160 Mercenaries vs. 15,000 Rebels: The TRUE Story of Executive Outcomes

By early 1995, the government of Sierra Leone was losing a civil war. Rebel forces controlled much of the country's diamond-producing regions, entire communities had been devastated by years of violence, and the capital itself appeared increasingly vulnerable. Regional military forces had been unable to reverse the situation, while international efforts produced little beyond promises and diplomatic pressure. With few options remaining, the government made a decision that shocked much of the world. It hired a private military company. The force that arrived numbered only about 160 men, yet within months it had driven the rebels away from the capital, reopened territory that had long been under insurgent control, and forced an enemy that had terrorized the country for years onto the defensive. It was a military success so unexpected that it challenged long-held assumptions about modern warfare and the role of private soldiers. Supporters argued that these contractors accomplished what governments and international organizations could not. Critics countered that they were mercenaries whose interest extended beyond the battlefield and into Sierra Leone's valuable natural resources. Let's find out what the truth is. What started the civil war in Sierra Leone? Who was fighting who? Why was executive outcomes even hired? What did they do? Hello, I'm Colin Heaton, former history professor, Army and Marine Corps veteran, and welcome to this episode of Forgotten History. Beginning of the toughest 26 days in Marine Corps history. 36th president of the United States died this afternoon. Starting in 1991, the Revolutionary United Front, or RUF, led by Foe de Sanco, a former Sierra Leone army corporal and outspoken Marxist, claimed to be a revolutionary movement fighting government corruption. In practice, however, it became a terror movement, criminal army, and diamond-funded insurgency. The RUF received support from Liberian President Charles Taylor and Liberian rebel networks. Its goal was to overthrow the Sierra Leone government and seize control of the country's diamond trade, using slave labor to finance its operations, with Taylor becoming one of its principal beneficiaries. The international community responded, but its initial efforts were limited and largely ineffective. The RUF was first opposed by the Sierra Leone army, and later by ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, which served as the military intervention force of ECOWAS, the West African Regional Block. Often described as West Africa's regional military fire brigade, ECOMOG was created in 1990 during the Liberian Civil War to conduct peacekeeping and intervention operations. Nigeria provided the bulk of the force, with additional troops from Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. Through British forces, United Nations peacekeepers and pro-government militias would later join the effort. By 1995, the Sierra Leone government was in deep trouble. Youth unemployment and widespread alienation created a large pool of angry young men with few prospects, making them easy recruits for the RUF. Some joined voluntarily in the early years of the conflict, while many others were later forced into its ranks. Control of the diamond mines became the fuel that kept the war alive. The RUF seized mining regions and sold what became known as blood or conflict diamonds to purchase weapons. As the rebels advanced toward Freetown, they killed thousands of civilians along the way. The Sierra Leone army was weak, corrupt, and deeply divided. Many of its soldiers were more interested in looting than fighting. Although the RUF began as an anti-government rebel movement, it quickly became notorious for its campaign of terror. It financed its operations through the diamond trade while abducting civilians, including children, to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. Human Rights Watch reported in 2000 that the RUF was forcing children, including demobilized child soldiers, back into combat. United Nations condemned these atrocities, but despite spending millions of dollars each month on the crisis, it proved incapable of stopping them. The world was horrified as reports emerged of the RUF and its allies using terror as a political weapon. Human Rights Watch documented rebels forcing victims to choose which finger, hand, or arm would be amputated. These amputations were not random acts of battlefield violence. They were deliberate psychological warfare methods designed to terrorize the population, discourage civilians from voting, and to make the country ungovernable. The rebels' message was simple. You don't need hands to vote. Child soldiers became another defining horror of the conflict. Children were abducted, drugged, brutalized, and forced to kill. Some were even ordered to attack their own communities, making it nearly impossible for them to return home after the war. As a result, Executive Outcomes was hired by the military government of Valentine Strasser and entered Sierra Leone during April and May 1995. At the time, Strasser's government was battling RUF forces just outside Freetown. Executive Outcomes quickly stabilized the situation in the eyes of many observers and saved the government from collapse. Executive Outcomes, usually referred to as EO, was a South African private military company founded in 1989 by former South African Defense Force officer Eben Barlow and staffed largely by veterans of the South African Defense Force. The company was later registered in Britain in 1993. Executive Outcomes became one of the most capable private military organizations ever assembled to conduct sustained combat operations. EO mastered the art of combining commercial ventures with paramilitary operations to stabilize regions, restore security, and reduce political instability when allowed to conduct military operations. Its founder Eben Barlow had previously been associated with the Civil Cooperation Bureau, or CCB, an organization with expertise in establishing front companies to circumvent sanctions imposed on apartheid-era South Africa. Following the end of apartheid, Barlow and others redirected many of those organizational skills toward private enterprise. As a result, EO became part of a web-like network of multinational holding companies, mining and oil interests, security firms, and air transportation companies that helped support its operations while obscuring the relationships between its affiliated organizations and personnel. In 1989, EO was approached by South African Defense Force Special Forces to develop special warfare training packages for their operators. The instruction covered subjects such as covert intelligence gathering, counter-espionage, and covert operations. Operatives trained in these disciplines were soon deployed both within and outside South Africa, where they achieved considerable success operationally alongside South African Special Forces. These teams conducted clandestine raids into drug-producing regions, striking drug cartels and their infrastructure with notable success. This style of counter-drug operation later became known as discretionary warfare. Word of EO's professionalism and success quickly spread. Before long, a major South African mining company approached the firm to provide security assistance and training for executives in the mining industry to combat both white-collar crime and the trafficking of high value commodities. Critics charged that EO and its associated companies engaged in what they described as predatory capitalism by extracting mineral and oil resources from troubled or failed states. Many governments that hired the company, however, believed their countries were better off as a result of its services. Within a month of Sierra Leone hiring executive outcomes in May 1995, government forces had regained control of the diamond-rich Tokono district, which produced roughly two-thirds of the country's diamonds. In Angola, oil and diamond-producing regions were among the first areas secured by government forces trained by executive outcomes. The company also reportedly mined gold in Uganda, drilled boreholes in Ethiopia, and maintained business interests in several other countries. EO drew much of its manpower from former South African Defense Force Special Operations Troops, reconnaissance and counter-insurgency veterans who had served in Angola, Namibia, and other regional conflicts. It also recruited experienced soldiers from several other countries, making it a truly international force. EO brought the full range of modern battlefield capabilities, including Mi-17 transport helicopters, Mi-24 Hind gunships, BMP-1 armored vehicles, mortars, light artillery, and highly mobile infantry teams. It also relied heavily on local scouts and militia intelligence while specializing in rapid helicopter-borne assaults. EO's method was simple but devastating for the RUF. It located concentrations of rebel forces, struck them from the air, then inserted or advanced ground forces to finish the job. The RUF was accustomed to ambushes, hit-and-run raids, and disappearing into the bush. EO forced the rebels into conventional engagements they did not want to fight, trapping them in isolated pockets where they could be systematically destroyed. EO's first major objective was to halt the RUF advance toward Freetown. Within roughly 10 days of arriving in May, 1995, EO reportedly used coordinated helicopter gunship strikes supported by a small infantry force to relieve pressure on the capital and drive RUF forces back into the interior. That marked the first major turning point in the war. Before EO arrived, the government appeared close to collapse. Afterward, the RUF quickly discovered that terrorizing defenseless villagers was far easier than facing disciplined professional soldiers supported by helicopter gunships. EO may have been mercenaries in the traditional sense, but on the battlefield they proved exceptionally effective. The company's second major objective was securing the eastern diamond belt, particularly around Kono and Koidu. These areas were vital because the diamond trade financed the war. Whoever controlled the mines controlled the money needed to recruit fighters and purchase weapons. EO helped clear RUF forces from the diamond fields around Koidu in June 1995, and one account claims the Kono district diamond fields were secured in just two days. That success also fueled controversy because EO's military operations overlapped with mining interests tied to Branch Energy and other affiliated companies. A UN-linked communication noted that Branch Energy, described as an EO affiliate, had been contracted to develop the Koidu diamond mines. EO's final major military objective was reportedly the destruction of an RUF headquarters about 80 kilometers east of Freetown, which it accomplished in December 1995. EO did not fight alone. One of its most effective decisions was to work with the Kamejos, a traditional Mende hunter militia group who knew the terrain and had a strong local motivation to fight the RUF. EO relied on the Kamejos for tracking, local intelligence, guides, logistical support, and jungle warfare expertise. The company viewed them as an effective substitute for the bush trackers South African forces had employed in Namibia because of their exceptional tracking skills and knowledge of the local terrain. EO equipped the Kamejos with ammunition and radio communications and integrated them into air ground offensives against RUF positions. This approach was tactically effective but politically risky. It strengthened the local militias that operated outside the regular national army. While that helped defeat the RUF in the short term, it also created another armed power center in a country already fractured by competing factions. EO also helped secure areas connected to Sierra Rutile and Sir Munkle, two important rutile and bauxite mining operations. By January 1996, executive outcomes had helped both companies resume production. This mattered because Sierra Leone desperately needed export revenue while the government needed cash to survive and to meet its financial obligations, including payments to EO. From a military standpoint, the operation in Sierra Leone had been a clear tactical success. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission later criticized the government's decision to terminate EO's contract prematurely. It concluded that ending the contract opened the door for the RUF to regain strength while also leaving Sierra Leone with financial obligations tied to penalty clauses. EO departed in early 1997 and many civilians who had finally begun to feel safe reportedly fled to neighboring countries after learning the company was leaving, fearing rebel reprisals. Those fears proved well-founded. In May 1997, Johnny Paul Caroma led the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or AFRC in a coup that overthrew President Ahmad Tejan Kaba. The AFRC quickly allied itself with the RUF, plunging the country back into crisis. Executive outcomes had warned Kaba that withdrawing the company prematurely could result in another coup within 100 days. The government was overthrown on May 12, 1997. With EO gone and the use of private military companies increasingly opposed by the United Nations, ECOMOG once again became the principal military force supporting the government. Nigerian-led troops eventually drove the AFRC and RUF from Freetown again, but the conflict was far from over. On October 8, 1997, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1132 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter imposing sanctions and demanding the restoration of Sierra Leone's elected government. The measures had little immediate effect on the fighting. In February 1998, ECOMOG launched another offensive that expelled the junta from Freetown, allowing President Kaba to return to office on March 10. Even so, the RUF continued to rebuild its strength with support from Charles Taylor and Liberia, prompting the United Nations to expand its role in support of the Sierra Leone government. The final blow to the RUF came in 2000, when Britain intervened through Operation Palliser, stabilizing Freetown yet again, evacuating foreign nationals, and helping rebuild the Sierra Leone army. That intervention became one of the decisive turning points of the Even so, it was Executive Outcomes that had first broken the RUF's military momentum several years earlier. By some estimates, EO had killed several thousand rebel fighters, creating the conditions that later made interventions far more successful. Hiring Executive Outcomes was not inexpensive, but compared with later United Nations operations, it was relatively economical. Estimates suggest it cost roughly 25% less than a comparable UN mission, despite the UN's repeated failures in Sierra Leone. And please see our video on leaving the UN. EO ultimately received about $15.7 million from a contract estimated to be worth between $35 million to $60 million. According to one source, the Sierra Leone government accumulated substantial debt, prompting EO to accept delayed payments, including monthly installments of $2 million to cover earlier arrears. Another source estimates that EO's military operations cost approximately $1.5 million per month. The important point is that Sierra Leone could barely afford the company. As a result, EO's compensation became increasingly tied to mining revenues and mineral concessions, leading critics to argue that the war was becoming privatized through access to the country's natural resources. One of the principal criticisms directed at EO involved allegations of human rights abuses during its operations. Many of those accusations originated with the RUF and even Liberian President Charles Taylor. However, following an in-depth investigation that included interviews with local witnesses, EO's record appeared markedly different from that of the RUF and the accusations. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that EO had been effective in combating the RUF and stated that its database contained no recorded allegations of human rights violations committed by any EO personnel. The TRC also noted, however, that civilians were killed when EO helicopter gunships attacked RUF jungle bases between 1995 and 1996. According to the commission, many of those deaths occurred because RUF held villagers hostage and used them as human shields, a fact that the Executive Outcomes air crews on the helicopters were reportedly unaware of during the attacks. The clearest conclusion is that EO was not accused of systematic abuses in the same manner as the RUF or the AFRC. Even so, its operations were not without civilian casualties and innocent people did lose their lives. Executive Outcomes eliminated the RUF threat to Freetown, recaptured strategic diamond-producing regions, restored government control over key mining areas, and helped reopen important export facilities and transportation routes. Through sustained combat operations, EO also forced the RUF toward negotiations, helping set the stage for Sierra Leone's 1996 elections. They accomplished all of this with roughly 160 operators fighting an insurgency estimated at nearly 15,000 fighters. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that EO had been efficient in combating the RUF and had pushed back rebel incursions in less than a year. Despite this remarkable tactical success, Sierra Leone's deeper problems remained unresolved. Executive Outcomes won battles, but it could not eliminate the corruption that had weakened the country long before the Civil War. The National Army remained ineffective, state institutions were still fragile, the diamond economy continued to fuel corruption, and armed militias retained significant influence. Once EO departed, the government lacked the security structure needed to preserve its military gains. It was like hiring a world-class mechanic to repair a failing engine while the owner continued pouring gasoline onto the seats. Executive Outcomes' campaign in Sierra Leone remains one of the clearest examples of a private military company changing the course of a war. The company was small, highly professional, and exceptionally mobile. It defeated the RUF on the battlefield during the 1995 and 1996 period, giving Sierra Leone enough breathing room to hold democratic elections. At the same time, the operation highlighted an uncomfortable reality. A sovereign government had been forced to hire foreign mercenaries, many with ties to mining interests, because its own military could no longer defend the country. EO won the tactical war, but Sierra Leone's political and institutional weaknesses remained. That is why the RUF was able to recover after EO left. Between 1991 and 2002, an estimated 50,000 people were killed during the war, and roughly 2 million were displaced. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, or UNAMSL, became one of the largest peacekeeping operations of its time. The United Nations credits the mission's eventual success to international support, sustained diplomatic pressure, and the determination of the Sierra Leonean people to end the conflict. Critics argue, however, that this assessment gives too little weight to Executive Outcomes' earlier campaign, which had already crippled the RUF and made later interventions far more likely to succeed. The UN also investigated the connection between Sierra Leone's diamond trade and the flow of weapons into the country. In 2001, a UN panel concluded that sanctions on Sierra Leone diamonds and arms were being violated with impunity. The war also helped drive the creation of the Kimberley Process, a certification system designed to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the It made a difference, although the diamond industry was hardly transformed overnight. The war itself ended through a combination of military exhaustion, foreign intervention, United Nations peacekeeping disarmament, and political pressure. By that point, the rebels had lost much of their momentum, Britain had stabilized the government, and UNAMSL had expanded and become more effective, and the people of Sierra Leone desperately wanted peace. Today, UNAMSL is often cited as one of the United Nations' most successful peacekeeping operations. After the war, Sierra Leone established two major accountability mechanisms. The Special Court for Sierra Leone prosecuted many of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, while the Truth and Reconciliation Commission documented the causes of the conflict, recorded human rights abuses, and preserved the testimony of victims. Liberian President Charles Taylor was later charged, arrested, and convicted by the Special Court for Aiding and Abetting Crimes committed in Sierra Leone, largely because of his support for the RUF and the Diamonds for Arms Network. Foday Sanco, the founder of the RUF, died in police custody before his trial could be completed. The Sierra Leone Civil War was not simply tribal violence, an explanation often used to oversimplify the conflict. It grew out of state collapse, corruption, youth desperation, regional instability, and the enormous wealth generated by the diamond trade. Although the RUF portrayed itself as a revolutionary movement, it ultimately operated as a predatory terrorist organization. The civilians paid the price through death, mutilation, displacement, sexual abuse, and the use of child soldiers, and lasting national trauma. Executive Outcomes has always denied that it was fighting simply to gain access to Sierra Leone's diamonds. Even so, EO, Branch Energy, Strategic Resource Corporation, Lifeguard, and other affiliated companies formed a network of interconnected military, security, logistics, and mining interests. Branch Energy acquired gold, diamond, and other mineral concessions in several African countries, including Sierra Leone. Those agreements were reached in part because EO had received less than one-third of its contracted payment, and the government's ability to meet its remaining financial obligations was uncertain. The EO corporate network combined security services with commercial ventures, giving it a competitive advantage in unstable regions. Critics viewed this as the privatization of war, while supporters argued it preserved legitimate mining operations and helped stabilize countries that otherwise faced collapse. That still remains the central controversy. Executive Outcomes unquestionably helped save the Sierra Leone government from military defeat, but its operations were also connected to a broader network of private security and resource companies. EO's departure was tied to the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord, as the RUF demanded the company's withdrawal, naturally. International presence, including the opposition to the use of private military companies, also contributed to the decision. In 1997, the South African government passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act to regulate the activities of private military companies operating from South African territory. Under the new law, organizations such as Executive Outcomes would require government approval before accepting contracts with foreign governments. And please see our video on the corruption and collapse of South Africa. Rather than operate under those restrictions, Executive Outcomes chose to wind down its operations. Many of its personnel and business relationships continued through aligned companies, including Sandline International, which operated outside South African jurisdiction. The exact relationships among these organizations remains difficult to untangle, because they were connected through a complex network of affiliated companies. So, do governments facing collapse have a legal and moral right to hire private military companies to defend themselves? Is that fundamentally different from requesting assistance from the United Nations or a foreign military? Where, if anywhere, should the line be drawn? We let you decide. Thank you for watching this episode of Forgotten History. If you liked what you saw, please click like, share, and subscribe. 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