China's Fifth Plenum Reveals Growing Tensions Between Xi and the PLA

Hello everyone, welcome back. All right, Thursday night. Now, I've done several programs on the CCP's fifth plenum, but I'm not finished yet. There's one crucial topic I haven't explored in depth, and that is Xi Jinping's troubled relationship with the military. In fact, some of the most revealing insights from the plenum may concern his relationship with the People's Liberation Army and the changing power dynamics within the PLA itself. Let me start with a remarkable set of numbers. Let's look at how dramatically the military's representation at the party's central committee meetings has declined. Let me just, hold on, I want to make sure. Am I coming through okay? Audio works for people? Yes? Okay, I just want to make sure. All right. People say, oh, here's Chris. Hello. Hello. Okay. Puff, puff. I think there's a delay. Oh, yes. Someone say yes. Okay. Audio fine. Excellent. Thank you, Christy and Jeffrey. Okay. Let's look at some numbers. Okay. So when the 20th Central Committee was formed in 2022, it included 44 full members from the military. At the third plenum in July 2024, 42 of those 44 members attended. At the fourth plenum last October, the number dropped to just 15. At the fifth plenum this October, only five. So from 42 to 15 to five in just a little over two years. And that's an astonishing 88% decline in attendance. And you may wonder, who were the five? Well, I asked Chris to put together a slide so you can. You can see them. There they are. Well, you have General Zhang Shenming, vice chairman of the CMC. And then you have Dong Jun, China's defense minister. And then you have Yang Xuejun, who serves on the CMC's strategic planning commission. And then you have Yang Zhiliang, who's a vice admiral. who is the former political commissar of the southern theater command navy and then lieutenant general Yu Qingjiang, former deputy commander of the PLA air force. Now notice something of the five military central committee members reportedly attend attending the fifth plenum only Zhang Shenming and Dong Jun held clearly identifiable senior leadership positions. Yang Shijing serves in a strategic planning role, while the other two generals had already left their previous command positions. And not one of the five was a serving theater commander or service branch commander. Now, think about what it means. So for 14 years, Xi Jinping has worked relentlessly to bring the People's Liberation Army under his personal control. He reorganized its command structure, promoted his own generals, and insisted that the entire military answer to one man, the chairman of the CMC. And that man, of course, is himself. But look at what just happened. His military leadership team has collapsed. Now, the Fifth Plenum formally confirmed the expulsions of 16 senior military officials. including Zhang Youxia. Well, actually, the total number of expulsions were 32, 32 plus one. Thank And then half of that, 16 of the 32 came from the military. And of course, on the list is Zhang Youxia, one of China's second most powerful military leader. But his name was not surprising. What caught people's attention was not Zhang Youxia, you. but two other names. They were Two of Xi Jinping's formal aides in the military, in fact, the three men who successively played the role of his military chief of staff, have all been taken down. So yes, so Xi Jinping's three military gatekeepers are all gone. So let's start with the first man. There they are. Okay, Qin Shengxiang. Qin became director of the Central Military Commission's general office in October October 2012. Just right before Xi Jinping officially took over as the military leader or the CMC chairman. And in August 2017, he was transferred to become political commissar of the PLA Navy. I'm And more than eight months ago, on February the 26th, his membership in the National People's Congress was terminated or was revoked. So that means he's in trouble. Now, the second name is Zhong Shaojun. You have heard this name many times before. Because of the three men, Zhong had by far the closest personal relationship with Xi Jinping. He had worked for Xi Jinping for over 20 years. Actually, 24 years. Back in 2002, when Xi Jinping moved to Zhejiang province, Zhong became his secretary. Zhong has a degree in psychology. Yeah, and he followed Xi Jinping from Zhejiang to Shanghai and then from Shanghai to Beijing and eventually into the CMC. Now, he wasn't just handling official business. According to some accounts, he even helped manage Xi Jinping's personal and family affairs, including arrangements involving Xi Jinping's daughter. And in 2017, he became the... director of the CMC's general office, despite the fact that he had never worn the uniform. And precisely because of his lack of experience in military affair. Well, actually, he was not only the director of the CMC general office, he also oversaw military reforms for Xi Jinping. Okay. And so he reportedly clashed with Zhang Youxiang because, I mean, The man oversees the CMC general office and the military reforms did not have any military experience. And in 2024, Zhong was transferred to the National Defense University as political commissar. Now, Zhang Youxia was widely believed to be the one behind Zhong's removal from the CMC general office. And then now, last month, at the Fifth Plenum, Zhong Shaojun was expelled from the Communist Party. Now, the third man, Fang Yongxiang, we have not mentioned him much because he was put into the position in 2024. After Zhong Shaojun moved to the defense university. Now, this man was affiliated with another Xi Jinping loyalist, Miao Hua. He had previously served in the CMC political work department under Miao Hua. So when Miao Hua was removed last year, or actually it was in 2024, Fang is out. He is a Miao Hua affiliate. And then at the fifth plenum, his expulsion from the party was also confirmed. So there you have it, three consecutive directors of the CMC general office. All three are out. All three have suffered serious political setbacks. What did he make of that? Is Xi Jinping turning the knife inward, purging anyone around him whom he considers corrupt or disloyal? Or are Xi Jinping's closest political loyalists being systematically removed by forces beyond Xi's control? I believe the second explanation is more realistic. I've never been convinced by the argument that Xi Jinping still holds absolute power and is simply eliminating his own handpicked generals because he has suddenly developed an overwhelming hatred of corruption. If that's really what's happening, then Xi Jinping's judgment has deteriorated to an extraordinary degree. His suspicion of those around him would have become so consuming that he's destroying the PLA's command system. But I think the situation is not that simple. The successive downfalls of these three men tell us something important. Xi Jinping's personal power network inside the military has suffered a devastating blow. Why? Well, to understand that, we need to look at what the director of the CMC General Office actually does. The General Office is one of the most important administrative organs of the Central Military Commission. Official documents, requests for instructions, and reports intended for the chairman pass through this channel. Decisions and orders issued by the chairman also depend on this office for their transmission and implementation. So the general office handles coordination, meetings, documents, circulation, confidentiality, and other sensitive administrative responsibilities. Now think about the position of its director. Who gets access to the chairman? Which reports reach his desk? Which issues receive immediate attention? How are instructions communicated to the rest of the military leadership? The director may not personally control every one of those decisions, but he occupies a position. Thank I mean, he is basically considered Xi Jinping's military gatekeeper. It's part of the nervous system of China's military command. you So historically, when the secretaries and trusted aides very of a senior Communist Party leader are removed, much. there are usually two explanations. Either the leader himself has decided to replace them or the leader is gone and his associates are being removed along with him. But Xi Jinping represents a third... A very unusual possibility. He is still in office. He's still the party's general secretary and chairman of the CMC. Yet all three men who successfully managed his military office have fallen. And they're not just like retired or, you know, move on to other positions. They're being kicked out of the party. And that's a major humiliation, political humiliation. So that raised two fundamental questions. First, can Xi Jinping still protect the people closest to him? Consider Zhong Shaojun, the man who followed Xi Jinping all the way from Zhejiang to Zhongnanhai and served him for over 20 years. If Xi Jinping couldn't protect someone like him, then who among his loyalists could he still protect? And the second, what has happened to Xi Jinping's channels of information and command? When the director of the CMC's office is replaced, the administrative network around that position can also change. Who handles reports? Who coordinates instructions? Who manages the flow of sensitive information? These are minor bureaucratic details. They're directly connected to the exercise of power. And that brings us back to the argument that Xi Jinping is simply cleaning house himself. I find that explanation increasingly difficult to accept. Any leader who purges his own people must still preserve a functioning network of trusted subordinates. Removing one or two senior aides might be understandable. I shouldn't say removing. In this case, punishing. Punishing one or two senior aides may be understandable, But all three successive military keepers, I mean gatekeepers. While 80 percent, 88 percent of his top military leaders are wiped out, something much bigger must be happening here. So my interpretation is that Xi Jinping's personal network inside the PLA has been severely weakened. And the question becomes, can he still command the military system those loyalists once helped him run? Okay, and that brings us to the next topic I want to cover, which is linked to this one. This is the PLA Daily's unusual message, which is no one-man rule, because that development makes the previous question about Xi Jinping's authority in the military even more intriguing. Now, in the past two programs, I examined the Fifth Plenum's communique and full resolution in detail. Both of those two documents placed great emphasis on democratic centralism and collective decision-making. Not one man making every decision, not a party secretary acting as the sole master of his organization, but leadership through collective decision. Or a collective discussion, internal debate, and established procedures. And in Tuesday's program, I even explained how these principles were closely associated with the political legacy of Hu Jintao. You can check out that program. But here's something I didn't fully explore, and I didn't tell you, and I think it's very, very interesting. The revival of these Hu Jintao era governing principles didn't begin at the fifth planet. Similar ideas, I should say the same ideas, had already been appearing in the PLA's own newspaper. And not just once or twice, the message appeared repeatedly over nearly two years. So yes, it was the PLA that revived the Hu Jintao era. Governing principles, and this has been going on for two years. It began attracting attention in December 2024, when Zhang Youxia was still a powerful figure in the Central Military Commission. And what happened next makes the story even more interesting. So let's go back to December 2024. Something unusual was happening inside the PLA. On November 28th, If you still remember, Admiral Miao Hua, a powerful member handling personnel and political work for Xi Jinping in the military, was officially suspended. Then 11 days later, on December the 9th, the PLA Daily published an article titled Take the Lead in Upholding Collective Leadership. Now remember, the PLA Daily isn't an independent newspaper. It's the official newspaper of the Central Military Commission. So when it discusses how the military should be governed, its wording deserves particular attention. And this article contains some remarkable language. It declared that collective leadership was one of the party's highest principles. It criticized military leaders who made major decisions on their own, effectively turning party committees into rubber stamps. And then just two days later, on December the 11th, the newspaper published another article. It's called Take the Lead in Promoting Intra-Party Democracy. Listen to the word, democracy. This one went even further. It declared that a party secretary may be the leader of a committee, but must never become its sole master. Think about that. Just days after Xi Jinping's powerful military ally was suspended, the PLA's official newspaper was warning against one-person decision-making. Some China observers interpreted these articles as indirect criticism of Xi Jinping's highly centralized leadership style. But here's what's particularly interesting. These weren't isolated articles. The message continued. In November 30th, 2025, the PLA Daily published an article titled An Area of Responsibility is Not a Personal Fiefdom. It won against officials who monopolized authority and treated their areas of responsibility like private kingdoms. And it made a crucial distinction. Major decisions should be made collectively, listen to that word, by party committees. Individual commanders are responsible for implementing those decisions. In other words, collective leadership determines policy while individual commanders carry it out. In December, the newspaper continued emphasizing democratic centralism and collective leadership. And the message didn't stop there. By the way, these articles I've asked Chris to copy. The links to these articles, I mean, they're original, in their original Chinese form, in the description. So if you want to read them, you can. The links are below. Let me turn this thing off. Now, what's interesting is these messages survived Zhang Youxiang. In January this year, Zhang Youxiang and Liu Zhengli were taken down. They were two of China's most senior military commanders. If the PLA Daily's earlier emphasis on collective leadership had been approved by Zhang Youxia or authorized by Zhang Youxia or connected to Zhang Youxia, you might have expected the message to disappear after his downfall. But that's not what happened. On August the 16th, the newspaper published another fascinating article. It recalled how the breakdown of collective leadership And arbitrary individual decision-making had contributed to disastrous military decisions during the early law march. And the article essentially presented the dangers of unchecked personal authority as a lesson from the communist military history. Then, just one week before the Fifth Plenum, on October the 19th, the PLA Daily published another one. And this one is even more clear. The message is clearer. The article condemned officials who were arrogant, self-important, arbitrary in their decisions, and unwilling to tolerate criticism. It also called for protecting people who dare to express different opinions. In other words, the PLA Daily was emphasizing something absolutely essential to effective military leadership, that is, the ability to challenge a bad decision before it becomes a military disaster. And this isn't merely a philosophical issue. I mean, military commanders must rely on intelligence assessments, operational planning, alternative scenarios, and professional advice. If subordinates are afraid to conduct or to do their due diligence and relate their findings to their superiors, And critical information may never reach the decision makers, right? On a battlefield, one disastrous decision can cost thousands of lives. Now, none of the articles named Xi Jinping. And they drew on established Communist Party principles. But consider the messages conveyed right before the plenum. And both articles, I'm talking about the August one and then the October one, both appeared after Zhang Youxiang and Liu Zhengli had been placed under investigation or taken down. So people generally associate the PLA Daily's earlier emphasis on collective leadership with Zhang Youxiang because he was a career military officer with actual combat experience. He understood the importance of professional deliberation. And the dangers of decisions dominated by a single political leader. So, of course, I don't have direct evidence that Zhang Youxia was actually behind those articles. But people generally attributed his leadership in the military at the time, who encouraged the publishing of those articles. Okay, so regardless which faction in the military pushed those articles forward, here's what we know. Zhang Youxia was removed, yet the message about collective decision-making did not disappear. In fact, it continued even after his formal expulsion from the party. So was this really Zhang Youxia's personal political position, or had these ideas Meaning, collective decision and democratic centralism. I'm Had these ideas taken root more broadly within starting the military establishment? That's an important question. But either way, it doesn't help Xi Jinping's political standing. And what happened at the Fifth Plenum makes it even more interesting. to speak So let me show you how the Fifth Plenum remarkably echoed the PLA's articles. now. So on October the 29th, the Fifth Plenum adopted a major resolution on comprehensive party governance and discipline. When the full text was released on November 1st, it contained language remarkably similar to what the PLA Daily had been emphasizing for nearly two years. Remember the December 2024 article warning that a party secretary must never become the sole master of a committee? The Fifth Plenum Resolution called for regulating the authority of top officials, of the number ones, remember, and preventing individual leaders from substituting their personal opinions for collective decisions. Remember the PLA Daily's criticism of one-person decision-making? The resolution explicitly prohibited leaders from dominating discussions or disregarding collective decision-making procedures. And remember the October 19 article encouraging officials to speak the truth? The resolution called for protecting party members who expressed different opinions. It even stated that when significant disagreements arise over major issues, decisions must not be forced through. Now, let's be clear. The Fifth Plenum Resolution wasn't a military document. It applied to the Communist Party as a whole. But these similarities do make people pay attention because the PLA, we can't say that the PLA dictated the contents of the resolution. But the fact that the PLA publication or the PLA Daily was the first state media that used these languages, that called for these. political frameworks to be put in place. So if you look at the sequence, in December 2024, the PLA Daily emphasized collective leadership. Throughout 2025 and 2026, that message continued. In August 2026, after Zhang Yuxia was taken down, the PLA Daily warned about a disastrous Or disastrous consequences of arbitrary individual decision-making. And then in October, it condemned the suppression of dissent and encouraged officials to challenge mistakes. Then at the Fifth Plenum, similar principles appeared prominently in the party's most important documents. So is that a coincidence? All right, well, that will bring us to the central mystery of today's program, which is the question, does Xi Jinping still control the PLA? I have addressed this topic many times. I know not everyone is convinced that he does not. I'm just presenting you these findings from CCP's official documents and official press reports. None of the things I present tonight It's speculation. They're CCP's own documents and press reports. So Xi Jinping still holds China's highest military position, but does he still exercise effective control over the PLA? That's the million-dollar question. And I think we need to examine three things to answer that question. First, personnel. Who controls the people who command the military? Remember, Xi Jinping spent 14 years restructuring the PLA and promoting generals he believed would be loyal to him. But look at the results. He Weidong, Miao Hua, Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhengli, and numerous other senior commanders have been removed. And the Central Military Commission, originally composed of seven members, has been reduced to just two, including Xi Jinping himself. Most importantly, the vacant positions were not filled or are not filled. Now, here's what I find difficult to understand. If Xi Jinping is still firmly in control, why has he allowed the military's highest leadership body to become so depleted without rebuilding it? If he personally orchestrated all the purges, like many top experts believe. Why hasn't he appointed a new generation of trusted commanders? Because when you take out someone, you want to put someone in. You don't want your military to be a hollow organization, right? So the prolonged vacancies on such a large scale raise serious questions about what's really happening inside the military leadership. So that's our criteria number one, personnel. Number two, command. Can Xi Jinping still issue orders and expect them to be carried out? This is even more important than personnel appointments. Now the removal of his three successive military gatekeepers has seriously challenged his real command. Who coordinates major decisions? Who controls the flow of information? Who resolves disagreements among senior commanders? And who ensures that orders from the CMC are carried out? Remember, holding the title of military chairman and exercising effective military command are not necessarily the same thing. Which brings us to the third test. That's official party documents and the political language they use. This may be the most revealing of all. I don't think any major Western analysts have paid attention to this, but this is a major revelation. Okay, so remember that in 2017, at the 19th Party Congress, two very important military formulations were incorporated into the Communist Party constitution. One was Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military. In Chinese, it's called Xi Jinping Qiang Jun Si Xiang. The other was Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System, Jun Wei Zhu Xi Fu Ze Zhi. Okay, these weren't ordinary political slogans. They became part of the party's formal constitutional framework. I mean, basically, one is Xi Jinping's military thought, and the other is saying Xi Jinping, the chairman, is in charge of the CMC. That's what the two things, the two formulations essentially say. And they became part of the party's formal constitutional framework. And for years, they were repeatedly invoked in official documents or state media to reinforce Xi Jinping's leadership over the armed forces. But something unusual happened at the fifth plenum. Neither formulation appeared in the official communique, and neither appeared in the full resolution released three days later. Not once. The communique is shorter, but the full resolution was long. It was 17,000 words. And instead, the resolution devoted... considerable attention to democratic centralism, collective leadership, all these jargons associated with Hu Jintao. Now, I want to make it clear, neither military doctrine has been removed from the party constitution. Both remain formally enforced, but their omission from these two important documents issued from the Fifth Plenum is worth examining. After all, these formulations are closely associated with Xi Jinping's military authority. And now, at a time when the military leadership is undergoing extraordinary upheaval, both formulations are absent from the party's two most important and authoritative documents. What does that tell us? If Xi Jinping is still firmly in command, why are these formulations Missing from both documents. And why does this coincide with the renewed emphasis on Hu Jintao's legacy? Of course, the PLA Daily continued to affirm the chairman responsibility system after the plenum. You know, once in a while they were dropping that line. So the omission doesn't mean that Xi Jinping's military or his formal military authority It has not been abolished, but there's a big difference between party resolution and media reports because the weight they carry is completely different. So I find it increasingly difficult to assume that Xi Jinping's actual military power is as secure as his official titles suggest. And if the party's top leader no longer exercise decisive control over the military, that creates a problem. A problem that China has faced before, that is the split of... Let me tell you what happened. Okay, let's go back to 1980. So, here are these two. So, at the time, Hua Guofeng, Mao's chosen successor, was still chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Deng Xiaoping was not. But Deng Xiaoping had already emerged as... As Deng consolidated his power, Hua's official titles increasingly failed to reflect the actual balance of power. And in 1981, Deng Xiaoping formally replaced Hua as CMC chairman. So it doesn't matter. Deng Xiaoping's real command of the military was far more superior than Hua Guofeng. So in other words, China had already experienced a period when the man holding the highest military title wasn't necessarily the man exercising the greatest influence over the PLA. And then there's another example that's also during the 1980s, when Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang successively held the Communist Party's top leadership position, while Deng Xiaoping retained decisive influence over the military. What happened? We'll pause. Both party leaders were kicked out by Deng Xiaoping, right? Both were forced out of power. So these experiences exposed the fundamental problem with the Communist Party's leadership structure. When political authority and military authority are divided between different leaders, disagreements at the top can become especially dangerous. After the political crisis of 1989, At the direction of Deng Xiaoping, the CCP gradually established the practice of concentrating its three highest positions, the party general secretary, the state president, and the CMC chairman in one person. That arrangement eventually became the norm under Jian Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. The purpose was to reduce the risk of competing centers of Actually, there was another president, you know, Mao Zedong was holding the top military position when his successor, Liu Shaoqi, was the state president, and that didn't work. Eventually, Mao, I mean, Liu Shaoqi died in detention. So these historical anecdotes show that when you have a center that's... That split, or you have competing centers of power, it creates tension. But now, under Xi Jinping, could the same problem be resurfacing if Xi Jinping has indeed lost control over the military? His political position could be far more vulnerable than his official titles suggest. Because in the Communist Party's political system, the ultimate question isn't simply who occupies the highest office. It's who commands the military when a serious political confrontation occurs. If you look at all those conflicts, every time the one who controls the gun won. All right, so now who has the final word? So for 14 years, Xi Jinping has worked relentlessly to build a military that answers directly to him. He reorganized his command structure. He promoted his own officials, I mean generals. He strengthened the chairman responsibility system. He made personal loyalty a central feature of military political life. But look at what happened, right? Generals. The generals that he promoted are gone. His trusted military aides have fallen. And the Central Military Commission has been reduced to just two members. And the PLA's own newspaper has repeatedly emphasized that major decisions must be made through collective deliberation. And even after Zhang Youxia's downfall, that message continued. Then came the Fifth Plenum. It's two central documents emphasized. The political framework of Hu Jintao and then set restrictions on personal authorities while omitting both Xi Jinping thought on the military and the CMC chairman responsibility system. So put all of that together, we can't help but ask, how is Xi Jinping's relationship Relationship with the PLA. And his personal authority over it. I don't know about your answer, but my answer is he may still be the chairman of the CMC, you know, on paper, but his real grip of the military command has faded. And China's own history reminds us that official titles and actual power are not always the same thing. So if Western experts always focus on official titles... And official statements, they may be misled. And even, well, even if they study the official statements carefully, like the way I did, then they would still find traces of, how to say, hints that something has changed inside the world's largest military. So, yeah, so. Um... Xi Jinping has spent 14 years making sure the PLA answered to him, but does he still have the final word? I'm not so sure. Now, in my next program, I'll explore an even more intriguing question. Who actually controls the PLA if Xi Jinping doesn't? Because this is actually the topic I was interested in and started. But as I look more and more into the activities and these press statements, I found more information. So I think before I talk about who actually controls the PLA, tonight's talk is kind of a preparation. It sets the stage for the next discussion. Otherwise, you wouldn't understand what I'm saying. I just want you to understand the dynamics, the political dynamics within the PLA right now before I actually talk about who controls the PLA. And in the unlikely event of an imminent war, which many people are talking, who would really be calling the shots? Yeah, so if you haven't subscribed yet, please do so, so you won't miss it. I think that talk will be very interesting. I will save that for Saturday, for Saturday night. All right, how do people like what I just said? All right, my live streams are not... Drawing a lot of attention nowadays, but it's okay. I can, oh, Mark Urban. Thank you, Mark, for the support. I really appreciate that. You know what? I'm not being affected by, you know, the number of concurrent viewers and all that. I think I'm going to focus on what I think is important. And my focus is actually covering the areas and then the topics, the other media outlets Journalists are not covering. If they're talking about something already, if they're talking about this topic already, then I won't cover it because you already have the information. So yeah, I think the things that I covered tonight is important, but I do not believe other Western media outlets are doing the type of analytical work that I'm doing. So I appreciate your support, Mark. Thank you very much. Do I see something else? I thought a couple of super stickers flew by. All right, let me see. Okay, questions, comments. Sometimes when you look at these things, you could get a headache. Yeah, you could actually get a headache looking at all this. Someone, let me see, questions. Okay, I don't see. Oh, here's a question from Jeremy Thomas. 8.05, these articles seem to dovetail nicely with the alleged personal letter penned by General Zhang. Oh, the letter? The letter? These articles seem to dovetail nicely. Yeah, these articles, I mean, I see, I agree with you. I agree with your observation. It has Zhang Youxia's fingerprints all over. I mean, if it weren't for Zhang Youxia, I don't think any other PLA generals would have the guts to publish an article like that. So it has Zhang Youxia's blessing. But that also proves that for a while, Zhang Youxia was the de facto military leader before he was sacked. All right. Well, thank you. A lot of comments. Oh, here's a question. Lay authentic Austin wrong. Intriguing. Thank you. My question is, when would we see amendments to the Constitution to reflect the new, if ghost, regime of democratic centralism? I think you don't need to put that into the... I think democratic centralism is already in the party constitution. It's already there. You don't need to do another amendment. It's just that Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao wasn't actually the one who started this. It was actually something that has always, democratic centralism has always existed. I mean, even Mao Zedong talked about it extensively. And then Deng Xiaoping was the one who really used that platform. So it's not anything new. It's just, to me, it's extraordinary how Xi Jinping stuffed two of his personal agenda into the party constitution. One is his military thought, which is what? We don't even know what his military thoughts are. And the second is, you know, the chairman's responsibility system. It's a nice jargon, but all it says is, I'm in charge. I'm in charge of the military. So he's just stuffed his two personal items into the party constitution, that's all, to make them official. But does this serve the purpose? For a while, they did. But look at what happened. I mean, the Fifth Plenum didn't even mention them. So, yeah. People say, why are CCP officials so obsessed with these useless, wasteful jargons? Because they are not exactly a political party. They are really what I call, the regime is a theocracy. They're really a religious regime. So that's why they are high on theory and ideology and low on practicality. Because essentially, the CCP regime is a theocracy. Yeah, that's my view. That's why they're obsessed with these terminologies and jargons and platforms and frameworks. I mean, if you really think about it, the leftist ideology has something similar because they're huge on terminologies. They're able to create these really nice-sounding big words to mean something that's very basic. Did you notice that? Where the conservatives are more straightforward, it is what it is. You say it out loud. But those on the left tend to... Dress up a certain concept to make them sound more important and high-sounding. They do have that tendency. And I think that it's similar. On that note, it's very similar to CCP's obsession with these big words, big political platforms. Yeah. Ideological symbolisms. They're very similar in that regard. Okay. Frank Na, do you see any parallels between the Trump, Putin, and Xi regime? By the way, nice earrings. Oh, you like my earrings. Got it. Do I see any parallel? Parallel. The three are certainly a dynamic trio, shall we say. But they play a different role. History has an interesting... I believe that everyone is here for a reason. And I don't know. Maybe I should do a program. That's a very interesting topic. Maybe I should do a program on that in my other channel, in my storytelling channel, Lays Looking Glass. This is a more serious geopolitical or political program or geopolitical platform or channel. My Lays Looking Glass is more storytelling. And maybe I should do that. Do I see any problem? There's certain, they share some traits, Of course, the issue is a lot more complex than a simple answer. Maybe I'll do something. Someone, Jeff Stockwell, asked me, if Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao disappear, will she's power struggles be over? If Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, what do you mean disappear? You mean disappear meaning they died or they went into hiding? Because they could mean different things. I mean... They have disappeared. I mean, we have never seen Hu Jintao since December 2022. We have not seen the man for four years, almost four years. So you could say he has disappeared, but his presence is felt everywhere. And Wen Jiabao, you don't see him very often either, right? Like only at major events you see him. So we've only seen him twice this year in 2026. Once was at this, what, Long March meeting? No, he didn't show up at Long March. I think we've only seen him twice this year, maybe even once. So you could say that they have disappeared. We don't see them, but their presence are felt. Unless you suggest they have died, but Hu Jintao, people have said, oh, Hu Jintao couldn't be involved because he's in poor health. Well, he doesn't need to be personally directing people on what to do. As long as he is legally alive, as long as he's not legally dead, he could be in a hospital, you know, on a life support system. But as long as he is still alive, his people could wave his banner to challenge Xi Jinping because he is the only living CCP, former CCP leader. So Hu Jintao, as long as he is alive, those who want to oppose Xi Jinping can use Hu Jintao's banner in his name to challenge Xi. And Hu Jintao himself doesn't have to do it personally. So it doesn't matter if he's healthy or not healthy, but it's important that he's alive. Yeah. All right, Lei, do you see any parallel between all these three? Okay, I already said. Do you think that most of the purges are trumped up or legit? Well, most of the purges, like I said, people attribute all of the purges to Xi Jinping. That's a little unfair to him because the purges in the military were executed over at least, what, three to four years by different political factions. Some of them are Xi Jinping's loyalists, taken down by Zhang Youxia and his political faction, those behind him. And some of the purges were taken out by Xi Jinping. But then, because Xi Jinping is the nominal leader, so all the purges are attributed to him. And that's the problem. But of course, there's no way that Xi Jinping took down all of this many people. It was actually the casualties are the result of brutal political struggles between multiple factions. And that's what we see. But a lot of China observers do not acknowledge that. They said that Xi Jinping took down everyone. And I disagree with them. I mean, if he does, then he's mentally insane if he did that, right? Why would he wipe out 88% of his military command? It doesn't make sense. So it could only be explained as the result of a brutal infighting between two factions. And it's actually between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping. All right, someone say, Lei, if Wenjia Baohu Jingtao, okay, I already answered that. Do you see any parallel? I already answered that. Greg Sim, oh, thank you, Greg. Thank you very much. Frank Na, again, Lei, do you see any parallel? I already answered that. Oh, JIRTS97, thank you for the super sticker. Lei, okay, I already answered that. Oh, wow. Seek the truth. Has the CIA recruitment efforts in China shown any success? Well, I wouldn't know. You would ask the CIA. But given the tens of millions of views of the videos the CIA released, I think they're making huge impact in China. And not just within the officialdom, but also in the military. Because they made, what, two videos, right? At least one, maybe two videos targeting military officers. And VPM is very popular in China. So a lot of people have watched those videos. All right. So if you haven't subscribed, please do so now, because the next talk is very interesting because we'll be talking about, you know, people say, well, if you have been saying that Xi Jinping is not controlling the military and now that Zhang Youxiang is gone, who is actually running the show? And that's a question that I've been. Looking for answers for a while, and I think I am very close to the answer, to the real answer. So join me on Saturday for another program so that we'll continue this discussion. How about that? Intriguingly, thank you. Wheezy, squeezy box. Well, thank you. Christy Bauer. Last time you mentioned how many books Xi Jinping had published, had written. Have you read any of them? No, no, I don't want to. Are they the same content over and over? No, they're not the same content. I think they just compiled all the speeches he gave and published them. I mean, he's, what, 70-some years old? I mean, he's been in politics for 40 years. And how many speeches he's given, a lot. And if you put them in words, that's 140 bucks. That's 140 bucks. It's crazy. All right. Someone said, That's a very idiomatic expression in Chinese. All right. Well, thank you very much. And I'll see you on Saturday. Okay, bye.