Bernardo Kastrup, Carlo Rovelli and Patricia Churchland lock horns over the New Science of Consciousness.
00:00 Intro 01:20 Patricia Churchland | On scientific evidence 02:50 Bernardo Kastrup | On material idealism 04:47 Carlo Rovelli | There is no hard problem of consciousness 07:00 Robert Lawrence Kuhn | Will we ever be able to provide data explaining consciousness?
We are uncovering a new science of consciousness. A theory that is getting closer to solving the problem of the self once and for all. Or at least so claim leading neuroscientists. Some argue the reality we perceive is a controlled hallucination as a best guess to how the world really is. Others that quantum mechanics or multiple levels of brain organisation are responsible for consciousness. But critics maintain these don't get to the heart of the problem: how the material stuff of the brain is responsible for the immaterial stuff of experience.
Should we see the 'new science of consciousness' as marketing hype? Might we alternatively need to give up our very notion of reality? Or could science be about to crack the ancient problem of the self once and for all?
There are many explanations, because we don't have a panel of 10 people, that are not represented
here, and I want to be fair to give this a little airtime. So I'm going to just mention four
explanatory categories, at least there are this much, that are not represented here, and I want
each of you to give whatever reactions you have to them, and it needs to be quick. So as noted,
Bernardo mentioned panpsychism, the idea that you need some sort of a fundamental aspect of
proto-consciousness in everything and every particle in the universe. It's one. Dualism,
which Patricia mentioned, which is, of course, a historical favor, that the mental and the physical
are both real and distinct. There's long out of favor, of course. Then there's non-reductive
physicalism, which has been gaining favor among some. And of course, Giulio Tononi's integrated
information theory. So give me some reaction, whatever you think about these four categories.
Well, there are three. What's the fourth one? What is the fourth one?
Panpsychism, dualism, non-reductive physicalism, and integrated information theory. Those four.
So, Pat, you want to take a shot at those?
Well, I'm prepared to believe things if you can show me an experiment or a whole set of
experiments that suggests that what you're claiming is true. I mean, part of the problem
with all of these things is that they are isms for which there are philosophical arguments,
but for which there are no data. The panpsychists imply, of course, that everything, including
electrons and cow pies and feathers, they're all conscious. And if you ask panpsychists what the
data are, they say, in principle, there are no data. This is just a metaphysical position.
So when there are no practical consequences, and I don't, for example, with regard to Bernardo's
view, I don't see how adopting that kind of idealism has any impact on one's practical life.
For example, if you walk your dog and your dog evacuates, do you pick it up or do you turn your
back and say, well, you know, I can't see it, so it's not real. If it has no impact on your
practical life, if there are no data for it, then you're just another person with an opinion.
Okay.
And it's fun, but I don't see that I want to waste my time.
Bernardo, your reactions.
Okay. There are enormous implications behind physicalism, idealism, and the other isms that
Patricia doesn't want to commit to. One, if idealism is correct, and we are the associated
processes of a broader field of subjectivity, when you die, your core subjectivity still exists.
This is an enormous consequence. If our bodies are the images of our own mental processes,
including the processes we cannot reach through introspection, through metacognition,
then talk therapy is a much more significant avenue to healthcare.
Making sense and integrating your own mental life can have direct physical effects,
like the so-called placebo effect, for which we have no account today.
So the consequences are enormous, and there are ways to distinguish between these things
through experimentation. It's obvious. Until 2012, we thought psychedelics would light up our brain
with brain activity. Today, we know they do exactly the opposite. They only reduce brain
activity. That's something that is relevant, or Carlo was talking about relational quantum
mechanics, to which I agree. But the direct implication is that all physical entities
do not have standalone existence. They do not have absolute existence.
So that's the premise of physicalism, that physical entities do have absolute existence and
then generate mental entities. Relational quantum mechanics contradicts that, and it has been,
I would claim, proven by experiment for the last couple of years. Two major experiments,
one by Proietti et al., and another one about Wigner's friend, a thought experiment that was
done now as an actual experiment, showed that Ravelli was right in that regard, and I would
claim this takes the floor from underneath the feet of the physicalists. Okay. Carlo,
your reaction to some of those other ideas? Thank you, Bernardo. I wish you were right,
that there are experiments that prove relational quantum mechanics. I would be very happy,
of course, if there were, but I don't think there are. Proietti et al.?
No, I don't think it's a confirmation of relational quantum mechanics.
Let me go through your questions, Robert. Panpsychism, I just don't understand it,
because I don't understand what it means. In fact, I listen with attention to what Bernardo says,
but I don't understand what it means that everything is mental, because I don't understand
what mental means. I think the mental just means related to the complex terminology
of things happening in me or in Bernardo, but that's part of nature. So, I agree that there is
no boundary between this and the rest of nature, but there's no boundary between a bicycle and the
rest of nature, and this doesn't mean that everything is bicyclist. Bicycle is just one
of the things around in nature. Dualism, I don't think there's many people defending dualism
today. Integrated information theory, Robert, you put it as one of the philosophies. Maybe
Tologne or somebody else might take it this way, but I think that's not its value. It's one
specific mathematical attempt to capture some aspect of consciousness. I would see it as a
scientific theory, which presents itself as a tentative with limits to be developed,
is the aspect of it. So, it's part of the game of developing tools that Patricia is talking about.
With respect to Patricia, I would say, yes, of course, data, but I'm a theoretical physicist.
You don't do physics only with data. You do physics with data, but then a lot of theoretical
work to develop good concepts to make sense of this data. So, of course, we have this data,
we bring them together, and we get ways of thinking about reality.
We need to go on. Thank you, Carlo. I think to conclude this first part is that consciousness
does have a spectrum of radically different explanations. I think we want to leave everyone
with that concept that I think we're being presented here with perhaps some of the most
common ones, but there is this spectrum, and ultimately, I guess only one could be correct.
Our second theme deals with the hard problem of consciousness directly and as an arguably
unbridgeable gap that in principle separates physical events from mental experiences. And
Bernardo, I want to ask you, you're king of this hill. So, would there be any data as Pat has
been offering that conceivably that could be discovered or experiments concluded that could
falsify your position as an idealist and convince you that you are wrong and that Pat is right?
If we had absolutely no instances of circumstances in which brain activity decreases tremendously
while inner experience increases in richness, in intensity, then that's one way to construe
that as indications towards something other than idealism. If we had a reason to believe
that all physical entities have absolute standalone existence, then that would also
indicate that something along physicalist lines could be true. As it turns out, neither is the
case. As it turns out, there are significant and growing empirical contradictions to physicalism
today. And physicalism is reacting through the traditional epicycles, through all kinds of
changes and additions and tortuous models to try to accommodate the anomalies. And we know
how that story goes and we know how it will end. Carlo, some would use quantum mechanics to
literally generate consciousness. You said you reject that concept. I'd like to know why.
Famously, Roger Penrose and Stu Hameroff with their orchestrated objective reduction think
within cells that quantum mechanics is needed in order to explain consciousness.
Murray Gell-Mann famously used the phrase a quantum flapnoodle to dismiss all sorts of
uses of quantum mechanics to other topics that he thought were inappropriate.
I don't dismiss this attempt a priori. I don't think they are silly totally and useless. I
think it's good that somebody looks at that. Everything is quantum mechanical, right? The
reason an atom stays together is quantum mechanical. Interaction between molecules
is quantum mechanics. In a sense, I'm saying quantum mechanics. But I've looked at these
specific proposals, Roger Penrose, others, and I'm not convinced that those works and I don't
see the need of that. Quantum phenomena disappear as soon as there is a sufficient macroscopic
number of degrees of freedom heat. So I don't, it seems to me that we're going to make sense of
what happened in our mind in terms of the complexity of the many things that happen.
We have a tendency when there are different strange things to connect them. Maybe the
strange of this is connected to the strange of that. Sometimes it's work, but I don't see
indications that that's the case. I see, if I might add one thing, a perspectival,
let me make this simple analogy here. What is a sunset? A sunset is the sun going down
and disappearing in the, you know, plunging in the ocean or disappearing behind the hill,
right? And then somebody comes in and says, no, wait, that's all wrong. There's a story behind
sun. There's a physical story behind the sun. You're sitting on a spinning rock and the sun
doesn't move at all. And the sunset is just what happened when you're going, when you're rotating
from the lit to the darker part of the rotating stone on which you're sitting. Have we changed
dramatically, substantially what a sunset is? No, we're just giving a better understanding of
the same thing. We're talking about something. There are different perspectival description
of the same phenomena at a different level of complexity and understanding. There's no
contradiction whatsoever between the two. So I think when we understand something, this is what
going on. We have a perspective on something, okay? Think how perspectival the sunset, nothing
happened to the sun. And we have a better account of what is going on. I think we're going to get
something similar with consciousness, a better account with what is going on, which makes sense
of our perspectival perception of it without any contradiction between the two.
Pat, can AI ever be conscious? Is virtual immortality possible in principle? In other
words, are first person awareness and personal identity uploaded into non-biological substrates
and lasting for a long period of time? I don't know. I don't think anybody really knows.
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