Nam Phương hoàng hậu từng được chọn để đứng trên Thủ tướng Ngô Đình Diệm thời VNCH | NAMDUONGTV

Welcome to Nam Duong TV. Nam Duong TV is one of the best works of Professor Nguyen Tien Hung. He was the former director of the National Committee of the People's Republic of Vietnam. Today, Nam Duong TV invites you to the last part of episode 10 of Nam Duong TV. After General Nguyen Van Hinh left, General Ngô Đình Diệm was still a thorn in the side of the French. The opportunity was given to the French, because the French General was close to the American General in Saigon, and they all thought that Mr. Diệm was not talented enough to lead the South, and needed an alternative solution. The French gave two choices to get rid of Mr. Diệm. The first was to choose Mr. Nguyễn Văn Tâm or Dr. Phan Huy Quách as the prime minister. Or the second was to create a new mechanism, appointing Mrs. Phó Dương to neutralize the parties. Mrs. Phó Dương was offered to be the Queen Mother of Saigon. In these two choices, the UK, a very close ally to the US, also liked the second choice, which was to allow the Queen Mother of Saigon to take power. However, both the UK and the French did not expect that the US Secretary of State was close to Mr. Ngô Đình Diệm, and did not like the king-emperor thing, so Mr. Nguyễn chose the first option, and found someone to replace Mr. Diệm, by Mr. Tâm or Mr. Quách. However, the US Secretary of State also assessed that Mr. Tâm was too close to the French, while Mr. Quách could only be a defense chief or a secretary. And so, the political crisis in Saigon in 1954 has not progressed at all. Now, let's move on to the last part of the book When the Allies Jumped the Wall, by Professor Nguyễn Tiên Hưng. Settling the problem of the conflict between the armies with the departure of General Hưng was not stable enough. The replacement of Mr. Diệm was still the most pressing issue between Saigon, Paris and Washington. Right at the important French-US meeting in Washington at the end of September 1954, when France had to put pressure on the US to support Mr. Diệm and encourage all anti-communist parties to cooperate with him. But that was just an agreement about the work to be done at that time. Because of a longer period of time, according to the memo, the issue of contacting the prime minister still requires consideration when it is necessary to strengthen the Southern government. General Hưng left on November 13, 1954. On December 6, 1954, General Collins, the special envoy of President Eisenhower who had just arrived in Saigon for more than a month, was persuaded by General Follelli to oppose Mr. Diệm. He sent a telegram to Saigon 2103 in Washington talking about his disappointment with the situation here. He said that Diệm's ability was poor and suggested that the US should only support him for another three weeks. Then, if the situation does not improve, the US should have other measures. But when the telegram of Prime Minister Collins just arrived in Washington, Foreign Minister Dulles took the first step. Knowing that the artist Mike Mansfield was also the one who wholeheartedly supported Mr. Diệm, Dulles immediately cut out the text for Mr. Mansfield to read. He read carefully and analyzed each point, emphasizing Mr. Diệm. I would like to say that even if the image of helping Mr. Diệm to strengthen and protect the South is a rumor, and no matter which general election in 1956 will be able to give the benefit to the Communist Party, the US still has to try on all fronts and use its resources to keep the South, although it is very expensive. Any other road will go to the loss of Laos, so the US has to do everything it can to help Mr. Diệm because no one else can replace him. End of quote. About General Collins giving a deadline from 2 to 3 weeks for Mr. Diệm to prove good results or not, it will be replaced. Mansfield said that 3 weeks was too short and it would be very dangerous because he had to play with a political bomb. In Paris, US Ambassador Dulles also put pressure on General Collins not to issue an order to dismiss General Diệm, something that could be done relatively easily at that time. Because General Collins clearly saw the role of the US as a major force in Vietnam, he should listen to Dulles's request. In his resignation, General Collins wrote the following. At the end of 1954, there was no month to send a letter to General Diệm to promise him unconditional guarantee of the US. Every day, the South Vietnam went deeper into the US solution. End of quote. General Collins said it was not wrong because he had enough information about the US position after the Geneva agreement. Also in the meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Congressman Mansfield said that General Collins should stop and do not interfere anymore. Mansfield asked the US government in Paris, Mr. Dulles, to persuade General Collins about this and advised him not to return to Vietnam. As for other figures being debated to replace Mr. Diệm, the version of the meeting recorded Congressman Mansfield said although Dr. Quack is a capable person, but he only hopes that Mr. Diệm will appoint Mr. Quack as Minister of Defense, not someone who is capable enough to replace Mr. Diệm. Although the British and French governments continue to promote the choice of Mr. Diệm to be prime minister, Congressman Mansfield firmly opposes this as well as opposes any pressure that forces Mr. Diệm to put Mr. Diệm in the Cabinet. Because of this, it gives the Communist Party a basis to accuse the Diệm government of being a scapegoat for the people. But although Congressman Mansfield supports Prime Minister Diệm, General Collins still refuses. He called on Washington to propose two solutions, asking Mr. Diệm to appoint Mr. Quack to replace Mr. Diệm or Mr. Diệm himself to return to Vietnam. I am very grateful for Mr. Diệm's influence on the leaders here. All are proud of him as the emperor and believe that he is the source of power. Mr. Diệm is only appointed by Mr. Diệm so he can take office at any time. In that palace, Mr. Diệm should only continue to support Mr. Diệm for a short time and should recall Mr. Bảo Đại if the United States can accept this. In addition, according to Ms. Lins, at a time like this, the US should not commit to a clear aid program for the South so that if the situation continues to worsen, the US should review its plans and can consider banning aid to the Vietnamese army and increasing aid to the French army In Saigon, at that time, General Elly and Ms. Lins also got closer to each other so Elly could persuade Ms. Lins to make such a firm offer. But at the same time, Ambassador Heath disagreed with Ms. Lins and General Elly. On December 17, he sent a report to Washington on the opposite opinion suggesting not to stop supporting Mr. Diệm and the Vietnamese army because the free world is losing face. He wrote like this. I would like to criticize. France has lost a battle at the border and that military victory of the Communist Party has been exaggerated into a humiliating defeat in the diplomacy of the free world in Genève. It is impossible to put all the current difficulties on Mr. Diệm's head because he only took office four months ago. He lacks political ability, stubbornness and skepticism. But in the four months in office, he had to face great opposition, including a rebellious military leader who accidentally became a tool of the Communist Party. The active opposition of the French and many other factors upset others. About France's intention, Mr. Heath reported that there are many evidences that support Mr. Diệm because there is no one more qualified than him. In conclusion, Mr. Heath asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report to him and the General and General Collins two points. The first point is that although we recognize the risks of the above policy, but we believe that because there is no better way, we will continue to support Mr. Diệm because no one can replace him The second point is that because this solution has been opposed on the basis that he lacks the support of the Vietnamese people and he has proven that he is not able to control in the past. In this confusing situation between France and the United States, there are also disagreements within the United States in Saigon between the ambassador and the president of the United States about supporting Mr. Diệm. On December 19, 1954, Mr. Diệm had a meeting at the Matignon Palace in Paris. Prime Minister Mélenchon said that he had previously agreed with Foreign Minister Dulles to support Mr. Diệm, but now he no longer believes that Mr. Diệm can succeed even if he receives maximum support, so he has to find someone to replace him. Foreign Minister Dulles did not agree, arguing that the situation in the South is very difficult, firstly because it is necessary to solve the problem of the war in the South, secondly because it is necessary to solve the problem of the war in the South, and thirdly because it is necessary to solve the problem of the war in the South. He also said that the United States should contact Mr. Bảo Đại because he still holds the power according to the law and is very active in stabilizing the South, for example, as it has helped to solve the problem of the situation. He added that no matter what, Mr. Bảo Đại is probably the only one who can save the situation. If that's the case, we've come to a desperate place. When it comes to the bottleneck and to compromise between the two positions of France and the United States on Mr. Bảo Đại, Prime Minister Mendès Frank later gave an answer that he said was considered by France before, that is, we should ask Mr. Bảo Đại to appoint a representative to exercise his power. This representative will be in a position of deputy and have full power to act. Such a proposition sounds reasonable because according to that, Mr. Bảo Đại does not need to return to Saigon and does not need to dismiss Mr. Diệm, maintain the continuity of power and can bring stability because the deputy will be the one to stand above all to give gifts as the Queen of England and Mendès Frank said. This solution is very useful and plays a key role in resolving disputes. The report on the meeting on December 19 stated this. Mr. Mendès Frank said France was willing to offer this to Mr. Bảo Đại and asked him to appoint another deputy immediately. The UK has been a country with a tradition of royalty for centuries, so when the French Prime Minister said to the King he said that if Mr. Bảo Đại was not in Vietnam, he could appoint a representative with full power to take over. It would be a mistake if Mr. Bảo Đại returned to Vietnam because Vietnamese still respect the tradition of royalty, so in this way or another, there must be a Royal Commission in some form because this is the best solution to get out of this current crisis. On this issue, Mr. Bảo Đại and Mr. Bảo Đại discussed the issue and asked Mr. Bảo Đại to appoint a deputy and ask for more details about the differences and her interests. I don't know if France and the UK are going to meet before the meeting, but when Mr. Eden said that and Mr. Delors didn't have time to give his opinion, Mr. Mendès Frank immediately sent a message to his friends in Asia, asking them to speak out against the actions of the French people. I am sorry to ask those who have suffered because of the war to express their attitude and action to help us end the war that is destroying our country day and night. On behalf of tens of millions of Vietnamese people, I ask all my friends and friends of Vietnam to stand up for freedom and ask the governments of the free world to intervene as soon as possible to create an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. I would like to thank all our compatriots for their deep gratitude. The US is a democratic country from the day it was founded. Mr. Delors did not agree and said that doing so would only make the problem more complicated because if we consider the double solution, that is, there is a second problem when the first problem has not been solved. In addition, such a double solution will be difficult to decide on a replacement for Mr. Diem and establish a machine to achieve our goals. We should focus on the current problem and not add a new one. Here, Donald Trump asked the French to see if he would continue to propose another person to replace Mr. Diem. General Paul Lely proposed three people, Mr. Nguyen Van Tam, Mr. Nguyen Huu Tri and Mr. Phan Huy Quat. Mr. Mendez Phan is still not satisfied with Donald Trump's argument. So he suggested that the two generals Collins on the American side and Ellis on the French side even Mr. Bao Dai. Mr. Mendez Phan asked the two sides of the United States and France to put an end to this and not delay any longer. The French side decided to replace Mr. Diem, Mr. Dulles said that if the United States had to decide not to find anyone to replace Mr. Diem, we would have to consider how much more we should invest in the East Dulles talked about his support for Mr. Diem at the U.S. Congress, especially the two diplomatic committees of the Senate and House of Representatives led by Mr. Manfield and Mr. Richard. Mr. Mendez often talked about the power of these two figures in the issue of supporting the French military. Speaking of the difference in goals between the two countries, Dulles noted that France invested in human resources and assets in Vietnam, while the United States focused on the Southeast Asia. He concluded that although there is only a slight possibility of success in Vietnam, it is worth investing a lot. Finally, at the end of 1954, Mr. Dulles firmly continued to support Prime Minister Diem and forced him to go to France to bring Mrs. Manfield to Saigon as a deputy. The fifth point in the Palace on December 24, 1954 was sent to General Collins in Saigon and Ambassador Dullon in Paris. He wrote as follows. I do not believe that France proposed to appoint a deputy and Prime Minister Mendez did not force anything more after analyzing this proposal. I think creating such a mechanism has little benefit while no one has been able to replace Mr. Diem and only caused more trouble. If the Queen of the South becomes a deputy, Prime Minister Diem will have a chance to replace Mr. Dullon in the book When the Allies Jumped by Professor Nguyễn Tiến Hưng, General Planning Director of the Vietnam Proposal Committee.