Beyond the Reality Illusion | Hilary Lawson

Human & Consciousness
3 followers
Apr 17, 2025
Hilary Lawson discusses science and the end of the real.
How can a theory, like Ptolemaic astronomy, be both ""wrong"" and successful?
We assume our theories describe reality and uncover the truth, for otherwise the success of science appears a miracle. Join leading critic of philosophical realism, philosopher Hilary Lawson, as he argues this is a profound and damaging mistake and puts forward a radical alternative that enables us to make sense of the mystery that is reality.
A British philosopher best known for his theory of 'Closure', Hilary Lawson is an outspoken critic of philosophical realism and Editorial Director of the IAI.
What's going on here? We assume that it's wildly wrong, so how's it so accurate?
Thank you, and thank you for coming for this talk.
So, we have a strong sense, don't we, that we can describe reality.
I mean, we look round us, we see people and objects, we see sky and hills and valleys,
and we have the impression that that account of it describes what's out there.
And it's not just in terms of our immediate experience either.
We have got a sense of where we are. We know the nearest town, the country that we're in.
We've even got a sense of where we are in the universe.
We're on a planet in a solar system somewhere in the Milky Way.
And, well, we're pretty confident that it's right.
Why are we confident that it's right?
Well, it works for most of the part. I mean, not always as much as we'd like.
But it works pretty well. We can communicate with people.
We can be reasonably precise about what we want to happen.
We can travel to the other side of the world if we've got the transportation and find our way there.
So we're pretty confident that it works.
And some people can land a craft on a different planet.
So on the surface of it, how could it be other than a description of reality?
But I think this is a mistake.
I don't think that our descriptions of the world,
well, I don't think our accounts of the world are descriptions of reality.
I think instead they're ways of holding the world.
They're metaphors for the world.
And we make the mistake of imagining that these metaphors are ultimately how it is.
And given that I have that view, it's what one might say, philosophically, it's a non-realist view.
I don't think that our language describes the stuff out there.
Nevertheless, many of us feel, well, that seems pretty implausible.
Why am I proposing this?
Well, I propose it because we all operate from within a perspective, don't we?
We have a perspective of our time and our culture and our language,
and indeed our very physiology, the way that we have been built, as it were.
And they are a way of looking at the world.
And I don't think we can somehow peer around that perspective and see what's really going on.
We're always, in a way, sort of trapped within that perspective.
Now, that account that I've given you, this story of closure, as it were,
proposes that we think about the world as if it's open.
Then instead of thinking that the world is divided, differentiated into bits,
and our descriptions just name those bits out there,
I think we have to think of the world as being not anything that's like that.
It's not differentiated in the first place.
We're not able to identify bits out there,
much in the way that if you asked a child to make a model of the sky using Lego bricks,
they wouldn't be able to.
You can't get from one to the other, can you?
Doesn't matter how you organise the Lego bricks, you can't describe the sky.
And that's what I think is going on for us in an overall sort of way.
Now, I'm far from alone in taking this view.
There are many other people who have challenged realism.
A number of the major philosophers of the 20th century,
the late Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Derrida, have all taken issue with realism.
And physicists like Heisenberg, who founded quantum mechanics,
came to the view, and I quote,
And in the last 10 years, I published Closure in 2001.
In the last 10 years, a whole slew of neuroscientists
has come to the same sort of conclusion that we are creating reality.
We're creating the individual particularities that enable us to intervene.
And so increasingly, I think there's signs that people are adopting
a similar sort of outlook to the one that I put forward.
But while you might think, well, maybe there are some good grounds for
thinking that this is the case, that we only have a perspective on the world.
Nevertheless, I think probably many of you just still feel, well,
I don't really like the idea of giving up this notion that there's a reality out there.
And I feel uncomfortable about that idea.
And what's really motivating that uncomfortableness with giving it up?
And I think, well, the first, an obvious one, is the one that I started with.
Well, it just seems to work so damn well, doesn't it?
And the American philosopher, Hilary Putnam, said in the 1990s,
he said, actually, he said this in the 1970s, sorry.
He changed his view by the time he moved to the 1990s.
He presented what's known as the no miracles argument.
And that's the idea of, well, the reason that we adopt realism,
because if we didn't, science would be a miracle.
And that sounds pretty convincing, doesn't it?
But I think it's a mistake.
We don't need truth in order to explain the success of science.
And what's more, as an indication that there's something wrong with this argument,
Putnam himself, who started out as a metaphysical realist,
abandoned this by the time it got to the 1990s.
He didn't any longer hold to this view.
Now, I'm going to give you an example of why that's the case.
Why is it the case that we're able to have an account of the world,
and it works even though it's not true?
Well, I imagine that most of you think that the Earth and
the planets go around the sun, don't you?
That's a story.
And in having that view, you have a view that was put forward
initially by Nicholas Copernicus in the 16th century.
And when he first put this forward, he was overturning a view that had
dominated in Europe for a couple of millennia, ever since Aristotle.
And in Aristotle's account, the Earth was at the center of the universe,
and the stars and the planets went round the Earth.
And his explanation of how this worked were that the stars were on
sort of giant spherical spheres that we couldn't see.
They were sort of transparent.
He called them crystal spheres.
And they carried the stars on them.
They were sort of fixed to these transparent stuff going across the sky.
And we obviously think that's absurd, don't we?
It's obviously ridiculous.
But did this mean that before Copernicus,
we couldn't predict the positions of the planets?
We couldn't predict when eclipses would take place?
Not a bit of it.
Aristotle's account of the universe was refined by a guy called Ptolemy,
and it was called the Aristotelian Ptolemaic account.
And they published a whole series of tables of
exactly where you would find things in the sky.
And it was unbelievably accurate.
And to give you an idea of just how accurate, when Copernicus put forward his
story, he didn't think that it was any better than the Aristotelian system.
He didn't claim, oh, I can show something that he can.
In fact, he assumed that the Aristotelian Ptolemaic account was exactly accurate.
It wasn't for more than 200 years after he put it forward,
there were any ways in which the heliocentric world,
as it's known, of Copernicus was seen to have any observable benefits.
And there are some people who would argue that we can correct, as it were,
the Aristotelian account in order to get it just as effective now
as the heliocentric account.
So what's going on here?
We assume that it's wildly wrong.
So how's it so accurate?
And I think the first way of understanding why it's accurate
is that our accounts of the world are not descriptions of reality.
They are metaphors.
They are ways of holding the world.
And if they don't work, we can refine them.
We can make them more accurate by watching how applying this model,
applying this metaphor to the world, we think, oh, actually, this bit doesn't work.
When it doesn't work, we just add another bit and we make it work better.
But we don't get actually any closer to how things ultimately are.
And Aristotle and Ptolemy introduced all sorts of amendments to their story.
I mean, the first and most obvious one is when you look at the sky,
the planets don't move in the same direction of the stars.
So what was Aristotle's solution?
Oh, there are lots more celestial spheres up there carrying each of the planets.
And in order to account for what was going up there,
he generated 50 celestial spheres, all operating in a way
to try and get it to work, his story to work.
And Ptolemy made it even more complicated.
This is a version of it.
It's pretty remarkable, isn't it, in the 15th century.
And he dealt with the fact that some of the planets seemed to go
in the opposite direction, what we now call retrograde motion.
And he accounted for that by the fact that each of the planets is actually not
on one sphere, it's on two spheres.
So when one is going across that, there's a smaller one that's sort of going up.
And occasionally, it means it's going in the opposite direction.
So we see the star is moving backwards.
So they made all sorts of amendments.
And I think that's how science works.
You all know the story of Newton and the apple, don't you?
There he was.
The apple was on the tree, fell to the ground because of gravity.
Well, when people first heard this theory, the critics said, well,
it's all very well this, Isaac.
But you've got this thing called force.
I mean, he might have called it spirit or ghosts.
It's an invisible thing.
You can't identify the force.
You can't see it.
You can't identify it in any way.
He just said, oh, there's this force.
And it's acting at a distance from the Earth to the apple.
And you can't see it.
You can't identify it in any way.
And people said, well, this is just mystical.
You've got no explanation.
You've got no way we can identify it.
And what's more, you can't even account for how it does anything.
And they had a further criticism.
And their criticism was, well, there's a whole load of apples on the tree.
They don't fall to the ground.
And you all know from the way we were taught at school, you know the answer.
There's an equal and opposite force in the branch that is holding it there.
And they said, but wait a minute.
You say that there's this invisible force which accounts for
the movement of the apple.
And then any counter example we give you, you just say there's another
invisible force, and there's a sort of certain circularity to that.
Well, I think that is exactly how it is.
And in fact, I would argue one of the reasons that the Newtonian framework
is so successful is because it's got a very quick way
of providing an explanation of where it doesn't work.
There's another force operating.
And it has a sort of quick way of inventing a celestial sphere.
And because it's invisible, there's no obvious way of identifying it's not there.
And so it enables the model to be very flexible.
Now, you might think, well, it's all very well.
I'm not sure I buy this story I'm giving you now.
Well, we're still at it.
Don't imagine we're not still at it.
We are inventing the universe now.
Just in 1998, we discover when we looked up at the stars that
they weren't behaving as we expected.
Our story of the Big Bang was that Big Bang had happened and
it threw everything out, as it were, and they're moving away from us.
All of the galaxies are moving away from us.
But they ought to be slowing down a bit because gravity should be
pulling them back in from the consequence of the Big Bang.
We discovered that's not what's happening at all.
They're accelerating away from us.
What was our solution?
Well, you know the solution now, don't you?
You know how Newton explains something when you don't have an explanation?
There's a new force.
That's what we've done.
We've just said there's a new force.
We've called it dark energy.
And the dark energy is just pushing everything apart.
Do we have any evidence for this dark energy?
Well, we don't have any more evidence than the problem that Newton had initially.
It's a proposal.
Let's imagine there's dark energy and that's doing the stuff.
We've got no explanation of what it is, or how it's doing this, or
even what the mechanism would be of how it's pushing everything away.
And it's a fundamental challenge as a result of the rest of our framework.
It hasn't stopped us inventing it.
And there's another thing about this, is that this force that we've invented,
dark energy, is not a small force.
It turns out to be absolutely enormous.
It's equivalent to 70% of the entire universe.
It's now the case that our version of the universe,
70% of it is accounted for by dark energy.
And we just made it up in the last 25 years.
And we've got no evidence for it.
Did this mean that all of you thought, oh, this science story,
it's obviously ridiculous?
No, you didn't think that.
And so that is how science is progressing.
What's more, we've also invented dark matter about the same time.
And in combination, dark energy and dark matter account for 95% of the universe.
The universe is 20 times the size that it was 20 years ago.
And that's as a result of the way we've changed our models,
our metaphors for the world, in result to the way that they operate.
Now, you might think, well, how does this relate to my everyday experience?
Well, let's stick with the sky.
When you go out at night, you look up at the star.
You see shapes, don't you?
You see constellations.
And in our culture and in the West, we tend to see the same sorts of ones.
I don't know, you can just make out maybe Orion here in this picture.
But other parts of the world see different patterns in the sky.
The Chinese have 318 constellations that they divide up the world.
We have about 88.
And they have a fewer number of stars in each one.
There are other groups of people in the world.
The Tupi, for example, an indigenous culture in Brazil,
have just seven constellations, but they have 23 stars in each of those.
So their way of holding this stuff up there is quite different from ours.
And indeed, this is how we see Orion.
But even within the same set of stars,
there are other cultures who see it quite differently.
I mean, the Navajo call it the slender one.
It's a totally different picture.
When we look at the sky, therefore,
there's an indefinite number of way we can pattern that stuff up there.
An indefinite number.
Even within 100 stars, just 100 stars, you can see about 2,000.
Within 100 stars, and if you draw a sort of supposed line between those stars,
you can make more patterns out of 100 stars
than there are atoms in the known universe.
There's just an unbelievable number of possible patterns that you can see up there.
Does that mean that any one of them is the true pattern?
Well, no, we don't think that, do we?
Does that mean, therefore, that they're not useful?
Well, that's not the case either.
Once you've identified your pattern, once you've seen Orion,
you can use Orion to put, you can say, look at this, the belt,
and it's pointing to this star down here.
Serious.
You've used the pattern to identify something else.
You can do that with any of the patterns.
Any of those millions of different ways of holding the sky,
you can track those patterns across the sky.
You can put them all together, and you can navigate around the world
using these patterns, even those millions of different options.
So you don't need truth to have a usable model that enables you to intervene.
It's not about truth.
It's about having a model and refining it and getting it to work.
So in the case of Aristotle and his celestial spheres, it worked amazingly well.
We don't think now, do we, that Aristotle, as he was adding these celestial spheres
and Ptolemy was making it even more complicated,
we don't think they were getting closer to the truth.
We're inclined to think, well, they were just compounding an error.
It was obviously ridiculous.
But is it so unreasonable to think that in some future culture,
they will look back on our story of the Big Bang and inflation and dark energy
and dark matter, and they'll say, well, that was absolutely ridiculous.
So that's how I think our theories are functioning.
Now, realists imagine that somehow behind all of these different patterns
that we can have for the world, what I would call closures,
they point to some underlying stuff.
But there's no way of being able to identify that underlying stuff.
We've only got our perspective.
We look through our perspective.
We can't somehow take off our spectacles and look from the side
and see what it's actually pointing to.
There's no way of getting to that underlying reality.
And instead, we have to think of the world as being different
from the way we have previously been operating.
And it seems to me that the contemporary predicament in terms of how we think
and the frameworks we operate is something like this.
For the last few hundred years, certainly 300 years,
philosophy has been trying to show how knowledge is possible.
And it's trying to do that because the previous story,
which was a religious one, just said the authority comes from the text.
You know, that's just how it is.
And the Enlightenment changed all of that.
We can discover what's going on out there.
We've got a human version of discovering knowledge.
So it then became important to show that that worked.
So a whole series of thinkers sought to try and show how knowledge is possible.
But it seems to me the contemporary situation is exactly the reverse.
As a result of our observations of the world,
we've got to a point of realising that we are unable to have knowledge.
We're unable to say how it ultimately is.
And the puzzle that faces us now, the contemporary puzzle,
is how is it that these accounts that we have of the world,
as I would describe these closures, how is it that they're successful?
Even though they don't have anything to do with the stuff out there.
How can we imagine the world?
And I think the first thing that we need to do is give up the idea
that the world is somehow differentiated.
It's already got lots of bits out there.
And our language and our theories are just naming the bits.
As if this is like a giant multiple choice question that, yes,
well, we spotted that one and we spotted that one and we get enough ticks and
we got it.
I don't think that's how we should think about the world at all.
The world is other from us.
I'm not imagining it's all in our heads, absolutely not.
There's something independent of us which is a constraint on our theories.
But we shouldn't imagine the stuff out there as being differentiated and
we are finding the correct answer.
I don't think that's what's going on.
So imagine that you were traveling to a far side of the universe and
to a place where everything was totally different.
The laws were totally different and you had no idea what was going on out there
and you were in your sealed container.
How would you try and explore this world that you'd not had any direct access to?
Well, I think you'd send out some probes, wouldn't you?
You might try and turn on a camera and if the camera didn't work,
you'd use some sort of robot arm or you'd send out a rover or something.
And you'd see what happened.
And if it came back, you'd think, well, maybe that bit's safe.
Maybe we can go into that bit.
And you'd watch what happened to it.
But if it came back and was all beaten up, you'd think,
God, I wonder what's causing that.
You'd watch what happened to your probe.
And as a result of doing that, you might be able to get a notion
of how to hold that stuff out there.
But you'd have no direct contact with it, would be you'd just be forming
a story about what's out there.
And it seems to me that is what we are doing.
We are putting together an account of what's out there and
then seeing whether it works.
And if it doesn't work, we tinker with it until we get it to work.
If you think of our response to the world, the standard neuroscience
sort of story, our account of the brain process is that we respond to
the world initially by the firing of neurons.
And they either fire or they don't fire.
And they take the whole of the stuff out there, what I would call openness,
they take all of that stuff and they've got one response that they fire
or they don't fire.
And we don't think that firing is a description of the universe, do we?
It's got nothing to do with a description.
It's a response to the world.
But I think that what we do is we build up from those responses layers of closure.
So this holding of the world as a firing of a neuron is a classic example of a closure.
It takes everything out there which is different and
undifferentiated and it holds it as one thing.
And then layers of closure in our brain processing build on that with further layers.
So we hold a whole hundreds of millions of neurons firing, as say a patch of blue.
The patch of blue isn't out there any more than the firing of the neuron is out there.
And our higher level levels of closure, like our language and
our scientific theories, are one step beyond that.
They're ways of holding the stuff that enables us to intervene.
And why does it work?
Well, there's been millions of years of trial and error.
Different organisms have developed ways of responding to the world.
And those ways of responding to the world have been the basis on which they've intervened.
And as a result of evolution,
those that turned out to be a good way to intervene have been retained.
And we have that.
We have that outcome of all of these different trials, of different models,
different methods, if you like, of holding the world, and we've received those.
Now, for higher level closure, that's at the sensory level, high level closure,
we are able to modify our accounts.
We can provide different ways of holding the world.
In terms of senses, we go outside.
If it's sunny, we look up at the sky.
We can't see it as green, can we?
You know, we're just stuck.
That's the way that our physiology works.
We're stuck with that response to the world.
But as far as language is concerned,
we've got lots of different ways that we can hold every bit of the world.
I mean, take this glass.
You probably think, oh, it's a glass.
But it could be a whole load of different things,
which are just all there waiting for you to see it like that.
So it could be a weapon.
It could be a collection of silicon atoms.
It could be part of a design format from the early 21st century.
It could be a transparent material.
There's no limit to the number of ways we can hold this bit of the world,
just in the same way as there's no limit to the number of ways we can hold those stars.
And we choose which one to go with.
We choose the ones which are useful.
And if we hold it as a glass, well, you know, I know what to do with that.
I can have a drink.
But if I want to do something else, if I want to use it in some other way,
I will hold it differently.
That's the nature of our closures.
We adopt those that enable us to do something.
The account that I've given you, that we close the world with a specific thought
of this definition of closure as closing that which is different as something specific,
I'm puzzled about how does that actual process of closure work?
What's going on?
And could we identify the overall characteristics of closure itself?
Because if we could, maybe that would indicate to us
how all of our theories might operate and the ways in which we think about the world
and how we might be able to intervene more effectively.
So I'm puzzled.
What can we get to as a description of closure itself,
that very process of creating something?
Well, the first thing I want to say is each example of closure generates two things.
It generates what I call material.
So in the case of the stars here, when you see it as a run,
you have something that wasn't there before.
You have the stars, but you've now got something new, the shape of a run.
And every closure generates new, what I call new material.
We're not always aware of it.
In a sense, we're not always aware of that thing.
But when we look at the stars, we actually perceive the shape.
We actually really, really have it.
We can see that new material.
But we don't only have material.
We also have what I call texture.
And that is the prior closures from which we've created the new material.
So in the case of the stars, you can go back to the stars, can't you?
You've seen a run, and you can think, oh, no, actually, I don't think it really is that shape.
I think we need to include this one, and we're going to draw it differently.
So the texture, which is held within each closure,
is always a potential threat to the material that we've generated,
because we could close it differently.
Now, that overall structure of closure, so in the case of each of these,
I think each of these closures is generating material and texture.
In the case of blue, we're holding all of those billions of neurons as something,
generating the material blue.
In the case of this shape here,
we've got something which we experience as countless different sensory effects,
depending on which angle you look at it,
you get different shapes, different visual sensations.
We hold it as one thing, the chair, and that generates the material.
We've now got something which we didn't have before from all of the sensations.
But we can always go back to the sensations and reinterpret what we've got
and say, oh, it's not a chair, it's firewood.
So this has a consequence that closure, I think, has three characteristics.
And the first is that it's unlimited.
Well, we've just seen this, haven't we?
You look up at the constellations,
you can have any number of ways of closing that stuff.
The same is true for every part of our visual field.
I've given you the example of a glass,
but when you look around the room, you see people and chairs and whatever.
But each one of those you could hold in an indefinite number of different ways.
Your visual field, instead of just being these fixed things,
could be sort of spectacularly complicated and
rich of all of the different possible ways of holding it.
So the first example, first characteristic of closure is it's unlimited.
And the second is that all closure fails.
You probably know the Magritte painting, translated into English here,
so not quite the Magritte painting, closure fails.
And I think was trying to get at this, that nothing is quite what we see it as.
That if you go for one particular closure,
you'll discover ways in which it's not that thing.
If you think that the glass is silicon atoms,
well, you can dig down and you'll discover, they're not silicon atoms at all.
There's a whole lot of space in there, there's protons and neutrons.
Maybe they're not just silicon, maybe there's other stuff.
Every closure fails, and every closure fails for a very straightforward reason.
It's not the same thing as openness, it's something different.
And it is always an unbridgeable gap, we're never going to arrive.
And that's why science never arrives.
It's not because somehow we're just toiling away and
we're building our stories and they always seem to be not quite right.
It's fundamental, it's necessarily the case, it can never get there.
Science can never get there.
It's just building those, it's inventing new celestial spheres.
And there's a third characteristic, the last,
which is that closure requires stability.
So you may know this drawing, it's a drawing of what's described as a duck rabbit.
So if you see it looking to the right, you see it as a rabbit.
If you see it looking to the left, there's a bill here and you see it as a duck.
But you can't see it as a duck and a rabbit at the same time, can you?
You sort of say, I've got the rabbit, maybe I can see whether I can find the duck.
And when you go to the other, you drop the other one.
And I think that's because we are hardwired to hold
our closures as one thing, not as lots of different things.
And there's a really good reason for that.
This account that I've given you, that you can look up at the stars and
see an indefinite number of ways of holding them,
that you can see the glass as an indefinite number of ways.
You'd just be totally overwhelmed with that, wouldn't you?
You'd be like, my God, I've just got too many options.
And so I think we are, as I say, hardwired to hold them in one way.
And I think that the fact that we have, as it were,
the necessity to have one closure to stay, is one of the reasons,
back to the point I was raising at the beginning, of why it is that we are so
attached to realism, because the particular closures that we adopt,
the particular ways that we see the world, we see as, well, just that's how it is.
It's really hard for us to catch sight of the other one.
Once you've got the duck, it's damn difficult to see the rabbit, and
vice versa.
But in fact, there's an indefinite number out there.
But we need to settle on one as a way of intervening in the world.
So the combination of these characteristics of closure,
that all closure is unlimited, it fails, and it needs to be stable,
is responsible, I think, for the way that we make sense of the world.
It's responsible for the way that we build our theories and
our beliefs, and indeed how we interact with each other.
And our theories are not, as Hawking said once upon a time,
a view into the mind of God.
We can't get into the mind of God.
That is sort of over.
Does this mean that all of our theories are just all equivalent?
Well, absolutely not.
If we see something as a collection of silicon atoms,
we've got a certain way that we might go about it.
We can investigate it.
We can investigate that metaphor.
We'll operate it like that.
If we see it as a design object from the early 21st century,
we'll have a whole different story about how is design working?
What's our cultural sense of how design it?
Every different metaphor we use has all sorts of consequences about how
we might intervene.
And one of the consequences is that we need to realize is
truth is a function of the model, not of reality.
I mean, you know this, I imagine, or many of you will,
as the London Underground map.
Does it describe what it's like being in the underground?
Well, of course it doesn't.
Is it the only map that we can draw of the underground?
No, there have been countless different ways of representing the underground.
But it works pretty well if you want to travel from Warren Street
to Charing Cross, because that's what the model is trying to do.
It's not trying to say how things are ultimately out there.
And the truth of this model is not by looking
at some ultimate character of the world.
It's applying the model, using it, and saying, actually, wait a minute.
I don't think this is Leicester Square.
I think we've got it wrong.
I think we need to change it.
But that's all within the model.
It's not describing the ultimate character of the world.
So you might still think, well, I see the idea,
but I really liked this idea of reality.
I felt I knew where I was.
I'm just a bit uncomfortable at the idea of giving up this security
and somehow wallowing in a space of lots of different stuff out there.
So I want to say, no, the passing of reality
is not something to regret.
It's something to lift our spirits.
We can feel confident that all of our different accounts of the world
that we have at the moment are, if they've stood the test of time,
are worth pursuing.
We can try and refine them.
We can get out there and try and make them better
than they are at the moment.
We don't have to give up our accounts of the world
and our scientific endeavors and so forth.
And what's more, there's unlimited potential, unlimited potential
to find alternative ways of seeing that might work better than the ones
that we have at the moment.
And so there's another thing about this overall framework
that I'd like to point to, which is that, in addition,
the passing of reality means that there's more to life
than our metaphors, our models, more to life than our closure.
There's an indefinite amount more.
And we may not be able to describe the ultimate character of the world,
but some of our most valuable experiences
are found in moments when we give up on wanting to hold it
as this particular thing.
The moments of wonder at the unknown, the moment at the seashore
as the storm breaks, the moment under the stars,
the moment when we're in love.
These are ways of escaping, if you like, from closure.
And artistic expression is often about avoiding closure
and not trying to close it.
So in the case of a poem or a painting, a great poem or painting
is not a literal description of what's out there, is it?
It's deliberately open.
And that attachment to openness is a really key thing.
Now, we can pursue closure, as I've said.
We can seek to refine what we previously mistakenly thought of as knowledge.
We can build our current scientific theories
and seek to improve our capacity to intervene
while at the same time recognizing that they will never arrive,
will consistently generate new unknowns.
But we also, within this framework, have an explanation
for the mystery of the world and its unlimited potential,
an explanation for our inability to find final answers to our questions,
and an explanation for the profound unknownness of what it is to be alive.
There's just one last thought I'd like to leave you with,
which is that the story I've offered you,
this story of openness and closure,
does not itself claim to have arrived.
I don't want to say, oh, no, this is the one way of holding it.
But I do think in a world which is ever more divisive and divided,
where people have firm beliefs that their accounts are true
and incompatible with others,
that the framework of openness and closure is a preferable place to be
at the same time of keeping all of the elements that matter.
And in the end, the account that I've given
is a way of seeming to hold fast a world that we cannot hold.
At all.
Thank you.
