod of the head.
Xi, however, continues looking straight ahead
and appears to show almost no reaction.
Wang then proceeds to his seat.
Although the gesture was quick and subtle,
it still caught people's attention,
especially given Wang's name,
which some say sounds like bowing before the king.
The unusual moment quickly circulated online,
with some users captioning the clip,
If you see him, you must bow.
Wang Huning is widely known as the CCP official
who has remained influential under three generations of leadership.
Often described as the party's political brain or ideological architect,
he helped craft key ideological slogans,
from Zhang Zemin's Three Represents
to Hu Jintao's scientific outlook on development
Xi Jinping appears to value Wang highly,
placing him fourth in rank within the Politburo Standing Committee.
Although this position is below Xi's authority,
it still represents one of the highest leadership roles in China.
Yet at this moment, a national-level leader like Wang
was seen bowing to Xi without any reciprocal gesture.
It remains unclear whether the gesture
was simply Wang's instinctive display of loyalty,
a response to political pressure,
or a sign that he senses something shifting in the political atmosphere.
Rumors circulating online claim that on the first day of the two sessions,
the CCP central office urgently arranged a flight
to bring Wang Huning's wife and daughter from Shanghai to Beijing.
Some analysts speculate their arrival may not have been for a family reunion,
but could resemble a form of political leverage.
This information cannot be independently verified.
However, if Wang's family was indeed urgently brought to Beijing,
some speculate they could have been used as a form of pressure,
forcing Wang to display extreme obedience.
Another possibility cannot be ruled out.
Wang Huning, known for his political cunning,
may be attempting to bind Xi more tightly to power.
By encouraging stronger personality cult dynamics,
he could be shifting greater responsibility onto Xi himself.
After Xi reportedly detained Zhang Yuxia,
no senior figures in the party, government, or military
have publicly voiced support for him.
In that context, some wonder whether Wang Huning sensed something unusual.
Could his deferential bow be subtly signaling that Xi holds all the power,
and therefore all the responsibility?
Which possibility seems more likely?
Two Key Figures Missing?
According to Daxijiu, in this year's two-sessions roster,
the absence of two names has raised serious questions.
Zhong Nanshan, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering,
and Xi Zhengli, director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Their absence appears to signal more than issues of age or health.
It may reflect shifting political winds.
Shanghai entrepreneur Hu Liren recently said in a livestream
that Zhong Nanshan had served as a member of the CPPCC since 2008,
yet he did not appear this year.
During the three years of the zero COVID lockdowns,
Zhong was a highly visible figure,
widely praised as a hero in the fight against the pandemic.
His absence has therefore raised questions.
Of course, age could be a factor.
He is now 89 years old,
though he has generally remained in good health and active in his work.
However, the case of Xi Zhengli is considered far more unusual.
She is still at a productive age,
but was removed from her CPPCC membership under unclear circumstances.
This comes as the Trump administration's second term
reportedly renewed investigations into the origins of COVID-19,
increasing international pressure that some view as evidence
implicating the Chinese Communist Party, CCP.
Hu Liren argues that Xi's disappearance from the list
is unlikely to be accidental.
Often referred to as the CCP's bat virus expert,
Xi Zhengli has studied bat-borne viruses since the 2003 SARS outbreak.
Early research focused on viruses that did not spread between humans,
but later work reportedly examined genetic changes
that could enable human-to-human transmission,
with related findings published in scientific papers.
Xi previously served one term as a CPPCC member and is 62 years old,
leaving little obvious reason for her removal.
By the CCP's own account,
she has made major contributions to China's virus research.
Hu Liren suggests that for the CCP,
investigations into the virus's origins may pose an even greater threat than war.
In that view, Xi's disappearance may indicate
that authorities are isolating and protecting a key living witness
under growing international scrutiny,
or possibly silencing her politically,
with Xi Jinping the one destroying the CCP.
The website Apollo Network once published a commentary
arguing that over the past 14 years,
Xi Jinping has taken five major steps.
These moves, the article suggests, are like a line of dominoes,
each one toppling the balance of power that the Chinese Communist Party,
CCP, had maintained for more than 70 years.
For a long time, the CCP has no longer been driven by revolutionary ideals,
but by naked exchanges of interests.
From the founding of the PRC until the reform and opening-up period,
the regime relied on ideology and coercion to maintain control.
After reform and opening, it relied on what some call corruption dividends,
binding officials at all levels, princelings,
and second-generation cadres into a vast network of shared interests.
This network became the real foundation of the Party's rule.
After coming to power, Xi Jinping launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign.
On the surface, it was described as taking down tigers and swatting flies.
But in practice, it dismantled the reinforced structures
that held these interest groups together.
According to data from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection,
from 2012 to 2025, more than 4.7 million Party members and officials
were investigated or disciplined nationwide.
In 2025 alone, nearly one million people were punished,
setting a historical record.
A series of high-ranking tigers also fell—
Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengkai, Ling Jihua, Su Rong, Guo Boxiong, Xu Kaihou, and others.
These once-powerful figures,
whose family networks stretched across the country,
were brought down one after another.
The long-standing system in which one person becomes an official
Once the tacit understanding—
you take bribes, I take bribes, and everyone prospers together—
was shattered, the entire system was left gripped by fear and resentment.
An authoritarian regime without powerful interest groups supporting it,
the argument goes,
is like a skyscraper without foundations,
destined sooner or later to collapse.
Reform and opening up once served as the CCP's lifeline
when it stood on the brink of collapse after the Cultural Revolution.
Deng Xiaoping restored the regime's legitimacy with the slogan
Economic Development as the Central Task.
The message was simple.
Even if people did not love the Party,
they could at least live better lives.
Xi Jinping, however, is portrayed by critics as reversing this course
and steering China back toward a Cultural Revolution-style path.
In Foreign Policy, he abandoned Deng's strategy of
hide your strength and bide your time,
promoting instead a more confrontational wolf-warrior diplomacy
and intensifying rivalry with the United States and the West.
He frequently speaks of the East rising and the West declining,
a community with a shared future for mankind,
and great changes unseen in a century.
Initiatives such as the Belt and Road,
efforts at de-dollarization,
and attempts to expand the CCP's narrative influence internationally
have accompanied these shifts.
Critics say these moves have contributed to rising global tensions
and have gradually closed parts of the global economic system to China.
Domestically, Xi has promoted common prosperity,
which some interpret as redistributing wealth to sustain the Party.
Policies seen as favoring state enterprises over private businesses
have increased pressure on the private sector.
As foreign capital opportunities shrink,
the government has emphasized domestic circulation
while discouraging grassroots economic activities
like the street stall economy.
At the same time,
slogans about new quality productive forces
point toward new development directions.
Where Deng Xiaoping once said,
let some people get rich first,
Xi has warned that capitalists must not ride on the backs of the people.
To critics,
this 180-degree shift has shaken the belief
that loyalty to the Party guarantees economic opportunity.
In this interpretation,
if economic growth was the CCP's final source of legitimacy,
then undermining that growth risks stripping away
the regime's last layer of justification.
Critics argue that Xi himself may have cut off that final source of legitimacy.
China's economy managed to remain stable for decades
largely because of the dual-track system
designed by Deng Xiaoping.
The Party set the political direction
while the State Council managed the economy.
No matter how politics shifted within the Party leadership,
the government could still operate according to economic principles.
In the past,
premiers such as Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, and Li Keqiang
were able to run the State Council with a certain degree of independence
using professional policy tools to stabilize the economy.
After the 20th Party Congress,
however, when Li Qing became premier,
the State Council was placed fully under Xi Jinping's direct leadership.
Political slogans began to translate directly into economic policy,
and critics say the result has been a sharp economic downturn.
Sales of commercial housing have declined for three consecutive years,
and new home transactions in first- and second-tier cities
have fallen by half, and then by half again.
In many areas, housing prices have returned to levels seen a decade ago.
At night, central business districts in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou
have grown unusually quiet.
Office towers that once bustled with restaurants and lights
are increasingly dark.
The country once known as the World's Factory
Step 4. Purging the Military
The CCP has always emphasized that
political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.
Without the military, there is no regime.
The armed forces are therefore the lifeline of the system.
Since taking power, Xi Jinping's military purges have been more sweeping
than those under any previous CCP leader.
According to some estimates, from 2012 to 2026,
more than 100 generals and lieutenant generals
have been purged or have disappeared from their posts.
Since 2022 alone, one round of purges
has reportedly affected 101 senior positions,
accounting for over half of top military posts.
Units such as the Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force,
and the Equipment Development Department have been heavily reshuffled.
Even senior figures once considered loyal to Xi,
such as Miao Hua, He Weidong, and Zhang Yuxia,
have reportedly fallen.
Online commentators have even joked that only one person
rivals the United States in taking down senior military figures—
Xi Jinping himself.
While the U.S. targets leaders of hostile regimes abroad,
Xi has repeatedly removed senior officers within China's own military.
The result, critics argue, is a growing distance
between Xi and the armed forces,
raising questions about the once-unbreakable link
between the party and the gun—
a development unprecedented in the CCP's 70-plus-year history.
Step 5. The Arrest of Zhang Yuxia
At the start of the year,
a dramatic development reportedly occurred.
Xi Jinping personally ordered the arrest of Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli.
According to this interpretation,
the move ignited tensions built up by the previous four steps
and became the final straw.
Zhang Yuxia is a princeling, second-generation revolutionary,
and had long been seen as one of Xi's closest military allies—
arguably one of the most trusted figures within his own camp.
Arresting him, critics say,
effectively signaled to the entire party, the military,
and the princeling elite that even the most trusted insiders
were no longer beyond suspicion.
Such a move could potentially trigger deeper internal struggles
among anti-Xi factions
and create simultaneous fractures across the party,
government, and military systems—
something rarely seen in CCP history.
According to this commentary,
the accumulation of these five major steps
has gradually dismantled the four pillars
that once sustained the CCP's rule.
The question it raises is simple.
How long can the system continue under these conditions?