Rupert Sheldrake speaks to Hilary Lawson about scopasthesia, morphic resonance, his ongoing struggle with the scientific establishment, and his core worldview.
What are the beliefs you would never give up?
00:00 Introduction 00:45 Why have you found the scientific community so difficult to convince? 05:08 Is your interpretation of experimental data affected by your underlying philosophical views? 08:00 Do you consider your own theory to be a model, or the truth? 10:26 What are the potential applications of your theories? 13:05 Are there key pieces of evidence that your skeptics are ignoring? 16:47 Are there parts of your philosophical framework that you would never give up? 20:10 To what degree does conventional scientific wisdom – and public interest – guide what you write? 24:02 What would you like to achieve next?
Rupert Sheldrake has spent decades defying science's unspoken dogmas. Labelled a heretic, he continues to ask one radical question: what if the universe remembers? In this conversation with post-realist philosopher Hilary Lawson, Sheldrake defends morphic resonance, recounts his excommunication by orthodox science, and explores how consciousness, memory, and mind might stretch far beyond the brain.
People are afraid, you see. They're afraid of stepping out of line, because they're afraid they'll be attacked.
So, Rupert, great to have you at the Festival again.
Now, you began your career as a biochemist at Clare College in Cambridge,
but you gave that up fairly shortly afterwards.
And since then, you've been very successful with a whole range of books
on parapsychology and telepathy.
And I think you would be probably fair to say, and you'd probably agree,
that the scientific community has never really fully accepted your take on a lot of that content,
and has often been rather critical.
But you have been very successful in the more general public.
What do you think is the reason for that?
Why do you think that the scientific community has been as difficult to convince as they have?
Well, it's hard to identify who the scientific community are.
For example, when I was a fellow at Clare College in Cambridge, after doing my PhD,
you know, I found when I discussed my ideas on the high table and with other scientists,
some were really intrigued, some were very friendly, some were a bit hostile.
It was a varied response.
Then I was working in India in an agricultural research institute,
an international agricultural institute.
And among the Indian scientists I worked with, none were hostile at all.
They were fascinated by the idea of morphic resonance and the kinds of topics I'm interested in.
I mean, none of them were militant atheists.
But when I came back to England and when I published my first book,
A New Science of Life, in 1981, again, there was a very mixed response.
Some people really liked it.
But it was denounced in a famous editorial by the editor of Nature, Sir John Maddox,
as a book for burning, and he did it on a front-page editorial.
And his intention was to excommunicate me from the scientific world by denouncing me as a heretic.
Now, that meant that I became dangerous to know for a lot of scientists.
But it doesn't mean that everyone thinks like that.
The people who have repeatedly attacked me have one thing in common,
which is that they're militant atheists.
Now, I know lots of atheists, and most of them are not militant,
and many of them are friends.
But people who are militant atheists have usually made the mechanistic,
materialist worldview into a kind of religion on which their identity depends.
And my criticism of that worldview and my attempt to move things on beyond it
were very, very upsetting and annoying for such people.
So what's happened is that these denunciations from usually committed members
of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry then get taken up by editors of Wikipedia,
where there's a whole team called guerrilla skeptics on Wikipedia
who have taken over my biography page at least 20 years ago.
They took over this page and control it.
Anyone who tries to edit it differently finds it hard to get.
They get banned, usually.
So there are some people who feel very strongly like that, but most scientists don't.
And whenever I give talks in scientific institutes,
most people are perfectly friendly.
And indeed, after the talk, it almost always happens during the drinks or the tea,
people come up and they look both ways and they say,
you know, I'm really interested in your work.
I've had these telepathic experiences myself.
My dog knows when I'm coming home from the lab, all that kind of thing.
And then they usually say, but I can't talk to my colleagues because they're so straight.
And then another one comes up and says the same thing,
and then another one.
And I sometimes say to them, actually, you're not alone.
There's at least three or four of your colleagues who think like you do.
They say, well, how do you know?
And I say, because they've just told me.
People are afraid, you see.
They're afraid of stepping out of line because they're afraid they'll be attacked.
It doesn't mean that this rather limited orthodoxy is actually actively believed
and enthusiastically believed by most scientists.
It isn't.
And so I guess your explanation there is that there's a whole bunch of people
in the scientific world who have an overall philosophical view
that is antagonistic to your approach.
Yeah.
And that they intervene on that basis to try and, you know,
cancel you from that conversation.
What would you say to them if they said to you, well, Rupert,
you have an overall philosophical view that is implicit in your approach
that is affecting the way that you go about interpreting your material?
Well, I do have an overall philosophical view.
It's a kind of holistic view of nature where consciousness is pervasive
in the universe and where minds are extended beyond brains and so on.
These are views and where there's morphic resonance or memory in nature.
And this differs from the standard mechanistic materialist view.
But I see these as views to be discussed and, if possible,
tested scientifically to where they differ in their predictions.
And, indeed, I spend much of my time actually doing experiments
to try and test these predictions.
So I think where we differ is that I think there should be an open debate
about differing world views, whereas they think that anything
that doesn't fit into this mechanistic materialist world view
should be branded pseudoscience and cancelled, if possible.
So it's asymmetric, you see.
In almost every other area of human activity, there's a plurality of views.
In philosophy, there are different schools of thought.
You have one yourself.
In politics, there are different parties.
In religion, there are lots of different religions.
And within each religion, there are different denominations,
Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian, etc.
But within science, that culture doesn't exist.
And there is no culture that I've come across
of fair scientific debates on disputed areas.
It works more on the grounds of winner-takes-all.
The dominant orthodoxy controls the grants, the top journals,
the peer-review process, the appointments,
the government advisory committees, and so on.
Yes.
And everyone else is sort of squeezed out.
It's not just in the areas that affect me.
It's in almost every area of science.
You can find a kind of dissident minority
who have been silenced, squeezed out, deprived of funding, etc.
Not a healthy situation.
And I think this is partly because no one has ever really
thought about how the culture of science could work.
You know, you have consultants in businesses
about how to make people interact better and that kind of thing,
absent in science.
Well, as you know, I share some of your overall comments
about science in terms of its imposition of a single view
and would encourage the idea of alternative views.
Of course, you're aware that I take the view
that science doesn't uncover the truth.
It provides a model by which we interpret the world.
Would you go as far as that?
Do you hold a model-theoretic view of your own interpretation?
Or do you think you have sort of seen how it really underlyingly is?
No, I have a model, and I have several models,
but one model is the model of morphic resonance,
memory and nature and influence from the past to the present.
My model is, in terms of morphic resonance,
similarity affecting subsequent similar things
across space and time.
Now, I'm fairly sure there must be a memory in nature
because I don't think evolution or biology
would work very well without it.
Whether I've got the right model or not, I don't know.
At the moment, it's almost the only memory model on the market.
There are a few people who've got vague statements
that might be memory in the universe.
The Hindu and Buddhist models of karma
do have a kind of memory within the universe
and causation across time.
So there are similarities there.
So, no, I definitely see it as a model.
I don't see it as the ultimate theory.
And my own view of morphic fields and morphic resonance,
I see as being a bit like Faraday's idea
of electric and magnetic fields,
and he didn't know how they worked.
I didn't know how they worked.
Maxwell came along 20 years later
with his equations of electromagnetism
in terms of the ether,
and everyone said that was great
and built up the 19th century understanding of light and so on
and radio waves.
And then Einstein came along and said no such thing as the ether
and had his special theory of relativity.
And then quantum electrodynamics came along and said
it's all based on the quantum vacuum field
and things that Faraday would never have thought of.
The models kept changing, but the basic phenomenon,
the fields of electricity and magnetism,
were what seemed to be a part of nature.
So I think the basic phenomena I'm talking about
may well be real, but I don't know.
That's why I do experiments.
If I knew the answers, I wouldn't spend much of my waking time
designing and carrying out experiments.
Well, and maybe it's not terribly important
whether there's an ultimate reality,
which is scribing,
the question of whether it has application,
which would be valuable in areas.
Are there ways in which your overall theories, you think,
have application that would make a difference to people?
Well, morphic resonance is a theory of memory.
It includes regular memory, your memory and my memory.
And it has implications for learning methodologies
because if morphic resonance happens,
then by tapping into resonance from people
who have learned something in the past,
you'd learn it quicker and better.
And I think that happens anyway with a lot of,
especially practical learning of sports skills
and technical skills.
People learn by practice, learn by doing.
I think it could make a big difference
to language teaching in Britain, for example,
where people are notoriously bad at foreign languages.
I mean, the last way that an ordinary French child
would learn French is by going through a list of irregular verbs
and declensions and things,
the way at least I was taught it from a textbook.
You could think of a much more effective method of doing it.
I see.
Morphic resonance might have technical implications.
It has implications for treating memory loss and Alzheimer's
and psychological problems with memory.
If morphic resonant computers could be developed,
and I think they'd have to be analog, not digital computers,
then you'd have worldwide memory banks
and I think you'd have artificial intelligence systems
that really were intelligent rather than simulating intelligence.
So that's one area.
The other work I do on the extended mind,
the feeling of being stared at, telepathy,
and pre-sentiment, various forms of intuition.
If you could train intuitive skills,
then people would be better at anticipating what's about to happen,
possible dangers in the environment.
They become more intuitive in responding to what's going on around them,
and there's a lot of scope for training intuition.
And so I think, yes, there are plenty of applications.
None of them are big technological applications
that would attract sort of billion dollars of funding
from engineering industries.
They're all more kind of soft power-type implications,
at least so far.
Do you think, in terms of trying to convince those
who are sceptical of your view,
that there are key bits of evidence that they are avoiding
or which you think would convince them?
Or do you think it's just that the interpretation of the results
that you would want to put on is different from the one that they would?
No, I don't think it's just interpretation.
I mean, take, for example, the feeling of being stared at from behind
and turning around to find someone's looking at you.
That's... 95% of people have had that experience.
I've done lots of experiments that show it's real.
I think they show it's real.
The sceptics then said, oh, you've done the randomisation wrong.
So I did the randomisation the way they thought it should be done.
The effect was the same.
Then some sceptics said, oh, well...
Have you got other people to replicate it?
Yes. Oh, yes. This has been widely replicated.
In fact, the Science Museum in Amsterdam for 25 years
had a sense of being stared at experiment as an exhibit,
which thousands of people took part in with very positive results.
And then some of them say, well, maybe it's, you know,
there's leakage of sounds and subtle changes in breathing.
Well, then it's been done through windows,
through soundproof barriers and steelworks,
or even through CCTV,
where there's no possibility of sensory leakage.
And the response of most of my critics to this,
the committed materialists, is to dismiss the evidence altogether
and simply to say it's impossible,
therefore the evidence must be flawed.
Yes.
That's, for example, Stephen Pinker,
who says that these things are impossible.
In his book Rationality, he actually argued
you don't need to look at the evidence in areas like this
because you know they're impossible, so it's a waste of time.
So I have challenged him to look at the evidence,
and he then said, oh, he didn't want to debate it with me
because he hadn't got the bandwidth to actually read the evidence.
He knew it was wrong, but he hadn't actually read it.
So he then said, why don't you have a debate
with someone who knows more about it, namely Michael Shermer?
And that debate actually happened at How the Light Gets In last year
at Hay on Wye, and Michael Shermer did exactly what Pinker does,
which is that he evaded the evidence at every step.
He made general remarks about the fallibility of human judgement
and that kind of thing,
but was absolutely unwilling to look at the evidence.
And of course, from my philosophical perspective,
all of that's very understandable in the sense that
we are attached to our own accounts of the world,
and the notion that you can use a bit of experimental evidence
just to convince somebody is not the case.
That's not, I think, how science usually works.
It's because if you've got a theory that works very well
in all sorts of areas,
and you've built your career on following that and so forth,
you need to defend that theory,
and you're just not going to contemplate something
that is a real challenge to that.
But on the other hand,
the same sort of question applies to all of us.
Whatever framework you've got, we're always at risk, aren't we,
of somehow imagining that we've cracked it
and we're attached to core bits of our general outlook,
which we're not really prepared to give up.
Do you think that's true for you?
Are there bits of your overall, as it were, philosophical framework
of how you understand the world that you think,
well, no, I'm just not prepared to give up that part of it?
Well, yes, I suppose there are.
But they're not things that are actually to do
with empirical evidence.
I mean, I don't think I deny any empirical evidence
because I have a great respect for empirical evidence.
And after all, science is supposed to be dependent
on empirical evidence.
It's supposed to be able to decide issues.
I mean, in reality, it's just as you describe.
It's mostly a matter of prejudice and commitment
to pre-existing beliefs.
I mean, in my own case, those beliefs include the idea
that the forms of consciousness in the universe
are greater than our own,
which we actually directly experience
through mystical experiences.
And so I would find it very hard to give that up
because I've actually had these experiences.
And if science is empirical,
that means it's dependent on experience.
And so my evidence for these is my own experience.
I don't expect it to convince others.
It convinces me.
And the alternative to that is not experience or evidence,
but a theory, the theory that the mind is nothing
but the activity of the brain.
It's all inside the head,
and there's no consciousness out there.
That's an assumption.
So I certainly disagree with that assumption,
and people who have that assumption disagree with me
on the basis of that assumption.
But I don't feel that what I'm committed to so much in this
is a particular theory,
because it's so strongly based on experience for me.
Yes, although you did accept
that there were some elements of your framework
which you wouldn't be prepared to give up there.
Well, I would be prepared to give up...
I mean, the idea that there's consciousness
greater than ourselves, I wouldn't be prepared to give up
because I think it's true.
If somebody came up with a better explanation
for memory and inheritance,
I might give up the idea of morphic resonance,
but I haven't seen any better theory yet.
Yes.
And, you know, I don't think morphic resonance
is the ultimate model.
I think it's a step on the way
to a better, more comprehensive model of reality.
And so I might give it up if someone came up
with something that accounted for the facts better.
Yes.
But not if somebody said,
we just believe this is impossible,
you know, because it goes against A-level physics
or something like that.
Yes.
I see.
But you were tempted,
maybe it was just the way you phrased it,
you did say the notion of a greater consciousness,
I think, is true.
Yes.
So it's...
Well, I think it's true as an experience
that I've had myself.
You could interpret the experience
that I and others have had of a greater consciousness
saying it's nothing but an illusion
produced inside your brain.
That would be another interpretation,
but I don't believe that interpretation.
I think it's direct experience.
Okay.
One last question.
You've been very successful
in terms of your following amongst the general public.
Why do you think that has been the case?
And have you ever, when framing your accounts,
thought that it would be a good thing
to take into account
the current conventional wisdom
within the scientific community
in order to be able to make your views more acceptable?
And the same on the other side.
Have you ever been tempted to frame a book
that you think might play well with the public
because you think that they will like it,
they'll think they'll like the overall story?
I don't think I've been tempted to do it
just because I think people like it.
I mean, whenever you discuss books with publishers,
then publishers' main concern is,
will the book sell?
It won't sell if nobody likes it and no one's interested.
So there's obviously an element of that in every author,
not just me.
Of course.
But in terms of framing things
in a way that's acceptable in the scientific world,
I've spent, in the last year, for example,
I've published about seven or eight papers
in peer-reviewed journals.
That's what I'm mostly doing at the moment,
is writing up research in peer-reviewed journals,
jumping through all the hoops that you have
with scientific journals,
phrasing it in ways that are acceptable to peer reviewers,
having all the references, the evidence, the arguments,
doing everything that's needed for scientific.
And some of my papers in the last few years,
you know, Proceedings of the Royal Society,
B, Journal of Experimental Botany,
Journal of Consciousness Studies,
you know, these are pretty mainstream journals.
So I do play the game by the rules
and I'm totally in favour of publishing in a normal way.
What I find is that,
although I play the scientific game by the rules,
I find a lot of my opponents don't play by the rules.
In my book The Science Delusion, for example,
where I look at the ten dogmas of science,
the main ten dogmas of science,
what I do is turn them into questions,
you know, the statement,
matter is unconscious becomes,
is matter unconscious, for example.
Then I treat it as a scientific hypothesis.
You can actually look at the evidence
and the arguments on both sides and see what happens.
Whereas the statement, matter is unconscious,
which is not the normal dogmatic,
it's not even stated explicitly usually,
it's just taken for granted,
doesn't leave any space for debate
or open discussion.
So what I did in that book was try to take
the central dogmas of conventional science,
make them into subjects for real debate and discussion.
And this has worked.
I mean, some scientists I know
really do discuss these issues.
People who are completely committed
to mechanistic materialism
as a kind of religious belief or scientism
then aren't interested in discussing them.
They just see this book as an annoyance
that should be ignored or suppressed if necessary.
When I gave a talk on it,
the TEDx talk on this book,
then, as you probably know,
several people, Dawkinsian-type people in America,
got it cancelled or tried to get it cancelled or censored,
not by arguing with me about what I'd said,
but by attacking the organization
that had put it on, TED,
saying they'd discredited themselves
and this would damage their credibility.
And that's their usual technique.
Don't attack the ideas, attack the platform.
I'm sure you get a lot of that in your line of work.
Indeed.
Yes.
Indeed.
So just a final question then, Rupert.
So what would you like to achieve now?
What's your next goal?
Well, I've got a new series of experiments
on morphic resonance,
which is my most central scientific idea,
and I'm hoping that there can be good evidence
one way or the other
about morphic resonance from good tests.
So far, there isn't much evidence,
not because people have tried to test it and failed,
but because it's been so controversial
that almost no one with a lab has wanted to do this.
So I'm optimistic about research on morphic resonance.
Then my other really big area of research
is the extended mind, the mind beyond the brain.
I'm launching at the moment an app
so people can take part in experiments
on the sense of being stared at themselves
and train themselves to get better at it,
and I'm hoping that this will lead
to widespread participation in the research
and especially if people can get better at it,
better experiments,
because right now most people aren't very good at it.
It's above chance, but not much above chance.
And if people can train themselves,
it would just move this whole field of research
to a new level.
Well, if you were able to show that,
it would be impressive, that is for sure.
Well, in fact, it's already been shown
in lots of papers in peer-reviewed journals,
but to have it to the level
where you could have demonstrations,
where you could have competitions,
you know, who's the most sensitive person
with the finals on TV?
And the same with telephone telepathy.
I've developed apps for that
and at the moment want to develop
intuition training apps
so people can become better at it
and then, if necessary, have competitions.
So if you ended up with the Telepathy Olympics,
for example, and if people could win gold medals
for being the most telepathic person
in the whole Olympic Games,
then it would become a social fact
instead of being something marginalized
by the sort of propagandists and materialism.
Most ordinary people treat it as a fact anyway.
It's not as if, talking to most normal people,
these things are disputed.
People say, oh, it happens to me all the time.
And most people don't have a problem
with these phenomena,
the sense of being stared at.
Most people say, oh, that happens to me.
Or dogs that know when their owners are coming home.
Have you considered trying to organize
any such thing like Telepathy Olympics?
Well, no, but we haven't had
the sufficiently sophisticated apps.
But with the Staring app,
it's the first one that's come along.
I mean, I'm not personally in a position
to organize large-scale competitions.
I'd have to work with some organization
that's better at public relations
and organization than I am.
But the first step is,
can people really get better at it?
I think they can, but I don't know that yet
because the app's just been,
it's coming out now.
I haven't had an official launch yet.
But I put it out in my newsletter today
to people who are on my newsletter list.
And some will be trying it soon, I hope.
And then once that's there,
and if it does work as I hope it works,
then competitions will become possible,
and then it's just a question of organization.
Very good.
Well, a pleasure talking to you, Rupert.
Thank you for being with us again.