CIA nói ông Nhu muốn thay ông Diệm làm tổng thống sau năm 1963, chỉ là thời chưa tới | NAMDUONGTV

Two works, C.I.A. and the Generals, Converge Support to the Military Government in South Vietnam and C.I.A. and the House of Ngo, Converge Action to South Vietnam, 1954-1963. Writer Thomas L. Iham Jr., Center for the Study of Intelligence, conducted a series of reports on the C.I.A. war, the first time in the history of the CIA. Three editors of the agency revealed two important documents about the C.I.A. and Vietnam. The first time in this sense is two books on the type of narrative history, with a title, a title, and more importantly, the author is a real person, read a lot of documents, and wrote back with professionalism for readers. Most of the C.I.A.'s secret documents before were heavy titles, for business reasons, or programs reported by staff to cover the wall. The C.I.A. and the House of Ngo, Converge Action to South Vietnam, 1954-1963. In another document, it says that in mid-1956, the C.I.A. received a message that Mr. Can was planning to remove Minister of Information Tran Chanh Thanh and adviser Ngo Dinh Nhu from the influence in the presidential palace. Through many pages, we can read the force of the Saigon government against the emperor Ngo Dinh Can in the central region. With two C.I.A. offices in Saigon operating independently, reports sent to the C.I.A. in Qua Thinh Don sometimes reverse, such as Thao Haw Wood's report on Mr. Nhu and his criticism of Mr. Nhu, Edward Landance's report on Mr. Nhu and his criticism of Mr. Nhu. At the end of 1956, after Landance was recalled to the U.S., Anne O'Moore, the head of the C.I.A. ordered the dismissal of the rest of the Saigon Military Mission and the attitude of the United States also began to change under the government of Ngo Dinh Nhu. Opposition contact In early 1958, the United States allowed the C.I.A. of Saigon to contact opposition political parties. The document said that the C.I.A. staff bought and formed an opposition force right behind Mr. Nhu in case they had to change their leadership. The November 11 coup of 1960 was a threat to the U.S. against President Diệm. C.I.A. staff were present at the command of Colonel Nguyễn Chánh Thy and next to him was Hoàng Cơ Thụy to limit the advance of the C.I.A. Diệp Duyên Ruth Mueller advised Colonel Thy to negotiate with Mr. Diệm, while it was clear that the military supported the government of Colonel Trần Thiện Khiêm was on its way from Dòng 4 to the capital to rescue. When he saw the attitude of the C.I.A., Mr. Nhu's intelligence network was not entirely passive. Saigon C.I.A. deputy Dulas Braufard was stunned when he discovered that his Vietnamese driver was not as fluent as when he was introduced to work. According to Trần Kim Tuyến, the driver was not only fluent but also understood both English and French. The document denied that in the same year as Ngo's family, the U.S. was largely responsible for the plan to overthrow President Diệm, but Mr. Diệm's own family was also outraged by the separation from his family. From the spring of 1963, Mr. Nhu asked the C.I.A. not to repeat what he and the C.I.A. exchanged, and after many conversations with the C.I.A., Mr. Nhu announced that he wanted to replace President Diệm. Meanwhile, Mrs. Nhu was often confused with President Diệm. In the 1963 election, Mrs. Nhu wanted to support 30 candidates she approved. Mr. Diệm did not agree, but Mrs. Nhu shouted until President Diệm surrendered. Mrs. Nhu won again when she asked to be the candidate for Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, as Mr. Diệm had indicated. As for Mr. Ngô Đình Cẩn, Mr. Cẩn refused to support or help Mr. Nhu on the strategy program in the Central. On the National Day of the United States, July 4, 1963, for the first time, President Diệm allowed the leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party to attend a feast organized by the Embassy. After the wine party at the Embassy of the United States, a group of leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the CIA pulled each other out of the restaurant to drink more. At the wine bar, General Trần Giang Đôn told the CIA staff that the generals wanted to fight against President Diệm. The tragedy of Mr. Ngô started from there. Southern generals Article 2 CIA and the generals converse support to the military government in South Vietnam In short, the CIA and the generals, the support for the military government of the Vietnamese Communist Party, are relatively secret compared to the documents published by the CIA. The documents in the CIA and the generals began after the November 1963 coup. What came from the documents showed, right after the coup, as a group, the military council was not coordinated, and as personal contacts, the generals were suspicious, suspecting each other before the coup. Before the coup, General Nguyễn Khánh spoke ill of two generals, General Nguyễn Giang Minh and General Trần Thiện Khiêm, to President Diệm and some CIA staff. Through many details, we see that the generals work together because they have to rely on each other to seek their own benefits, not really have the same ideal. The day before General Khánh executed General Minh and four generals Le Giang Kim, Tôn Thất Đính, Mai Hữu Xuân and Trần Giang Đôn, General Khánh often spoke ill of the CIA for the rumor that the above generals would follow France to turn Vietnam into neutrality. February 1964 General Nguyễn Giang Thiệu sent many officers of the Vietnamese party to the important positions in the military. When asked what for, General Thiệu replied that it was to overthrow the Communist Party and the Communist Party. But CIA sources said that Thiệu would use the officers of the Vietnamese party to avoid General Khánh. And that's exactly what happened. General Khánh was very naive when he accused General Thiệu that the US would play him. But as we have seen, the US played General Khánh before General Thiệu. Let's take a look at some of the generals. The details were revealed in the CIA Ensenadron. Among the Vietnamese generals, the CIA respected the knowledge of General Le Giang Kim the most. In a presentation on the plans that were being carried out in the North, while General Duong Van Minh made a fool of himself with military intelligence details, General Kim regained the respect of US intelligence with very professional questions. General Nguyễn Đức Thắng was admired by the Americans. In a report, CIA Director Richard Ham suggested that General Thắng at the same time keep two defense ministers and build a rural area with all the US forces under General Thắng's authority. About General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, although the Americans did not like General Loan for his frankness, but they believed that General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan was an honest, brave person who knew the intentions of the Americans. General Loan was not afraid to tell the truth about his intentions with US intelligence. In early 1967, the United States was behind the Vietnamese government in communicating with the Southern Liberation Front. Loan told the CIA that the Americans from here would go behind the country. In the end, the Americans would leave. Only the Vietnamese Republic alone against the North Vietnamese. At the end of 1966, the United States intended to force communication with a number of personnel of the Southern Liberation Front. The theory of the CIA is that they want to infiltrate the interior of the Vietnamese Republic to get information from the Southern Liberation Front. The CIA asked the Vietnamese government to analyze the importance of the Southern Liberation Front being detained by the Vietnamese National Police. Among them was the wife of Mr. Tran Bach Dang, Mrs. Mai Thi Giang, and Mrs. Pham Thi Yen, the wife of Mr. Tran Buu Kiem, and some officers. Initially, the Vietnamese Republic opposed, but in the end, the Vietnamese government decided to force communication with the Southern Liberation Front. From February 1967 to April 1968, the Vietnamese Republic released Mrs. Giang and Mrs. Yen, plus 10 more officers on the other side. In return, the Southern Liberation Front only released three U.S. soldiers. Since then, the Vietnamese Republic, especially General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, has been in contact with the Vietnamese government for some time. According to these documents, the CAA has a very detailed list of personnel and instruments of the Vietnamese Liberation Front. In addition, the CAA also has reports from the Temporary Southern Vietnam Government as a descendant of the Vietnam Liberation Front since June 1969, which was sent to the Central Bureau of the Vietnamese Government to update the progress at the Paris talk show The CAA has infiltrated the administration and personnel structure of the Vietnamese Communist Party from about 1967 to 1975, especially after the first presidential election of the Communist Party since 1967. Because of the election result, the Vietnamese Communist Party had to be legally recognized, especially in an election in which two members of the same party, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cau Ky, split up before sitting down with each other, and most of the candidates who lost the election opposed the result. The United States instructed the CAA to do everything it could to ensure that Ha Dien would accept the election result. Ha Dien voted 58-43, confirming the candidate for re-election. The CAA and General's report said that the U.S. intelligence agency had misled some of the voters in two presidential elections, 1967 and 1971, and the 1970 National Assembly election. The CAA has misled 10 voters, but wants to have 10 more voices to support it to confirm the bills being discussed. The report said that the CAA has spent a lot of money to establish or help political parties, with the hope that these forces will support and build a force behind President Thieu. The National Resistance Party of Senator Tran Van Don was sponsored by the CAA with the hope, but when he found out that the organizer was Duc Khoi, a relative of Mr. Ky, Mr. Thieu refused to support. To have a separate organization, Mr. Thieu gave birth to the Democratic Forces. After the Democratic Party, the CAA sponsored another political force called the Socialist Alliance Party, with the hope of bringing all political forces together under the leadership of President Thieu and Vice President Ky. But the problem is that Mr. Thieu and Mr. Ky no longer want to appear together in public. Finally, with the request of the American people and for the national interest, the Alliance was founded on July 4, 1968 under the leadership of Mr. Thieu and Mr. Ky. The Alliance comprises more than 25 large and small political parties in the South. The CAA sponsored this party until the end of 1969. Despite the advice of the United States, President Thieu always doubted the intentions of the Americans. He told CAA staff that not only did the Vietnamese Communist Party have to face the invasion of the North Vietnamese army into the South, but also had to face the invasion of the CAA into the government's personnel. Other revelations in CAA and General are the intelligence of the MICV, which said that the North Vietnamese would attack via military use in the 1972 summer offensive. But the United States did not inform the Vietnamese Communist Party of the attack on the North Vietnamese units. On the contrary, the attitude of General Rayston Aram and Ambassador Panker was very optimistic. The two stated that at the peak of the attack, the North Vietnamese would lose all its troops after the total attack. These details make the reader wonder if the United States intended for the attack to happen or not. These details make the reader recall President Richard Nixon's statement to Henry Kissinger that after this game, both sides must have one side out of the army. Since August 1972, to prepare for Kissinger and Le Duc Tho's final negotiations in Paris, the CAA was ordered to exhaust President Thieu's opposition to some terms in the agreement. One of Thieu's strongly opposed terms was that the United States agreed for the North Vietnamese to leave the army in southern Laos, Cambodia. Some documents released at this stage, August 1972 to the signing of the Paris Agreement, January 1972, show that the CAA had spies in the Central Committee through the information they received about the talks between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger. Although the documents were disclosed, some large details, age, and spies' points of interest in the book were still under surveillance. But if the reader summarizes the details in CAA and Ngo, in CAA and Generals, and compares some documents that were disclosed by the Foreign Relations of the United States of Vietnam, the reader can deduce who was in those black holes.