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WHAT IF RUSSIA REJOINS SWIFT?

Unseen Ledger
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760 Video Views·May 15, 2026
00:49 I. NEW YORK’S NEW TAX: TARGETING MILLION-DOLLAR CASH BUYERS
4:56 II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SWIFT SYSTEM AND STRATEGIC TRADE-OFFS IN U.S. MONETARY POLICY
AI Generated·May contain errors
Today's Macro Bulletin focuses on analyzing two structural bottlenecks,
currently reshaping the financial system at both the micro and macro levels.
The first point of departure is a new tax policy aimed at offsetting budget deficits in New York,
reflecting the impasse in maintaining local revenue streams amidst a shift in large-scale
asset transactions. On the global systemic level, the discussion regarding the reconnection
of Russia to the SWIFT network is not merely a matter of sanction concessions.
Rather, it reveals a strategic trade-off by the United States to protect the unique hegemony of
the U.S. Dollar in the face of a national debt approaching the $40 trillion threshold and the
risk of international payment fragmentation. New York new tax trekking million-dollar cash buyers
based on source ZeraHedge. The first notable point in the U.S. domestic financial landscape
is the move to adjust tax policy in New York to deal with a severe budget deficit.
Within just 48 hours after a plan to sharply increase property taxes met with fierce opposition,
leading to warnings of credit rating downgrades from rating agencies,
the administration of Mayor Zoran Mamdani proposed a new revenue collection scheme.
New York lawmakers are currently planning to implement a new tax targeting cash home purchases
valued at $1 million or more. The legislature is also considering expanding the scope of this tax
to all cash home purchases over $1 million statewide, including suburban and upstate regions.
Specifically, the revenue in New York City alone is expected to bring in $160 million
to help fill the budget hole. The proposal stipulates a tax rate equivalent to 1% of
the total transaction value, with the buyer being the party responsible for paying this fee.
Regarding the policy context, a spokesperson for Governor Kathy Hochul stated that she has
announced a general agreement with the state legislature on several key elements of the fiscal
year 2027 budget, in which the final budget bills will provide further specific details.
At the same time, Mayor Mamdani has announced a $124.7 billion budget plan for the fiscal year
beginning July 1, which includes additional support from Albany. Governor Hochul confirmed
the state will transfer $4 billion in new aid to the city to help address the deficit.
Additionally, the administration is calculating revenue from another tax proposal on second homes
valued at over $5 million, although the enforcement mechanism is still under discussion.
New York Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie and State Senator James Skoufis, a member of the Senate
Finance Committee, both confirmed that this new type of tax has been brought to the discussion
table as part of the plan to narrow the budget deficit. Analyzing the transaction mechanism
further, the surge in cash payments is a direct consequence of skyrocketing mortgage costs.
Instead of relying on expensive credit financing, buyers are opting to liquidate other securities
and accepting the payment of capital gains taxes to create liquidity for real estate purchases.
This method also holds great appeal for sellers in a fiercely competitive market like New York City,
thanks to faster processing speeds and reduced risk of deal collapse
compared to the lengthy mortgage approval process. Actual data compiled by the New York City
Neighborhood Network Center shows that all cash transactions accounted for more than 60%
of the nearly 18,000 transactions in New York City during the first six months of 2025.
Particularly in the Manhattan area, 9 out of 10 real estate purchases valued at over
$3 million were conducted entirely in cash between January and June 2025.
From the perspective of experts and market practice, these tax policies are revealing
many structural inconsistencies. The president of the Real Estate Board of New York, James Whelan,
emphasized that New Yorkers are already the highest taxed residents in the country,
and the city's budget problems cannot be solved simply by adding more taxes. He warned that the
new proposal would increase the burden on both buyers and sellers while directly threatening
existing revenue sources. Furthermore, homebuyers in New York are already subject to a mansion tax
ranging from 1% and rising to 3. 9% for homes over $1 million regardless of whether they pay in cash
or with a mortgage. More importantly, the process of generating cash to buy a home usually requires
the elite to liquidate assets such as stocks. This liquidation process is already subject to
very heavy capital gains taxes from both the federal government and the New York state government.
This actual tax amount often far exceeds the 1% cash tax currently being proposed by the
administration, serving as evidence of a policy judged to lack economic logic in solving the
budget puzzle. The Instructure of the SWIFT System and Strategic Tradeoffs in U.S. Monetary Policy
Moving to the global macro lens, sometimes a policy adjustment at the margin can illuminate
the deep structure of the entire system. The proposal regarding the possibility of
reconnecting Russia to the SWIFT payment network is a prime example. The focus here does not lie
in the localized aspect of Russia, but rather reflects the shifting equilibrium between
monetary hegemony, geopolitical leverage, and the resilience of the financial orders centered
around the U.S. dollar. Instead of being just a surface-level sanction calibration, this move is
understood as a strategic reassessment. To what extent can the U.S. use financial exclusion as a
statecraft without accelerating the very process of disintermediation they wish to prevent?
The issue is not limited to SWIFT, but concerns the long-term stability of a system where
currency status, energy flows, national debt, and geopolitical alliances are tightly interwoven.
Delving into the operational mechanism—bringing Russia back into SWIFT integration—is not merely
a technical change in infrastructure. Formally, SWIFT itself is only a messaging network,
not a transaction interface or a settlement platform. However, in practice, access to SWIFT
is deeply embedded in a broader institutional structure, including correspondent banking
systems, USD clearing, and Western financial intermediaries. This is the lifeblood system
that reinforces the global reach of the U.S. dollar. Reconnection does not only signal a
loosening of sanctions, but is also a calibration of how the U.S. manages the boundary between
inclusion and exclusion. It demonstrates an acknowledgment that maintaining continuous
exclusion will create significant general equilibrium effects, especially as it
encourages rival and non-aligned nations to develop parallel payment channels.
This is the essence of the de-dollarization phenomenon. Assessing strategic positioning
monetary policy is entirely inseparable from geopolitics. The U.S. dollar continues to
its role as the dominant reserve, pricing, funding, and settlement currency globally,
despite narratives and efforts to replace it. This dominant position provides measurable
advantages—a deep and highly liquid treasury market, constant structural demand for USD-denominated
assets, and lower national funding costs compared to normal conditions. This provides the U.S.,
with a margin of fiscal and financial freedom that other nations do not possess.
Therefore, protecting this structure is a central pillar of U.S. strategic policy,
not a secondary objective. Continuing the analysis of the reality of alternative systems,
the possibility of Russia being reconnected shows that alternatives to the USD system remain
underdeveloped. The BRICS-BLOX currency project has not moved beyond the boundaries of ambitious
declarations. Establishing a credible reserve asset requires not only scale but also
institutional credibility, including the predictability of the rule of law, capital
mobility, transparency, and the absence of arbitrary interference. Both China and Russia
currently fail to meet these conditions. China's central bank digital currency may provide a
transaction bypass mechanism, but as a store of value, it remains limited by capital controls
and political risk. The core issue is credibility, as reserve status ultimately rests on trust in
the issuer's ability to protect value in the face of crisis. Nonetheless, this move itself
does not entirely bring stability. The discretionary nature of sanctions, including calculation,
imposition, enforcement, and potential reversal, has eroded the perception of neutrality that was
the historical foundation for the expansion of the USD system. Market participants and nations
will realize that access to USD infrastructure is conditional rather than guaranteed.
This realization increases the expected value of building redundant systems. Even in the absence
of a formal alternative reserve currency, the momentum for diversifying settlement mechanisms
through bilateral clearing, yuan pricing, gold accumulation, or regional payment systems remains
intact. From this, a structural tension emerges clearly. A completely closed system maximizes
coercive power but accelerates the search for alternatives. Conversely, a conditionally open
system preserves network effects but weakens the power of the threat of exclusion. Reconnecting
Russia could slow the pace of de-dollarization at the margin by reaffirming the indispensability
of the system, even as it reinforces the logic of diversification. This is not a concession to
Moscow, but a tacit admission that the power of the USD system stems as much from its utility value
as from its capacity for coercive enforcement. Considering the correlation with the energy
market, Russia plays a pivotal role as a major exporter of hydrocarbons, fertilizers, and
industrial raw materials, directly linked to the core of global trade payments. The commodity market
is still overwhelmingly priced in USD, and the operation of this market depends on a financial
architecture capable of supporting large-scale, rapid cross-border transactions with minimal
friction. Allowing Russian energy flows to operate with fewer barriers has immediate macroeconomic
implications, creating downward pressure on energy prices and mitigating volatility.
More importantly, this reaffirms the central role of the U.S. dollar in sectors that demand
high transaction scale, liquidity, and reliability. In this configuration, Europe's position is
relatively weakened. Prior to the application of sanctions, Russian energy trade contributed
to euro-denominated payment flows, strengthening the international role of that currency. Severing
those links has imposed higher energy costs, eroded industrial competitiveness, and dampened
the prospects of the euro as a challenger to the U.S. dollar. Ultimately, a reserve currency needs
a solid underlying economic foundation, competitive industries, and deep capital markets, and Europe's
current trajectory is complicating that proposition. For BRICS and advocates of currency diversification,
the takeaway is not that the U.S. dollar is on the verge of immediate decline, but that it is
simultaneously dominant yet challengeable. The advantages of the U.S. dollar are real,
but the motivation to minimize exposure to its political risk aspects is also entirely present.
The most likely outcome is not comprehensive replacement but fragmentation, a gradual
increase in non-U.S. dollar settlements, greater reliance on regional mechanisms, and the gradual
diversification of reserve baskets, with gold as a top priority. These adjustments do not need to
be dramatic to produce powerful cumulative effects. From the U.S. perspective, the primary
risk is not a sudden rupture but the gradual erosion of monetary senior age rents. Even a
modest diversification away from USD-denominated assets could translate into higher national
borrowing costs, particularly in the context of persistent fiscal deficits and a national debt
that has touched nearly $40 trillion. The exorbitant privilege of issuing the world's
primary reserve currency helps lower funding costs and expand policy space. The weakening
of this privilege will impose increasingly tight constraints on both monetary and fiscal authorities.
In summary, according to the assessment of Dr. Peter C. Earle, economist at the American
Institute for Economic Research, the U.S. strategic dilemma has never been clearer.
Financial exclusion demonstrates deterrent capability but encourages circumvention.
Inclusion protects the network but weakens coercive power. The pull of the U.S. dollar
persists because there is currently no alternative that can replicate the perfect
combination of liquidity, legal infrastructure, market depth, and geopolitical backing. However,
every time this system is used as a weapon, it adds further incentive for users to seek an
insurance policy. The long-term stability of the USD order depends less on its ability to exclude
and more on maintaining the absolute indispensability of the system.
Cost remains a complex puzzle for medium-term economic growth prospects.
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