Xi’s ‘Killer Move’ for Another Term: Purging Zhang Youxia’s ‘Anti-Party Clique’?

Zhang Yuxia unexpectedly drops a bombshell. Did he once join forces with party elders in a plot to oust Xi Jinping from within Zhongmenhai? If Chai Shengkun's latest revelations are true, then the coup long dismissed as mere rumor at the Third Plenum may actually have taken place. Xi Jinping allegedly suffered a stroke, narrowly escaped removal, and was forced to remain in office as little more than a reluctant puppet. Even more strikingly, as natural disasters ravage large parts of China and the country's top leadership maintains an unusually conspicuous silence, a mysterious National Restoration Party is reportedly rising quietly from within the regime itself. And with Xi Jinping's name being mentioned alongside Soleimani's in the U.S. media, one question looms. Is his increasingly visible fear really unfounded? Did Zhang Yuxia admit to plotting Xi Jinping's ouster? On July 15, Chai Shengkun published a post claiming that Zhang Yuxia had confessed to secretly joining forces with several veteran party figures in a plot to remove Xi Jinping from power. At present, Chai Shengkun is the sole source of this exclusive claim, and there is no way to verify it independently. If the disclosure is true, it would suggest that Zhongnanhai witnessed the most serious internal power struggle in decades, possibly the largest since the Chinese Communist Party seized power. Xi Jinping would have faced a severe political crisis and come close to being removed from office altogether. Clearly, after Xi entered his third term, the image of himself as the party's unchallengeable core, an image he had carefully cultivated, began to collapse. Even Zhang Yuxia, who came from a family with long-standing ties to Xi's and had reportedly known him since childhood, had become deeply hostile toward him, let alone others within the system. If the report is true, it would also lend credibility to a series of earlier rumors, including claims that Xi's authority had weakened, and that Zhang Yuxia had taken control of the military. However, we will still need to watch for any official announcement regarding Zhang's situation. The authorities may never disclose these internal developments or reveal the full truth. Let us turn the clock back. On July 15, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party convened its third plenum. That same day, Xinhua published an article of roughly 10,000 Chinese characters titled Xi Jinping the Reformer, lavishly praising Xi's reform achievements since taking power. The article elevated his stature far above that of Deng Xiaoping and placed him almost on a par with Mao Zedong, the founding leader of the Chinese Communist regime. Yet the article remained online for only a few hours before being scrubbed from the entire Chinese internet. That same day, a member of China's second-generation military elite claimed that Xi had suddenly suffered a stroke during the meeting and had been hospitalized. Doctors reportedly advised him to rest for six months. Further reports then emerged alleging that Zhang Yuxia entered Zhongnanhai with 200 special forces personnel, accompanied by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and other veteran Communist Party figures. They reportedly placed Tai Chi and Wang Xiaohong under control first. Zhang then allegedly slammed the table, confronted Xi directly, and declared, My authority was given to me by the people, not by you. The account further claimed that the military initially intended to remove Xi outright and nominate Liu Yuan to take charge of the overall situation. Liu, however, was reportedly unwilling to step into such a political quagmire and found an excuse to decline. With no clear successor available, the military was said to have backed down temporarily, allowing Xi to remain in office as a figurehead in order to preserve the appearance of stability and prevent nationwide turmoil. On August 16, 2024, Kai Shengkun received information that he considered reasonably credible. According to the report, during the third plenum, surviving Party elders who had held full state-level rank used tactful and moderate language to raise numerous objections to both the decisions made at the meeting and Xi Jinping himself. They reportedly put forward around 30 recommendations. These included restoring collective decision-making, assigning economic affairs to a leader with genuine economic expertise and extensive administrative experience, ending the practice of forming exclusive inner circles and political factions in the selection and appointment of officials, rejecting the portrayal of Xi Jinping as a reformer and adjusting China's foreign policy direction, among other demands. For a considerable period afterward, many unusual developments emerged within Chinese Communist Party politics. John Yuxia appeared increasingly assertive, while Xi Jinping seemed more like a puppet who simply followed orders. Nearly all the CCP officials who were removed from office or pushed aside were members of Xi's own faction. Among them were Zhang Xiaojun, the former director of the Central Military Commission's General Office and an absolutely trusted aide who had followed Xi for 20 years, as well as Jing Junhai, the former Party Secretary of Jilin Province. Jing was said to have advanced his career by overseeing renovations to Xi Junction Cemetery and was derisively described by outside observers as Xi Jinping's household servant. Many others were reportedly affected as well. If the claim that John Yuxia confessed to colluding with senior Party elders and secretly plotting Xi Jinping's removal is true, then the rumors and strange political developments seen previously would now have a plausible explanation. Many overseas commentators had also argued that although John Yuxia, as the first-ranked vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, had the authority to mobilize the armed forces, he would have found it extremely difficult to accomplish anything on his own without coordination and support from the Party's top leadership, especially its veteran political figures. John, however, did not immediately force Xi Jinping from power, leaving Xi with a small window of opportunity to recover. At the time, reports from multiple sources claimed that Xi had secretly contacted a number of military commanders and launched several counter-offensives. The first few attempts reportedly failed, but the final one succeeded. This culminated on January 24th of this year, when the CCP military suddenly announced that John Yuxia and Liu Zhenli had been removed from their positions and placed under investigation. John Yuxia's hesitation and willingness to compromise had, from that moment onward, planted the seeds of his own downfall. The Rise of the National Restoration Party In fact, as Xi Jinping has increasingly concentrated power in his own hands and imposed authoritarian rule, the number of people opposing him and seeking to remove him from power has continued to grow. Yuan Hongbing, a legal scholar based in Australia, told Vision Times that a democratic revolutionary political organization known as the National Restoration Party has emerged. The group openly declares that its goal is to overthrow Xi Jinping's regime, eradicate what it calls the According to information provided to Yuan by conscientious insiders within the system, an internal document from the CCP's Ministry of Public Security indicates that the authorities have already begun A source said that, in terms of its operational strategy, the organization is What does that mean? It means that anyone who accepts the National Restoration Party's principles and responds to its call is automatically regarded as a member. The party is seeking to promote resistance movements and popular uprisings throughout China with the aim of bringing an end to the CCP's authoritarian rule. Citing sources within the system, Yuan said that The group has reportedly carried out more than 100 successful operations and obtained substantial resources. Insiders within the system have described this as a serious political crisis for Xi Jinping. They say that This has created unprecedented room for the resistance movement to expand rapidly. Just a few days ago, Guangxi was struck by Tropical Storm Maysac. Heavy rainfall reportedly caused several reservoirs to burst their banks, triggering catastrophic flooding. Around 900 venomous snakes escaped from captivity, and local residents suffered heavy casualties. Yet none of the seven members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, including Xi Jinping, made any public statement or visited the disaster zone. One angry Guangxi resident wrote a message addressed to Xi Jinping and the CCP on the door of a public restroom. Xi Jinping, step down! Guangxi is suffering from devastating floods. Where the hell are you? Since the beginning of July, China has been repeatedly battered by tornadoes, earthquakes, Typhoon Maysac, and Typhoon Bavi. More than half the country has reportedly been severely affected by various natural disasters, resulting in widespread casualties. And what about Xi Jinping? He has issued nothing more than verbal instructions. Every day he remains holed up in his Beijing stronghold, issuing orders from afar, without once visiting the front lines. As one internet user put it, Xi Jinping only inspects places where there are no disasters, wherever it is safest. That is hardly surprising. A leader like him appears only once in several decades. Naturally, he values his own life above all else. Xi Jinping set to visit Shanghai, roads sealed off, and airspace tightly controlled. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jin announced at a regular press conference on July 13 that Xi Jinping would attend the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai. Soon afterward, a Chinese internet user posted the following message. At 10 a.m. on July 14, our institute's group chat shared a notice stating that, under orders from the Shanghai municipal government and the Shanghai Public Security Bureau, all low, slow, and small aircraft, including drones, would be strictly prohibited from being launched or operated anywhere in the city from midnight on July 15, 2026 until midnight on July 20, 2026. All faculty members and students were instructed to take note and suspend every low-altitude flight activity, including test flights conducted for scientific research. The notice also warned that anyone violating the restrictions would be dealt with by the public security authorities. Other internet users reported, the Bund area in Huangpu District and the North Bund area in Hongkou District have both been completely sealed off. Not only are vehicles barred from entering, but pedestrians and tourists are also prohibited. The Shanghai municipal authorities issued the restriction today. The reports quickly sparked heated discussion online. Internet users mocked the measures, saying, the man whose arrival causes the internet to be cut off wherever he goes now wants to tell the world how the internet should be governed. Since the beginning of the year, drones and light aircraft have seemingly hovered like a constant shadow over Xi Jinping, making him increasingly suspicious, fearful, and uneasy. Have Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party reached the end of the road? Veteran journalist and author Bill Gertz publicly named Xi Jinping in a post on X and also invoked another name, Soleimani. He wrote, If a military attack is launched against Taiwan, the kind of drone decapitation strike carried out against Soleimani will be repeated in Beijing. The targets would include every member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, including Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping. There is a force in the world capable of stopping the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The Chinese Communist Party, like its Soviet predecessor, will be swept into the ash heap of history. Later, following Maduro's arrest, former U.S. Defense Department official Tony Hu gave an interview to Mirror News. Hu stated unequivocally that the United States had the ability to carry out a direct decapitation strike against China's ruling elite, that is, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. If you are asking about capability, there is no question that the United States possesses it, Hu said. That has been demonstrated time and again. We entered Iran, the U.S. military went into Iran, completed the operation, and withdrew within 90 minutes, with almost no meaningful response. This time, U.S. forces also entered Venezuela and similarly encountered no significant resistance. Do you think Xi Jinping's fear is unfounded? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Deng Pufang and Liu Yuan team up. Is there an August deadline for Xi? According to information obtained through private channels by Shanghai businessman Hu Liren, the Chinese Communist Party's Second Red Generation, the descendants of senior CCP revolutionaries, and its Second Military Generation, the descendants of high-ranking military officers, are now entering a phase of broad, coordinated backlash against Xi Jinping. This resistance is said to have moved beyond verbal discontent and developed into concrete political action. Reports claim that members of the Second Red Generation have formed an alliance led by Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping, working alongside several influential figures within the party, including Liu Yuan, the son of Liu Shaoqi, to deliver a political demand to China's top leader with a clear deadline. They are reportedly demanding that Xi Jinping resign before August 30th this year. Why has Deng Pufang emerged as the leading figure? Within the CCP's political lineage, the Deng family represents the ideological legitimacy of China's reform and opening-up era. Although Xi Jinping has spent the past several years using various means to marginalize the party elders, he has remained wary of confronting Deng Pufang directly, much like someone afraid to strike a rat for fear of breaking the valuable objects around it. The fundamental reason the Second Red Generation and the Second Military Generation have chosen this moment to risk everything is their own interests. During the first three decades of reform and opening-up, these families relied on the extensive resources and networks established by their fathers and grandfathers in the military and local governments to gain control over highly profitable industries such as energy, finance, and real estate. Enriching themselves in the process, there was an unspoken understanding that economic privileges would be tolerated in exchange for political stability. Xi Jinping's decade-long campaign of selective anti-corruption, however, has completely shattered this unwritten arrangement. Countless members of the Second Military Generation have been forced to watch as their family assets were confiscated, their close associates arrested, and they themselves face the prospect of marginalization or even political purging. If corruption is a crime, then who is the most corrupt of all? Hu Liren argues that Xi Jinping's own family is the biggest rat in the system. Some have even alleged that the family has used a range of secret channels to appropriate benefits worth as much as 3 trillion yuan. Whether or not that rumored figure is entirely accurate, the allegation has reportedly become a powerful rallying point within both the military and the Second Red Generation. Members of the Second Military Generation still command extensive resources and personal networks throughout the middle and lower levels of the armed forces. They have come to believe that if Xi is allowed to continue acting without restraint, they may all eventually end up in prison. Hu Liren therefore believes that the internal power struggle within the CCP is now approaching what he calls the critical threshold of civil war. To understand the present rupture between the military and China's top leadership, it is necessary to return to March 2018, a moment that altered the course of Chinese history. At the time, the first session of the 13th National People's Congress was held in Beijing. Its agenda included amending the constitution and abolishing presidential term limits. To ensure that the constitutional amendment passed, military personnel reportedly entered the assembly hall itself. This near-open display of coercive force left the more than 2,000 delegates present with little choice but to obediently vote in favor. In substance, the passage argues, it amounted to a military coup. According to Hu Liren's analysis, the key figure capable of deploying troops into the National People's Congress hall to support Xi Jinping's bid for lifelong rule was Zhang Youxia, who was then serving as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Military personnel were allegedly present not only inside the voting venue, but were also deployed in large numbers outside the hall. A powerful figure within the armed forces, Zhang Youxia was both a member of the second military generation and one of Xi Jinping's loyal allies during the early years of Xi's leadership. The cruelty of politics, however, lies in the fact that yesterday's loyal supporter often becomes tomorrow's threat. Zhang Youxia could never have imagined that after once using military boots to help Xi Jinping trample the law, the poisonous consequences would one day fall upon his own head. Now, the passage claims he has been detained by Xi Jinping. Hu Liren believes that Xi may have assumed that controlling the security forces in Beijing would allow him to control all of China. In reality, however, he is now facing fierce resistance from the entire network of interests associated with the second red generation and the second military generation. This resistance resembles a silent coup advancing step by step toward the August 30th deadline. 48 hours at the Xizhou State Guest Hotel Can Xi Jinping win over the party elders? From July 15 to July 16, 2026, Xi Jinping attended an artificial intelligence conference at the Xizhou State Guest Hotel in Shanghai. According to Jiang Feng, Xi hoped to use the event as a political trump card to score points, restore his standing, and persuade the public that he still deserved to remain on the throne. But the display was not enough to convince the party elders that he remained capable of leading China. According to Jiang Feng, their cold verdict was simple. Xi Jinping must resign. These veteran Communist Party figures have survived enough political storms to become masters of the system. They do not need to understand artificial intelligence. They only need to understand Xi Jinping. He has been in power for 13 years. That is more than enough time for the party's senior figures to judge a man's abilities, and enough time for state-owned enterprises and local government finances to be devastated by policies personally designed and imposed by him. Most notably, even within the CCP itself, Zhu Rongji had reportedly lost all confidence in Xi as early as a year ago. It is important to remember that Zhu Rongji was never a Western-style free-market reformer. He came from the planned economy system and was responsible for introducing China's tax-sharing system. Few people believed more strongly than he did in the state's ability to concentrate its strength to accomplish major tasks. Moreover, Zhu has been retired for more than 20 years. He is famously tight-lipped and has never publicly commented on serving Chinese leaders. If even he had completely shaken his head in disapproval a year ago, one should consider just how serious that loss of confidence must have been. What then has Xi Jinping turned China's national development strategy into over the past 13 years? The Party elders opened three blood-soaked ledgers and placed them before him. What they saw was one staggeringly foolish pileup after another. The first vehicle was real estate. Xi believed the sector was moving too quickly. So he introduced the three red lines, slamming on the brakes while the car was still racing at 120 kilometers per hour. He created no new sources of tax revenue for local governments, left property developers no escape route, and gave no consideration to the financial security of tens of millions of families. The result was a wave of collapsing developers and local governments stripped of their primary source of revenue. Tens of millions of people were left carrying 30-year mortgages while standing in the rain outside unfinished apartment buildings, homes they could not live in but were still required to keep paying for. This, in turn, triggered a nationwide mortgage payment boycott. In effect, it directly destroyed the foundation of household wealth across the country. The second vehicle was the semiconductor industry. Xi ordered the launch of a massive chip manufacturing campaign that resembled the great leap forward era drive to produce steel. Cement traders, property developers, and even pig farmers took over companies overnight, reinvented themselves as semiconductor experts, and began chasing government subsidies. A single project, Wuhan Hongshan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, consumed 12 billion yuan. In the end, even the factory was never completed. Its only ASML lithography machine, still sealed in its shipping crate, was pledged to a bank as collateral. Trillions of yuan were poured into the sector. What remained were fraudsters who pocketed compensation and subsidies, finished factories, and enormous piles of bad debt on the balance sheets of state-owned banks. The third vehicle was the new energy vehicle industry. Once the sector was branded as a project personally championed by the top leader, local governments rushed to build factories and compete for production output. When the cars failed to sell, companies cut prices. Businesses plunged into a price war, bleeding one another dry. When price cuts still failed to generate sales, some companies reportedly created shell firms and bought their own vehicles in order to claim government subsidies. In the end, tens of thousands of brand new cars were abandoned on empty plots of land, forming spectacular electric vehicle graveyards. No one dared to stop production. Halting the factories would have meant admitting that the direction set by the General Secretary had been wrong. With these three bad debts laid out on the table, the party elders now see artificial intelligence as merely the fourth vehicle Xi Jinping is preparing to crash. The greater irony is that the technical foundation of artificial intelligence depends on the free flow of information, the integrity of data, and the unrestricted collision of ideas across borders. But what will artificial intelligence face in Xi Jinping's China? Before any large language model can be released online, the first step is not to test its algorithms, but to submit it to the cyberspace administration of China for ideological review. These models must first enter the mind, enter the heart, and enter the soul. Above all, they must study Xi Jinping thought. When the human mind has already been forced into silence, how can a computer be expected to become intelligent? This is the recurring pattern of decline shared by every leader-driven project under Xi Jinping's system. Bad news is suppressed, while fabricated data is reported upward. Failing projects continue to receive funding, while those who are genuinely capable of developing technology and building products are denied resources. Those who are best at shouting slogans, writing flattering reports, and posing for photographs with senior leaders are pushed to the front of the line. Eventually, the entire industry is dragged into price wars, debt, and chronic overcapacity. Xi Jinping himself, meanwhile, is always right. Success is credited to his personal leadership. Failure is blamed on Western suppression or on subordinates who supposedly failed to carry out his instructions correctly. With this style of leadership, can China truly move forward into a new era? Please share your thoughts in the comments. Thank you for watching. Beidaihe 2026, the most anticipated leadership gathering in years, is unfolding amid explosive rumors of a life-or-death power struggle over Xi Jinping's fate. Zheng Qinghong is said to favor a Mao-style verdict of 70% merit, 30% fault, while Wen Jiabao is reportedly demanding answers about Li Keqiang's death and the whereabouts of two missing generals. With both camps deadlocked, Hu Jintao may be playing the decisive card, bringing Hu Chunhua back into the politburo. How much of this is true? Let's take a closer look. Leaked secrets from the Beidaihe Talks commentator Jian Feng recently claimed that, according to a negotiating framework leaked from inside China's political establishment, Zheng Qinghong insists that Xi Jinping may step down, but should be judged in the same way as Mao Zedong. 70% merit, 30% fault. Officials who directly carried out Xi's orders, such as Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, could be handed over. But the entire conservative camp and the red families must not be subjected to criminal purges. Wen Jiabao, however, reportedly argues that the death of Li Keqiang and the whereabouts of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli must be fully investigated. In his view, these alleged criminal accounts must be settled. The two sides have therefore reached an impasse. No one is willing to draw a conclusion about Zhang Youxia or Liu Zhenli. As Zheng Qinghong and Wen Jiabao remain locked in a bitter struggle, Hu Jintao, the Chinese Communist Party's fourth-generation leader, has quietly played what may be his most decisive card. The scope of any purge can be negotiated later, but Hu Chunhua must first be restored to the Politburo. For Hu Jintao, this is unfinished business from the CCP's 20th Party Congress when he was publicly escorted out of the closing session. Xi Jinping allegedly tore up a last-minute agreement. Li Keqiang was forced to step aside, Wang Yang retired, and Hu Chunhua even lost his Politburo seat. At the closing ceremony, Hu Jintao appeared to be trying to examine the leadership list before being removed from the hall in full view of the world. Now the argument goes he is returning to the source of political power, seeking to reverse a succession path that Xi had forcibly diverted and restore its original course. Hu also understands that any immediate decision on Xi's fate, the extent of criminal investigations, or the identity of China's next top leader would provoke joint opposition from both Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong. His first move, therefore, is simply to return Hu Chunhua to the Politburo and place him back in contention as a sixth-generation successor. By the 21st Party Congress, if Zeng Qinghong tries to elevate the conservative Ding Shuixiang, Hu Chunhua would already be in a position to challenge him. Zeng reportedly has little justification for blocking Hu Chunhua's return. Who is not Wang Yang? Wang might push for separating the Party from the government, while Hu Chunhua is unlikely to threaten the core interests of the red families or powerful business elites. From Wen Jiabao's perspective, Hu Chunhua has no vast interest group behind him, but does have broad, local government experience and a strong record of implementation. On issues such as disclosing officials' assets and investigating unanswered questions surrounding Li Keqiang's death, he may at least be willing to take on the political risk. Securing Hu Chunhua a seat would be like placing a major piece on the board ahead of the 21st Party Congress to block Ding Shuixiang. The most important thing, for now, is simply to get him back into the room. To help local officials judge which way the wind is blowing, two sharply conflicting signals were reportedly sent through the bureaucracy just before the Beidaihe meeting. The first was that old scores would be settled. Kai-Fu Chow, the former head of the state broadcasting regulator, was suddenly placed under investigation a decade after retirement. The move was interpreted as a strike at Jia Qinglin's network. Anyone prepared to defend Xi Jinping at all costs could see their allies systematically removed. The second signal was that a safe exit remained possible. Zhang Yuzhuo, head of the state assets regulator, reportedly surrendered control of a key economic portfolio and was transferred to lead the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Those who voluntarily give up power, the message suggested, may still preserve their dignity and personal safety. One man was detained, another was allowed to leave safely. Political insiders immediately understood the message. But local officials still face one overriding question. What happens if Xi Jinping attempts to mobilize the military again? Before entrusting their fortunes and their lives to the CCP's retired elders, they need to know one thing. Does Xi still have the power to command the armed forces and reverse the situation? The answer, the commentary concludes, lies in Baoding and Xishan. Four lines of defense. Is Xi Jinping unable to act? On January 20th, Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli were reportedly arrested. In a single night, the first-ranking vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and the PLA's chief of staff were both removed. Under normal circumstances, this should have been the perfect opportunity for Xi Jinping to exploit the chaos, install his own loyalists, and seize full control of the military. But according to Jiang Feng, before Xi could celebrate, he discovered that he had entered a dead end prepared long in advance. Liu Yuan and Wang Yan immediately activated a top-secret, four-part containment plan. The first line was Baoding. Liu Yuan left Beijing overnight and headed directly to Baoding. He understood that if all personnel communications and command authority remained inside Beijing's August 1st building, Xi could take over the military simply by sealing off its headquarters. Baoding controls substantial forces south of Beijing and key routes into the capital. Liu Yuan's arrival there effectively pulled the military out of Beijing's political quagmire and sent a message to the armed forces. Zhang Yuxia may have been arrested, but military power must not be handed back to Xi alone. The second line was Kunming. Wang Yan reportedly took highly classified documents there. What he carried was not military power, but the central communications channel for party documents and the complete documentary basis for the political arrangements proposed by senior party elders. Weapons alone are not enough. Without legitimate authorization inside the party, any unit refusing Xi's orders could be branded as part of a military coup, giving the rest of the armed forces a pretext to suppress it. Wang, therefore, had to preserve the party's internal legal procedures in Kunming. As long as those documents remained there, Xi could not fabricate a central committee resolution. The third line was Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao holding Beijing. Hu remained in the capital to safeguard political legitimacy through his status as a former general secretary and former chairman of the Central Military Commission. With Hu present, the military's refusal to obey Xi's personal orders could not easily be portrayed as a rebellion by rogue generals. Instead, it could be framed as an effort by senior party figures to correct one-man rule. Wen stayed in Beijing to stabilize the state council and the disciplinary system, preventing Xi from using the disorder to launch surprise arrests or retaliatory purges against local officials who had changed sides. The fourth line was Xishan, which allegedly severed the tactical communications network. The August 1 building is merely an administrative headquarters. Xishan controls the military's strategic communications and emergency command systems. Xi could sit in his office stamping documents and signing orders, but it would mean little. Unless Xishan connected him to the theater command's communications frequencies, his military orders would remain nothing more than paper. The arrangement was designed to be nearly impossible to break. Xi might control the August 1 building, but not the forces stationed around Baoding. He might possess the official seal, but not the political authorization preserved in Kunming. He could attempt to issue orders by force, but Xishan could refuse to transmit them. He could call the resistance a coup, but Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao remained in Beijing to block that interpretation. Even if Xi controlled Zhongnanhai, he could not seize all four sources of power at once. More troubling for Xi, the account claims, is that after Zhang Youxia's downfall, two newly promoted generals, one overseeing military operations and the other responsible for disciplinary reviews, were not Xi loyalists. The PLA Daily has also reportedly stopped using the phrase the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the CMC chairman since July 11. Soon afterward, the newspaper took the unusual step of publicly exposing internal military problems. Troops using flares carelessly during night exercises and revealing their positions, junior officers refusing to make decisions without requesting approval at every level, and offices consuming eight printer cartridges a month to support bureaucratic formalism. On the surface, these were criticisms of lower-level units. In reality, the commentary argues, they raised a broader question. After more than a decade of the chairman's personal leadership, how had the military actually been managed? The PLA has not publicly abolished the position of Central Military Commission chairman. Xi may still attend meetings, preside over promotion ceremonies, and sign official documents. But whether his orders are transmitted and whether the theater commands obey them is allegedly no longer his decision alone. Once the military stops following a single chain of command from Zhongnanhai, local officials' first response is not to shout slogans of loyalty. It is to search for an escape route. That became especially clear, the commentary claims, after Ma Xingri was placed under legal investigation, followed closely by his ally Guo Yongham, the party secretary of Guangzhou. Local officials saw a brutal reality. Xi Jinping's protective umbrella no longer worked. Ma had once guarded southern China and Xinjiang on Xi's behalf and overseeing major national projects. Yet in the end, his entire network was still purged. Hu Jintao vs. Zheng Qinghong According to John Feng, local officials are unlikely to openly support either faction. Their priority is to ensure that, regardless of whom the party elders ultimately elevate, they are not so closely tied to Xi Jinping that they are excluded from the next power structure. To protect themselves, they are expected to surrender three things. Records of past projects, control over local personnel appointments, and the authority to nominate delegates to the 21st Party Congress. Handing these powers to a new central decision-making body would amount to acknowledging that Xi alone will no longer decide future personnel changes, investigations into past liabilities, or who enters the next leadership lineup. This, the commentary argues, is the common logic behind recent personnel movements involving Guangdong, Jiangsu, Taizhou, Henan, and Xinjiang. Local governments have begun moving away from Xi's one-way command structure and toward a collective central leadership overseen by senior party elders. They are still watching to see whether Wen Jiabao and Zheng Qinghong can agree on the limits of any political reckoning, whether Hu Chunhua can first return to the Politburo, and whether the elders can genuinely control the next round of senior appointments. Hu Chunhua's possible return is not a new card suddenly pulled from Hu Jintao's sleeve. It has reportedly been in play since the spring, after Wen Jiabao appeared publicly in late March. Beijing's first task was said to be determining who would oversee the review of the personnel networks, projects, and security apparatus Xi had built over the previous decade. By early April, according to an unnamed source inside China, Hu Chunhua had allegedly been appointed to lead a temporary task force reviewing the Xi faction. The role was never announced publicly and would not appear in official reports, but insiders would not need to wait for confirmation. Once working groups began examining old projects, the organization department started reviewing personnel files, and local authorities suddenly received requests for additional documents and explanations, provincial party secretaries and ministers would immediately understand that the political winds had shifted. Hu Chunhua's reduced public profile since April should also be viewed in this context. The commentary claims he has allegedly been operating within a non-public mechanism, reviewing local personnel lists and their connections to projects inherited from Xi's political system. But this arrangement created a problem. Although Hu Chunhua was reportedly overseeing the review, he remained only a vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He could handle special assignments authorized by senior elders, but he had no formal seat in the Politburo. Hu Jintao therefore needed to close that gap. Restoring Hu Chunhua to the Politburo would not simply be an act of revenge. It would formally recognize the responsibilities he had already assumed since April. Speculation about Xi Jinping's fate suggests that he may not be arrested immediately, as the Gang of Four were. A more likely scenario, according to these claims, would be a prolonged state of political suffocation. Xi might temporarily retain his titles and still be allowed to attend meetings, but he would no longer control personnel appointments or the military. Local officials would stop following his instructions. When the 21st Party Congress is eventually held, the most awkward scene could be Xi still seated on the presiding platform, while the more than 2,000 delegates below him and the newly formed Central Committee and Politburo are no longer a leadership team he alone selected. Thank you for watching. See you next time.