Is Power Quietly Shifting Away From Xi Jinping?

So could there really be an exit deal for Xi Jinping? China's National People's Congress formally removed Zhang Youxia as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Liu Zhenli as a CMC member. Now, after months of uncertainty, the Zhang Liu case has finally moved closer to a procedural conclusion. The process had been stalled for seven months. On the surface, this looked like a major victory for Xi Jinping, but was it? Because Zhang and Liu were not the only people taken down. Also removed in the same announcement were Zhong Shaojun, who was Xi Jinping's longtime aide and former political commissar of the National Defense University. He spent more than 20 years at Xi Jinping's side. He was one of Xi Jinping's most trusted aides. Despite having never worn a uniform, he was parachuted by Xi into the Central Military Commission to manage not only his military reforms, but also the commission's general office, effectively becoming one of Xi's most trusted aides, or one of his most trusted ones in the military. And that is why his downfall matters. There have been many reports of serious tensions between Zhong Shaojun and Zhang Youxia, between these two. Now, according to many accounts circulating outside China for the past couple of years, Zhong Shaojun behaved aggressively toward Xi Jinping because he believed he had Xi Jinping. And at one point, Madam Xi, Peng Yiyuan, was behind him. So there are numerous claims that Zhong Shaojun humiliated Zhang Youxia publicly and infuriated the old general. And that was the beginning of Zhang Youxia's feud with Xi Jinping. Eventually, Zhong Shaojun was transferred out of the CMC's general office and sent to the National Defense University by Zhang Youxia to be its political commissar. Now, some observers saw that was one of the early signs that Xi Jinping has lost control of the military to Zhang Youxia when he failed to protect his loyal aide. When General Zhang was finally taken down, many people expected Zhong Shaojun to return because the logic seemed obvious. If Xi Jinping had defeated Zhang and regained control of the military, then surely he would restore one of his most loyal aides because there aren't many left in the PLA. Instead, the opposite happened. Zhong Shaojun himself has now been taken down. And that makes him a very important political indicator. And there's another strange detail. Now, Zhong appears to have run into trouble as early as last October when he was replaced as political commissar of the National Defense University. So, it was a two-step process. He was first sent to the National Defense University. He was kicked out of the general office of the CMC and he was sent to the Defense University. And then last October, he lost that position as well. But it wasn't clear where he went. So, for months, there were no formal announcements or information regarding his whereabouts. Then suddenly, his case was announced together with Zhang Youxia's. You may wonder why. Why announce them together? Well, I don't think that timing is meaningless. The most commonly accepted interpretation is that after months of fighting at the top, some kind of political bargain was finally reached. Xi Jinping was allowed to finish the Zhang Youxia case. But at the same time, one of his own closest loyalists had to go. In other words, Xi Jinping got Zhang Youxia, but he could not save Zhong Shaojun. So, that's why these two men were announced. They were both removed in the same announcement. Therefore, Zhang Youxia's removal is not proof that Xi Jinping has completely regained control of the military. It may actually show something much more complicated. Because at almost the same time, another interesting personnel move took place much closer to Xi Jinping himself. And that brings us to this man. His name is Kong Shaoxun. Until recently, he held two extremely sensitive positions. He was a deputy director of the CCP Central Committee General Office, and at the same time, director of its Secretariat Bureau. Then at the end of August, he was suddenly transferred out of Beijing and sent to Gansu as its deputy provincial party secretary. Now, Kong Shaoxun was not well known to the general public until 2022 at the closing ceremony of the CCP's 20th Party Congress. So, Kong Shaoxun was the key official seen here in this picture, responding to Xi Jinping's instructions to escort former CCP leader Hu Jintao out of the podium or out of the hall. That extraordinary scene made Kong Shaoxun famous overnight. Whatever exactly happened that day, it demonstrated one thing very clearly. At one of the most sensitive political moments imaginable in Beijing, Kong was someone inside Xi Jinping's immediate administrative system, trusted to carry out a delicate task right beside him. That is why his transfer matters. The Central Committee General Office is not just any administrative department. It is one of the most important nerve centers of the entire CCP system. It controls the flow of information into the top leadership. It coordinates top-level documents and meetings. Inside the General Office, the Secretariat Bureau is even more sensitive. It handles the circulation of top-level documents, prepares materials for Politburo meetings, coordinates leadership schedules, and manages internal communications across the top of the system. So, when someone in both deputy director of the General Office and head of the Secretariat Bureau changes hands, it means the person sits extremely close to the center of CCP's political power has changed. And this guy, Kong Shaoxun, has just been moved out. Now the timing makes the move even more interesting. The fifth plenum is approaching. This is expected to be an extremely important meeting, potentially shaping personnel arrangements heading toward next year's party congress. One of the highly anticipated agendas of the meeting is the succession plan. And the detailed organization of such an important meeting falls heavily on the General Office and the Secretariat Bureau. Now, Cai Qi may formally sit at the top of the General Office because he is the director of the General Office. But he doesn't, I mean, Cai Qi has many titles, many hats to wear. He doesn't actually do the work. Much of the actual work is handled by the deputy director. So, Kong was one of the most important people involved in that. Then, only weeks before the fifth plenum, he was suddenly sent to Gansu, far away from Beijing. What does that mean? Was this simply a normal rotation? Or was someone quietly removing a trusted Xi Jinping official from the center of power at an extremely sensitive moment? Well, it's hard to say at this point, but there's a very simple way to judge it. Watch who replaces him. And that brings us to Jin Shanwen. There are rumors circulating that Jin Shanwen will be the one moving into the General Office of the Central Committee to replace him. And if Jin really does move into the General Office, then this personnel change becomes politically interesting, because Jin's career background is very different. Most of his career was spent inside the trade unions. It's called All-China Federation of Trade Unions. And during those years, he worked under several senior leaders associated with the pre-Xi Jinping political establishment, including Wang Zhaoguo, who was a very powerful figure going way back when, and then Li Jianguo, and then Wang Dongming. Now, these names aren't familiar with you. You probably have not heard about them. That's fine. But if I tell you who they are closely tied to, you'll recognize the names immediately. Those three names are closely tied to these three men, Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan, and Wen Jiabao, three heavyweights of the reformist faction. Because of those connections, Mr. Jin is perceived as someone with stronger links to the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao era political network than to the Xi Jinping's traditional inner circle. The appointment itself, if it happens, would be worth watching closely, because then the story would no longer be that Kong Shaoxin got a provincial promotion. It would become a trusted official from Xi Jinping's general office was removed out just before the fifth plenum, and someone from the reformist political network moved in. And now we have to ask whether those people around Xi Jinping are also beginning to move, because the next case is even stranger. One of Xi Jinping's oldest economic allies has simply disappeared for more than two weeks from public view. So now let's move to this guy. Yes, He Lifeng. Now, Xi Jinping returned to Beijing on the morning of September the 3rd. Xinhua listed three people accompanying him on the trip. His wife, Peng Liyuan, Cai Qi, his chief of staff, and Wang Yi, his foreign minister, but not He Lifeng. And think about what this trip involved. The SCO summit, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, major infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, investment deals, China's economic relationship with Central Asia and the Middle East. In other words, money was everywhere. Yet the man overseeing some of the most important parts of China's economic and financial system was nowhere to be seen. He Lifeng's last confirmed public appearance was on August the 19th, when he met with a Chilean foreign minister. After that, nothing. By September the 5th, he had been out of public view for 17 days. Now, a 17-day absence by itself proves nothing. Maybe he was not feeling well. Maybe he had other things to take care. But he is not an ordinary vice premier. He is a Politburo member. He's one of Xi Jinping's oldest political allies. And he's one of Beijing's most important officials in economic negotiations with the United States. And that makes another absence even harder to ignore. At the end of August, G20 finance ministers gathered in North Carolina. Scott Besant was there, but He Lifeng was not. That is notable because He Lifeng is arguably the most important Chinese official dealing directly with Scott Besant on the economic relationship. So naturally, people began asking, where is He Lifeng? And there's another piece of the story. Five days before his last public appearance, Chinese authorities announced an investigation into a senior official who is tied to He Lifeng. His name is Chen Xiaobo. I have a picture of him. Chen had worked within the NDRC system, National Development and Reform Commission. So he had worked within the NDRC system under He Lifeng for nearly six years, including his final year as one of the commission's deputy secretary general, while He Lifeng was the chairman of the commission. The official announcement said Chen had voluntarily surrendered. Interesting wording. There's no public evidence proving that Chen has implicated He Lifeng. That's important. But the timing immediately attracted attention. August the 14th, Chen's investigation was announced. Five days later, He Lifeng made his last confirmed public appearance. And then he disappeared from view. Now in CCP politics, a sequence like this attracts attention. That's because the CCP has a long established tactic of going after an official's inner circle before moving against himself, the official himself. And there's an expression called Jianquanbian. It's a political slang in China, meaning trimming the edges of the skirt. So what it means is first you cut away the people around the target, then you move toward the target. While some people around Xi Jinping seem to be losing ground, one other figure appears to be moving in the opposite direction. And that brings us to the man who is considered one of the three possible candidates to succeed Xi. On August 31st, Xi Jinping met with Vladimir Putin during the SCO summit. The meeting was highly political. Xi Jinping spoke about the strategic relationship, the international order, and the future of the SCO. Putin pushed for more practical cooperation, especially in energy, but no major commercial energy deal was announced. Then just two days later, something unusual happened. Ding Xuexiang, Politburo Standing Committee member and Executive Vice Premier, arrived in Russia in Vladivostok. And that evening, Vladimir Putin personally met with him. The next day, Ding co-chaired the China-Russia Investment Cooperation Committee and participated in major energy discussions. The details of those negotiations are not really the point. The politics are. Because Xi Jinping had just met Putin, and within 48 hours, Putin was sitting down separately with Ding Xuexiang. Usually, Xi Jinping sets the political direction and meets with his counterpart. Then officials like Ding Xuexiang follow up with Putin's subordinates. They turn that direction into actual discussions or negotiations involving investment, energy, pricing, long-term strategic commitments. But in this case, Putin negotiates with Ding 48 hours after meeting Xi Jinping. Why couldn't Xi Jinping directly talk with Putin about those issues when they met? That is what makes Ding Xuexiang's meeting with Putin interesting. That tells us something about the authority Ding Xuexiang is carrying now. Or look at it from another perspective. Perhaps Xi Jinping's real power in international affairs is now a little questionable. So people ask, is Ding Xuexiang being tested for something bigger? The key question is not just, why did Ding Xuexiang go to Russia? It is, how much authority did Beijing allow Ding Xuexiang to carry with him when he went to meet with Putin? And why? Why was he given that responsibility or authority? Because there's a big difference between representing Xi Jinping and being trusted to make decisions in Xi Jinping's place. So when we put all these four developments together, the picture becomes very interesting. Zhang Youxia is formally out, but so is Xi Jinping's loyalist, Zhong Shaojun. A key Xi Jinping associate has been moved out of the general office and possibly replaced by someone from the opposing faction at a critical time, right before the fifth plenum. Then He Lifeng, the economic czar, has disappeared from public view after one of his old associates has, quote unquote, confessed. And Ding Xuexiang is suddenly being given more assignment on the international stage. Taken together, they raise a much bigger question. Are we watching a routine reshuffle around Xi Jinping, or are these the early signs of a much larger redistribution of power?