Who really commands China's military after the downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli? Xi Jinping remains China's supreme military leader. But two generals may hold the key to understanding who's actually calling the shots inside the PLA. Meet Li Zuocheng, a retired combat veteran with deep military connections, and Zhu Chuansheng, a rising lieutenant general reportedly managing the PLA's operational command center. Their careers reveal intriguing connections to Zhang Youxia, the military purges, and a possible power network operating behind the scenes. Could a retired general be influencing China's military through his former subordinate? And what does this mean for Xi Jinping's control of the PLA? We examine the evidence, the relationships, and a provocative theory about China's military power struggle.
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I must say that until January this year, Zhang Youxia
was widely regarded as one of the most, if not the most important
or most powerful figures or the most powerful figure in the PLA.
So he was the vice chairman of CMC
and he had enormous influence over military affairs.
And he had a key ally, General Liu Zhenli,
chief of the CMC's Joint Staff Department.
Together, these two occupied two of the most important positions
in China's military command system.
But then on January 24th, both men were officially placed,
were announced to be in trouble, under investigation.
So suddenly, a critical question emerged.
So who would run the PLA's operational command system in their absence?
To understand why this matters,
we need to look at the Joint Staff Department.
Okay, think of it as the operational nerve center
of the Chinese military.
It plays a central role in war planning,
combat readiness, intelligence coordination,
and joint operations across the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and other military branches.
It also helped translate decisions made
by the CMC into coordinated military action.
Again, Xi Jinping remains the CMC chairman.
But there's a difference between holding that title
and managing the machinery that
puts military decisions into action.
So when we ask who is really calling the shots,
we need to consider not just who holds the
highest position, but who runs the command system,
who is in charge of the command system,
and also who might be influencing those officers
in key positions behind the scenes.
And that's what makes
General Liu Zhengli's removal, so significant.
With the Joint Staff Department suddenly without its chief,
someone had to keep this critical command apparatus functioning.
So the question becomes, who stepped in?
And that brings us to this man.
Chris told me that he couldn't find
the picture of this general, Zhu Chuanshen.
He is 56 years old.
He's a lieutenant general.
But here he is.
He was born in Henan.
In 1970, he joined the PLA at the age of 17.
He began his military career
in the 41st Group Army based in southern China.
That is a critical detail, and I'll explain why shortly.
So General Zhu worked his way through the ranks.
He served as a regimental commander,
held senior positions in the 123rd Division,
and eventually became a commander of the 121st Division in 2012.
Four years later, he became deputy commander of the 14th Group Army.
And that's also a crucial detail that you should keep in mind.
Then his career took an interesting turn.
In 2017, he transferred
into the newly reorganized Marine Corps as a deputy commander.
By late 2021, he had become commander of the PLA Marine Corps.
Think about that. He started in a traditional army formation,
then moved into the Marine Corps, specializing in amphibious warfare.
That gave him experience in both ground operations
and amphibious warfare.
But his career took an even more interesting turn last year.
In March, General Zhu was appointed deputy commander
of the Eastern Theater Command and commander of its ground forces.
He was also promoted to lieutenant general at that time.
Now, I must tell you that the timing, March 2025, was extraordinary.
The Eastern Theater Command, the one that he was promoted to,
is responsible for military operations in the direction of Taiwan.
For years, it had been closely associated with Xi.
It's one of the most important military organizations
in Xi Jinping's close circles.
It's probably the most important theater command to him personally
because of its proximity to Taiwan.
So for years, it had been closely associated
with Xi Jinping's military loyalists.
um
And one of them is He Weidong.
A former Eastern Theater commander
who came from the old 31st Group Army in Fujian
when Xi Jinping was an official in Fujian.
So Xi Jinping had fast-tracked He Weidong
into the position of the vice chairman of CMC.
you.
But in March 2025,
He Weidong suddenly disappeared from public view.
And right in the middle of this turmoil,
General Zhu Chuanzhen arrived at the Eastern Theater Command.
So He Weidong was the commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
Then Xi Jinping promoted him to be the vice chairman
of CMC at the 20th Party Congress.
And he put one of his loyalists
to be in charge of Eastern Theater Command.
And then just as the new vice chairman has disappeared,
General Zhu was sent to the Eastern Theater Command.
Okay, remember that timing.
So some observers interpreted his appointment
as a move by Zhang Youxia to place one
of his own officers inside Xi Jinping's military stronghold.
Why do they say that?
Because Zhu stayed there for just six months in September 2025,
shortly before the Fourth Plenum and the official announcement
of the downfall of the then Eastern Theater commander, Lin Xiangyang.
Zhu was transferred to Beijing as deputy chief
of the joint staff department working under Liu
Zhenli. Now, if you think about that sequence,
Zhu arrived in the Eastern Theater Command just
as He Weidong disappeared,
and the command's senior leadership was coming under scrutiny.
Six months later,
he moved into the PLA's Central Operational Command apparatus.
So he stayed there only for six months.
And it's too short for a routine transfer.
So people wondered if General Zhu had
been sent to the Eastern Theater Command
on a specific mission to help dismantle Xi Jinping's military network
before moving on to an even more important assignment in Beijing.
Because his six months started with the disappearance of He Weidong
and ended with the downfall of the Eastern Theater Commander.
You know, it's just too dramatic.
So as soon as those two individuals
or those two generals fell, he left.
And then he was brought into the Joint Staff Department.
OK, so people suspected that there
was a special mission for him for six months.
So we don't know.
I mean, that's just a speculative idea.
We don't know if that was the case.
All right.
So then what happened?
Once he moved to Beijing,
just a few months after his arrival at the Joint Staff Department,
his boss, Liu Zhenming, was also gone.
Now, here's something unusual.
Traditionally, the chief of Joint Staff Department holds
the rank of full general,
but Zhu is only a lieutenant general.
And Beijing hasn't publicly announced his formal appointment.
There was just no formal announcement.
They didn't even announce he was the interim chief.
There was nothing said.
Information, you know,
it was generally believed that he is running the place.
And then people just,
people are curious why now we have a lieutenant general
performing responsibilities normally associated with a full general
at the very center of China's military command system.
And that's why he's called the general without the title, okay?
And so people wonder, why Zhu? Why him?
And then who is backing him?
To explore that question, we need to look at another general
whose career is closely connected to Zhu.
And that man is Li Zuocheng.
Well, he is a retired general.
So he is no ordinary retired military elder.
I use the term party elder, and here we have military elders.
He was born in 1953.
He's only 73 years old.
In fact, he's actually four months younger than Xi Jinping.
He is one of the relatively few senior PLA leaders
with actual combat experience.
He's from the army and fought in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War
and built his reputation as a battlefield commander.
He eventually rose to command the 41st Group Army
and later the Chengdu Military Region.
responsible for China's southwestern frontier,
including areas facing India.
In 2016, following Xi Jinping's sweeping military reforms,
General Li became the first commander
of the newly established PLA army headquarters.
And then in the following year, 2017,
he was appointed chief of the CMC's Joint Staff Department.
And he was no ordinary military bureaucrat.
Most Western media outlets remember him from this episode.
Remember the controversy surrounding U.S. General Mark Milley,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
In 2020, or maybe early 2021, Milley made two phone calls
to his Chinese counterpart, and that is General Li Zuocheng.
At the time, American intelligence indicated
that Beijing feared that the U.S. might launch
a military attack against China.
And according to Milley's congressional testimony, he contacted
General Li to reassure him
that Washington had no intention of attacking.
But the calls became controversial after reports alleged
that he had promised to give
his Chinese counterpart advance warning of an American attack.
That was the controversy.
So Li Zuocheng was the Chinese general
at the center of one of the most controversial
episodes in recent U.S.-China military relations.
When he retired in 2022,
Liu Zhenli succeeded him as chief of the Joint Staff Department.
And you know, in the Chinese PLA,
the retiring general oftentimes has a big say in
Um, chooch.
choosing his successor. So obviously Liu Zhenli
and Li Zuocheng were close, or Li wouldn't choose
Liu as his successor.
And interestingly, Liu was also a veteran of the war with Vietnam.
So for years, this critical military institution
was led by two generals
with actual battlefield experience.
So after Lee retired, he largely disappeared
from the center of public military affairs, or so it seemed.
Now, on September 30th this year,
China held its annual National Day reception at the Great
Hall of the People in Beijing, and General Li was spotted.
He attended, along with other top leaders.
Now, his appearance was captured by CCTV.
Now, it's normally seeing a retired general
at a National Day reception wouldn't be
particularly surprising, but his appearance was widely discussed.
By various China observers and overseas Chinese media outlets,
such as Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao.
So what people were discussing is the PLA had
been shaken by an extraordinary wave of purges.
Its senior command structure had been severely depleted.
And suddenly, a former chief of the Joint Staff Department,
a decorated combat veteran
with longstanding connections across the army,
was back in public view.
And some people saw more than a routine ceremonial appearance.
Hong Kong's political analyst, Lin He Li,
I believe his English name is Willie Wolap Lam,
Willie Wolap Lam, Lin He Li,
suggested that General Li's reappearance,
together with his reported ties to Zhang Youxia,
could indicate that military opposition
to Xi Jinping was becoming more organized.
So that raises an interesting question.
Could Li Zuocheng still be exercising influence over
the PLA from behind the scenes?
But how?
Because he's retired.
If he does, it has to be done through an active duty officer, right?
And if so, through whom?
So that brings us back to Zhu Chuanshen.
Remember what I told you earlier about Zhu
beginning his military career in the 41st Group Army?
Well, there's a reason I emphasized it.
From 1998 to 2002,
Li Zuocheng was the commander of the 41st Group Army.
And where was Zhu Chuanshen during those years?
In the same formation.
So Zhu had joined the 41st Group Army in 1987
and was building his career there,
while Li was its commander.
So the two men weren't merely graduates of the same military academy
or officers from the same province.
The, uh...
Zhu actually served in a military
organization commanded by Li Zuocheng.
Now, of course, Zhu was a much more junior officer at the time.
And we don't know how closely the two men worked together.
But in the PLA, relationships formed within
military units can last for decades.
And their connection becomes even more interesting
when we examine Zhu's next important assignment.
So in 2016, Zhu became deputy commander of the 14th Group Army.
Why does that matter?
Because Zhang Youxia.
Also had deep historical connections to the 14th Group Army.
He had served in that formation earlier in his career
before rising to become one of China's most powerful generals.
So let's look at Zhu's career.
He served in the 41st Group Army when Li Zuocheng was its commander.
He later became deputy commander of the 14th Group Army,
a formation historically associated with Zhang Youxia.
So many people believe that Liu Zhenli
Zhu Chuanshen and Li Zuocheng, they're all very closely connected.
And so after Liu Zhenli was out to, you know,
naturally took on greater responsibilities
within that department,
and the man behind him supporting that is precisely General Liu,
I'm sorry, Liu, I mean, Li Zuocheng, the retired general.
That leads us to an even more consequential theory.
Is General Li secretly running the PLA?
Now, in overseas Chinese political circles,
an extraordinary claim has been circulating,
and there are actually very good analysis
and insights written about this.
So I do not want you to think that this is just a pure rumor.
There were very good in-depth analysis written on this.
Some commentators believe that after Zhang Youxia
and Liu Zhenli were taken down,
a network of retired generals became outraged
and began exerting greater influence over military affairs.
Among them are former CMC vice chairman Chi Haotian and Cao Gangcuan.
Both of them also served as defense minister.
Now, here's the thing.
Both men are now in their 90s.
So they can be possibly personally involved.
They are just, they're symbolic figures.
They're still very influential in the military
because they're really big names in the PLA.
However, so they are considered the military elders.
Now, Li Zuocheng is also a retired general.
He's also a military elder, but he's much younger.
He's only 73.
He's, like I said, four years younger than Xi Jinping.
So according to this theory,
Li isn't simply a retired general attending ceremonial events.
He's actually helping coordinate military affairs behind the scenes,
with Zhu Chuanshen acting as his link to the Joint Staff Department.
One article published
by China News Center describes Zhu as a trusted officer
Associate with or a mentee of General Li.
of both General Li and Zhang Youxia,
and the article alleged that Zhu is helping stabilize
military arrangements in Beijing with help of these military elders.
And one of his important
responsibility is to protect the interest of retired generals
and party elders.
With so many senior PLA generals removed,
it's possible that some active duty officers
have turned to respected military elders for guidance and support
because they don't know how to do their job anymore
because their superiors might have all disappeared
and they feared Xi Jinping's next step.
They don't know what will happen to them.
So it's very likely that they have turned
to these military elders for support.
And Li Zuocheng is particularly well positioned to provide that support
because he's young, he's only 73.
And he has decades of military experience,
long-standing relationships across the army,
and five years as chief of the Joint Staff Department.
So he's well-connected.
And so according to this theory, Li isn't merely offering advice.
He's helping coordinate a network
of senior military figures behind the scenes.
And Zhu Chuansheng may be the crucial link, right?
As the officer managing the Joint Staff Department,
Zhu could help translate decisions into coordinated military action.
So the alleged arrangement is straightforward.
Li provides the experience, personal networks,
and behind-the-scenes coordination and support,
while Zhu manages the operational machinery inside the PLA.
That brings us to the heart of the mystery.
In a military crisis, who would actually be shaping the decisions
and who would be responsible for carrying them out?
Of course, on paper, Xi Jinping remains China's commander-in-chief.
But military authority isn't just about titles.
It's about who coordinates the forces, manages the flow of information,
ensures the orders are carried out.
So that brings us to two extraordinary figures,
one without title and another general without the title.
One reportedly operates inside the military command system
and the other may be influencing it from the outside.
Thank you so much for watching.
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