Could Xi Fall Because of 69 Votes? Wen Jiabao Strikes Back, 5th Plenum Final Battle

Rumors that Hu Jintao's entire family has run into trouble are still spreading rapidly across online forums. In recent years, Xi Jinping has moved with increasing force while Hu Jintao has never once retaliated directly. Why would a man holding a loaded gun choose not to pull the trigger? The answer points to a far more complicated power struggle. Three rival factions locked in a tug-of-war around Zhongnanhai, a covert network operating beyond the reach of the formal system, and a battle for every single vote ahead of the October Central Committee meeting, where just 69 votes could determine Xi Jinping's political fate. Why hasn't Hu Jintao struck back at Xi Jinping? These four events may offer clues. First, on October 26, 2022, at the closing session of the CCP's 20th Party Congress, Hu sat beside Xi Jinping on the Presidium. When Hu reached for documents on the table, Li Jiangshu held them back, and two staff members then escorted Hu from the hall. Before leaving, Hu patted Li Keqiang on the shoulder. Many assumed Hu would eventually settle the score with Xi. He never did. Second, in October 2023, Li Keqiang died suddenly in Shanghai. Li had been closely associated with Hu and was once seen as a successor to his political line. Yet even then, Hu did not retaliate. Third, according to alleged leaks, before the plenum of the 20th Central Committee last October, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Jiang Yuxia reportedly approached Hu with a proposal. Deploy troops and force Central Committee members to vote Xi out, using military pressure if necessary. Hu refused. He was said to have replied, If the military can use guns to remove him today, it can use guns to remove me tomorrow. Once that door is opened, who will the party obey? The person with the most troops. In other words, Hu was not without leverage. The gun was placed in front of him, but he chose not to use it. The fourth event came on January 20th this year, when Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli were reportedly detained and stripped of real power. Four days later, the Defense Ministry announced investigations into them, accusing them of seriously undermining the system of responsibility under the CMC chairman. A general once portrayed as preparing to draw the sword had himself become the target. Yet the military remained in place, and no shots were fired. Over the past four years, Xi has been portrayed as escalating each move, while Hu has consistently avoided direct confrontation. So, what is he trying to prevent? According to Jiang Feng's analysis, Hu stands at the center of three competing forces within the reformist camp. When Jiabao favors full historical accountability, Xi stepping down would not be enough. Responsibility for constitutional changes, political purges, and other abuses would have to be traced individually. Hu Chunhua is described as holding personnel files and evidence needed for such investigations, and as favoring a deeper reckoning rather than allowing a few subordinates to take the blame. Zheng Qinghong, by contrast, reportedly wants to contain the scope of the purge, give Xi a relatively dignified exit, and close the book on old grievances. The reason these three sides can still sit at the same table, the argument goes, is that Hu Jintao remains the balancing force. Hu's principle is said to be straightforward. Those directly involved in crossing political red lines cannot remain, but the wider circle of officials should not all be purged at once. Each person should be screened individually, preserving those who can still be useful. His goal is to remove Xi without sinking the entire ship. Seen this way, Hu's restraint is not protection for Xi, but a final period of political probation. As long as Hu remains active, he is not only holding the reformist camp together, he is also restraining those behind Xi who are ready for revenge. Zhang Fen further argues that, after January 20th, the military was effectively Liu An was allegedly positioned in Baoding, controlling key forces south of Beijing and the corridor into the capital. Wang Yang was sent to Kunming with what was described as internal party authorization, communications channels, and official documentation. Because without party legitimacy, military disobedience could be branded a coup. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao remained in Beijing to provide political cover for the military to reject Xi's personal orders while preventing generals from acting independently. Finally, the military's strategic communication system was said to remain under control at Xishan. Without access to theater command communications frequencies, even orders bearing Xi's seal and signature would be little more than paper. This amounted, in Zhang Fen's telling, to a four-layer system of isolation. But if Xi truly could no longer command the regular military, what were the elders still afraid of? If the gun had already been taken out of his hands, why did rumors still emerge that Hu Jintao's entire family had died? Xi Jinping's secret military force. When Zhang Yuxia and Liu Jianli ran into trouble, the force used was not part of the regular military, and the theater commands knew nothing about it. The incident took place at the Central Party School, a venue used for meetings. Afterward, the party elders reviewed what had happened and reached one conclusion. The two men had been far too careless. The location had been arranged by the other side, they walked in on their own, and they had not deployed troops beforehand to secure and sweep the area. The lesson was a harsh one. If someone cannot confront you head-on, they do not necessarily need to attack you directly. They only need to wait inside the room where you are going to meet. So what kind of force could carry out such an operation? It was neither the regular military nor the conventional police, but a personnel network Wang Xiaohong had built in recent years while handling cross-border operations. Plainclothes operatives overseas, underground networks in Southeast Asia, covert communication channels, and a group of personnel cultivated outside the formal system. Such a force would need only a handful of people, a vehicle, and a prepared location to complete the operation. That was why, after January 20th, the security gap the elders and the military were trying to close was precisely this one. The Central Guard Bureau and police special units are now under supervision, while the Beijing garrison has also been placed on high alert. Around key figures such as Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Chunhua, a single layer of protection is no longer enough. The military has had to add another security layer. According to Jiang Feng's argument, if any one of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, or Hu Chunhua were assassinated, the negotiation process would end immediately. The military would conclude that Xi Jinping's side had abandoned a negotiated transfer of power and turned to violent purges instead. The reformist faction would also conclude that the red families were completely incapable of guaranteeing the safety of the negotiations, while those families themselves would begin to wonder whether they might be the next targets. At that point, no one would dare sit and wait. Everyone would think that if they did not strike first today, they might be dead tomorrow. That is why Zheng Qinghong is now under just as much pressure. The problem is that no one can say for certain how extensive the overseas network left behind by Wang Xiaohong really is. Even if Xi Jinping has lost control of the military, he may still have a number of secret weapons hidden in the shadows. This is described as the only variable that cannot currently be calculated. Those covert forces may no longer be capable of helping Xi regain control of the military, but they could still kill one person, derail the entire negotiation process, and push Beijing straight to the brink of civil war. What Xi Jinping needs most right now? Suppose Xi Jinping really ordered someone to act and assassinate one of the three, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, or Hu Chunhua. What would he gain? According to Jiang Fen, he would face a backlash from the military. The debt involving Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli has been suppressed within the military since January, mainly because pressure from above has forced them to exercise restraint. If another senior elder were to die, that restraint might no longer hold. Even Zheng Qinghong, who can still say a few words in Xi Jinping's favor, would then be powerless. Any chance for Xi to leave office with dignity would immediately disappear. Even the conservative camp would no longer be in a position to plead for leniency on his behalf. So, striking at the reformist camp would not save Xi Jinping. The moment he actually makes such a move, he could be removed from the game altogether. What, then, does Xi Jinping truly lack right now? According to Jiang Fen, the answer is the votes he needs at the October meeting. The CCP constitution stipulates that for a full or alternate member of the Central Committee to be removed from a party post, placed on probation within the party, or expelled from the party, the decision must be approved by more than two-thirds of the plenary session of the body to which that person belongs. However, only full members have voting rights. Alternate members do not. The 20th Party Congress elected 205 full members of the Central Committee. Two-thirds of 205 is 137. Working backward, if Xi Jinping wants to avoid removal, he needs at least 69 members not to raise their hands in support of a motion against him. According to calculations by some media outlets outside China, these 205 members can now be roughly divided into three blocks. About 40% aligned with the reformist camp, around 40% with the red families surrounding Zheng Qinghong, and roughly 20% still following Xi Jinping. 20% amounts to about 41 votes. If Zheng Qinghong can provide Xi with another 28 votes, Xi would reach the 69 votes needed to block his removal. That is why the reformist camp's real objective now is to split the more than 80 votes controlled by Zheng Qinghong's block. This will not be easy. Of those 80 plus votes, they must ensure that fewer than 28 ultimately shift to Xi Jinping's side. A difficult task. Zhang Feng argues that there are two ways to gain an advantage in the vote count. The first is to remove those who still support Xi Jinping from the meeting altogether. There would not even be a need to wait until the day of the session. Once a central committee member is formally placed under investigation, that person can no longer attend the plenum and their vote immediately disappears. But the seat would not remain vacant. The party constitution also stipulates that when a full central committee seat becomes vacant, alternate members are promoted according to the number of votes they received. There are 171 alternate members waiting in line. Whenever someone is removed, a person from that list can be promoted to replace them, immediately gaining voting rights. And naturally, if the faction controlling the replacement process has a choice, it would not want to fill the vacancy with someone who supports Xi Jinping. The CCP has used this method before, including at a meeting whose circumstances were considered quite similar to the present situation. That was the 12th plenum of the 8th Central Committee in October 1968, when the central issue was the expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the party. At the time, the 8th Central Committee had 97 members. 10 had died, while most of the others had been detained or were under investigation, leaving only about 40 people able to enter the meeting hall, less than half of the total membership. Under the rules, such a meeting could not normally proceed. The solution was to select 10 alternate members on the spot and promote them to full central committee membership. That pushed attendance above the halfway mark, allowing the meeting to go ahead. The plenum then approved the investigation report on the crimes of the renegade, traitor, and scab Liu Shaoqi and decided to permanently expel Liu Shaoqi from the party. The upcoming October meeting likewise needs two things, enough people to force Xi Jinping from office, and a complete report to provide the basis for that decision. Those who are investigated or removed can be replaced, thereby determining who is able to sit in the hall and raise a hand to vote. Why could this strategy work? Because the votes controlled by Zhang Qinghong are bargaining chips. As long as these families can continue supporting one another, they can impose conditions. Xi Jinping may step down, but old accounts must not all be reopened. He may give up his position, but the other red families must not be dragged down with him. What Wen Jiabao and the reformist camp are doing now is gradually stripping them of the confidence to keep bargaining. If Wen Jiabao can make them understand that the price of continuing to vote in Xi Jinping's defense is that their own family's old debts will be reopened, many of them may ultimately choose to vote in the direction the reformist camp needs. What do you think? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thanks for watching and see you next time.