Xi Promotes 2 Generals, Has Xi Lost the PLA? His Closest Ally Purged Due to Zhang Youxia

Chen Xi, once regarded as the strategic mastermind at Xi Jinping's side, has now unexpectedly become the target of an investigation by the CCD, accused of direct involvement in the explosive Zhang Youxia case. As he reportedly responds to every question with, I don't know, a behind-the-scenes power struggle between Chen Xi and Cai Qi is beginning to surface. The key question is, who will ultimately be held responsible? Meanwhile, another rumor is stirring intense speculation. Hospital 301, long considered the premier medical facility for China's top leadership, is reportedly tightening limits on hospital stays. Could it be that Beijing's coffers have been drained to the point where the government can no longer afford to provide the same level of care for the very officials who once stood at Is the upper class of the Chinese Communist Party, CCP, truly beginning to crack? Chen Xi reportedly faces CCDI investigation in Zhang Youxia case. According to a recent report by Secret China, a longtime independent media commentator who closely follows Chinese politics, has revealed that Chen Xi has officially come under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, CCDI. The source claims that the decision to investigate Chen Xi was made by the Communist Party's central decision-making body and has received backing from the so-called Red Hair Faction within the Chinese Communist Party, CCP. According to the source, the Red Hair Faction consists of left-wing elements within the CCP, along with veteran officials such as former Politburo Standing Committee member Zeng Qinghong. They are described as being far-left politically, but far-right economically. The source further alleges that the primary focus of the investigation is the case involving Zhang Youxia. Earlier reports had claimed that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were detained at the Central Party School. As the school's president at the time, Chen Xi, the source argues, could not possibly have been unaware of what had taken place. The source also alleges that the official overseeing the investigation is Liu Jingguo, first deputy secretary of the CCDI. According to the source, Chen Xi is still clinging to a sliver of hope and has launched what is described as his last stand, believing that Xi Jinping might still step in to save him. As a result, Chen has reportedly denied everything, responding to every question by saying that he knows nothing. He has even claimed that on the day of the alleged incident involving Zhang Youxia, security inside the Central Party School was the responsibility of the Central Guard Bureau, which falls under Cai Qi. Security outside the campus was handled by the Ministry of Public Security, led by Wang Xiaohong. Chen Xi insists that Zhang Youxia's alleged detention had nothing to do with him and that he was completely unaware of what happened. As president of the Central Party School, he says his role was merely to provide the venue where the events took place. The implication, according to the source, is that Chen is attempting to shift responsibility onto Cai Qi. Meanwhile, Liu Jingguo is also said to have questioned Cai Qi directly. According to the source, Cai Qi's response was straightforward. First, he reportedly argued that the Zhang Youxia case Because of the gravity of the accusations, he said, the matter fell outside the jurisdiction of both the CCDI and the military's disciplinary commission. Instead, he claimed it was a decision made by the Politburo Standing Committee and carried out directly by the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. Second, Cai reportedly stated that the Politburo Standing Committee had convened, approved Zhang Youxia's detention, and that Xi Jinping personally authorized the decision. However, despite Cai Qi's firm stance, the source claims that he has been unable to produce any Politburo Standing Committee resolution bearing Xi Jinping's signature authorizing an investigation into Zhang Youxia. More recently, another claim has surfaced alleging that Li Xi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the CCDI, acknowledged internally within the party that no Politburo Standing Committee meeting had ever been held to discuss investigating Zhang Youxia before the alleged detentions of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Why is the anti-Xi camp targeting Chen Xi first? According to SecretChina, the anti-Xi Jinping faction is targeting Chen Xi first not only because he was one of Xi's closest confidants and most trusted advisors, but also because he is considered the easiest figure to investigate. The reasoning is straightforward. Cai Qi is a Politburo Standing Committee member while Wang Xiaohong sits on the Politburo. Bringing down either of them would require a far more comprehensive investigation and much stronger evidence. After the 20th CCP National Congress, Chen Xi stepped down as a Politburo member and central secretariat secretary on October 23, 2022. In April 2023, he also left his post as head of the Central Organization Department, becoming president of the Central Party School as an ordinary party member. Once he left that position, he no longer held any senior official rank. For that reason, Chen Xi is reportedly viewed as the most practical point of entry for investigating Xi's so-called Fujian faction and reopening the Zhang Youxia case. Political commentator Tang Jingyuan argued in a recent program that, if these reports are accurate, they suggest Xi Jinping had carefully laid a trap for Zhang Youxia, including accusing him of leaking nuclear secrets to the United States. According to Tang, only a charge of that magnitude could justify bypassing the jurisdiction of both the CCDI and the military's disciplinary commission, allowing the general office of the CCP Central Committee to take direct control of the case and keeping party disciplinary bodies away from the investigation. He believes the objective was to ensure that the cases against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli remained firmly under Xi's control until they could be turned into what Chinese authorities call an ironclad case. Tang also argued that Xi was unlikely to have devised such a strategy on his own, and that Chen Xi may have played a key role in designing it. Tang further contended that the longer Chen Xi remains standing, the longer Xi's faction can hold out. Whether Zhang Youxia is still alive or not, he believes Xi's rivals will ultimately seek to hold Tai Chi, Wang Xiaohong, and Chen Xi accountable. In his view, Chen Xi and Wang Xiaohong are unlikely to escape unscathed. As for Cai Qi, Tang argued that his position as a Politburo Standing Committee member affords him some protection under the party's unwritten rule against criminally prosecuting sitting or former Standing Committee members. Instead, pressure could be directed at his son. Following the recent crash of a light aircraft into the China Zoom Tower, Tang speculated that Cai Urban, Cai Qi's son and executive deputy director of the Low Altitude Economy Bureau under the National Development and Reform Commission, could become a pressure point for Xi's opponents in their efforts to target Cai Qi. Xi Jinping personally promotes two generals to the rank of general. On the morning of July 3, a ceremony to confer the rank of general, Shang Jiang, was presided over by Zhang Shengmin, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, CMC, of the Chinese Communist Party, CCP. During the ceremony, Xi Jinping awarded the rank of general to Zhang Shuguang, secretary of the CMC's Discipline Inspection Commission and director of its Supervisory Commission, and Wang Gang, commander of the People's Liberation Army Air Force. Zhang Shuguang, 62, has spent much of his career in the military's disciplinary inspection system and is said to have close ties to Zhang Shengmin. He previously served as secretary of the Air Force Discipline Inspection Commission under the Northern Theater Command before becoming secretary of the Army Discipline Inspection Commission. His appointment as secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, together with his promotion to general, leaves him just one step away from becoming a member of the CMC. Wang Gang, 61, began his career as an aerobatic pilot. He later served as commander of the PLA Air Force's 1st Air Division before holding a senior posts, including director of the Air Force Training Bureau, chief of staff of the Central Theater Command Air Force, and deputy commander of the Central Theater Command Air Force. He has now formally assumed the role of Air Force commander and has been promoted to the rank of general. According to circulating rumors, Xi Jinping has personally promoted 81 officers to the rank of general during his tenure. However, counting those who have officially fallen from power, those who have disappeared from public view, and other reported cases, more than 40 of those generals have reportedly encountered serious political setbacks. An even more striking rumor claims that at least 57 PLA generals promoted under Xi have ultimately been purged. Against that backdrop, the promotions of Zhang Shuguang and Wang Gang are being interpreted by some observers as Xi's latest effort to patch up his military authority and fill what they describe as major gaps in his control over the armed forces. Political commentator Jiang Feng, however, offers a different interpretation, calling the ceremony little more than political theater. Liu Yuan is now effectively handling the day-to-day responsibilities of the CMC chairman and works out of the chairman's office in the Baiyi building, the CMC headquarters. In public appearances over the past year, Liu Yuan has consistently been seen wearing military uniform. Since anyone working inside the Baiyi building is expected to wear uniform, why would a retired officer regularly appear there unless he was actively performing official duties? Xi Jinping may still be the one formally conferring military ranks, but he is merely carrying out decisions made by others. By the time the promotion ceremony takes place, the real decisions have already been made. Xi's role is reduced to reading the order, shaking hands with the recipients, and posing for commemorative photographs. Jiang contends that Xi remains on stage because he is still, at least nominally, the chairman of the Central Military Commission. That title continues to serve an important symbolic purpose. Publicly removing Xi would amount to calling into question the legitimacy of the party itself. By preserving Xi's public image and retaining his signature on official documents, the CCP can project an appearance of institutional continuity. In this interpretation, the promotion ceremony serves precisely that purpose, using Xi's own hand to formally elevate officials whose appointments had already been decided by others. Are senior officials being forced to leave hospital 301? While internal turmoil has yet to subside, a new rumor has begun circulating outside the system that long-term patients in the senior officials ward at hospital 301 will soon face strict limits on how long they can stay, with a maximum hospitalization period of just three months. So far, there has been no official public document confirming this claim, so it should be treated as an unverified report rather than established fact. Still, why has this rumor gained so much attention? Why does it seem plausible even without official confirmation? One reason is that many observers believe China's financial situation is under increasing strain. From the very beginning, hospital 301 was never intended to be an ordinary hospital. It was established as a major medical institution and eventually became one of China's leading hospitals. But its creation also served a clear political purpose. Senior military officers, top central leaders with military backgrounds, and other politically important figures no longer wanted to wait in line alongside ordinary citizens for medical treatment. Over time, one of hospital 301's most well-known buildings became the South Building, often referred to as the Senior Officials Building. It was far more than just a hospital ward. It functioned as a convalescent center for China's political elite and, for many of the Communist Party's veteran leaders, the final stop in life. Those admitted there often received extraordinary levels of care. Medical specialists were not simply doctors. They became part of the political support system. Nurses were not only caregivers. They also formed part of the security apparatus. Treatment plans were not based solely on medical judgment but were also shaped by organizational and political considerations. According to commentator Jiang Feng, China's top Communist Party leadership has always had a complicated relationship with hospital 301. On one hand, they depend on it because it offers the country's best medical resources, the strictest security, and the fastest emergency care. On the other hand, they fear it. The higher someone rises within the political system, the more they understand that their life is not entirely in the hands of medicine. In Jiang Feng's view, this is the tragedy of rulers who reject religious belief. Once political power can no longer promise longevity or immortality, they begin to fear everyone who comes close to their bodies. So where does hospital 301's funding actually come from? As a military hospital, its basic operating budget comes through the military logistics system and is tied to China's national defense budget. Every year, the state allocates substantial funding to it under defense spending. However, hospital 301 does much more than treat military personnel. It also provides health care for China's top leaders and senior officials through a special medical benefits system reserved for the country's political leadership. Officially, the Chinese Communist Party refers to party and state leaders, a designation covering only 21 categories of positions across certain government institutions. At present, roughly 71 people occupy these 102 official posts, including both serving and retired leaders who are still living. If retired provincial and ministerial level officials are included, the total number of people covered is estimated to be fewer than 1,000. According to figures that were published more than 20 years ago by the China Youth Daily, annual health care spending for this group totaled about 16.4 billion yuan, averaging nearly 20 million yuan per person each year. Those figures have not been republished since. The same report claimed that approximately 8.5 million party officials accounted for more than 80% of the government's total health care spending, receiving an average of around 200,000 yuan per person annually. By contrast, the remaining population of more than 1 billion people received an average of only 400 yuan per person. Critics argue that despite this disparity, the Chinese Communist Party has continued to reduce benefits available through the public health insurance system. From this perspective, if the rumors about Hospital 301 limiting long-term stays for senior officials prove to be true, some commentators see them as a sign that China's fiscal pressures have entered a new phase, one in which even the core of the political elite is beginning to compete over increasingly limited resources. What do you think? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thanks for watching and see you next time.