Soviet scientists who defected to the US later admitted their government signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 — then secretly built a massive bioweapons arsenal anyway.
Annie Jacobsen is the Pulitzer Prize finalist and bestselling author who interviewed the defectors who exposed it.
We cover: - Why Nixon unilaterally destroyed the US bioweapons arsenal in 1969 - What Soviet defectors said motivated Russia to cheat on the treaty it signed - The chilling story a Soviet scientist told about being asked if Ebola on a steering wheel would kill a target - Why Jacobsen believes mistrust between nations is more dangerous than the weapons themselves.
Everybody in the business of preventing biological warfare knows whatever they build can also escape the lab.
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This discussion explores the history of biological weapons, focusing on the Soviet Union's clandestine program despite the Biological Weapons Convention. It examines the psychological drivers of such programs—namely paranoia and mistrust—and contrasts the total annihilation of nuclear war with the targeted, yet unpredictable, dangers of biological agents and lab leaks.
Many people don't realize that once upon a time,
biological weapons were legal.
They were legal in the United States,
meaning they weren't illegal.
And the United States was building a massive arsenal
of biological weapons.
This is on the record known work,
primarily at Fort Detrick in Maryland,
but also at several other places around the country.
And starting in 1969,
President Nixon just sort of mysteriously,
there's air quotes around that,
decided to give up the biological weapons arsenal.
You know, he talked about them being repugnant
to the conscience of mankind.
And the treaty as a result,
the Biological Weapons Convention Treaty,
which is also known as the BWC,
that was signed by all these nations starting in 1972,
including Russia.
And the reason why I choose Siberia, Russia,
as the lab leak, the vector lab,
is because there's historical precedent
of Russia absolutely kind of crossing its fingers
behind its back.
As they signed this treaty,
they began by their own admittance of their scientists
that defected to the United States,
they began a colossal biological weapons program.
And so when everyone else like the United States
was destroying its arsenals,
the Soviets were not only not destroying theirs,
but they were building new weapons
using recombinant DNA technology
that they, in essence, stole from Burt.
What do you think is their motivation?
I mean, they have more nuclear weapons
than they did for a long time.
The missile gap was closed in the 60s.
What would be their motive?
I mean, play armchair psychologist for a moment.
What is their rationale?
I could see a rogue state wanting to do it
because it's a poor, you know,
crazy warlord's version of a nuke,
but why would they do it?
Well, I don't have to play armchair speculator
because it's on the record
because a number of the Soviet biological weapons engineers
defected to the United States in the 1990s.
And they came here and they told us what they were doing.
And they told us why they were doing it.
And the reason was twofold.
One, they were told by their powers that be,
their military minders,
that of course the United States was cheating on the treaty.
Of course they were making biological weapons.
That was the one, which, you know,
historically is not true.
As far as I know, that is not true.
As far as I know,
we really did spend 214 weeks destroying our arsenal.
They were told that.
And then the second point is that they were told,
listen, America, the West hates the Soviet Union so much
they will do anything to annihilate us.
And so we have to do anything to annihilate them.
You know, lie, cheat, steal, kill, et cetera, et cetera.
And those two really disquieting concepts
underpin the whole narrative.
You know, this idea of paranoia,
this idea of you cannot trust anyone.
So if there's any sort of, you know,
ballast to that that I think the book offers,
it's to try and really have people reconsider
how dangerous mistrust and paranoia are,
both as in an individual and in a nation.
Do you feel somewhat paradoxically more hopeful now
that no nukes have been exchanged
in this current conflict in the Ukraine?
Or do you feel even that we're still on this razor's edge?
Well, certainly it's like a profoundly great thing
that no one has been crazy enough to use a nuclear weapon.
And Russia often threatens tactical nuclear weapons,
which they have in their arsenal.
We do not, right?
And we do not for a reason,
because they would be too easy to use.
But, you know, I make it really clear in nuclear war
that from my experience and my understanding
and everything I have learned about it
is that everybody in the business
of preventing nuclear war knows
that if nuclear war begins, it only ends in one way,
which is total annihilation.
And so I would say you can't use nuclear weapons.
So is it a good thing?
Of course it is.
And does it make you wince every time, you know,
Putin or Lavrov or somebody suggests
that they might be used?
I mean, I just, you know, hold my breath.
Bio is very different.
It's, and again, that idea of an accident,
an incident, a lab leak.
So not far from this campus is Illumina Genomics,
great many Nobel laureates, including, you know,
hopefully future guests, Frances Arnold from Caltech.
Hopefully she'll be, she's a board member.
And there's sort of the industrial version
or the professional version of 23andMe,
which recently went through bankruptcy,
then emerged, and there was a great concern
that, you know, people's DNA would be used against them
to tailor, you know, handcrafted bioweapons.
Is that scenario doesn't take place here per se,
but that came to me sort of, you know,
that you could basically have a much better weapon.
If you could tailor it, you know,
Putin happened to spit in a cup someday
and, you know, Zelensky wants to get him out,
they could just take him out by having some pathogen
that could get to him.
Are there more, less, you know, catastrophically,
you know, world-ending scenarios
where bioweapons could be more humane, you know,
that they could be targeted to just specific incidents
and that could be viewed as a proper tactic of war?
Or are they always and for all time
to be never used in any scenario?
I think of that more in the category
of targeted assassination,
which is something I wrote about in another book
about the CIA's paramilitary called Surprise Kill Vanish.
And people have been targeting and killing one another
with poisons, with toxins since time immemorial.
So, you know, and there's actually an interesting anecdote
from one of the Soviet defector scientists
where he talks about,
and this is like back in like, let's say the late,
probably the early 80s,
where he talks about someone from the Politburo
coming into his office.
The person I'm referring to, his name is Ken Allebeck.
And he kind of famously wrote a book called Biohazard.
I think he published right around the millennium.
And he tells the story in that book
and I'm repeating it, paraphrasing it,
which is that Politburo guy comes in and says like,
hey, if we wanted to, like, let's just say hypothetically,
there was somebody I wanted to get rid of.
And if we were to put Ebola, let's say on his steering wheel,
would he get it and die?
You know, I mean, it was literally that specific
and I'm pretty sure the pathogen was Ebola.
And then you can read the book and see, you know,
Allebeck's reaction.
And it's like, yes, it would kill him,
but it would probably kill a bunch of other people.
And so though, I think what you're speaking to
is very interesting in terms of science
and computational science and where we are today
and realizing you can do it.
The answer is yes.
Any question you ask me, yes.
Can we target, fill in the blank, yes, yes, yes, yes.
All of this can be done.
This is a major concern of everybody working in the business
of preventing biological warfare.
And even scarier is, you know,
whatever it is that they're working on
can also escape from the lab.
Yeah.