A newly declassified 2020 NSA memo shows senior officials delayed a foreign-election intelligence report in part because they feared releasing it during the Trump administration would expose the agency to accusations of political bias and association with the “deep state.”
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
A newly declassified National Security Agency memo reveals that senior officials delayed the release of intelligence concerning foreign targeting of the United States and the 2016 election because they feared publication could damage the NSA’s reputation for political neutrality during President Donald Trump’s first administration.
The March 13, 2020, memorandum, reported by Just the News, was written contemporaneously by an NSA analyst involved in producing the intelligence report and was released Tuesday by the White House Government Transparency Task Force.
Nsa Election Threat Reporting March 2020 by yourNEWS Media
The document describes an internal meeting over whether and how to publish an intelligence product that analysts had completed long before senior officials resolved questions surrounding its distribution.
According to the memo, an NSA deputy director, referred to as DDIR, worried that publishing the report amid intense political tensions surrounding Trump and the intelligence community could cause the agency to be viewed as part of the “deep state.”
“DDIR explained that he was concerned that releasing the [report] at this time – in the current political climate, with an acting ODNI who had been tasked (according to DDIR) to ‘clean house’ in the intelligence community, and with an administration that is suspicious of the IC and aggressive in removing anyone who stands in their way – would damage NSA’s credibility. He believed that questions would be asked as to why the NSA was choosing to release this information, most obviously pertinent to the 2016 election, now, more than a year after the election, and that NSA would be accused of releasing it for political purposes.”
The document further describes concerns inside the agency that other intelligence organizations had already become associated with the “deep state” label while the NSA had largely avoided it.
“The documents show that DDIR perceived that ODNI, CIA, and to an extent the FBI had been tarred as hosting or being part of the ‘deep state’, but that NSA thus far had not been associated with the deep state and was trusted; he felt that publishing this report would destroy that trust. He felt that the questioning of NSA that would ensue would have ramifications on the credibility of NSA reporting overall and would result in morale problems among the broader NSA workforce. He repeatedly said that he wanted to protect our ability to be who we are at NSA: ‘nonpartisan, objective, speaking truth to power.’”
The memo was dated March 13, 2020, and declassified Aug. 12, 2026, by White House Counsel David Warrington.
An administration official told reporters that Intelligence Community Ombudsman Barry Zulauf reviewed the memo before producing a sharply critical 2021 report examining alleged politicization of intelligence concerning foreign election interference during the 2020 election.
The NSA analyst who wrote the newly released memorandum repeatedly referred to “we, the analysts” and expressed frustration that senior officials had delayed the intelligence product for approximately 16 months even though the underlying analytical work had been completed on schedule.
The report had originally been proposed for publication in December 2018 and examined foreign targeting of the United States beginning in 2014, including activity connected with the 2016 presidential election.
A narrower version of the intelligence had already been released, but publication of the fuller assessment encountered two major obstacles.
One involved information that, even with names removed, could contextually identify members of Congress. That required additional approval under the intelligence community’s Gates Procedures, which govern the dissemination of congressional identity information.
The second involved details connected to the 2016 election that officials considered “sensational,” requiring more restricted distribution.
According to the memo, senior levels of the intelligence community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, repeatedly failed to make timely decisions about the report for roughly 16 months.
By February 2020, officials had finally approved a distribution list, clearing one of the principal barriers to publication.
The report was then moved toward release pending approval by NSA Director Gen. Paul Nakasone.
Deputy Director George Barnes nevertheless objected to releasing the assessment “as-is at this time,” according to the memorandum.
Officials Considered a ‘Watered-Down’ Version
Barnes proposed alternatives to publication of the full report, including issuing a reduced or “watered-down” summary.
The NSA analyst objected to that approach.
According to the memo, combining or reducing the intelligence would still risk contextually identifying members of Congress, particularly because of references involving the 2016 Democratic presidential contest between Hillary Clinton and Sen. Bernie Sanders.
The analyst also argued that selectively retaining information involving Republican candidates while removing material involving Democrats could itself appear politically motivated.
Beyond the immediate election context, the analyst maintained that the original report contained foreign-intelligence value that remained relevant because it documented the policy preferences and strategic thinking of foreign actors.
The March 2020 meeting also addressed another intelligence product still being drafted concerning the Russian Internet Research Agency’s preferences and strategy during the 2020 Democratic presidential primary.
That report faced similar complications under the Gates Procedures because its contents could indirectly identify members of Congress.
Barnes considered incorporating some of the older 2016 material into the newer 2020 assessment.
Another possibility discussed was a non-serialized process in which select intelligence analysts could receive the material without publication of a formally distributed intelligence report.
The deliberations show officials trying to balance the perceived intelligence value of the reporting against concerns over political fallout, congressional-identification rules and the NSA’s institutional reputation.
Memo Adds to Evidence of Intelligence Community Divisions
The NSA dispute occurred amid broader internal disagreements over how U.S. intelligence agencies assessed and distributed election-related intelligence during the closing years of Trump’s first administration.
A separate 2021 intelligence-community ombudsman report alleged that some analysts handling intelligence involving China and the 2020 presidential election withheld or resisted reporting because of personal disagreement with Trump’s policies toward Beijing.
According to that report, one China analyst objected to providing intelligence to “that vulgarian in the Oval Office.”
The resulting intelligence assessment produced differing conclusions within the intelligence community.
A majority assessment downplayed the extent of Chinese election influence, while a minority position supported by then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe concluded that Beijing had attempted to undermine Trump.
Those allegations came from the ombudsman review and represented findings about internal intelligence-community conduct rather than a judicial determination.
The newly declassified NSA memo provides a separate example of officials struggling with the political consequences of election-related intelligence.
In the NSA case, the concern described in the contemporaneous document came from senior leadership worried that publishing potentially sensitive reporting would cause the agency to be viewed as partisan or aligned with the “deep state.”
The China-related dispute described in the ombudsman report concerned allegations that some working-level analysts allowed personal policy views to influence how intelligence was handled.
Together, the documents portray an intelligence community grappling not only with foreign election threats but with internal concerns about politics, public perception and the consequences of delivering politically sensitive information during an election year.
The NSA analyst’s account is particularly notable because the stated concern was not that the intelligence lacked analytic value, but that releasing it after a prolonged delay could damage the agency’s credibility and invite accusations that it was acting against the president for political reasons.
The memo shows those concerns ultimately became part of the decision-making process surrounding when and how election-related intelligence reached policymakers, even as the analyst responsible for the work argued that the information remained relevant and should be released.
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