Private credit has become one of the largest and least understood corners of modern finance. The loans made in this space have worked their way into the insurance policies and retirement annuities that ordinary Americans depend on. If the margin of error for this $10 trillion industry is only $658 billion, what could actually happen if that buffer runs out?
In this episode, Siyamak sits down with Nick Nemeth, investor and writer behind the Substack newsletter Mispriced Assets, who spent months reading the actual loans inside private credit funds and found a system where the risk is real but the visibility is not. ----- 03:39 – How PE Uses Debt and Overpays 06:24 – Why PE Pays High Valuations 09:17 – Who Funds Private Credit 11:19 – PE Moves Into Insurance Assets 13:12 – Incentives and Risk in Credit Markets 14:57 – Why Credit Needs High Hit Rates 16:10 – $10T Insurance, Thin Buffers 18:32 – Loss Limits Before Intervention 20:21 – Captive Insurers and Oversight Gaps 22:08 – Reinsurance and Loss Protection 23:41 – Model Pricing vs Market Reality 26:26 – Fixes: Transparency and Valuation 27:55 – Key Takeaways from the Interview ----- Let's Stay in Contact: • Substack - https://substack.com/@themarketinsidershow • X (Twitter) - https://twitter.com/MktInsiderShow • Linkedin - https://www.linkedin.com/company/market-insider-show/ ----- 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘯𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘧𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘬𝘦𝘵 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳. 𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘶𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭, 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦. 𝘈𝘭𝘸𝘢𝘺𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵 𝘢 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴. 𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘢𝘺 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬𝘴.
What's happening with private credit right now?
And where are the major risks?
Today we sit down with Nick Nemeth,
who has been studying this space.
Even though he's not a private credit expert,
he's been digging in and he's gotten praised
by many economists online about what he's been finding
inside these portfolios.
Private equity has decided that the best way
to get assets under management
is to buy insurance companies.
The insurance industry, just life and annuity alone,
which is the largest component, is $10 trillion.
That is 140% bigger
than the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.
So that industry has only $660 billion in reserve.
So that is the margin of error.
And if they lose that amount of money,
in aggregate, the whole thing is going to go
to the government's balance sheet.
First to the states, but the states cannot afford it,
and there will have to be a bailout.
I'm Siamak, and this is Market Insider.
Nick, it's great to have you on, welcome.
Thank you for having me here.
You have been studying this space.
You have actually done a lot of work
and people regard you as highly informed in this space.
Can you quickly tell us what is private credit
for those people that may have not heard about it?
So private credit is private lending to businesses
that are typically not public.
So the apples of the world, they're in the public markets.
Private credit is private markets.
Increasingly, it is private equity-backed companies
that either want to make an acquisition themselves
or the private equity companies will do a leverage buyout,
which is essentially a mortgage.
So they only have to put up 40 or 50%
of the price of the purchase.
There has been a major growth in this space, right?
And you found some red flags.
I think when you see an asset class grow so exponentially,
it's always a red flag.
So it was on my monitor, and then seeing that
all of a sudden the economy is doing okay,
and yet we have credit problems, meaning in the debt markets,
it just seemed weird to me as an equity investor.
So that's when I started having to really dive in
and be like, I need to figure this out
because this is a risk that I need to underwrite.
What was it like figuring this out?
Because these are complex funds, right?
What did you find inside there?
I saw PE companies running seven times leverage on EBITDA,
which is profit minus a lot of stuff that they add back
and say they don't want to pay attention to it.
But in reality, it's about nine times levered
on their earnings, which is a lot of debt.
You look at three to four times in public markets,
and that's typical.
These guys think it's completely fine
at what they call seven, which is really nine.
There's a lot of leverage debt on these businesses.
And I found that pretty early and pretty shocking.
And my thesis was always,
this is gonna be ugly during a recession.
But it started happening before the recession.
And then I really dove into,
how are they getting away with saying
that this is an acceptable amount of debt?
And then also the purchase prices that they were paying,
I started looking into those,
and I was like, that's really expensive.
I can find you cheaper stocks in the public markets,
and the public markets are typically better businesses.
So there is the private equity part
where there are leverage buyouts, right?
Like people are, these are private equity companies
going and borrowing money and buying companies
and putting them together
and eventually taking them to public
and selling them at a premium, right?
Yeah, even some public companies will go to private markets.
And that's sort of an indication.
You'll go to the public markets
if you can get money in the public markets.
And the interest rate, you have the risk-free rate,
they call it SOFR, that's the base rate.
And then you wanna add a spread on top of that
for the amount of risk that it is.
Average across these portfolios
is about a 10% interest rate,
which isn't far off from a credit card.
I think it's more important
to focus on the private equity firm
because if a company borrows,
they're gonna use the cash
to fund their business in some sort of way.
Now it could be distressed,
that's of course a possibility,
but these private equity firms
are trying to increase returns
by mortgaging the businesses that they buy.
And in that sense, the money,
the debt is going to the PE firm.
It is not going to the business to grow the business
or make an acquisition even,
although some of it is,
there's a lot of add-on acquisitions,
but it's basically just increasing the risk
as well as hopefully, they hope, the returns.
I found car wash companies in the private markets
going for 15 times their EBITDA,
which you add back interest, taxes,
depreciation, amortization.
Most business owners know
that the revenue minus the cost of goods sold
is not the take-home money,
but more or less, that's what EBITDA is.
And they're paying extreme multiples on this
for businesses that don't deserve it.
Some businesses deserve a premium
if they're growing, high-tech,
but an HVAC company, a dental practice,
a veterinarian shop,
I was wondering why they're so expensive.
You mentioned they have a lot of debt.
Where did you see the debt?
Isn't it like two to one at the max
from what we have seen,
or is it a lot higher amount of debt
that goes into these purchases?
The industry says that 40%
of the total value of the business is good.
And you might put 25% or 20% down on a house,
but selling a house is easy.
Selling a business in times of trouble is not so easy.
And there's also, a house is gonna be a house
unless a fire comes,
but a business, there's a lot of variability of outcomes,
especially when economic times are not so good.
So from what you saw,
there's a lot of money going into private equity,
and these companies are raising money
from the private investors,
individuals with a lot of wealth in the beginning.
They're putting this money to buy companies,
and companies like car washes
and different kinds of regular type companies
at valuations that you think,
or you've seen based on the public market,
valuations that may not make sense.
And the idea is you're supposed to get cheaper companies
that are private,
and that's the whole idea of the-
To put them together, grow them,
and then do a roll up,
and then take them to public,
and then eventually exit.
Yeah, if you're trying to take them public,
why are you paying more when it's private?
So there's been a lot less of going public.
There's been a lot less exits in general,
or realization of their investments.
And I just found it very strange.
To put it in perspective of what 40% loan to value,
LTV that these guys will say is,
if Nvidia had 40% loan to value,
that would be about $1.6 trillion of debt.
Are they getting that much loans from the banks?
The banks are typically the center.
They'll syndicate it.
They have great relationships.
So a private equity company will go to the bank,
say, can you underwrite this?
And the bank will go and decide,
okay, we can probably find people to loan to this.
And then they will send it to their network.
And it's possible that a private equity company
could go to a bank to underwrite it,
that will syndicate it, and they take a loan back,
as many of these private equity companies
are also, and potentially bigger, private credit companies.
So can you walk us through one company?
Let's say the car wash you mentioned, Shen.
The car wash that's making a million dollars a year
in EBITDA, and now all of a sudden is worth 16 million.
Can you tell us how that kind of transaction works?
So private equity will raise a fund.
Sometimes 10, $20 billion.
But they wanna buy $50 billion worth of businesses.
So they will put down 60%,
and then they will go out to market
for 40% of the value of the business.
The banks typically facilitate.
They make a lot of money on fees as a facilitator.
And then it ends up in another fund
that is called a private credit fund.
It might be a BDC interval fund,
something that retail could have access to,
or it is something that pension funds have allocated to,
or high net worth wealth advisors.
So essentially, when they come to that car wash company
and they buy it at $16 million,
they have some equity of their own,
which they've raised from their investors,
and then they have to borrow another 60%.
Right.
And who do they borrow from?
Is it from the private creditors?
It is from private credit funds.
The banks have a little bit on their balance sheet,
and there is a massive amount,
over a trillion dollars in insurance balance sheets.
And then they have to pay interest.
That car wash now has to pay interest
on that eight, nine, $10 million loan, right?
Right, so the private equity firm used the debt,
they got the debt, and the company has to pay it back.
The company that they own, but still,
the company's success is what will determine
that loan getting paid back
that has been syndicated throughout the system.
So your suspicion was that some of these companies
may not be able to pay what they've been paying
if there is a downturn.
But then there was a bankruptcy of one of these companies,
and the value of this debt went to zero.
And some people are wondering
there's gonna be major losses,
or it's not very clear what the losses will be.
Which company is good?
What loan is good?
What loan is not?
You kind of took a look into these loans.
Can you tell us what you saw?
I looked into some of these private credit firms,
and I used tools available to everyone.
And then I started filtering through,
because nobody ever reads this stuff
when they invest in, apparently, as I've learned.
Everyone wants to talk about the adjectives and adverbs
that they assign to these funds.
And I'm like, what about the businesses?
Why aren't we talking about the businesses?
So I'm filtering through,
hey, everyone's focused on software, I agree,
but I wanna see what type of software.
I wanna see what type of business it is.
And then running an LLM through my thesis
in order to make 4,100 different loans in one fund
a little bit more digestible
so that I can go through and find outliers
and figure out, okay, this one seems like
something I should look further into.
So there's thousands of companies.
Potentially.
Private equity has decided that the best way
to get assets under management is to buy insurance companies.
The insurance industry, just life and annuity alone,
which is the largest component, is $10 trillion.
That is 140% bigger
than the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.
The insurance and annuity balance sheet is $10 trillion.
To put that in perspective,
the Federal Reserve's balance sheet is $6.5 trillion.
These are huge numbers, and they're hard to imagine.
So that industry has only $660 billion in reserve.
So that is the margin of error.
And if they, in aggregate, lose that amount of money,
in aggregate, the whole thing is going to go
to the government's balance sheet.
First to the states, but the states cannot afford it,
and there will have to be a bailout.
So how would this work?
It started with demutualization for insurance funds.
They wanted to go public.
They wanted to be for profit.
A mutual is like the Green Bay Packers.
The policyholders own the company.
So the people that are allocating there,
they work for the policyholders.
There's no profit incentive.
They are going to get paid.
Some of them are very smart guys,
but they're not trying to pay a shareholder
or pay a PE firm.
They're not a profit center in that sort of way.
When they started to go public,
you started to see issues,
like we saw with AIG several times.
That's when there's a profit incentive,
and they want to raise dividends and payouts,
and the executives have a misalignment on the incentive.
As they're trying to hit every single quarter,
they are creeping into more and more risk,
and that led to the issues of the global financial crisis.
So the safety is gone.
They're willing to take more risk
because now it's a public company.
They gotta grow the shareholder value.
At the same time,
they might be willing to take more risk on their portfolio.
Right, so when they get premiums in,
they have to get excess returns of that
in order to have profits.
First, they gotta pay the people that work there,
and then ultimately,
they want to return money to shareholders.
Now, in public markets, it's highly scrutinized.
You have people that ultimately,
someone might short the stock.
Someone might come out and say,
AIG's taking too much risk.
So you have $10 trillion in investments,
like they're investing in stocks and other things, right?
It is mostly treasuries, mortgages, corporate investment.
Safe things.
It's typically mostly been safe things.
Now the industry has gone 8% of assets
towards private credit, CLOs,
which is a collateralized loan obligation
where they bundle up these loans.
To make it more diversified, right, essentially.
To make it more diversified,
this is exactly what we saw with CDOs
and the global financial crisis,
where the ratings agencies will say it's safe
because of the diversification factor
that you're talking about.
But you look in and all of those ratings
are made by ratings agencies nobody's ever heard of.
And once you look into the individual loans,
the ratings are too high
and probably shouldn't be trusted on.
And just because you bundle a bunch of BBB-rated loans,
I don't think it should be a AA-rated instrument
just because of the diversification factor.
So there is risks inside these loans individually,
and some sectors may do well,
some sectors may not do well.
The CDOs, it was all housing when the housing collapsed.
But there's potential that there's some bad ones
and there's some really good companies in there, right?
Yeah, but in private credit, you need a 90% hit rate.
It's not like stocks.
People might have a stock portfolio.
Not every single stock needs to go up
for your portfolio to go up.
In private credit, if something goes badly,
you're gonna lose 80% of that loan most of the time.
So if you have two of those in a portfolio,
you're underwater.
And if that happens to wealthy individuals,
if it happens to pension funds,
they can probably handle it.
It probably hurts a little bit more.
But if it happens on insurance balance sheets,
that $10 trillion of assets
is only backed by $658 billion of capital surplus.
So that's their margin of error
before this ends up on state balance sheets,
which obviously they can't handle.
They cannot manage.
So the federal government will have to bail it out.
Tell us about that.
So this $10 trillion is essentially leveraged
from what you're saying.
And there's only $600 something billion of equity, right?
Yes.
Can you tell us about the leverage part
and how it will work?
They have liabilities,
and that means policies that they have to pay out.
An annuity is supplement for retirement for most people.
Life insurance typically takes care of your family
after death.
Both are relied on by average Americans.
So they have to pay those out.
And then the $10 trillion of assets,
they're hoping to get more returns then
so that they can have profits.
The problem is that when the assets and the liabilities,
which are already really close across the industry,
some of them are razor thin, some of these companies,
when that gets to a certain level,
the regulators have to step in.
And if the regulators step in,
and this is happening to many
of those massive balance sheets at once,
you're looking at something bigger
than a global financial crisis.
But out of this $10 trillion,
a lot of it is also liabilities too, right?
How much liabilities are there?
Right, they have to pay out policies.
So that's $9.5 trillion.
And the difference between that
is the difference between the entire industry in aggregate.
Obviously, there's different risk parameters
for each company,
but if you just considered it one company.
If you put everything together,
it's 10 trillions of assets
and 9.5 something around that of trillions of liabilities.
Right, if you put Lehman Brothers and Citibank
and JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs,
if we're using the global financial crisis,
if you put them all together,
the difference is $658 billion
between it being functionally insolvent.
So if they lose as a whole,
as the industry loses 650 billion, something like that,
then people that have those insurance policies
may not get paid.
The states guarantee 250K,
in some states, 500K for pension risk transfers,
as well as life insurance policies.
In excess of that, they're out of luck,
but the states don't have that money.
They cannot print money.
So the federal government will have to step in.
So you mentioned that on the private debt side of things,
they can only lose a person.
Can you explain that?
So we're speaking in aggregate.
There's gonna be a huge variability.
PE-backed insurers take way more private credit debt.
They can charge more fees.
More management fees makes sense
than just buying treasuries.
They also entice consumers with higher rates
in order to make up for that excess risk
that they're taking.
So on a PE-backed insurer,
they might have 15% of assets allocated
towards private credit.
The typical industry is 7% to 8%.
The thing is, they will say that, and it sounds not so bad,
but again, the margin of error is only 6.5%.
And the regulators step in
before that capital surplus goes to zero.
And again, there's some insurers
that are way worse than others.
And there's some insurers
that are backstopping all other insurers.
So that actually, that 6.5% margin room
is probably a lot less.
Before we get into that,
we wanna talk to you about
that whole reinsurance side of things.
But can you explain to us
how big is the footprint of private equity
inside the insurance?
I know that a couple of them
have bought life insurance companies,
but how big is their footprint?
How much control do they have into the assets?
Of the top 10, there are two major players.
There's MetLife, Prudential,
and then there's, KKR actually has three.
Brooksfield is, I think, in the top 10,
and Athene is the big one.
So there's a few of them
that now have a big footprint into that.
So they're coming into this 10 trillion asset
that you mentioned.
Yes, aggressively.
And there is no regulatory requirement
to look into that, right?
This is all happening.
It's very strange,
because once you have a captive insurer,
all of a sudden, the typical rules don't apply to you.
And especially if you're in Vermont,
originally, if you had a captive insurer,
it was to insure yourself.
ExxonMobil did this on their offshore drilling,
and they said in court,
we don't really wanna have BP know
all of the risk parameters and our secret sauce.
And that kind of makes sense.
But recently, over the past 10 years,
they've expanded that to external insurance,
which to me, I think, is causing a big issue.
So essentially, people can come
buy these insurance companies
and then use their book to invest in your own product.
Yes, so you can immediately become the asset manager,
and they have to show you a few line items,
asset liabilities and equities,
but they don't have to show you the individual loans
so that somebody can go in there and say,
is this balance sheet good or not?
Forensic accountants, they work really hard
to try to figure out exactly what the liabilities are,
exactly what the assets are.
And only a couple companies actually show you.
And the companies that have showed,
there's been reinsurance that is very worrisome
because seven companies are backstopping
570 different companies.
And you look at their balance sheets,
and there's not much capital there,
certainly not enough for even three of those contracts.
So do these insurance companies
buy insurance on their portfolios?
Is that how it works from where?
Right, a lot of people don't understand reinsurance.
For property and casualty, it makes sense.
So if you're a Florida insurer,
you're gonna want some help in case of a big hurricane.
So you wanna get your own insurance
on top of your portfolio.
Right, just in case.
So if you lose everything,
then you can go to other people,
and they can cover for you.
At a certain level, like, listen,
if it's Hurricane Katrina,
we need you to come in for $100 million.
That is reinsurance.
It's one example of reinsurance.
The annuity in the life industry,
the risk is their balance sheet.
So they will insure against the value
of their balance sheet going down.
It's called an XOL asset, excess of loss asset,
that they then put on their balance sheet.
And the accounting is weird,
but they will use that as an ability
to make their capital surplus higher,
even though it is a promise from a reinsurer
to come in with the money,
that in some cases, they don't even have a reserve for it.
So you think the people that are doing this reinsurance
don't have the money to cover for these assets?
Certainly not in the U.S.,
and then they'll send it to the Bermudas
where supposedly there's $2 trillion backstopping it,
but it's invisible to an American citizen like myself
or even American regulators.
There's another side to this as well.
Recently, some investors are panicking about this
and they're trying to get funds out of these private funds.
It's hard to know what's the value of this debt
because they don't get mark to market.
The car wash that somebody borrowed $10 million
or $8 million to buy,
and it's a $60 million car wash,
it's hard to know is that debt still worth it,
that amount or not.
In some cases, there actually is a market price
and they still don't pick it.
It's like I have a phone in my pocket, it's $10,000,
and I'm just deciding to say it's $10,000
even though you can go online
and see that it's not $10,000.
There are examples of that.
I think in general, the way that the industry values
the equity and by a result, the debt,
although the debt is typically a little bit harder
because you have to create a probability of default.
Is it threatened?
What would the liquidation value be?
How would this price?
And also the debt holders have priority
over the equity people, right?
They do.
In court, private equity is known
at playing pretty tough in court.
Let's just say that.
So it's not perfect where the equity will always get zero
and the debt will always get all of the liquidation value.
They do fight and there's a lot of legal fees
associated with it, but typically, yes.
The difference is if the business does really well,
the debt only gets 9%
and the equity can get potentially 100%.
People have panicked and this is a bad thing.
When people panic, they just usually rush
to get their money out and it will cause those assets
to get stressed out, more stressed out.
And some experts are arguing
that these funds are gonna sell whatever
that's the best right now, the more liquid to pay.
People will sell the thing that they can sell.
And I think that there's been bad marketing
to get people into these funds
where now they're in a position where they're like,
I didn't know half of this stuff that was in here.
I want my money back and I can't get it back.
There's no reason to cause panic,
but I do think people should assess the risk themselves.
And I also think it's ironic that the only regulations
that these private credit guys want,
that are applied to the banking center,
is someone stopping a bank run,
which is not allowed, but these are not banks,
they're shadow banks.
So what do you think this industry should do
to bring confidence back?
For somebody like you that you've been looking into this
and you're trying to put pieces together,
what do they need to show you for you to be confident?
We need to address the fact that mark to model
versus market causes potential risks.
We need to be forefront about that.
Everyone needs to admit that, it's so obvious,
it should be admitted.
And number two, I think we need to have a discussion
about transparency, the marketing that went into this,
as well as the actual business performance underneath.
Because when I'm looking in, I'm trying to backdate,
I can't see the balance sheet.
I'm guessing at the liquidation value
based on what type of business it is.
I can't see the business performance.
I can only see news stories.
I can only try to assess,
this type of business is like this,
how do I think it's doing?
That should be more transparent.
It shouldn't all be bundled up, built with trust.
I think on the private credit side and the insurance side,
we need visibility into the offshore trillions of dollars
holding this whole thing together that is supposedly there,
but I'm starting to get pretty scared
that it's not exactly 100% there.
Well, Nick, we're gonna be in touch with you.
Keep us posted on your findings in this space.
It was great to have you on.
Thank you so much.
This is what I'm understanding from the private credit space.
It's very hard to understand it.
There are different kinds of loans.
Some loans went directly to companies,
like software companies,
and some loans went to private equity firms,
and then they got invested inside these companies
used for leverage buyouts,
and some of them got leveraged by the banks.
So there are a few potential risks here.
One of them is the risk to the banking system.
Because banks also lend it to these companies,
same companies that got funding from private investors,
they got lending from the banks,
there is a chance that the banks may lose money
if these companies don't do well
and can't pay the loans back.
If the banks lose money,
then it could create potential crash
for the financial system,
something like what happened in 2008.
Also, it's hard to tell how much exposures these banks have.
One day, the CEO of top banks in America come out
and say, this is not a big deal for us.
We can handle the losses from private credit.
A week later, the same CEO comes back and says,
private credit is gonna be a big problem
for the economy and the financial system.
So it's very hard to tell what's really going on.
On top of it, the fact that insurance,
life insurance and insurance funds
are now exposing themselves to private credit.
And some of these insurance providers
were bought by private credit players.
That creates a big question,
whether the funds that are getting invested
from these insurance companies
into these private credit funds,
are they going to the right investments?
And would there be losses?
And if there are losses,
people that have life insurance policies,
would they get paid?
And of course they have to get paid
because some of these things are backed by governments.
But that could have a systematic impact as well.
At the same time, pension funds
are also exposed to these private credit funds.
And the question is what kind of losses there will be?
We know that this private equity space
is full of sophisticated people.
Some of them are very savvy in business
and they're good at buying companies
and creating value for them.
At the same time,
we know that a ton of money went into this space
and it might have become too crowded
and they have been chasing businesses
that might not be optimal for this kind of growth.
We're gonna be monitoring this closely
and we're gonna help you understand what's going on
by interviewing experts that know this space well.
So stay tuned.
I'm Siamak Khorami, this is Market Insider.
We'll see you next time.