Who Would Command China's Military in a War? Two Generals Behind the Mystery.

Well, hello, everyone. Hi, welcome to Leigh's Saturday Night Live. I think my voice sounds a little funny. Did I lose my voice? Well, maybe I have to shout a little bit. All right. Well, welcome. This is a program I've promised for a week. So here we are. Let me start by asking a question. If China goes to war tomorrow, who would actually command its military? The general without the title, the general without the job, or maybe both, or someone else entirely. Tonight, we're going to examine these two generals, one without the title, the other without the job. I'll tell you about their remarkable military careers and the hidden relationships that may help explain who's really calling the shots inside the PLA. All right. All right. Yeah, I'm actually very excited about tonight's program because I've been preparing for it for over a week. All right. As we all know, the PLA has suffered a devastating blow amid intense factional infighting, and the scale of the damage is extraordinary. So let me give you some statistics. Now, right after the 20th Party Congress in 2022, the PLA had roughly 40 to 45 active-duty full generals. They're the highest-ranking military rank in the PLA, full generals. In 2023, they were still around 40. In 2024, roughly 35 to 40. But then came a dramatic collapse. By late 2025, only about a dozen were still publicly active. And today, in November 2026, just six remain publicly active. So in just four years, the number of active full generals has plunged by more than 80%. And China hasn't even fought a war. So here's the question. Who is actually running the PLA when its top command structure has disappeared? Now, before we tackle that question, let's take a closer look at the six remaining active four generals. And I think because we need to take a look at who they are. All right. So the first two, well, here's the first one. There's Zhang Shemin, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, who recently got promoted to Politburo. He's also the only uniformed officer serving on the CMC alongside Xi Jinping. His relations with Xi Jinping isn't amicable because Zhang played an instrumental role in taking down a number of Xi's diehard loyalists. Then there's Defense Minister Dong Jun, an admiral and naval officer who got promoted into the position by a disgraced general, Miao Hua. who was Xi Jinping's former ally and head of military personnel. Therefore, Dong Jun is generally considered a Xi Jinping ally. Then you have these two, Yang Zhibin, commander of the Eastern Theater Command, and Han Shengyan, commander of the Central Theater Command. Both came from the Air Force and were installed into the position before Zhang Youxia, I mean by Zhang Youxia, before he was taken down. And then we have another pair, these two. They were promoted into full general July this year. Zhang Shuguang, the new head of the CMC's Discipline Inspection Commission, he had worked under Zhang Shemin. So he was promoted this July to take over Zhang Shemin's old job. And he's generally believed to politically align with Zhang Shemin. Also promoted in July was Wang Gang, commander of the air force. He is a career air force officer. Now here's what makes this lineup very interesting. Of the six remaining four generals, three hold primarily administrative or political positions. The other three command theater commands or a military service, and all three came from the air force. That's a remarkable departure from the PLA's traditional power structure. You see, China's military has historically been dominated by the army. In fact, before Xi Jinping's military reforms, the army was so powerful that it didn't even need its own headquarters. The PLA's four general departments effectively served as the army's headquarters while exercising ...authority over the entire PLA. And look at the Central Military Commission. When Xi Jinping took power in 2012, seven of its ten uniformed members came from the army, 70%. But today, half of the six remaining publicly active full generals are from the Air Force. So, here's the question. Has the Air Force suddenly become the dominant force inside the PLA? The answer is, not necessarily. Because the generals with the highest ranks aren't always the ones directing military operations. Xi Jinping remains the chairman of the CMC and holds supreme military authority, supposedly. But imagine China goes to war tomorrow. Who would actually coordinate the troops, direct military operations, and turn decisions made in Zhongnanhai into action on the battlefield? Would it be one of those six full generals? Will the Air Force dominate the decision-making? Or could the people exercising the greatest operational influence still come from the Army? I believe the last possibility deserves a much closer look and to understand why we need to go beyond military ranks and official titles. So stay with me because this is where the story gets really interesting. I must say that until January this year, Zhang Youxia was widely regarded as one of the most, if not the most important or most powerful figures or the most powerful figure in the PLA. So he was the vice chairman of CMC, and he had enormous influence over military affairs. And he had a key ally, General Liu Zhenli, chief of the CMC's Joint Staff Department. Together, these two occupied two of the most important positions in China's military command system. But then on January 24th, both men were officially placed, were announced to be in trouble, under investigation. So suddenly, a critical question emerged. So who would run the PLA's operational command system in their absence? To understand why this matters, we need to look at the Joint Staff Department. Okay, think of it as the operational nerve center of the Chinese military. It plays a central role in war planning, combat readiness, intelligence coordination, and joint operations across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other military branches. It also helped translate decisions made by the CMC into coordinated military action. Again, Xi Jinping Remains the CMC chairman, but there's a difference between holding that title and managing the machinery that puts military decisions into action. And there's another factor we shouldn't overlook, and that's informal influence. In the PLA, personal relationships, military networks, and longstanding loyalties can remain important long after a general retires. Because military relationships are built around camaraderie. And so that factor should not be overlooked. So when we ask who is really calling the shots, we need to consider not just who holds the highest position, but who runs the command system, who is in charge of the command system. And also, who might be influencing those officers, in key positions behind the scenes. And that's what makes General Liu Zhengli's removal so significant. With the Joint Staff Department suddenly without its chief, someone had to keep this critical command apparatus functioning. So the question becomes, who stepped in? And that brings us to this man. Chris told me that he couldn't find the picture of this General Zhu Chuanshen. He is 56-year-old. He's a lieutenant general, but here he is. I found his picture. He was born in Henan in 1970. He joined the PLA at the age of 17. He began his military career in the 41st Group Army based in southern China. That is a critical detail, and I'll explain why shortly. So General Zhu worked his way through the ranks. He served as a regimental commander, held senior positions in the 123rd Division, and eventually became commander of the 121st Division in 2012. Four years later, he became deputy commander of the 14th Group Army. And that's also a crucial detail that you should keep in mind. Then his career took an interesting turn. In 2017, he transferred into the newly reorganized Marine Corps as a deputy commander. By late 2021, he had become commander of the PLA Marine Corps. Think about that. He started in a traditional army formation, then moved into the Marine Corps, specializing in amphibious warfare. That gave him experience in both ground operations and amphibious warfare. But his career took an even more interesting turn last year. In March, General Zhu was appointed deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command and commander of its ground forces. He was also promoted to lieutenant general at that time. Now, I must tell you that the timing, March 2025, was extraordinary. The Eastern Theater Command, the one that he was promoted to, is responsible for military operations in the direction of Taiwan. For years, it had been closely associated with Xi. It's one of the most important military organizations. In Xi Jinping's close circles, it's probably the most important theater command to him personally, because of its proximity to Taiwan. So for years, they have been closely associated with Xi Jinping's military loyalists. And one of them is He Weidong. Do I have a picture of him? Where did it go? He Weidong, here we go. A former Eastern Theater commander who came from the old 31st Group Army in Fujian when Xi Jinping was an official in Fujian. So Xi Jinping had fast-tracked He Weidong into the position of the vice chairman of CMC. But in March 2025, He Weidong suddenly disappeared from public view. And right in the middle of this turmoil, General Zhu Chuansheng arrived at the Eastern Theater Command. So He Weidong was the commander of the Eastern Theater Command. Then Xi Jinping promoted him to be the vice chairman of CMC at the 20th Party Congress. And He put one of his loyalists to be in charge of Eastern Theater Command. And then just as the new vice chairman has disappeared, General Zhu was sent to, where did he go? This guy was sent to the Eastern Theater Command, okay? Remember that timing? So some observers interpreted his appointment as a move by Zhang Youxia to place one of his own officers inside Xi Jinping's military stronghold. Why do they say that? Because Zhu stayed there for just six months. In September 2025, shortly before the fourth plenum and the official announcement of the downfall of the then Eastern Theater commander, Lin Xiangyang, Zhu was transferred to Beijing as deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department working under Liu Zhengli. Now, if you think about that sequence, right, Zhu arrived in the Eastern Theater Command just as He Weidong disappeared. And the command's senior leadership was coming under scrutiny. Six months later, he moved into the central operation, the the PLA's Central Operational Command apparatus. So he stayed there only for six months. And it's too short for a routine transfer. So people wondered if General Zhu had been sent to the Eastern Theater Command on a specific mission to help dismantle Xi Jinping's military network you. Before moving. onto an even more important assignment in Beijing because his six months started with the disappearance of He Weidong and ended with the downfall of the Eastern Theater commander. You know, it's just too dramatic. So as soon as those two individuals or those two generals fell, he left. And then he was brought into the Joint Staff Department. Okay, so people suspected that there was a special mission for him for six months. So we don't know. I mean, that's just a speculative idea. We don't know if that was the case. All right, so then what happened once he moved to Beijing? Just a few months Months after his arrival at the Joint Staff Department, his boss, Liu Zhengli, was also gone. On January 24th this year, China's defense ministry announced that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli were both under investigation. And Liu was the chief of Joint Staff Department. Like I said, he was one of the most experienced operational commanders in the PLA. So then the question becomes, who would take over his responsibilities? He was gone in January. Now we're in November. So for 10 months, the question is, who is running the Joint Staff Department? And according to various reports, Zhu Chuanxin was left handling the department's day-to-day operations. Now, here's something unusual. Traditionally, the chief of Joint Staff Department holds the rank of full general, but Zhu is only a lieutenant general. And Beijing hasn't publicly announced his formal appointment. There was just no formal announcement. They didn't even announce he was the interim chief. There was nothing said. It's just that information, it was generally believed that he is running the place. And then people are curious why now we have a lieutenant general performing responsibilities. Normally associate with the full general at the very center of China's military command system. And that's why he's called the general without the title. Okay. And so people wonder why Zhu? Why him? And then who is backing him? To explore that question, we need to look at another general whose career is closely connected to Zhu. And that man is Li Zuocheng. Do I have a picture of him? I do. He is. Well, he is a retired general. So he is no ordinary retired military elder. I use the term party elder. And here we have military elders. He was born in 1953. He's only 73 years old. In fact, he's only he's actually four months younger than Xi Jinping. He is one of the relatively few senior PLA leaders with actual combat experience. He's from the army and fought in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war and built his reputation as a battlefield commander. He eventually rose to command the 41st Group Army and later the Chengdu Military Region. Responsible for China's southwestern frontier, including areas facing India. In 2016, following Xi Jinping's sweeping military reforms, General Li became the first commander of the newly established PLA Army Headquarters. And then in the following year, 2017, he was appointed chief of the CMC's Joint Staff Department. So yes, the very same department where Zhu Chuanshen now works. So for five years, from 2017 to 2022, Li occupied one of the most important operational positions in the Chinese military. He helped oversee major military activities, including joint exercises with other countries such as Russia, and he was no ordinary military bureaucrat. Most Western media outlets remember him from this episode. Oh, where did it go? Oh, here we go. Yeah. Remember this? I should move a little bit so you could see me. This was, remember the controversy surrounding U.S. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2020 or maybe early 2021? Milley made two phone calls to his Chinese counterpart, and that is General Li Zuocheng. At the time, American intelligence indicated that Beijing feared that the U.S. might launch a military attack against China. And according to Milley's congressional testimony, he contacted General Li to reassure him that Washington had no intention of attacking. But the calls became controversial after reports alleged that he had promised to give his Chinese counterpart advance warning of an American attack. That was the controversy. So Li Zuocheng was the Chinese general at the center of one of the most controversial episodes in recent U.S.-China military relations. So that just tells you something about who this guy is and the importance of the position he held. When he retired in 2022, Liu Zhengli succeeded him as chief of the Joint Staff Department. And you know, in the Chinese PLA, the retiring general oftentimes has a big say in So obviously, Liu Zhengli and Li Zhucheng were close, or Li wouldn't choose Liu as his successor. And interestingly, Liu was also a veteran of the war with Vietnam. So for years, this critical military institution was led by two generals with actual battlefield experience. So after Li retired, he largely disappeared. From the Center of Public Military Affairs. So it seemed. Now, on September 30th this year, China held its annual National Day reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. And we saw this picture. Where did it go? This one. And General Li was spotted. He attended, along with other top leaders. Now, his appearance was captured by CCTV. Now, it's normally seeing a retired general at a National Day reception wouldn't be particularly surprising. But his appearance was widely discussed by various China observers and overseas Chinese media outlets, such as Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao. And so it was a little, it got his... appearance at this event was getting or received a lot of attention. So what people were discussing is the PLA had been shaken by an extraordinary wave of purges. Its senior command structure had been severely depleted. And suddenly, a former chief of the Joint Staff Department, a decorated combat veteran with longstanding connections across the army, was back in public And some people saw more than a routine ceremonial appearance. Hong Kong's political analyst, Lin He Li, I believe his English name is Willie Wolap Lam, Willie Wolap Lam, Lin He Li, suggested that General Li's reappearance, Reappearance. together with his reported ties to Zhang Youxia, could indicate that military opposition to Xi Jinping was becoming more organized. So that raises an interesting question. Could Li Zuocheng still be exercising influence over the PLA from behind the scenes? Because he's retired. If he does, it has to be done through an active duty officer, right? And if so, through whom? So that brings us back to Zhu Chuanshen. Yeah, that brings us back to this guy. Remember what I told you earlier about Zhu beginning his military career in the 41st Group Army? Well, there's a reason I emphasized it. From 1998 to 2002, Li Zuocheng was the commander of the 41st Group Army. And there was Zhu Chuanshen during those, and where was Zhu Chuanshen during those years? In the same formation. So Zhu had joined the 41st Group Army in 1987 and was building his career there while Li was its commander. So the two men weren't merely graduates of the same military academy or officers from the same province. Zhu actually served in the military organization commanded by Li Zuocheng. Now, of course, Zhu was a much more junior officer at the time, and we don't know how closely the two men worked together. But in the PLA, relationships formed within military units can last for decades. And their connection becomes even more interesting when we examine Zhu's next important assignment. So in 2016, Zhu became deputy commander of the 14th Group Army. Why does that matter? Because Zhang Youxia also had deep historical connections to the 14th Group Army. He had served in that formation earlier in his career before rising to become one of China's most powerful generals. So let's look at Zhu's career. He served in the 41st Group Army when Li Zuocheng was its commander. He later became deputy commander of the 14th Group Army, a formation, excuse me, Historically associated with Zhang Youxia. And in 2025, he moved into the Eastern Theater Command amid the downfall of several senior officers associated with Xi Jinping. And just six months later, he was transferred into the Joint Staff Department, right? The same, the very same organization Li Zuocheng had headed for five years and now managed or then managed by Liu Zhengli. So many people believe That Liu Zhengli, Zhu Chuanshen, and Li Zuocheng, they're all very closely connected. And so after Liu Zhengli was out, Zhu naturally took on greater responsibilities within that department. And the man behind him supporting that is precisely General Liu, I'm sorry, Liu, I mean, Li Zuocheng, the retired general. That leads us to an even more consequential theory. Is General Li secretly running the PLA? Let me put his picture on. This guy. So is this guy actually running the PLA? Now, in overseas Chinese political circles, an extraordinary claim has been circulating, and there are actually very good analysis and insights written about this. So I do not want you to think that this is just a pure rumor. There were very good in-depth analysis written on this. Some commentators believe that after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli were taken down, a network of retired generals became outraged and began exerting greater influence over military affairs. Among them are former CMC vice chairman Chi Haotian and Cao Gangcuan. Both of them also served as defense minister. Where are they? Not these two. Oh, these two. Now, here's the thing. Both men are now in their 90s. So they can be possibly personally involved. They are just, they're symbolic figures. They're still very influential in the military because they're really big names in the PLA. However, so they are considered the military elders. Now, Li Zuocheng is also a retired general. He's also a military elder, but he's much younger. Where is he? He's only 73. He's, like I said, four years younger than Xi Jinping. So according to this theory, Li isn't simply a retired general attending ceremonial events. He's actually helping coordinate military affairs behind the scenes, with Zhu Chuanshan acting as his link to the Joint Staff Department. One article published by China News Center describes As a trusted officer, Associate with or a mentee of General Li, of both General Li and Zhang Youxia. And the article alleged that Zhu is helping stabilize military arrangements in Beijing with help of these military elders. And one of his important responsibility is to protect the interest of retired generals and party elders. Because, you know, like I said, the police is controlled by Xi Jinping. But so these party elders are actually protected by the military. And something that happened in March has added to this theory. Remember this picture? This one, right? I showed you this picture. I should move a little to the right. Perfect. Otherwise, I'm disappearing. He visited a research institute under the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. But what caught the attention of Chinese observers was his motorcade. According to analyses of the footage, Wen was traveling in a military vehicle bearing a license plate, or actually not just one. I'm like the, the. Three cars in his motorcade bared license plates associated with the CMC's Joint Staff Department. Yes, the same department where Zhu now reportedly manages day-to-day operations and where Li supposedly, you know, supervises or once served as chief. At the time I made a program and said that it suggests a deeper connection between retired party leaders and the military. Some people believe that the picture, the footage, supports the theory that the military has aligned with party elders in opposing Xi Jinping. Okay, so let's put that aside. Now, here's what makes the larger theory particularly interesting. With so many senior PLA generals removed, it's possible that some active duty officers have turned to respected military elders for guidance and support. Because they don't know how to do their job anymore. Because their superiors might have all disappeared. And they feared Xi Jinping's next step. They don't know what will happen to them. So it's very likely that they have turned to these military elders for support. And Li Zuocheng is particularly well positioned to provide that support because he's young. He's only 73. And he has decades of military experience, longstanding relationships across the army, and five years as chief of the Joint Staff Department. So he's well-connected. And so according to this theory, Li isn't merely offering advice. He's helping coordinate a network of senior military figures behind the scenes. And Zhu Chuansheng may be the crucial link, right? As the officer managing the Joint Staff Department, Zhu could help translate decisions into coordinated military action. So the alleged arrangement is straightforward. Li provides the experience, personal networks, and behind-the-scenes coordination and support, while Zhu manages the operational machinery inside the PLA. One operates outside the formal chain of command, the other operates within it. Now, I have to say that this is a speculative analysis. This theory relies on anonymous sources and interpretations of military appointments. Thank We don't have independent evidence that Li is directing Zhu or issuing military orders through him. But if this theory proves to be correct, you very then General Li could exercise, So he could be the one. much. Controlling the PLA in time of war or major conflicts without holding any official position, right? So that brings us to the heart of the mystery. In a military crisis, who would actually be shaping the decisions and who would be responsible for carrying them out? So imagine a serious confrontation along the China-India border or a dangerous military incident in the Taiwan Strait. A crisis that demands immediate decisions, accurate intelligence, and coordinated military action. I do not think Xi Jinping, given his political situation, his health, and his lack of military experience, is in the position to make that decision. So who would be assessing the situation and making the decision? And that person? It's very likely, according to the theory that I presented, that person is very likely General Li Zuocheng, with help from General Zhu, right? So, is he the man who's actually shaping operational decisions behind the scenes? I offered my insights and analysis. I don't know if that is the case exactly. But let's just step back and consider what we do know. China's military has experienced an extraordinary wave of leadership purges. The Joint Staff Department has lost its chief. China's highest-ranking military commander, Zhang Youxia, is missing or is taken down. A lieutenant general is reportedly managing some of its most important responsibilities without a formal appointment to the top position. And a retired general who once headed the same department has reappeared in public, and that's General Li. And the two, Li and Zhu, share a military history dating back to nearly three decades ago. And so that's why some Chinese commentators believe these connections point to an informal power structure operating behind the PLA's official chain of command. The evidence remains incomplete, but the questions are significant, right? So that brings us back to our opening question. In a military crisis, who would actually be shaping the decisions and who will be responsible for carrying them out? Of course, on paper, Xi Jinping remains China's commander-in-chief, but military authority isn't just about titles. It's about who coordinates the forces, manages the flow of information. It ensures the orders are carried out. So that brings us to two extraordinary figures. One without title. Where did he go? One without title. He's a lieutenant general reportedly handling responsibilities normally associated with a full general as the chief of the Joint Staff Department and another general without the title. A retired combat veteran who no longer holds any official position, but may still be influencing military affairs through his former subordinates. One reportedly operates inside the military command system, and the other may be influencing it from the outside. We don't know yet whether that relationship extends beyond their shared military history. But if China faces a serious crisis right now. The distinction between formal authority, meaning the chairman on paper, and actual operational influence could become two different matters. They could be distinctively different. So who would really be calling the shots when the PLA goes to war? You make your decision. That's my talk for tonight. Just to answer the question, who's calling the shots inside the PLA? Actually, maybe I'll copy the link from that Chinese, it's called China News something. I'll copy the link so that you can read it. But it's in Chinese. It's very well written. And you translate it into English. So that's what I have. I want to tell you about my spy thriller. Released tonight in Lay's Looking Glass, it's about how a lonely Fed economist fell into a CCP honey trap and a disastrous relationship at the same time. Someone told me that they have already watched the video and enjoyed it. I thought that you would like it because I thoroughly enjoyed making the video. Thank you. So, Chris, could you please copy the link here? And, all right. Okay, let's see what do people say. Well, if you can, you know, I ask everyone to double check your subscription link. I don't know what happened, but I think YouTube might have accidentally, I don't know if it's accidental or intentional, have dropped my subscribers. Um, and, or maybe people are not getting notifications about my live streams, but I think the topic that I cover and the quality of my talk is that has been consistent, but suddenly it's just that I don't know where people just not, I mean, not showing up. So if you can double check your subscription and turn on the bell, and if you could like my video, like my program and leave a comment that will help me with the algorithm. All right. Let's see. Let's see. Questions, comments. Here's a question. It's a highlight. Jane, Jane B6471. Why didn't China take over Taipei before January 2026, before the second highest ranking gentleman was removed? What do you mean China taking over Taipei? Well, there is a very interesting mayoral election. In Taipei going on right now, I made a video which was released last Saturday. It's about the Puma wave. And I thought it's the most encouraging election story that we've seen in a long time. You should check it out. So Taipei, yeah, Taipei politics could change. I hope that answers your question about Taiwan. And Jane, well, thank you very much for the support. Okay, here's one from 14 Axel. If and when the PLA succeeds in overthrowing Xi and his loyalists, do you think the succeeding leader or party or military will have the same geopolitical agenda as Xi? No, I do not believe so. I think China will definitely pivot away from an alliance with Russia. I think the Russian connection is a purely Xi Jinping agenda. He just somehow likes Putin. He calls Putin his brother. But I think most Chinese and most Chinese officials do not have a positive view or feeling toward Russia because of historical reasons. So I think that will be a major change. And this has nothing to do whether you're on the left side or the right side within the Chinese politics. Yeah. They may not be friendly. They may not be, not everyone is going to be friendly towards the U.S., but they're not going to be friendly to Russia or more friendly to Russia. So I think that will be a major change in geopolitics. North Korea? North Korea is not so much of a liability to China, but Russia right now is. But Russia and North Korea have come together or come closer. So relations with North Korea might also be affected. Hopefully I've answered the question. Oh, someone said, if, when the PLA succeeds in overthrowing Xi and his loyalists, do you think? Yeah, we have the same geopolitical agenda. Okay, I answered that question. Let's see. CCP regime paid minions are attacking your channel. I think, yeah, I think they are. CCP regime is using AI to meddle with my algorithm, seriously, because it fears my influence. And some of the YouTubers who cover similar topics have shared their insights because they're having the same problem. And they found out that they're using AI to be messing with my channel. I'm just one woman. I mean, just me and Chris now. I don't have the resources to counter that. So any support you could give me is appreciated. Let's see, questions. Puma, here's the Puma Shen video. Please take a look. Yeah, Chris just copied that. I hope you'll check it out. Oh, someone asked me about Jensen Huang has been subpoenaed for questioning by US House. More and more information on the Jensen Huang story or saga has been released. I didn't do a program on that because there's enough information for you to consume in mainstream media or in the Western media. So I just don't want to, you know, because I really don't think I have anything more to offer. Yeah, I try to cover things that they don't cover. You know, that's my niche. If everyone is talking about the same thing, then I will skip that topic. So that's why it's kind of hard for me to grow my channel because it's not necessarily a hot topic. I mean, who is talking about right now? Who is really talking about the generals, a retired general possibly running the PLA? I think it's an extremely important topic right now, but it's not something so urgent on people's mind. So I tend not to let those sentiments affect my choice of topics. I focus on what I think is important and what's missing in the public domain. And so by that, I think I may not, my videos may not be the most viral. Yeah, and that's what I need your support. All right. Anything you could do, leave me a comment, like my video. Donation is appreciated. Yeah, during this time. All right, a question. Someone said, Lana Lombardo, where does Liu Yuan fit into your analysis? Liu Yuan certainly plays a very important role. I think because he's a political commissar, he is not a military commander. You know, he helps maybe putting people in the right position. He helps vetting the officers. I heard that one of the most important thing he does is controlling the 82nd Group Army, which is part of the Central Theater Command. And it's the CCP's elitist unit charged with the responsibility to protect the capital city. And that's firmly in control. Of somebody like Liu Yuan. That's what I heard. Yeah. So he's helping, he's assisting as a political officer, but not as a military commander. But good question. Oh, by the way, I have two important developments to share with you. Xi Jinping does not look good after the fifth plenum because two important people fell. I should say fell from their position. One is a woman, a woman doctor who's in charge of a health bureau. Her official title isn't that important, but she is the physician, primary physician for Xi Jinping's mother, right? Everybody, so she is officially announced. And the reason that they brought her down is not because they, it's because she turned herself in. Yeah. In Chinese, we say, 自己啊，自首 So she turned herself in. And when you have an official who turns herself in, it only means that her backer, she realizes that her backer is gone. She's without support. So she turned herself in. And the second person that has fallen from, has been missing, is Wang Huning's replacement in that research institute. In that, like... Wang Huning used to head the Marxism or Communist Theoretical Research Institute, right? The think tank, the most important think tank. in the CCP's central committee or whatever. So Wang Huning used to head that function and then there was a replacement. His name is Jiang Jingquan, I believe. And he is the mastermind. The Jiang Jingquan guy is the mastermind of that 2442 formulation. You know, those political slogans to embellish Xi Jinping's power. This guy is gone. The man who created these political embellishments for Xi Jinping is out. So what does that tell you? You know, still there are people believing that Xi Jinping took them down. Why is Xi Jinping so crazy? And just focusing on taking out all of his inner circle, why would he take down all these people who used to be loyal to him? It's becoming very bizarre, right? And that happened within a few days of each other after the fifth plenum. Supreme Chancellor. Well, thank you. Super Chancellor. Well, thank you very much. All right. Let me see. Any questions? No. I reached the bottom. Oh, here's one. I concur with your interpretation, Lei. Okay. Well, I appreciate that. Um... Geopolitics is a dog-eat-dog world, allegedly. Oh, I got another super sticker coming my way. Manny Kyla, thank you very much. What is the condition of Xi Xin, mother of Xi Jinping? She turned 100 years old, yes. She was rumored to be dying, but I guess she's still around. But her doctor is out. Her primary care physician. is out. Could you imagine? She holds an official title. She heads up a traditional medicine bureau of the National Traditional National Medicinal Bureau. Yeah. And that woman is out. I don't know how Xi Jinping's mother feel about that. If his son, if her son took her to her doctor out. Or brought her doctor down. I don't think the mother is very happy. So I do not think Xi Jinping forced the doctor to turn herself in. Why? All right. I reached the bottom of all questions. Anyone has anything? We had, what, 55? We did this program in 55 minutes. Well, that's quite some time that we... That I've been talking with this voice that I have. I'm surprised that I lasted this long. All right, that's all for tonight. Should we call it quits? Yeah, like that? Should I start enjoying my weekend? I can't. All right. Here's a question. I'm just picking. Your channel is awesome. We love it. Well, thank you very much. I think so too. I think I offer very, very valuable, insightful information and it's very well backed up. You know what? I should copy you that the link to that article. If you have a chance, you should read it. It's very interesting. All right. That's all for tonight. Thank you very much. Play a song. Should we play a song? Maybe next time when I get my My voice back. All right, well, everyone, enjoy the rest of your weekend. I'll see you, what, next Tuesday. Okay, bye, bye.