Xi’s Purge Punished! Hu Jintao’s Revenge Begins — 3 Near-Deaths & A Secret Coup!

At the Chinese Communist Party's 20th Congress, when Hu Jintao was publicly escorted out of the hall, many believed that in the era of Xi Jinping's near-absolute power, Hu would be completely sidelined. However, rumors have recently spread that Hu Jintao and former Premier Wen Jiabao are leading a group of party elders who have, from behind the scenes, managed to turn the tide and rein in Xi's authority. On May 19th, both People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency simultaneously published articles stressing the principles of scientific, democratic, and law-based decision-making. These were hallmark slogans of the Hu Jintao era, but they had largely faded after Xi took power. Their sudden reappearance has fueled speculation that Hu Jintao may be making a comeback. Why has there been such a dramatic shift? What is the real story behind the rivalry between Hu and Xi? Let's explore this in today's program. A Loyal Party Member Hu Jintao was born in 1942 in Taizhou County, Jiangsu Province, into a well-off tea merchant family. According to relatives, young Hu was reserved, fond of reading, and known for his cultured and gentle demeanor. In 1959, he was admitted to the Department of Hydraulic Engineering at Tsinghua University, one of China's most prestigious institutions. There, he excelled not only as a student but also as an artistic youth with a passion for dancing, serving as the secretary of the Student Performing Arts Troupe. It was also at Tsinghua that he met his future wife. After graduation, Hu stayed on at the university as an advisor. When the cultural revolution erupted, he responded to Mao Zedong's call and went to Gansu, then one of China's poorest provinces, to work as a grassroots technician. Soon after, he shifted to party work, becoming an office secretary and later deputy party secretary of his unit, laying the foundation for his future political career. In the 1980s, the CCP promoted the four modernizations of its cadres— revolutionary spirit, younger leadership, better education, and professional expertise. With his Tsinghua background and grassroots experience, Hu caught the attention of Song Ping, the Gansu Provincial Party Secretary. With Song's recommendation, Hu was promoted directly into the Communist Youth League's central leadership, becoming first secretary of the Central Committee in 1984. A year later, he was appointed party secretary of Guizhou Province, where he made some achievements in poverty alleviation. In early 1989, at just 47, Hu was transferred to Tibet as party secretary during a time of turmoil, becoming the first Han Chinese in the role without a military background. That same year, the sudden death of the 10th Dalai Lama at age 51 triggered waves of Tibetan protests, creating a severe crisis for Beijing. What followed forever altered Hu Jintao's image as a mild-mannered technocrat. Faced with mass demonstrations and street unrest in Lhasa, Hu opted for harsh repression in line with CCP directives. At midnight on March 8, 1989, under Hu's command, the Tibetan Party Committee imposed martial law in Lhasa. Tanks and heavily armed troops rolled into the streets, gunfire mingled with cries of anguish and the rumble of engines, and Tibet's holy city turned overnight into a living hell. The martial law lasted 14 months. Unofficial estimates say hundreds were killed in Lhasa, and thousands more were injured or arrested. After the crackdown, the CCP propaganda machine went to work, recasting the enforcer as a hero. The Tibet Daily ran a photo of Hu Jintao wearing a steel helmet as he visited martial law troops in the streets. That image reportedly drew praise from Deng Xiaoping. Hu Jintao stood firm on principles and showed no hesitation. Thanks to this endorsement and with continued backing from his mentor Song Ping, Hu was elevated in 1992 as the designated successor to Jiang Zemin for the next generation of party leadership. Three assassination attempts by Jiang Zemin, yet the title of successor proved less a shield than a curse for Hu Jintao. From 1992 to 2002, he lived under the shadow of Jiang Zemin, moving with extreme caution for a full decade. After Deng Xiaoping's death, Jiang sought to build his own line of successors and tried repeatedly, though unsuccessfully, to remove Hu from the path. In 2002, Hu finally rose to become the CCP's top leader, assuming the post of General Secretary. But Jiang, through loyalists in the military such as Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Jiang Wanyan, staged what could be called a half-coup. At the Presidium meeting of the 16th Party Congress, they suddenly put forward a special motion demanding that Jiang remain chairman of the Central Military Commission. Confronted with pressure from senior generals, Hu had no choice but to bow his head and declare his full agreement. From then on, he entered a decade-long struggle in which, as people put it, his orders never went beyond Jiang Nanhai. The military and the political-legal apparatus, both crucial levers of power, remained firmly under Jiang's control. In name, Hu was general secretary. In reality, he was a puppet on strings. But mere control was not enough to satisfy Jiang Zemin, especially regarding the brutal suppression of Jiang had acted unilaterally, facing protests and lawsuits abroad, and widespread condemnation as a perpetrator of crimes against humanity. He lived in constant fear that if he lost power, he would face retribution. Hu Jintao, meanwhile, never openly endorsed Jiang's bloody campaign. To secure his own successor and protect his legacy, Jiang reportedly directed multiple assassination attempts against Hu. The most dangerous incident took place in May 2006 on the Yellow Sea. While Hu, then chairman of the Central Military Commission, was inspecting the North Sea fleet aboard the PLA Navy's most advanced missile destroyer, two warships in the fleet suddenly turned their guns on his vessel during a drill. Five sailors were killed instantly. The destroyer carrying Hu raced out of the exercise zone at full speed. Shaken, Hu did not dare return to Beijing immediately. He secretly flew to Yunnan and remained there for a week. A later investigation revealed the attack order had come from Jiang Dingfa, the Navy commander at the time, and a trusted follower of Jiang Zemin. Months later, Jiang himself died suddenly in a Beijing hospital. No obituary, no funeral, his death shrouded in mystery. According to Hong Kong media, Hu narrowly escaped at least two other assassination attempts. Once in 2007 in Shanghai, when a time bomb was discovered in the hotel garage where he was staying, and again in 2009 during a naval parade in the Yellow Sea, when he received a last-minute tip-off and altered his itinerary to avoid disaster. Throughout that decade, Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao often of an abyss, as if walking on thin ice. Looking back, those were not empty words, but a vivid portrait of the perilous reality they faced. Stepping down completely, handing all power to Xi Jinping. After ten years of restraint, Hu Jintao finally reached the pinnacle of power on the eve of the 18th Party Congress. Yet during the handover of authority to Xi Jinping, he made a stunning decision, a complete step down. He transferred all three pillars of power, the party, the government, and the military, to Xi, while stressing two key points. First, that although he had once held high office, he would never interfere in politics after retirement. Second, that even the position of chairman of the Central Military Commission must not have At the time, observers believed Hu's move had two purposes. First, to strip away the lingering military and security power still clutched by Jiang Zemin. And second, to demonstrate his commitment to safeguarding the ideals of the Communist Party. In effect, this was Hu Jintao's greatest act of support for Xi Jinping, paving the way for him to consolidate power and later purge Jiang's faction. In fact, in 2015, while in the hospital, Hu clasped Xi's hand with tears in his eyes and urged him with four words, advance with courage. At the start of his tenure, Xi reciprocated with gestures of respect, often praising Hu Jintao as a man of high moral character and integrity. But the honeymoon of this political alliance did not last. As Xi's grip on power grew ever tighter, he began systematically eliminating all factions, including the Youth League faction, that had once helped him rise. The final rupture came in the most humiliating way imaginable, played out before the eyes of the world. On October 22, 2022, at the closing session of the 20th Party Congress, Hu Jintao tried to look at a folder on the table before him, but was blocked by Li Jiangshu. Then, on Xi Jinping's instructions, two staff members came forward to escort Hu out of the hall. Hu clearly resisted, struggling several times, even trying to grab the folder in front of Xi, only to have Xi press it down firmly. In the end, before the full glare of cameras and the watchful eyes of the Presidium, Hu Jintao was led out of the chamber. The other senior officials on the dais remained expressionless. No one dared to intervene. Analysts later noted that Hu was absent from the new Politburo lineup. Fearing that Hu Jintao might see the list and react angrily on the spot, potentially disrupting the atmosphere of Xi's third-term coronation, Xi ordered him removed in what some described as a political coup in real time. This moment marked the definitive collapse of the Hu-Xi alliance. Public opinion widely concluded that Hu Jintao's Youth League faction had been completely wiped out by Xi Jinping at that very point. The return of the gentlemen and a historic showdown. But nothing lasts forever, not even the position of supreme authority. Recently, several figures from the Communist Youth League faction have begun to re-emerge, sparking speculation that political winds are shifting, and Xi Jinping has lost a significant share of his power. The first sign came from Hu Chunhua, Hu Jintao's designated successor from the next generation, who had been sidelined by Xi and relegated to vice chairman of the CPPCC. This year, however, Hu Chunhua has been unusually visible. In April, he was unexpectedly tasked with overseeing Africa policy within the CCP's Community of Shared Future strategy, leading a delegation to three countries, a role typically reserved for Xi himself. Many saw this as a deliberate move to reactivate Hu Chunhua. By August, he accompanied Xi to a ceremony in Tibet, then led his own delegation to Ningchi, where he had once worked, following an itinerary that closely mirrored Xi's earlier inspection tour. Moreover, whether attending the Northeast Asia Expo or conducting agricultural surveys in Sichuan, Hu Chunhua was received with high-level protocol. He even resumed responsibilities in agriculture, reminiscent of his time as vice premier. If Hu Chunhua's new visibility is like a political weathervane, then the appearance of Hu Jintao's son, Hu Haifeng, is more like a political earthquake. In August, during a ceremony in Tibet, Hu Haifeng quietly appeared in a group photo alongside Xi Jinping. But state media conspicuously avoided mentioning him, as if deliberately hiding it. Just two months earlier, at the Lujiazui Forum in Shanghai, Hu Haifeng, still only a vice ministerial official, stood on equal footing with Chen Jining and other minister or vice state-level leaders to inaugurate a new association. In the CCP's hierarchy-obsessed political culture, such an arrangement was highly unusual and sent a powerful signal. Adding to the intrigue, on Tuesday, September 23, Turkey's official Facebook page reported, Ambassador Selçuk Unal had a protocol meeting with China's vice minister of civil affairs Hu Haifeng. The two sides exchanged views on strengthening bilateral cooperation. Commentator Xiao Shuojia recently claimed that adjustments to the CCP Politburo standing committee for the upcoming fourth plenum would be a three-down, three-up, Xi Jinping, Li Qian, and Cai Qi stepping down, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and Yuan Lich rising. Though unconfirmed, the signs suggest the Youth League faction is regaining influence. Could this be Hu Jintao's long-awaited revenge after years of forced patience and humiliation? In fact, around March 2024, when rumors about Xi's health began to spread, John Yoshida unexpectedly seized control of the military. He joined forces with party elders to reshape the balance of power in Zhongnanhai. To this day, many analysts believe that fierce internal struggles are raging within the CCP and that the anti-Xi faction is gaining the upper hand. In China, there's a saying, the wound on your foot comes from the path you chose yourself. Today, Xi Jinping finds himself isolated and betrayed. Many CCP officials and even their families have turned into his political enemies. Step by step, he brought this upon himself. Whether you believe in it or not, the law of cause and effect always shows itself in the end. No one should turn against the very people who once lifted them up, because one day, those people will do the same in return. As the ancients said, water can carry a boat, but it can also capsize it. Xi Jinping's failure lies not only in his lack of strategic vision, but also in his poor ability to command. If Sun Tzu were alive today, he might sigh. The wisdom of a thousand years of China clearly was not meant for Xi Jinping.