Why did China change its “Never Kneeling” rhetoric and suddenly back down in Geneva? In this episode, we uncover the hidden forces behind Beijing’s shocking trade concessions to the U.S. While state media credited Xi Jinping’s loyalists, a closer look at the negotiation team—and Trump’s own words—suggests someone else was pulling the strings. Former Premier Wen Jiabao may have quietly re-emerged to steer China’s economic direction. From Wen’s reformist vision to Xi’s conspicuous absence during the talks, all signs point to a deeper power shift inside the CCP. Was Geneva just a trade deal—or something bigger? A quiet handover of control?
1. Comparison of the 2018 and 2025 Chinese negotiation teams 2. Wen Jiabao’s vision for U.S.–China trade relations 3. Rumors surrounding Vice Premier He Lifeng 4. Trump’s cryptic clue about Beijing’s power shift
Hi, everyone. Welcome to LazeWorld Talk.
I'm so sorry for the delay.
I couldn't get my normal camera to work,
so I'm using this low-resolution computer camera.
All right, let's get started.
Why did China back down?
And who was really behind the Geneva trade talks?
The Chinese...
Actually, I have some pictures I want to share with you.
Where did the pictures go?
Anyways, all right.
Okay, I'll share with you the pictures later.
So let's take a look at what has happened
in the last couple of weeks, right?
So since Trump returned to office,
U.S.-China relations have grown increasingly intense.
Things hit a boiling point on April 2nd
when he launched a global tariff offensive.
Beijing retaliated with its own punitive measures
and state media fired back with a defiant propaganda video
called Never Kneeling or Never Kneeling Down.
But then came a stunning twist.
Last week or last weekend in Geneva,
Treasury Secretary Scott Benson
met with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng,
who is on the screen.
What followed shocked even the American delegation.
Beijing made major concessions
and showed an unexpected willingness to cooperate.
I cover that in my Tuesday's live stream.
The speed of the breakthrough
was nothing short of extraordinary.
Then U.S. Trade Representative, I think Jameson Greer,
remarked that the pace of the agreement
suggested the two sides
weren't as far apart as everyone had assumed.
And the Chinese side dropped hints as well beforehand.
Before the talks,
China's newly appointed trade negotiator,
Li Chenggang, was cornered by reporters
and he gave a careful reply.
This is what he said.
He said, no matter when the joint U.S.-China statement
is released,
it would be big news and good news for the world.
That one line tells you everything.
Beijing was already prepared to make peace
and it's a complete reversal
from its usual hardline posture.
So the real question is,
what changed and what made China suddenly back down?
We know the CCP leadership
has been embroiled in brutal power struggles
and there are clear signs
that Xi Jinping no longer has full control.
So here's my take.
Xi Jinping wasn't the one directing the Geneva talks.
The real driver behind the deal,
former Premier Wen Jiabao,
who is a reformist and a party elder,
quietly pulling the string from behind.
And I'll give you three reasons
why I believe it was Wen Jiabao and not Xi Jinping
who was behind Geneva.
The first is that the negotiation
bears Wen Jiabao's fingerprints.
His influence is unmistakable.
And I'll discuss that from two angles.
One is I'll compare the 2025 negotiation team
to the 2018 one during trade war 1.0.
And secondly, I'll go over Wen Jiabao's vision
for U.S.-China trade relations.
And then President Trump dropped a cryptic clue.
And yes, rumor mill is spinning
and some of those whispers are worth listening to.
So first things first,
let's look at the negotiation team.
So aside from Vice Premier He Lifeng,
China's state media said very little
about who was actually at the negotiation table.
And then on May 11th,
Reuters reviewed the full lineup.
And along with He Lifeng,
the delegation included Vice Finance Minister
Liao Ming.
These are the two individuals.
And also Vice Commerce Minister
and Chief Trade Negotiator Li Chenggang.
And also Vice Minister of Public Security Xu Datong.
Here's what's important.
Most of these officials are not part of Xi Jinping's
inner circle except He Lifeng.
And that matters.
So officially He Lifeng was leading the talks,
but here's the problem.
He is very close to Xi Jinping.
He's known to be just as hardline.
So it's hard to believe that he would willingly agree
to the kinds of concessions made in Geneva.
In fact, just one day before the deal was reached,
the Financial Times even published an article titled
From Liu He, who was the lead negotiator from China
during trade war 1.0.
So Liu He was He Lifeng's predecessor.
So the Financial Times article was titled
From Liu He to He Lifeng,
Why the New Negotiator Would Be Tougher for the US.
And the piece quoted,
the piece noted that unlike Liu He,
who studied at Harvard's Kennedy School
and led the 2018 talks,
He Lifeng is a loyal Xi Jinping ally
with a hawkish stance towards the US.
So the expectation was that the negotiations
would become even tougher.
But the real shift came from the other members
of the Chinese delegation
who are drastically different from those in the 2018 team.
So let's take a closer look at the names.
So I have two individuals on the screen for you.
So let's talk about Li Chenggang.
He recently replaced Xi Jinping's man, Wang Xiaowen,
as China's lead trade negotiator.
Now Wang was a known hardliner
with a poor reputation among Western officials.
Li, by contrast, is a legal expert.
He studied law at Beijing University,
earned a master's in law and economics
from the University of Hamburg,
and has deep expertise in trade law.
And here's the twist.
Li was never promoted under Xi Jinping.
He remained stuck at the vice ministerial level
largely because of his ties to the Hu Jintao faction
or the reformist faction.
He was also at one point a,
no, he was not at one point, what am I saying?
He went to college with Li Keqiang
who was also at Beijing University.
So he's considered aligned with the reformist camp.
Now the other gentleman, Liao Ming,
the vice finance minister,
is another heavyweight in trade policy.
He holds a bachelor's and master's degree
in economics from Beijing University
and an MBA from Cambridge University.
He's published several books on global finance
and rose through China's financial system,
eventually overseeing tariffs.
He's known to be extremely smart,
played music in college,
and speaks English fluently.
Importantly, he has no known ties to Xi Jinping's faction.
So both Li and Liao are in their 50s.
They're younger than He Lifeng who's 70 years old.
And these two gentlemen were educated in the 1980s
when China's education system
was still rigorous and competitive,
not as corrupt as it is today.
At the time, getting into Beijing University
meant being at the top of your class.
So these men are true technocrats
with strong academic backgrounds
and they're very different
from many of Xi Jinping's political appointees.
Now let's talk about Xu Datong.
So this man is currently the youngest vice minister
of the public security ministry.
And there are six of them.
He's the youngest and he ranks the third.
He doesn't come from a public security background.
He spent nearly 30 years working in Tianjin
before being promoted to deputy governor
and public security chief of Shaanxi province.
And he has no clear factional ties
and was likely brought in to address the fentanyl issue.
So you see while He Lifeng is a Xi Jinping loyalist,
the other three men have no obvious links to Xi Jinping.
And in the case of Li Chenggang,
he's actually connected to the reformist faction.
So this team is a very different lineup
compared to the one led by Liu He in 2018.
So let's focus on these two men.
So these two men are the key negotiators.
So let's look back at May 2018
when Liu He led a large delegation to the US.
Who were in that group?
Well, we had finance minister Liu Kun,
commerce minister Zhong Shan,
central bank, the governor of China's central bank,
Yi Gang, and the vice chairman of NDRC, Ning Jizhe,
and vice foreign minister.
There's a vice foreign minister,
there's a vice finance minister,
and there's a vice commerce minister.
So it was a high profile lineup full of big titles.
But here's the thing,
those officials didn't do the actual work.
It was more political theater
than pragmatic diplomacy or negotiation.
It was something very Xi Jinping.
At the time, the Wall Street Journal noted
that most of those officials
had limited experience in trade negotiations
and lacked deep knowledge of trade law,
which made serious progress in negotiation difficult.
This time it's different.
The team is much smaller,
but much more competent.
Li Chenggang is a specialist in international trade law,
and Liao Min has spent years
working in the field of global finance.
So the small team is far more capable
and far more professional
than the group China sent seven years ago,
which is why it's hard to believe
that this lineup was chosen by Xi Jinping.
And no, it has Wen Jiabao's fingerprints all over.
And let me explain why.
So now let's talk about Wen Jiabao.
There he is.
This was from almost 20 years ago.
So Wen Jiabao is part of China's reformist
or opening up faction.
He's long believed that the best way
to resolve US-China tensions
is through dialogue and not confrontation.
So back in December 2003,
he gave a rare interview to CNN,
and that's where this picture was taken from.
And the entire conversation was about trade.
That interview was so important,
and it was translated into Chinese
and published on the website
of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
And here's what Wen said.
He said,
the rapid development of US-China economics
benefits both countries.
15 years ago,
he said bilateral trade was only $2.5 billion.
This year, it has exceeded $100 billion.
So is this development only good for the US
and not for China?
Of course not.
It benefits both nations and both peoples.
So that win-win outlook
has defined Wen Jiabao's approach to trade
throughout his entire career.
In another interview in 2010,
he went even further.
He argued that even if the US
cuts back on imports from China,
it won't solve the trade imbalance
because most Chinese exports
are low-value added goods.
If America stops buying from China,
it will just switch
or shift to buying from India,
Sri Lanka, or Bangladesh.
But Wen Jiabao didn't shy away
from China's internal problems.
He openly acknowledged that
corruption and inflation
could threaten China's long-term stability.
And then he said something unheard of
for a senior CCP official.
And he said,
freedom of speech is a necessity in every country.
Now that's a big deal,
especially from someone
who sat at the very top of the regime.
Even though Wen disagreed with US trade tactics,
he offered thoughtful, logical responses
and never denied China's own flaws.
And this kind of honesty is rare inside the CCP.
He also proposed raising the level of
the joint US-China Trade Commission
and creating a permanent mechanism
to manage trade issues.
So fast forward to now,
US Treasury Secretary Scott Benson
described the new arrangement
as the Geneva Mechanism.
So that was Wen Jiabao's vision coming to life.
So Wen believes in solving disputes
through steady negotiation
and dialogue and not ideological struggle.
And that's a stark contrast
to Xi Jinping's zero-sum mindset.
And that brings me to my conclusion.
The reason the Geneva trade talks
made such unexpected progress
is because they were led,
at least in spirit
and quite possibly in practice,
by Wen Jiabao.
And I'm not the only one saying this.
There have been reports
saying that Xi Jinping's grip
on power is collapsing.
And the real control of the party
has quietly shifted
to three powerful party elders.
And they are Hu Jintao,
former president,
Wen Jiabao, former premier,
and Hu Deping, a reformist intellectual
and a princeling who is the son of Hu Yaobang,
also a known, a famous reformist.
And Hu Jintao is said to be in poor health
and largely symbolic.
Hu Deping, while he is influential
and a visionary,
he lacks hands-on experience
in managing the government.
So that leaves Wen Jiabao
as the one party elder
with the background, credibility,
and the strategy
to guide the trade negotiations.
And from what we've seen in Geneva,
his influence is starting to show.
And the fact that this meeting
went so smoothly,
tell us one thing,
that wasn't Xi Jinping's style.
Now, remember,
during Trump's first term,
US-China held round after round of talks.
But no matter who sat across the table,
there were always, you know,
the Chinese,
those sat across
from the American officials
always carried out Xi Jinping's strategy.
And that made negotiation almost impossible.
US officials described the talks
as chaotic and unpredictable.
And at one point they got mad
or things got so bad
that the Americans nearly walked away.
And also it was said that
the very first day
the Chinese delegation landed in the US,
things blew up.
The two sides argued fiercely
and it was an absolute disaster.
It got so bad
that they canceled
the next day's meeting altogether.
So that was Xi Jinping's style of negotiation.
So what happened in Geneva,
it was the opposite.
That brings us the next question.
So what role did He Lifeng play in Geneva?
Right?
If things went so smoothly in Geneva,
it means that either Vice Premier He Lifeng
wasn't actually in charge
or he wasn't following Xi Jinping's orders.
And I believe that is the biggest clue of all.
He Lifeng is a big Xi Jinping loyalist.
He was one of the few people
invited to Xi Jinping's wedding
to the famed singer Peng Liyuan.
But according to another well-known scholar,
Su Xiaohe,
there's growing whispers
in Beijing's political circles
about five senior officials
who are quietly distancing themselves
from Xi Jinping.
And He Lifeng is one of them.
So Mr. Su said this,
he said,
everyone's talking about
the 90-day tariff suspension deal.
But the real story isn't just the numbers,
not the 30 versus 10% tariff gap.
The real story is that China agreed
to loosen restrictions on the U.S.,
including in media, publishing,
news, and even the internet.
Think about it.
These are Xi Jinping's most guarded red lines,
and yet they were conceded.
So what happened, right?
So Mr. Su says the answer is simple.
He said,
even if Xi Jinping didn't want to agree,
he had no choice.
The pressure on him was overwhelming
from retired generals,
PLA generals,
from the reformist camp,
meaning Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao camp,
and most of all,
from the U.S. and from Trump.
And the biggest force of all,
the Chinese people.
So according to Mr. Su,
the reason a deal was even possible
is because Xi Jinping's own loyalists
have started to jump ship.
They've began siding with Wen Jiabao's
reformist faction and the party elders.
He said,
Xi's power is being reigned in,
and his closest allies can feel it.
That's why they are starting
to shift their loyalties.
He named five officials who have
purportedly broken ranks with Xi Jinping.
They are He Lifeng,
Xi's top economic advisor,
Zhang Youxia,
the highest-ranking military officer,
Wang Yi,
once known for his aggressive
wolf-warrior diplomacy,
Xi Jinping's head of foreign affairs,
and then
Ying Li, the party secretary of Beijing,
and then Ma Xinrui,
former governor of Guangdong
and currently party chief in Xinjiang.
All right, so that's the rumor mill.
Now there's another person
who's been quietly signaling
that Xi Jinping may no longer be in charge.
Who is that?
President Trump.
Think about it.
What was the most striking promise
Beijing made in Geneva?
It wasn't the tariff cuts.
It was the promise to open up China.
Before the Geneva talks,
President Trump told reporters
aboard his Air Force One
that his goal in the trade war
was to open China.
At the time, I thought
that was his wishful thinking
or that he was being too optimistic.
I couldn't imagine Xi Jinping
agreeing to something
so fundamentally threatening to his rule.
But then came May 10th.
I want to share with you an image.
Do I have an image?
Oh, by the way, here, where is that image?
Oh, here it is.
Let me make this bigger.
Make it this bigger.
So this is what Trump posted on May 10th.
He said,
A very good meeting today
with China in Switzerland.
Many things discussed.
Much agreed to.
A total reset negotiated
in a friendly but constructive manner.
We want to see for the good
of both China and the U.S.
an opening up of China
to American business.
Great progress made.
Okay, so there it was again.
Opening up of China.
And he didn't stop there.
On May 12th, during a press event
in the Oval Office,
Trump said,
We have to get it on.
We have to get it papered.
But they've agreed to open up China.
And that same day,
in an interview with Sean Hannity
on Air Force One,
Trump emphasized once more
that the opening up of China
to U.S. business
was the most exciting part of the deal.
And he said this.
He said,
The biggest thing to me
is the opening up.
I think it would be fantastic
for our businesses
if we could go in
and compete with China.
It would be a lot of jobs for China.
That's when it hit me.
Trump wasn't bluffing.
Wait, let me do this.
So he wasn't bluffing.
The Chinese side has clearly
made a commitment to open up.
It was obvious.
I mean, if the Chinese
didn't make a clear,
serious commitment to open up,
he wouldn't be talking this way.
Because he learned his lessons
during trade war 1.0,
how the Chinese can go back and forth.
So if he wasn't being really,
you know, if he wasn't given assurance,
he wouldn't have said this.
But here's the thing.
Now, here's the thing.
For the CCP to agree to something this big
is no small matter.
It could only mean one of two things.
The first is Xi Jinping has done
a complete 180-degree reversal
and is now embracing a policy
that undermines his own power base.
Or two, Xi Jinping is no longer
the one giving orders on trade.
Even if the agreement technically
came with Xi Jinping's signature,
the context tells us something very different.
If he agreed to it,
well, it's because he was forced to.
Because let's be honest,
if Xi Jinping were still in full control,
there's no way he would agree
to give the green light to something like this.
So no matter how you look at it,
how you slice it,
Xi Jinping has lost control
over China's economic direction
and Trump knows it.
And that's a game-changing shift.
Now, here's something else
you shouldn't overlook.
And if Xi Jinping really did support
opening up the U.S.,
why would his first public speech
upon returning from Russia
be packed with anti-American rhetoric?
His first event back
was the China-Latin America Forum or Summit.
in Beijing,
which took place yesterday,
May the 13th,
maybe two days ago.
Here's what he said.
He gave a keynote speech
and here's what he said.
He said,
in the 1960s,
large-scale demonstrations took place across China
in support of Panama's efforts
to reclaim sovereignty over the canal.
That's provocative, right?
To talk about that at this moment.
And then he also said,
since 1992,
China has voted 32 times
at the UN General Assembly
to support ending the U.S. embargo on Cuba.
So that's classic Xi Jinping.
Anti-U.S., defiant, nationalist.
So the question is,
who was really behind the promise in Geneva?
I find it hard to believe that it was Xi Jinping.
Was Wen Jiabao the man behind the curtain?
Well, if you look at the delegation,
the shift in tone and the content of the deal,
it matches Wen's style.
Quiet, strategic, and pragmatic,
and willing to compromise to protect the long game.
But that said,
it doesn't mean Xi Jinping is willingly
or will willingly accept
the results of the talks in Geneva.
The two sides will fight.
I mean, Xi Jinping's speech at the Latin America forum
is a clear sign of that.
Obviously, he is not backing down.
So let me share with you two pictures.
Where are the pictures?
Where did the pictures go?
Oh, here we go.
Let me make this bigger.
These two pictures,
here's one.
I'll show you the other one.
The pictures were released or shared by Secretary Scott Besant.
Am I saying that right?
Names are challenging.
And these pictures got the Chinese talking.
The Chinese went wild.
They noticed how He Lifeng looked like a subordinate.
The entire Chinese delegation appeared so submissive.
He Lifeng looked like he is a subordinate reporting work to the big boss.
While China's trade negotiator, Li Chenggang,
I think the man who was the last two men on the right,
the second right is Li Chenggang,
and then the first right is Liao Ming.
They look like they are school students taking notes
from the teacher who's lecturing.
And the Chinese are saying,
these pictures are going to spell trouble for He Lifeng.
And there's another picture.
This is equally bad.
They say China's chief trade negotiator who was walking on grass in front
looked like a tour guide.
While again, the American secretary looked like a big boss
walking with his hands behind him.
And He Lifeng just doesn't look so submissive.
Let's put it this way.
So they say, well, these pictures are going to cause He Lifeng troubles.
If Wen Jiabao wasn't the one really behind the trade talks,
they spell troubles for the entire Chinese negotiation team.
So that's all.
That's all I have.
But before I take questions, I want to make two announcements.
First, we have a new video released in my other channel, Lazy Looking Glass.
It's a video about a modern day Thai prophet
who has been accurately predicting world events so far.
And her latest prediction about what's going to happen before August
is seriously alarming and worrisome.
So I encourage you to take a look.
Chris has copied the link in the description.
And I just hope whatever she predicted doesn't happen
because I still have places I want to visit,
loved ones to catch up with, and friends to be reconnected.
And I hope whatever she predicts doesn't happen.
So take a look at the video.
It's fascinating.
And also, I have a correction to make.
In my last live stream, I said the 90-day started retroactively from April the 2nd.
Obviously, that was wrong.
It would start on May the 14th.
So it is indeed 90 days from the negotiation.
So the two sides have until the middle of August to finish their negotiation.
So that's all.
That's all I have for today.
And this camera is awful because it's in the wrong place.
And the resolution is terrible.
And my flowers are drooping.
They are sad.
They're sad that I can't fix it.
I'm so technically challenged.
I fixed the internet problem.
I'm so proud of myself that I fixed the internet speed problem.
Now I have a camera issue.
I just couldn't get it work today.
I have no idea why it's behaving like that.
So my flowers are sad.
Okay.
All right.
Let's see what people have.
Oh, I have a Richard Hinman.
Thank you, Richard.
Let me see what people have for me.
This resolution is awful.
And this lighting, this resolution, this camera is awful.
And the lighting is awful.
I look very spooky.
This room looks very spooky.
Anyways.
Okay.
Let's see.
I'm sorry for the late start.
I was trying to get the camera to work, but I don't want to wait.
I didn't want to waste any more time.
Okay.
Of course, I want to say that my talk is speculative analysis.
I just offered my views based on what I can gather and what I have seen.
I gave you my logic.
It doesn't mean that I'm correct.
It's just my analysis.
It's one view to take a look at the trade talks.
All right.
So, Super Stickers, is there any?
Super Stickers, where are you?
Okay.
All right.
Okay.
That's from Richard.
Oh, yeah.
Chris Sanderling.
Yeah.
Okay.
So, here's a question from Don Sanderling.
What does it mean to be a reformist in the CCP?
Okay.
What does it mean?
That's a good question.
Reformists are compared to the hardliners.
I mean, as opposed to reformists, you have the hardliners, which are true Maoists.
So, the reformists are more open to market economy.
They embrace political reforms.
The true reformists embrace real political reforms, but they're not doing well in CCP's
system.
I mean, some of the big-name reformists have all been sacked, like Hu Yaobang, right?
The death of Hu Yaobang was one of the causes for the June 4th student movement in 1989.
And then as a result of that, Zhao Ziyang, another big-name reformist, was sacked and
was under house arrest for the rest of his life.
And then Li Keqiang, I mean, China's premier, like Wen Jiabao is a reformist.
And then Li Keqiang is, or supposedly is a reformist, but he couldn't do anything.
Look at him.
He died.
I'm not saying that they entirely embrace a democratic political platform.
Within the CCP's spectrum of political platforms, they're more liberal, or they're more open
minded, and more reform-oriented, or market economy-oriented, but they're still part of
the big system.
So as long as they don't abandon the rule of the Communist Party, there's really no
difference.
I really don't see much difference.
So the question is, are the reformists ready to embrace real political reforms?
And that means the end of the CCP.
So I think that's what a lot of people are waiting to see.
Here's a question from Norbert Claus.
Do you think there is an internal struggle in the CCP about either aligning with Russia
or the US?
Will the future more favoring the US?
I think Xi Jinping and his followers want to align with Russia.
And even some of the Maoists want to align with the United States.
Even some of the people on the left want to align with the US.
I think very few people want to align with Russia.
Russia is really not very popular amongst the Chinese, because historically, Russia
and China have border issues.
So compared with the US and Russia, of course, people generally favor the United States.
I'm talking about the people in the system.
I'm not talking about the general public, because the general public may be brainwashed
by the propaganda and therefore hate the Americans.
But I'm talking about the officials, because a lot of them have benefited from doing business
with the West.
So why are they against the United States?
It's not in their best interest to oppose the US, right?
Their children, their assets are in the West.
They're not in Russia.
So why should they oppose the US?
So it's just not popular to align with Russia.
And here's a question from Maria28.
This channel is awesome.
Love your analysis and explanations.
Well, thank you.
Thank you.
OK, so let me see.
It's a question forwarded by Chris from Nomo News.
Nomo News.
Hey, Lei, do you think the CCP will also open the internet freedom along the trade?
Is this possible without government change?
It sounds like it.
Because if China has agreed to open up—I mean, this is what we've been—there has
been debate amongst the China observers.
I mean, we're saying, well, if Trump is so confident that China has agreed to open up,
and then if you look at some of the things that people are talking about, they're talking
about internet, they're talking about media.
So if China opens up media and the internet, that means the censorship will become history,
because you can't.
Once these digital platforms from the West are accessible in China, then censorship is
history.
So that's big.
Unless those who are actually running the show behind have clearly communicated with
the Trump administration that big changes are upcoming, that China is ready to embrace
political reforms, but all they need is a little bit of time.
They need a little bit of time to sort out the next step internally.
Otherwise, I don't see how China can open up.
It's not that Xi Jinping doesn't want to open up, it's he cannot afford to, because
as soon as he agrees to open up, the CCP's control will collapse.
It's impossible.
The state economy, the censorship, everything he does serves one purpose.
That is to keep the regime going.
It's not that he likes to return to the Maoist era, it's just that's the only possible
way.
That's his only option as long as he wants to protect the regime.
There's no other way.
All right, so next string.
We love you, Lei.
Great insights.
I think China had an insight track with the US key ally, but they decided to try to
overtake us.
Now we're with the Middle East.
Well, thank you.
Thank you for the comments.
All right, that seems to be all.
That's all.
Have I reached the bottom?
I have reached the bottom of the comments.
That's amazing.
All right, okay.
Oh, here's a question from Zero Hero.
Thanks, Lei, for your wisdom.
What do you think will be the aim from the Chinese side in future trade negotiations?
What will be the aim?
I mean, bargaining as much as they can?
I think they have a lot to accomplish, because think about it.
They know the current mode of operation is not sustainable.
Something has to change, right?
And then they want to prevent an ugly downfall.
So they're trying to make the transition as smooth as possible.
And that's why they're keeping Xi Jinping in place.
But if you have Xi Jinping in place, that means he's going to try to stage a comeback.
He's not willing to go down.
So the two sides are fighting.
And this will make any negotiation with the U.S. difficult, because the United States
government could get very mixed signals.
We already see mixed signals.
The foreign ministry spokesman gave a defiant speech today—I saw it on the internet—when
he was asked about the fentanyl.
And he said, as far as we're concerned, that's American.
That's a problem of the United States, and we shouldn't be blamed.
I mean, how does that go along with the trade talk?
So I think we're going to see these mixed signals coming from Beijing for a while.
And I think a lot of the deals will be made behind the scenes, because the CCP wants to
save face and wants to prevent the regime from falling apart too quickly.
I think this is a very chaotic couple of months.
From now until mid-August, I think things could be very chaotic and messy.
All right, I will end it here.
I promise I'll fix my camera before the next live stream, because I can't stand this
resolution.
I look so spooky.
Okay, that's all for tonight.
Thank you for joining me, and I'll see you next time.
Bye-bye.