The Shocking Story of the FBIs Biggest Traitor! - YouTube

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Espionage is often called the world's second oldest profession,
but few have practiced it with such devastating success as Robert Hansen.
While governments rely on spies to gather secrets, some of those insiders turned against their own
country. Hansen wasn't a foreign infiltrator or an ideological radical, he was an insider,
an FBI special agent who sold out the very agency sworn to protect America's secrets.
Robert Hansen was one of the most damaging spies in U.S. history,
a senior FBI agent turned traitor. Hansen sold secrets to the Soviet Union and later Russia
for over two decades, compromising U.S. intelligence operations and putting countless
lives at risk. His betrayal was so deep it prompted an overhaul of American counterintelligence
practices. Who was Robert Hansen? What was his background? What did he do?
Why did he do it? What was the end result? Hello, I'm Colin Heaton, former history professor,
Army and Marine Corps veteran, and welcome to this episode of Forgotten History.
Robert Philip Hansen was born on April 18, 1944 in Chicago, Illinois, and had a domineering father
who was a Chicago police officer. Hansen graduated from William Howard Taft High School in 1962
and attended Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois, graduating with a bachelor of science degree in
chemistry in 1966. Hansen applied to the National Security Agency as a cryptography specialist
after graduation but was turned down due to budget constraints. He then enrolled in dental
school at Northwestern University, but he switched his focus to business after three years.
He married Bernadette Bonny Walk in 1968. Hansen received an MBA in accounting and
information systems in 1971 and took a job with an accounting firm, but after one year he resigned
and joined the Chicago Police Department as an internal affairs investigator specializing in
forensic accounting. In January 1976, Hansen left the Chicago Police to join the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, moving into highly sensitive national security roles as a counterintelligence
and cyber security specialist. Hansen was assigned to the FBI's field office in Gary,
Indiana. In 1978, he and his growing family of three and eventually six children relocated to
New York City. The next year, Hansen was transferred to counterintelligence and given
the task of compiling a database of Soviet intelligence for the FBI. In 1979, Hansen
approached Soviet Military Intelligence, the GRU, on his own initiative. His motive was not ideology.
He was a Catholic and political conservative, but greed, ego, and resentment of being undervalued in
the bureau motivated him. He stopped his spying briefly in early 1981 after his wife allegedly
caught him and made him confess to a priest. The priest advised him to stop and donate the money
he'd received to charity. Hansen agreed, but it didn't last. He restarted his espionage activities
in 1985 and continued until 1991 when he ended communications during the collapse of the Soviet
Union, fearing he would be exposed. But in 1985, Hansen was again transferred to the FBI's field
office in New York City where he continued to work in counterintelligence against the Soviets.
After the transfer, while on a business visit back to Washington, he resumed his espionage career,
this time with the KGB and later a successor, the SVR, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,
after the Soviet Union collapsed and operated under the alias Ramon Garcia. His Soviet handlers
never knew his real name to ensure his security, which allowed him to remain unknown to U.S.
intelligence for two decades. From the U.S. investigation file, Hansen sent an anonymous
letter to the KGB offering his services and asking for $100,000 in cash, equivalent to about $290,000
in 2024. In the letter, he gave the names of three KGB agents secretly working for the FBI,
Boris Yushin, Valery Martynov, and Sergei Moderin. Hansen was unaware that Aldrich
Ames of the CIA had already exposed all three agents earlier that year. Hansen had simply
corroborated the information. Yushin had returned to Moscow in 1982 and had been interrogated by
the KGB because he had lost a concealed camera in the Soviet consulate in San Francisco,
but he was not arrested for espionage until exposed by both Ames and Hansen.
Martynov and Moderin were both recalled to Moscow and arrested, charged, tried,
and convicted of espionage against the Soviet government.
Martynov and Moderin were both executed via gunshot to the back of the head while Yushin
was imprisoned for six years before he was released by a general amnesty granted to
political prisoners and he subsequently emigrated to the United States. Because the FBI blamed
Aldrich Ames and the CIA for the leaks, as he was spying for the Soviets at the same time as Hansen,
both men provided the Soviets with many aspects of the U.S. counterintelligence program.
Following Ames' arrest, the problem was believed to have been solved and Hansen was neither
suspected nor investigated, which gave him a clear field to betray his country without scrutiny.
For his services, the Soviets and later Russian governments gave him over 1.4 million dollars in
cash, bank transfers, Rolex watches, and diamonds. He never met his handlers face-to-face, using
dead drops to communicate. Hansen operated without directly identifying himself and being a
cybersecurity and counterintelligence expert, he knew how to evade surveillance. By that time,
Hansen sold about 6,000 classified documents to the KGB that detailed U.S. and NATO strategies
in the event of nuclear war to include developments in military weapons and technologies.
Hansen also revealed the existence of a top-secret FBI surveillance tunnel under the Soviet embassy
in D.C. and handed over classified surveillance techniques, nuclear war plans, and information on
continuity of government plans, as well as a complete list of American double agents.
For that information, Hansen received a $55,000 payment the following month, in September 1989.
These pieces were falling into place. Both the FBI and CIA realized by the 1990s that there was a
mole somewhere, although they were unsure if it was only one or other agencies, and to which agency
the mole or moles worked in, or both. To make things even worse, CIA mole Aldrich Ames, unknown
to Hansen, also gave information on Dmitry Polyakov, a major general in the Soviet GRU,
who spied for the CIA and the FBI during the Cold War. He was exposed by Ames in 1985,
and later Hansen's information corroborated Ames's report. Polyakov was arrested in 1986
and executed by the KGB in 1988. Ames was officially blamed for giving Polyakov's name to
the Soviets, while Hansen's role in also exposing Polyakov was not revealed until after his 2001
capture. After Ames's arrest in 1994, some of these intelligence breaches remained unsolved,
and the search for another spy continued, and Hansen began taking extra precautions.
However, despite Ames being caught, the situation seemed to get worse in the late 1990s,
and suspicions mounted further, especially after more intelligence assets went dark in Russia.
Hansen, being somewhat paranoid, refused to use the dead drop sites that his handler,
Viktor Cherkashin, suggested, and instead chose his own. He also designated a code to be used when
6 was to be added to the month, day, and time of a designated drop, so that, for example,
a drop scheduled for January 6 at 1 p.m. would be written as July 12 at 7 p.m.
Following the CIA's method of catching Ames, the FBI themselves launched their own top-secret
internal mole hunt. Ironically, Hansen was to investigate any possible penetrations of the FBI
and find the man responsible for exposing Martinov and Motorin. As a result, there was
no progression in this investigation. In 1989, Hansen told the Soviets about the investigation
into U.S. State Department employee Felix Bloch, who was suspected of espionage. Hansen warned of
the KGB that Bloch was being investigated, causing the KGB to end contact with him abruptly.
So, without evidence, Bloch was never charged with a crime, although the State Department
later terminated his employment and denied his pension. Hansen also gave the KGB extensive
information about U.S. planning for Measurement and Signature Intelligence, or MASINT,
using a variety of electronic means, such as radar spy satellites and signal intercepts.
The failure of the Bloch investigation and the FBI's investigation of how the KGB learned that
they were investigating Bloch caused the mole hunt that eventually resulted in Hansen's arrest.
The FBI then divided up various departments, keeping their mole hunt on a need-to-know basis
so that even Hansen himself was unaware of the other tentacles of the investigation.
The FBI paid KGB agent Alexander Shcherbakov $7 million for a file that disclosed Hansen's
fingerprints and a voice recording and audio tape of a July 21, 1986 conversation between Hansen
and KGB agent Alexander Fefalov. The FBI was unsure if the evidence was real or a plant by
the Russians, so they took precautions and set up surveillance and reassigned Hansen to a fake post
with no real access to classified data. Astonishingly, in 1990, Hansen's brother-in-law,
Mark Wolk, also an FBI employee, had suggested that the FBI investigate Hansen because his sister,
Hansen's wife, told him that her sister, Jean Beglis, had found a pile of cash on a dresser
in the Hansen's house. Bonnie had previously told her brother that Hansen once discussed
retiring in communist Poland. Wolk also knew that the FBI was hunting for a mole and spoke
with his supervisor, but nothing was done. After the fall of the USSR in 1991, Hansen,
perhaps unsure if his activities would be exposed or if he would even have his supplemental income,
went to the Russian embassy and offered his services to a GRU agent. He identified himself
as Ramon Garcia, but the agent, not in the previous intelligence loop, did not recognize him
and drove away, fearing a trap. In 1993, Hansen hacked into the computer of a fellow FBI agent,
Ray Mislock, possibly wanting to learn anything about the mole investigation.
He claimed it was to prove the insecurity of the system and he was believed. In 1994, Hansen wanted
a transfer to the new National Counterintelligence Center, but when told that he would have to take
a lie detector test to join, he changed his mind. Earl Edwin Pitts, himself a convicted FBI mole,
told the FBI that he suspected Hansen due to the Mislock computer hack. In fact, Pitts was the
second FBI agent to mention Hansen by name as a possible mole, but again nothing was done.
The FBI and CIA then joined forces in 1994 to find the leak. They created a list of all agents
known to have access to cases that were compromised. The FBI's codename for the suspected spy was
Graysuit. Some promising suspects were cleared and the mole hunt found other penetrations,
such as CIA officer Harold James Nicholson, who was arrested in 1996. However, still Hansen was not
detected, but he was finally suspected. Since Hansen had been due to retire, the FBI acted
quickly in an effort to catch him red-handed. The former Deputy Assistant Director of the
Counterintelligence Division, Deborah Evans Smith, said afterward,
what we wanted to do was get enough evidence to convict him and the ultimate aim was to catch him
in the act. So, to lure Hansen back to FBI headquarters for closer monitoring, he was given
a fake assignment and Hansen began working in his new office, complete with hidden cameras and
microphones, at FBI headquarters in January 2001. Hansen suspected something because he wrote a
which the FBI later recovered, stating that he was placed in a dead-end job. Dropping a friend
off at the airport on February 18, 2001, Hansen drove to Virginia's Foxtone Park, where he placed
a white tape marker on a park sign to signal his Russian contacts to retrieve a package at the
dead drop site. He then followed his usual routine, taking a sealed garbage bag of classified material
and taping it to the bottom side of a wooden footbridge over a creek.
FBI agents watching then rushed in to arrest Hansen, who asked, what took you so long? The FBI
waited two more days to see if any of Hansen's Russian contacts would arrive. No one came and
the United States Justice Department announced Hansen's arrest on February 20. Hansen received
15 life sentences without the possibility of parole after pleading guilty to 14 counts of espionage
and one count of conspiracy to commit espionage, thereby avoiding the death penalty for treason.
He was incarcerated at ADX Florence, a federal supermax penitentiary known for housing other
high-profile inmates like al-Qaeda terrorist Zacharias Moussaoui and Boston Marathon bomber
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Hansen died of colon cancer on June 5, 2023. Hansen operated undetected for
over two decades, shielded by the compartmentalization of US intelligence agencies and
the deep mistrust between them. Neither the FBI nor the CIA could see the full picture, allowing
him to slip through the cracks. But in the end, Hansen had compromised more than 50 top-secret
operations and inflicted damage so severe it took many years to fully assess. His betrayal is still
considered the worst intelligence failure in FBI history, but in exposing those cracks, Hansen
forced the intelligence community to face its deepest vulnerabilities, working together and to
finally start fixing them. Thank you for watching this episode of Forgotten History. If you liked
what you saw, please click like, share, and subscribe. And if you would like to assist with
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