Xi Cornered by CCP Elders? Li Keqiang’s Death Explodes in Douyin! Song Ping Left a Secret Letter?

Recently, Jong-nan-hi has sent out two signals. One was hidden in a leaked personnel record involving the Politburo Standing Committee. The other was buried in official coverage of Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea. The first signal, five ministerial-level positions were reshuffled. The Jaejong faction gained two seats, while the Fujian faction was forced to give ground. Wei Xiaodong, a close ally of Kai Qi, has just fallen from power, There is also one assessment that has left many observers holding their breath. By 2027, Xi Jinping is expected to hand over power to that person. The second signal, Xinhua CCTV and People's Daily simultaneously released a series of reports on Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang. The praise was all there, word for word. Yet when compared with coverage of the same visit in 2019, six details have been quietly removed, toned down, or erased altogether. And those omissions reveal Xi Jinping's real situation. What do they mean? Are party elders curbing Xi Jinping's power? On June 8-9, Xi Jinping and Peng Liwan paid a state visit to North Korea. As usual, Chinese state media gave the trip extensive coverage. However, when compared with coverage of a similar visit in 2019, commentator Mei Lingshuang identified six unusual discrepancies, all pointing to the same conclusion. First anomaly, the arrival ceremony was largely absent from the coverage. Traditionally, Chinese leaders' overseas visits are accompanied by detailed reporting on the airport welcome ceremony. Weather conditions, welcome banners, handshakes, and motorcade greetings are all carefully documented. That was exactly how Xi's 2019 visit was covered, with footage that was both elaborate and emotionally charged. This time, however, reports of Xi's arrival in Pyongyang were reduced to a brief statement that he received a warm welcome at the airport. Short video clips showed neither Xi and Peng disembarking from the aircraft, nor Kim Jong-un and his wife greeting them in person. It was not that Pyongyang failed to stage a grand reception. It was that Beijing chose not to broadcast it. Second anomaly, Xi's name disappeared from the welcome banners. State media only mentioned the slogan, China-North Korea friendship will remain evergreen. In 2019, however, banners also carried messages such as, Warmly welcome Xi Jinping. Xi's name had been removed from the welcome displays. For a leader as attentive to political symbolism as Kim Jong-un, such an omission would hardly be accidental. He treats every propaganda message as a political statement. So why did Chinese state media avoid reporting it? If Xi still exercised complete control over the propaganda apparatus, such a downgrading of his image would almost certainly never have passed censorship. Third anomaly, Peng Liyuan was once again deliberately downplayed. During the state banquet, Kim Jong-un offered his warmest welcome to Xi Jinping's visit. More notably, he made no mention of Peng Liyuan. Although Xinhua could easily have supplemented the report, it chose to omit her entirely. No separate articles were published about her activities during the trip. Viewed alongside recent developments, including US sanctions on Shandong petrochemical firms, the Ma Xingri case allegedly involving interests linked to Peng's family, and the dismantling of the so-called Shandong First Lady faction, her reduced visibility within the CCP's propaganda system no longer appears coincidental. Fourth anomaly, North Korean officials vanished from the reports. In 2019, Chinese media meticulously listed the senior North Korean officials attending various events, highlighting Pyongyang's political regard for the visit. In 2026, not a single official was named. In diplomatic reporting, deliberately omitting the host country's officials is highly unusual. Naming senior North Korean leaders would normally underscore the importance Pyongyang attached to the visit. Fifth anomaly, coverage of the cultural performance was toned down. In 2019, Chinese media emphasized that the performance had been specially created for Xi's visit and highlighted the participation of tens of thousands of performers. Xi and Peng, together with Kim Jong-un and his wife, even appeared on stage at the finale, producing highly symbolic images. In 2026, however, reports merely noted that the North Korean side performed three CCP Red Songs. There was no mention of the two couples appearing on stage together or taking commemorative photos with North Korean artists. Finally, there was the mystery of the memorial inscription. In 2019, Xi personally read the names of several celebrated war heroes, including Huang Jiguang and Qu Xiaoyun, and expressed his reflections. He also wrote in the memorial guestbook, Remember the Martyrs, Friendship Forever. Chinese state media reported the entire process in meticulous detail. In 2026, by contrast, the visit received only cursory treatment. Reports merely stated that Xi carefully reviewed the roster of Chinese People's Volunteer Army martyrs and discussed related matters with Kim Jong-un. Did he leave an inscription? Did he write anything at all? The reports made no mention of it. These six anomalies point toward a single conclusion. Perhaps it is not Kim Jong-un who is downgrading the diplomatic protocol. Rather, some form of invisible restraint may have emerged within the CCP itself regarding the promotion and glorification of Xi Jinping. Sensitive keywords about Li Keqiang's death spread on Douyin. Former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stepped down in March 2023 after completing a decade as premier and announced his retirement. On August 30th of the same year, he visited the Mogao Caves in Dunhuang, Gansu Province, waving to members of the public. This was his last public appearance before his death. On October 27th, 2023, while resting in Shanghai, Li Keqiang reportedly suffered a sudden heart attack. Despite emergency medical treatment, he passed away at the age of 68. Chinese authorities later announced that the cause of death was a sudden cardiac event. However, because of the political circumstances surrounding his death and lingering questions about his health, speculation emerged that he may have been assassinated. On June 5th this year, users noticed that beneath an otherwise ordinary video on Douyin, a related search suggestion unexpectedly appeared reading, Why did Xi Jinping kill Li Keqiang? Many netizens were shocked by the phrase and quickly took screenshots, which were then shared across overseas social media platforms. Some analysts pointed out that although Douyin heavily censors sensitive content, its related search recommendations are still influenced by the search behavior of large numbers of users. As a result, when enough people repeatedly search for a particular term, the system may automatically include it among its suggested queries. Many online commentators viewed the incident as a noteworthy signal. In their view, public discussion surrounding the cause of Li Keqiang's death has not faded with time but continues to attract significant attention. Alongside the controversial search term, a publicly available video from the first session of the 14th National People's Congress on March 11, 2023, has also been widely discussed. The 12-second clip has been cited by some overseas media outlets, commentators, and independent content creators as symbolic evidence of strained relations between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. The footage shows that after Li Qian was elected premier, he first shook hands with Xi Jinping and then moved toward Li Keqiang, who was seated to Xi's left. As he stood up, Li Keqiang turned his back toward Xi and repositioned himself so that Li Qian could shake his hand from the narrow space on the left side. Xi Jinping initially remained standing but then sat back down. When Xi and Li Keqiang eventually shook hands, they made eye contact only briefly, and both appeared restrained in their expressions. Following Li Keqiang's death, these details have been repeatedly analyzed and interpreted. Some overseas observers argue that the body language reflected subtle tensions during the leadership transition and further fueled long-standing speculation about a rift between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Did Song Ping leave a secret letter complaining about Xi? On March 4, 2026, Song Ping passed away in Beijing at the age of 109. A former member of the CCP's 13th Politburo Standing Committee, he was both the oldest living senior party leader and the longest-serving party member among China's top political figures. Just two months before his death, reports circulating outside China claimed that in early January 2026, Song Ping had sent a letter to Xi Jinping. According to those reports, the letter criticized Xi for imposing increasing restrictions on the personal freedoms and freedom of expression of retired senior officials. Song Ping's longevity was not merely remarkable, it was exceptionally rare. Yet among the CCP's highest-ranking officials, such advanced age is not an isolated phenomenon. Why is that? The reported letter also highlights another reality. A party elder who retired more than 30 years ago could still write directly to China's top leader to discuss major state affairs. This suggests that within the CCP system, retirement and withdrawal from power are two very different things. Maintaining the status of being retired but not removed from influence comes at a cost, and that cost is ultimately borne by taxpayers. How large is the bill? The government has never disclosed it, but commentator Li Mudong attempted to estimate it. First expense, pensions and allowances. For retired officials at the highest state level, basic pensions combined with various allowances reportedly provide an annual income of roughly 300,000 to 420,000 yuan, nearly equivalent to their compensation while in office. Within the CCP system, once someone reaches the very top, they effectively remain under the system's protection until death. Second expense, housing. Even after retirement, top-level officials continue living in villas or secluded residential compounds in central Beijing, typically ranging from 250 to 400 square meters. Many are located near Yuquan Mountain, fragrant hills or areas adjacent to Zhongnanhai. Utilities, property management and maintenance are all covered by the state budget. Conservative estimates place annual maintenance costs alone between 800,000 and 1.5 million yuan per residence. Third expense, special supply privileges. Ordinary citizens buy vegetables at local markets. Retired senior leaders receive food through an entirely different supply system. The CCP established a hierarchical supply system as early as its Yan'an period. After 1949, the special supply system became institutionalized. The core supply bases include Yuquan Mountain Farm and Fragrant Hills Farm in Beijing, which are dedicated to producing, testing and distributing food specifically for national and vice-national leaders. Fourth expense, security protection. Officials at the national leadership level continue receiving round-the-clock security protection after retirement, including close protection teams and outer security details. Standard arrangements reportedly involve four to eight security personnel. In addition, they are provided with dedicated government vehicles, full-time drivers and traffic control privileges during travel. Annual security-related costs are estimated at between 1.5 million and 3 million yuan. These personnel are not private bodyguards. They come from the Central Guard Bureau and other state security agencies. Their salaries, equipment and training costs are funded by taxpayers, even though the individuals they protect no longer hold public office. Fifth expense, and the most expensive, healthcare. Retired state-level leaders enjoy lifetime access to elite medical care. Hospitalization, surgery, medication and medical supplies are fully covered by the state with no spending cap. They may receive consultations from the country's leading medical experts, stay in VIP hospital wards and access the latest high-end medical equipment. For elderly but relatively healthy retirees, annual healthcare costs are estimated at 2 to 4 million yuan. For very elderly individuals or those suffering from serious illnesses, annual expenses can reportedly range from 5 to 10 million yuan, with no upper limit. How vast a system are Chinese taxpayers ultimately supporting? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you for watching and see you next time.