America's manufacturing comeback has become a major economic priority, with companies reconsidering their reliance on China and exploring ways to bring production closer to home. But announced investments and reshoring plans don't necessarily translate into factories, jobs, or competitive domestic production. How much manufacturing is actually returning to the United States, and what is holding it back?
The challenge goes beyond tariffs and trade policy. Companies must weigh the cost of domestic production against imports, navigate shifting government policies, find skilled workers, and improve productivity. Diversifying supply chains away from China is also different from bringing manufacturing back to the U.S. Without addressing these underlying costs and capacity constraints, reshoring ambitions may be difficult to turn into lasting manufacturing growth.
Harry Moser, founder of the Reshoring Initiative, discusses the latest data on reshoring, why tariffs may be more effective than subsidies, and how policy uncertainty affects manufacturing investment. He also examines the challenges facing the American workforce, declining manufacturing wages, and the productivity improvements needed to make U.S. manufacturing more competitive. ----- 00:00 Intro 00:44 The Real Data on Reshoring 03:11 Diversifying vs. Leaving China 06:15 The #1 Obstacle to Coming Back 09:53 Why Tariffs Beat Subsidies 15:45 How Policy Chaos Kills Deals 19:30 Confronting the Gov't on Labor 21:53 Why Manufacturing Wages Dropped 24:43 The U.S. Productivity Crisis ----- Let's Stay in Contact: • Substack - https://substack.com/@themarketinsidershow • X (Twitter) - https://twitter.com/MktInsiderShow • Linkedin - https://www.linkedin.com/company/market-insider-show/ ----- 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘯𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘧𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘵 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳. 𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘶𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭, 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦. 𝘈𝘭𝘸𝘢𝘺𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵 𝘢 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴. 𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘢𝘺 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴.
Is manufacturing coming back?
And are tariffs and tax incentives enough
to make people produce in U.S.?
Today, we sit down with Harry Moser
from the Reshoring Initiative
to find out what he's seeing in the data.
The U.S. manufacturing cost is just too high.
Our manufacturing cost, on average, 50.
That's 5.0% higher than China's or India's.
And right now, we have a $1.3 trillion trade deficit.
And getting rid of that requires U.S. manufacturing to increase by 40%.
Harry, it's great to have you on.
Welcome.
It's great to be here.
We want to talk to you about reshoring.
Are manufacturers coming back, or is it more announcement?
Is construction happening?
What are you seeing out there?
It's easier to track the announcements, and that's what we do,
but we only record them if the announcement says this product will
be made at that location and we've bought the land,
and ideally they've started to dig.
So we try to tie it into the real thing, and if it ever turns out
that it doesn't happen, we yank it out of the data.
But the reality is large increases.
In the first slide, you can see the actual trend over the years.
I founded the Reshoring Initiative in 2010,
and in that year, we identified about 11,000 jobs,
a combination of reshoring by U.S. companies and FDI,
foreign direct investment, by foreign headquartered companies.
And you can see the trend that it's gone over the years.
It's grown at a compound rate of over 25% per year.
We've had ups and downs like most things do, but specifically 2025
was up from 2024, despite the chaos of the tariff announcements
and all the complications that were going on.
And then this year, projected from the end of September,
looks like almost 400,000, so a new all-time record.
So it's doing very well, and it's real.
And there's lots of factories being built
and quite a number of jobs that have actually been filled.
So these are the jobs that have come back, right?
That announced coming back.
On the average, especially for the big factories,
a lot of the jobs are big companies with billion-dollar
or multi-billion-dollar factories with 1,000 or 2,000 employees.
And from the announcement,
Until the factory is completed is often two or three years,
and then it can still take another
year to hire the people that are going to man the factory.
So there's a delay built in. So
you could take the whole thing and shift it down.
by 10% or something like that,
and you'd be seeing the jobs that had actually been created
and actually filled. One of the things
that's happening right now with a lot of companies,
when we're talking to companies,
they want to diversify out of China, and they're seeing a big
risk by being in China and being overseas,
and some of them are thinking about coming back.
How much of it is?
Coming back, reassuring,
and how much of it is diversifying their supply.
Well, if they diversify their supply and they had been getting it
from China and then they get it from India and the U.S.,
so they've diversified into those two countries, then let's say half of
it's still coming back to the U.S. and that's the half that we count.
So diversification is one of the reasons for reshoring,
and sometimes if you're getting it out of China.
You might say half from China, half from the U.S.
That's fine.
Or you might say half from Vietnam
or Cambodia or India and half from the U.S.
That's fine as long as the U.S. gets a piece of it.
Do you see that happening a lot
or do you see that some people are just completely coming back?
The FDI, the foreign direct investment,
which is about 40% of the total of these numbers here,
the FDI is definitely new factories being built here or expanded here.
And so it's unambiguous...
In the reshoring cases done by U.S. companies, they sometimes build
a whole new factory, and sometimes they will bring back
the production of one model, like in an automotive factory,
and fit it into an existing factory, and then go out.
And find a supply chain in the US to make the parts,
many of the parts for them.
So it's rare that a company is getting 100% in China,
and then gets 100% in the United States.
It's piecemeal here, some more.
Like Caterpillar has had a series of announcements of new factories
to make different products. Some they brought back from England,
some they brought back from other countries.
And another good example is...
GE Appliances,
which is actually now owned by the higher company of China.
And they have announced...
Over the last 10 years,
$6.5 billion of investment in increased capacity in Louisville
and at several of their other factories, and hundreds of millions
of dollars of additional purchases of components from foundries,
from machine shops, from all kinds of motor makers.
So the numbers here represent both that OEM, that big company.
You know, expanding their assembly plant
or building a new one and the supply chain that's
making additional components now
that that assembly is taking place here.
Now, in terms of the obstacles that these companies are facing
when they come to U.S.,
do you see any specific obstacles or any issues they are facing?
There certainly have been obstacles, otherwise it would have happened
before and without me here to try and make it happen.
We asked, in 2025, we asked the OEMs.
How much of the product that they now source offshore
would they bring back under different conditions?
And they got not nice responses for a lower dollar,
which makes them more competitive, for less regulations.
Remember, Trump talks a lot about less regulations,
a lower corporate tax rate, so the return on investment goes up,
additional tariffs, which he actually did.
But they gave by far the highest.
Rating the biggest impact item was to have a U.S. workforce
with sufficient quality and quantity of skills and enough of them,
enough people with enough skills.
And in general, that's been a weakness of the U.S. for the last 40
or 50 years because the government and society has told
everybody they've got to go to university, whereas.
And therefore, we haven't had the flow to become welders and toolmakers
and precision machinists and chemical technicians and plumbers
and carpenters and all kinds of what people call the trades
and I call the professions.
And so the OEM said, our biggest problem is workforce.
And in survey after survey, when you survey U.S. companies about
where you're going to build your next factory in the U.S.,
they always say workforce availability is the number one issue.
And so that's clearly, workforce is number one.
Uh, man.
The other big problem,
and the problem that drove the work away in the first place, is
that the U.S. manufacturing cost is just too high.
So our manufacturing cost is maybe, on average, 50.
That's 50% higher than China's or India's, maybe Mexico's.
And maybe 10 or 20 percent higher than most, say,
Western European developed countries with similar incomes to ours.
And so so companies didn't go to China to have trips to China.
They went to China because they could buy stuff
so inexpensively and eventually the quality got quite good.
And and so to to overcome, to get them to come back,
we have to find a way to get our cost.
more competitive so that it's easier
for the companies to see it's in their interest.
The uncertainty of tariffs was certainly a problem.
There were a lot of companies that
I said we'd like to bring it back, but if the tariffs would stay
in place, stabilize, get fixed, stay in place,
and we're confident they'd be in place for 10, 15 years, then I'd
be willing to build a billion-dollar factory and hire all those people
because the economics of the factory is dependent upon having the...
Thank
Having those tariffs in place, making the imports less expensive
or more expensive relative to the U.S.
you
Component availability is a problem, especially in electronics.
There's electronics, there's...
When we stopped making televisions, radios, servers, et cetera,
very
then the companies that made those components stopped making them here
and they made them over in Asia.
much.
And so now if you want to start making all kinds
of electronics here again,
you need to start making the components
here again so you have them available.
And there's 10 more things I can list,
but those are the most important.
In terms of bringing manufacturing back, there are some incentives
that have been given, like tax credits and also some tariffs.
In terms of what's actually been done,
one of the most impactful things was the immediate expensing.
Which was in the one big,
beautiful bill that was passed about a year ago.
And what it means, it used to be before that, that if you bought a new,
let's say, $100,000 piece of equipment, you expensed.
You amortized it over seven years and took a seventh of it each
year against your income to reduce your declared taxable income.
But with immediate expensing,
you can write it all off in the immediate year.
So companies, especially smaller private companies that have...
You know, significant income and, you know,
the owner will go to the accountant and say, what can I do?
We're going to pay too much taxes.
And the accountant will say, buy a piece of equipment.
And your taxable income comes down by $100,000 or a million
or whatever it is you bought, have to get it installed that year.
So that drove a lot of it.
But Biden's incentives, you know, a billion dollars here,
$2 billion there, drove huge projects, EV batteries, chips, et cetera.
And we're very successful in doing that.
But they were not affordable.
We've got $2 trillion deficits going on sort of forever.
And if we did enough incentives to bring back everything,
to balance good, the trade, to not have a deficit,
it would cost us an extra trillion a year or something like that.
So that's not a good idea.
and
Tariffs have had a big impact despite the uncertainty.
If we had certainty, if Trump had said 15% on everything
but 25% on China, stop, and Congress approved it and was locked in,
couldn't change, we'd have had 50% more come back than we did.
you.
Um, but
But even with that uncertainty,
we track the reasons that companies bring their work back.
And tariff was the fastest growing reason.
It went up 12 times from 2024 to 2025.
And so it definitely had a significant impact.
In fact,
And the ROI, return on investment impact of tariffs,
is greater than incentive.
So if, say, Biden gave him a billion-dollar incentive
to build a $3 billion factory,
well, that means the company's still putting up money.
And then when it's operating, its costs are going to be too high
and it maybe isn't going to succeed because it can't compete.
Whereas with a 15% tariff, now the imported product is more expensive.
And so now the company can be competitive.
Relative to that, and maybe make a half billion dollar
a year profit for 10 years or 20 years
if the tariffs stay in place.
So the economics for the company are better
with tariffs for the long run than incentives
for the short run.
In terms of what tariffs are right now, how do you see them?
Are they in a place where they justify
for more manufacturing to come back?
Well, clearly.
As I said, a significant number of the companies said they brought
their work back because of the tariffs.
So that's a fact.
And the rate of announcements surged last year
and even more so this year.
So they're working.
The companies say they're working.
The companies that are competing
with imports say the tariffs are working.
The companies that depend on imports, like retailers.
Or somebody who's assembling something, but all the components
are coming in from offshore, they're complaining,
the retail is complaining because their costs have gone up.
But the company that makes things here is happy
because now they're more competitive, their volume's going up,
maybe their prices have gone up a little because of that.
And so their margins are better, their volume is better,
they're hiring people, they're in a good way.
So I'm, to me,
To me it's clear that tariffs have worked,
everything you do has negative consequences.
For some people it might have a different consequence.
Yeah, prices went up, some companies went out of business,
there's always something.
But it's a question, are you willing
to have US manufacturing continue to decline from
From being the leading manufacturer in the world to almost nothing.
Are you willing to do that and take the consequences
for national security, for technological leadership,
for economics, for the budget deficit, for all these things?
Are you willing to do that or are you willing to take a little pain
of higher prices and some companies having problems, no question?
You know, the retailers that complain now about.
I'm not about having to pay more for Barbie dolls and for,
you know, whatever they bring in over the last 40
or 50 years when the manufacturers were going bankrupt
because they couldn't compete with the imports.
Those retailers weren't saying, oh, that's oh,
oh, you know, we'll we'll we'll charge more
for these things if it's made in USA and we'll get it.
We'll find a way to get it. So they
weren't very sympathetic to manufacturing.
And so I'm not.
too sympathetic to the retailer who benefited from all of the offshoring.
You mentioned there is an element of uncertainty with the tariffs.
Is it because the Congress, it hasn't been put into law by Congress?
And how do you see that uncertainty?
Is it impacting companies?
Clearly, I think in the Constitution,
the Congress has the power of taxes and tariffs and things like that.
It has the primary power in those areas.
And if Trump had gone to, if Trump didn't do that,
and he went with this 301 program to justify his tariffs, and
And then the Supreme Court overturned
that and said, no, you can't do that.
That's illegal.
And so he had to give back the money.
And then he went to another program.
And that lasted, I think, for six months.
And then he went to another program.
Yeah, and...
And so I've seen charts of what
the average tariff rate is across all products.
And like every week, they're like this.
So, and the purpose of the tariffs is to convince companies.
To produce more here, source more here instead of importing.
But not only can they not guess what the tariff is going to be six
months from now or a year from now if they build a factory, it's hard
to know what the tariff is today because it's changing so fast.
And so that uncertainty makes it hard for the companies to make,
especially those big decisions,
billion-dollar decisions that hire thousands of people.
So the I think what Trump should have done was in the beginning,
when it was a majority in the House and the Senate,
gone to Congress and gotten them to approve the tariffs,
you know, but then it would have had been organized.
You know, neat and clean instead of chaotic.
But he would have had to have gone to them and get them to approve it.
And if they had done so,
then it would take another Congress to overturn that.
And therefore, it would have had a much more solid foundation.
And then the companies would have believed it.
And they would have felt more confident in going out
and spending the money.
Harry, you mentioned that people are...
The skilled labor is one
of the biggest challenges this space is facing,
which is shocking to me. I thought it was the cost.
Well, let's say for the work that they have
or that they can easily get, skilled labor is the biggest problem
because the companies can't find any more people.
And if you want to increase your output by 10%,
you need 10% more people or something like that.
And so in the short run, the availability of people is essential.
But overall, the reason the work was lost was because cost.
The big companies sourced offshore, built factories offshore,
because you can get, you know, 20 years ago,
you can get a decent worker in China for $2, and it was $20 here.
And now it's up to maybe $6 or $7 in China,
and it's up a little bit here.
But there's no question that the cost is dramatically different.
And so the...
And how do you overcome that cost?
Well, one way is to be more productive,
but to be more productive,
you need better trained workers.
And we don't do a good job of training our workers,
We don't have a good apprenticeship program
like Germany or Switzerland has.
So, and part of the problem,
I ascribe as a failing of the U.S. government.
So maybe 2013, the Department of Labor called me down to tell them how
to get the workforce ready for reshoring, for the surge of reshoring.
And so I was in the Secretary
of Labor's conference room meeting them and Harry.
And I said, well, first we have to get the Department of Labor
To stop being part of the problem and become part of the solution.
And they say, okay, what's your point?
And so I pulled up their chart, something like this, off their website.
And it shows the headline actually
was million dollars more lifetime income versus a high school degree.
So a bachelor's degree compared to a high school degree.
And it shows income going up with number of degrees.
And I said, well, I thought you were responsible
for the workforce that we have, that we have
the workforce we need.
Yep.
I thought you were responsible for the apprentice programs.
Yep.
I said, well, why don't you,
on this chart next to the bachelor's degree, either just
above it or just below, show the people
who passed an apprenticeship make just as much
money as a bachelor's degree.
So then the high school teacher, the guidance counselor,
the student, the parents, everybody
can say, wow, huh, no tuition.
You start making money when you're 18.
You know, you've got a solid job that there's a lot of demand for.
That makes an awful lot of sense.
But they weren't telling them, giving them that data.
So I've been.
hitting on the Department of Labor since then.
And they say that they're gathering the data
to put in the chart.
It's been 15 years since I suggested it.
But I see that if you go on the
government websites, you'll see this in 10 or 20 places.
And then the universities use it to say,
you got to get a degree. The insurance companies use it to say,
you have to have enough insurance
to send your kids to university so they can.
Get a degree and make money, you see.
And so we've been brainwashed that the only way to get ahead is to get
a bachelor's degree or better, as opposed to having society say,
find a way with education or training that gets you a career
so you can make a good income all your life.
And we haven't sufficiently told that to the kids.
And it's starting.
It's starting to happen now.
Now, you mentioned the manufacturing jobs.
What's the value of these jobs?
What's the difference between manufacturing jobs and service jobs?
It used to be...
Let's say 20, 30 years ago that starting jobs
in manufacturing paid substantially more, 20, 30 percent more than
a job at McDonald's or somewhere like that, without a degree,
without any special training, just as an absolute minimum worker.
And that difference, the benefits are still better in manufacturing
than in services, but the difference in wage has compressed.
And I think largely because.
The U.S. company has to compete with the imports,
and if you pay your people too much more before they're really skilled,
before they're really productive,
then the cost of making your product goes up, and you lose
the business to China or India or somewhere else like that.
So it's like a glass ceiling on top of the wages, and tariffs,
and my preferred solution, which is a lower U.S. dollar.
If this is the U.S. wage, and that's the Chinese wage expressed
in dollars, and the dollar comes down by 20%, which is what I'd like,
then the Chinese wage in dollars comes up closer to the U.S. wage
in dollars, and now the cost comes more similar,
and now it's easier for the company to pay people more
and get more business at the same time.
And that might be hard, Harry,
because China is pegging their currency to the U.S. dollars.
And they're trying to make sure
that the currency stays at a certain rate.
Then we should peg ours to the Chinese currency and force it up.
They can do it.
We can do it.
But actually, the methodology that we recommend
is something called the market access chart.
Put out by a Dr. John Hansen, and it says that the reason the dollar
is so high is because we're the reserve currency and foreign companies
and countries and individuals store their money in banks here
because it's a safe haven.
Thank
And that's what, their buying of dollars drives the dollar up
and drives their currency down.
So Dr. Hansen's conclusion is to apply a charge,
maybe a half a percent to the money when it comes in,
and that means less money will be stored in U.S. banks
you.
and the demand for dollars will come down and you adjust that currency,
that charge to get the currency level to where you want it to be.
And I believe that's the simplest reason.
Simplest way to fix things because the initial problem is because
the overvalued dollar caused most of the offshoring in the first place.
Now, in terms of the jobs, people argue that some of these jobs
are dirty, but then we've talked to some other experts that think
that these are going to be very high-end jobs that are like tech,
because for manufacturing to compete in the U.S.,
there has to be a big element of technology involved.
What are your thoughts on these jobs?
Certainly, the skill level, the automation level has
been growing over the years, but rather slowly.
U.S. labor productivity, so output per labor hour,
has grown at about 0% per year for the last 15 years,
while it's been growing at maybe 6% per year in China.
And that's one reason China is able to pay its people
so much more than they used to,
because they balance it off with the productivity improvement.
So the, um...
The jobs are clearly going to be at all competitive.
The U.S. jobs have to become more productive.
The output per worker has to go up.
I've read a couple of people writing that the way
to get the workforce we need is to automate enough
so that a skilled worker in a factory makes $100,000 a year.
At that point, it'll be easier to attract the intelligent,
hardworking people that you need, and you'll be able
to compete effectively with China and India, not just China.
And I see companies doing that.
It's automating AI, you know, the quoting system,
the paperwork system, the robots loading and unloading,
doing as much as possible, which leaves the programming
and the decision making to the people and less of the grunt work.
So, but there's, there'll always be some work, I think,
for the next 20 or 30 years, there'll always be some lower level work.
And the, in terms of the number of workers.
So our goal is to balance goods trade.
And right now we have a $1.3 trillion trade deficit.
And getting rid of that requires
U.S. manufacturing to increase by 40%, 40%.
So if our productivity level stays the same,
we need 40% more manufacturing workers,
which is 5 million more manufacturing workers.
And so we can increase productivity dramatically.
And hire more workers, have more manufacturing workers as long
as we're reshoring, as long as we're bringing the work back.
And so you get a virtuous spiral as you bring the work back.
New factories get built.
So right now we've got old factories.
China has new factories, mostly built in the last 10 or 20 years.
We mostly have old factories built 30, 40, 50, 60 years ago.
So as we get new factories with new equipment.
And people well-trained, our cost comes down,
and therefore we can have more workers and better-paid workers.
But it takes investment by companies.
It takes the government to have the right policies.
Harry, you mentioned you started the reshoring initiative.
You're very passionate about bringing manufacturing back.
Why?
Why?
All right.
It needs to be, needed to be done.
And I had benefited from manufacturing.
I had good jobs, president of companies, things like that.
Nice, nice jobs, very rewarding.
And, but I look back at my.
family history. And my ancestors on my mother's side
were like the first settlers of New Jersey
back in 1660, something like that.
And they settled in Elizabeth, New Jersey, and had the
farm there and so on. And my grandfather,
who's part of that Crane family,
All right.
He started at the local gas utility as a plumber when he was 17
and retired on the board of directors
and treasurer of the corporation in 86.
He worked for the same company for 69 years.
He's a good role model.
That's commitment.
A bit better.
And it worked for him.
He's just a great guy.
Bye-bye.
His biggest customer for gas was Singer Sewing Machines,
as most people have heard of.
Singer's biggest factory in the world was in Elizabeth.
5,000 workers, 3 million square feet.
It would be a huge factory today, a wonderful factory.
Any city would love to have it today.
And my grandfather was a foreman.
My dad ran about a third of the factory.
I worked there summers in high school and college.
And I went past, you know, 10,
15 years ago and nothing of Singer's made there anymore.
Everything, as far as I can tell, is imported from low-wage countries.
And so the city lost all those jobs, the state, the country.
During my career, I sold machinery, CNC machine tools,
foundry equipment, things like that.
And industry after industry,
company after company I wanted to sell to went out of business,
wiped out by cheap imports from China,
from Japan, from India, you know, from somewhere.
And
And I said, well, this is wrong.
It's hollowing out the country.
you
Somebody has to do something.
And at that point, I was retiring
very
from the last of those companies that I ran.
And I said, well, I guess I'll do it.
a
And so the rest of it is history.
for
And as you can tell from that curve,
I've been pleased with the results that we've achieved.
You know it isn't I
I don't make any money at it, but I get a lot
time.
of psychic satisfaction from doing good for the country.
And is the momentum shifting?
Are people coming to you and kind of joining this initiative?
Or are you seeing a change in momentum?
The thing I see the most, I get...
I get LinkedIn or other messages about once a week
from some company that wants to bring work back
and they want me to be their vice president
or their advisor or something.
And I can't tell whether they're real
or they're hacks of some kind
trying to get my social security number.
But I get a lot of those.
And I get...
When I go on LinkedIn, et cetera, there's always,
we post something every week, and people
will say something like, and they congratulate us and say,
it's wonderful what you're doing,
and they refer to me as Harry the Legend,
and I say, I don't like legend, because legends
are typically mythical and dead.
So, but this is clear that...
When I started this 20 years ago or 16 years ago, nobody believed.
They said, Harry, you're wasting your time.
It's impossible to bring the work back.
Don't even try.
It's a waste of time.
And now people, when I go to some meetings, I'll talk to everybody.
Yeah, we've done some.
We haven't done a lot.
We've done some.
And customers are talking to us about it all the time.
And so it's clear that there's a lot
of momentum that still need more reality.
You know, still need to move the jobs up more,
still need to move the production up more,
but it's been more than even I had expected back,
you know, 16 years ago.
And how long do you think does it take
to bring that cycle back,
where you have this ecosystem?
You're talking about an ecosystem
where it encourages more and more development.
And it isn't just the ecosystem.
It's, as I said, you have to start getting
the workforce in and training them.
And then you have to do something about cost.
So we have something called the total cost of ownership estimator.
And this is 288 cases where the user, probably a U.S. user, compared
something sourced in China versus sourcing the same thing in the U.S.
And the blue line.
is the price. And the horizontal axis
is the China price as a percentage of the U.S. price.
And at 100, they're equal to the left.
China's cheaper, the right's U.S. cheaper. And based on
price, the U.S. only wins 6% of the time.
But the red line is the total cost of ownership,
which starts with the price, but adds in the duty,
freight, carrying cost of inventory,
you know, other characteristics like that.
And now the U.S. win goes to 62%.
And if there's a 25% tariff, it goes to, I think, 78.
And if there's a 50% tariff, U.S. win rate goes to 86%.
So by first, most important, no cost,
getting everybody to use total cost.
Second would be of the tariffs, and now the area under the curve
to the right of the 100% bar goes up from 6% or 8% up to 70%, 80%.
The blue line is the problem to overcome,
and the TCO and the tariffs are the way to overcome it.
People will say, well, you announce all these jobs, where are they?
We can't see them, you know,
because the manufacturing employment is essentially stable.
And I say, yeah, it's stable,
but if you go back, I took the years from 1995.
through 2006,
and I regressed the data from those years.
That gives you the yellow line.
So if the trend had continued at that rate,
which included China joining the WTO,
if it had continued at that rate, we'd be down to...
Eight million or less than eight million jobs.
Yeah, seven million jobs or something like that.
And instead, we're at almost 14 and 13.
And so the, so, so.
I say that the reason it was he had that slope to the curve
was so much work was moving off every year offshore,
China, India, you know, various places.
And now the rate of work moving offshore has slowed dramatically.
You don't read about many factories closing
to move work outside the country.
And and the rate of reshoring and FDI is picked up dramatically.
And so so so we've gone from steeply down to slightly up.
And that's, that's a big improvement.
You know, they always say, if you're in a hole and you want to get out,
the first thing is to stop digging.
Okay, so.
So we've stopped digging, you know, and and now we have to get enough
of the factors in place, the workforce, the dollar or the tariffs,
tax, tax rates, you know, et cetera, et cetera.
We fix, you know, two or three of those things within reason.
And then we can get get the workforce back up.
You know.
You know, many economists will tell you
that that's not going to happen.
They say that as a company, as a country matures.
And riches, it goes from agriculture to industry
to services, technology, banker, lawyer,
We're, you know,
you know, et cetera, et cetera, doing things for each other.
And yet, if you look at the
data for our peer countries in Western Europe,
their manufacturing workforces
average about 13% of their total employment, and we average about nine.
And nine times 1.4, which is the 40% increase, gets you to 13.
And so I say, no, economists, everybody else is able to do it.
Why can't we?
And the reason we can't is because
of the reserve currency status of our dollar, which
makes us not competitive.
So overcome that problem, and then we can do as well.
As well as Italy or Spain or France and other countries over there.
Germany has 22% of their workforce in manufacturing.
So I don't need to do that.
But I'd be happy to be just average for the high-income countries.
And we're not.
We're talking about what kind of workers companies are looking for.
So in our 2026 survey, we asked the big companies,
what kind of workers are you having the most problems finding?
And the...
Very difficult or critical condition is the top sort of.
Kirk Burgundy or whatever it is at the top.
And so for unskilled labor, not a problem.
For administration and management, not a problem.
For engineers, a problem.
But the biggest problem is for maintenance
and repair techs and technicians.
So what I call professionals, what other people call the trades,
but well-skilled, well-trained,
you know, trained as well as in any country in the world.
And they need those people.
First, they need people, and then they need a really well-trained.
And it's hard to find them.
And the lack of them in construction delays
the construction of these factories.
And the lack of them in the workforce delays
the manning of the factories.
One of the things we do to accelerate reshoring
is to recognize companies that have reshored.
And so at IMTS, the 92,000-person machine tool show,
In 2025, the two winners were GE Appliances that I mentioned,
the fellow on the left, and Marlin Steel,
the Drew Greenblatt on the right. And these companies were recognized
because of the excellent job they had done reshoring.
And so anybody who's listening,
if you've reshored anything, we'd like to hear about it.
But if it's made out of metal,
then you're eligible to apply to win the.
The 2027 contest. What you're trying to pull up
is what we call the geopolitical risk map.
And it shows the probability of decoupling.
And decoupling is a U.S. company being cut off
from its suppliers somewhere, but probably in another country.
And so we have a map that shows the probability of that occurring.
And right now, Russia and Iran are cut off.
You basically can't trade with them.
And there's a risk.
It could happen with Canada, you know,
if things go bad, but not likely, very unlikely.
But certainly there's a possibility in China because the Chinese,
Xi has said he wants the Chinese military to be prepared enough
so it could succeed in invading and taking over, taking back Taiwan.
In 2027, that's one of his, his missions,
like my mission is very short.
His mission is be ready to take back Taiwan. And
And so there's a risk,
there's a probability that it will happen next year.
You can ask different people, some will say zero, some will say 100%.
And so we, in our analysis, we say 5%, 5% chance of it happening.
And so we tell companies they should do is look
at the components that they and their
suppliers get from China or Taiwan.
And think about what would happen if there was a war there
and nothing was coming out.
You know, there's missiles and there's bombs and stuff,
planes going everywhere and nothing's coming out.
And you're dependent on all those components.
How are you going to make your product?
And they'll say, well, Harry, I'll call the suppliers
that always wanted to make them for me in the U.S.
And I say, well, you call them up,
and they're going to say, sorry, you know,
you're the thousandth call I've had since the war started yesterday.
I'm going to devote my resources to the companies
that were buying from me before the war started.
They had loyalty to me.
So, therefore, I tell companies to think about.
How much revenue they'd lose if they couldn't get a supplier
for six months or a year, how much revenue they'd lose,
how much margin they'd lose, how many customers they'd lose,
whether the business would even exist at the end of the six months
or a year, and therefore be willing
to pay somewhat more now to have a supply base.
So if that happened with China or with anywhere else where
you think there's a significant risk, that they'll survive.
And survival is one of the responsibilities of a good manager.
You are doing this initiative
and your organization helps companies to come here.
Can you tell us more about it?
First, we provide motivation.
By showing the data and displaying the cases and giving the awards,
it tells the company that it's possible.
If all those companies are doing it, then maybe we should
at least look at it and see if it makes sense for us,
as opposed to blindly saying, keep everything offshore.
So first, we provide motivation.
Second, we provide the TCO estimator,
total cost of ownership estimator.
I showed you those curves that came out of users of that.
We have a revised version that's due out in December,
and it will use AI to find some
key costs like tariffs and freight,
things that are changing all the time and hard to
tell what it is, and yet there are major parts of the equation.
And we provide visibility with articles, webinars,
presentations, the award that I just showed you,
the geopolitical risk map that helps them quantify the cost of that.
We'll
One of the hot topics over the last five or 10 years has been ESG,
environmental, social, and governance, especially climate.
you know
People are worried about global warming and so on.
you
And we've done a series of studies that show that...
next
Making it here instead of making it there, and especially China,
you reduce the CO2 emissions by 25% or so by making it here.
time.
Combination of the CO2 from the shipping.
But also, the Chinese electricity is dirtier than ours
because it's much more coal-based.
So each kilowatt hour has more CO2 emissions there.
And so the combination of those two comes out to maybe 25% difference.
We also have a database
of 8,000 or more cases of reshoring and FDI,
and it's used by financial analysts at big financial companies,
industrial marketing companies looking for new customers,
and academics.
and
And so anybody who thinks that might be useful,
again, that we sell.
And then for workforce advocacy,
You see, we...
Working with the government, we do a series of articles
to show kids that it's a good way to get ahead.
you.
We always have a picture of the individual when they were an apprentice
at 18 and now when they're the president of the company in a suit
and a tie, you know, living a good life, so to speak.
So that list is more or less what we do to make things happen.
Harry, it was great to have you on.
Harry Moser with Reshoring Initiative.
It was great to have you on, Marketing Insider.
Please come back and update us in the near future.
It's a pleasure.
I'm honored to be here.
Tell us what you think about this discussion.
Do you think we should have more manufacturing jobs here?
And do you encourage your family members
and young people to get into manufacturing?
Make sure to tell us in the comments.
I'm Siamak, this is Marketing Insider.
We'll see you next time.