What if the “hard problem of consciousness” isn’t hard at all?
In this mind-expanding conversation, Slavoj Žižek, Carlo Rovelli, and Alenka Zupančič challenge one of philosophy’s biggest mysteries: consciousness itself. Is subjective experience really an unsolvable puzzle — or are we asking the wrong question?
Drawing from philosophy, quantum physics, psychoanalysis, and cultural theory, the trio deconstructs the so-called “hard problem,” questioning the very assumptions behind it. Instead of treating consciousness as a mystical add-on to matter, they explore whether it emerges naturally from how we misunderstand reality, language, and the self.
The conversation takes an even deeper turn with reflections inspired by Michael Pollan, examining how altered states, perception, and human experience reshape what we think consciousness is.
Why do you use the term freedom? What does this mean for a stone?
We shouldn't pretend to make this believe that we have a picture of reality which is complete.
Come on. It's not incomplete for some details. It's majestically incomplete.
The problem with chalmers and guys like him is, of course, as you said,
they mystify the question. They first dig a gap and then they're surprised,
there was a time where science and physics in particular seemed to offer a foundational view
of reality called materialism made by an empty space with material little stones moving around
by forces. Quantum physics completely destroyed that. For sure, physical reality is not that.
The phenomena are clearly incompatible with that. Now, these phenomena are often described in terms
of observer phenomena. What I think is a crucial idea here is to not be confused by words.
The notion of observation, which is used in quantum physics,
even if some confused people say the opposite, has nothing to do with consciousness,
has nothing to do with the specific brain of something like us or the subject of anything
like that. It's observer in a very simple sense. When we say the velocity of the moon relative
to the earth is a certain value, the earth is not conscious. It's just a way of saying
that velocity is relational. If we say the velocity of the earth with respect to an
observer in the sun has this value, you don't need an observer in the sun. It's just relative
to the sun. So, forget about consciousness being at the root of quantum mechanics. That's a
profoundly confused idea or at the root of reality. However, and that's a point that Slavoj
was making, it's the other way around. Once we realize that to understand the physical reality,
we need this relationalism, we need to say, and that's what quantum theory is telling us,
that the property of an object makes sense relative to another object. We have a materialism,
if you want, much, much wider, much, much rich than the naive materialism of the 18th century
of particles moving around, which includes the possibility that reality has actual this
relational aspect, out of which one extremely specific particular version of it is what comes
about when a number of biological things are happening and then cultural things are happening,
and we have our brain. So, if reality is itself relational in this way, it's much less surprising
that we can talk about reality with respect to us in a way that doesn't contradict science and
doesn't contradict our subjective, perspectival view of reality. Let me go to the main point here,
experience and loops and gaps. We are in the middle of all sorts of loops, right? The world
that we know, it's our information about the world, what we know about the world, okay? Yet,
we're part of this world. You can look at me, and for you, I'm a part of the world. Which world?
Well, the same world which I described in my information. There's a singularity here,
and there are plenty of these singularities. Slavoj mentioned the one about language,
everything is language, etc., but language is an aspect of reality, and so on and so forth. Well,
what's wrong in singularity? That's our human making sense of reality, it's full of singularities.
When you pretend to not have a singularity, you get confused. And second point, ignorance.
We are largely ignorant about the world. We don't know what's going to happen in the future. I don't
know what's going to happen to me tomorrow. Nobody knows what's going to happen to him or her
tomorrow. So, the large part, we shouldn't pretend or make this believe that we have a
picture of reality which is complete. Come on, it's not incomplete for some details,
it's majestically incomplete. We just have little hints of what reality has. The future is completely
unknown to us. The point that Slavoj often, and you know, when the future comes, we rearrange
the past, as Slavoj is telling us, to make sense of the future. But it's new, it's experience.
Choose a point in the circles and put it as a fundamental. You need a gap and a mystery,
because you don't explain that point from that perspective. You need something else for
explaining it. I just wanted to add, because of what Carlo just said, this fact that
our knowledge is majestically incomplete, I guess what we would add, I think Slavoj would also agree
here, is we perhaps could also speculate that the reality itself that we try to know is
majestically incomplete. That it's not just our knowledge, you know, that there is something that,
and this is precisely where the interesting question of knowledge starts, which is not simply
description of reality, but also has a kind of more intimate connection to this reality itself.
It's not simply, as I said before, this kind of a mirroring or observation. And of course,
I understand very much this point that, I mean, I'm completely ignorant of quantum physics,
this is really Slavoj's thing. We all know, you don't have to repeat, obviously.
But I quite, I mean, understand very well that observer here means like a reference point or
something like this, which is, of course, not how the subjectivity is meant in this philosophical or
whatever, psychoanalytic way that we use it. It's not simply a reference point or a perspective
point. Precisely, subjects usually don't, I mean, Lacan even has this interesting point,
you know, when you look at things in reality, where you are, it's not your perspective,
you are looking at something. It is the point of the gaze which is out there and looks back at you.
This is where you are really as a subject. So it's not the same as perspective, it's not a point,
it's not the same as reference point. It is this kind of highly speculative proposition,
but which nevertheless, I think, has some material proof in the way in which
things happen and evolve and we think of them.
Slavoj, may I ask? Very benevolent. I'm a Stalinist with a human face, you know, like
once they wanted socialism with a human face. But a very serious question to you, Carlo. I
notice that when you, in your polemics against, if I will simplify you very much, I hope I at
least got your basic point, when you oppose the, I use consciously a wrong term, objective reality
of wave function. You said that waves are the way for us to calculate and then at that point,
I hope I will quote you correctly, you wrote somewhere that the state vector becomes a
description of the correlation of some degrees of freedom in the observer. Doesn't this mean
nonetheless that before you observe something, but you know that will observe you, somehow there are
different options or decisions in you. Will I observe this, that, and so on, and so on.
Now, would you, now I will appear a naive idealist. Why do you use here the term freedom?
What does this mean for a stone? I don't think the stone has, oh, will I approach in this way
or in that way? Doesn't this already, this term of freedom, imply a notion of life? And I'm here
very precise, I'm like you, totally opposed to that bullshit of idiots who, if we take power,
me and you, Carlo, they get instantly a free first class ticket to Gulag. Those idiots who think
observer that what quantum physics calls different names, incompleteness, indeterminacy,
that this is the foundation of freedom, no? So you don't mean, why did, now my Stalinist point,
why in what sense did you use the term some degree of freedom? Does this apply to a stone also?
You don't make jokes with Stalinists, you know. Yeah, yeah, no, I'm not a Stalinist with a nice
face. I'm a Leninist with a nasty face. The group of freedom, freedom here means lack of constraints.
It's an extremely weak notion of freedom. If you don't know what's going to happen
about something, first thing, you consider that free to happen one way or the other.
So freedom here, it's a very weak, weak, weak thing. In some sense,
look, physics is model. Physics is all about if this, then that. Physics is not a description.
Science is not a description of what happened. But physics in particular, there's something
called phase space, which all the possibilities, you don't know the possibilities. You go and
approach a system and it could be this way or this way or that way. You don't know a priori.
This is the majestic incompleteness of our knowledge or the freedom of nature with respect
to us. So a degree of freedom in physics is just a name you give to the open possibilities.
When I say that there is a system and an observer, and I talk about the degrees of freedom,
I'm using this language with respect to thinking that I'm an external observer or an internal
system which can interact with both. With respect to me, I don't know what is this,
I don't know what is that. But if I know that there is a correlation, I know that one knows
about the other one. This fundamental question whether we can eventually resolve the relationship
between the self and the world around us, you already think this has been solved from what
you've said already. We already understand how the self is embodied in the world.
Let me give a precise answer to that, my understanding. I might be wrong, of course,
but my understanding. There's a guy, David Chalmers, who made an interesting point,
separating two problems of consciousness that he called the easy problem and the hard problem.
What he called the easy problem is just the physics of the brain,
just understanding all that happens in a human being when a human being does what it does.
And then the hard problem, in his language, is the following. Suppose we have understood
everything there is to say physically about the brain. There is some other open problem.
It's not zombies in the way that Slava was using. Could it be that something is exactly
physically like me in all the minute detail of the atoms, and yet mentally different?
So there is something else. Now, I think that this distinction by David Chalmers is brilliant.
It just misnamed two problems. The easy problem is horrendously complicated. We are
most closely complicated machines, of course, so we have no idea what happens inside our brain.
We just have a vague picture from outside, and we call it Carlo, we call it Alenka, we call it Jack.
But, of course, all sorts of things happen in there which we don't know,
which is the normal situation of us. So that's what David called the easy problem. It's horrendously
hard to understand what happens. The hard problem, if you have understood all that,
the open problem, well, that's easy. That's just confusing ourselves,
making ghosts into machines. They're not zombies. If there's another copy of Slavoj,
not just looks the same from the outside, but such that inside every single physical detail of him
would be like him, he would be like him. I mean, he would have a subjectivity.
Yeah. So you can't have a replica of Slavoj which lacks the consciousness,
so it necessarily has to emerge? Is that the right way of putting it?
Emergence is a world which is all possible use and misuse. So one gets confused when we say,
if I say yes and no, somebody jumps up and says, no, but by emergence I mean something else.
So I think that Slavoj is real, it has a conscious experience, it's a squalia, it's all that stuff.
And these things are real. There's nothing illusory in all that. And these things are
the name to the complex phenomenon, which is Slavoj. And there are other complex phenomena
which are very complicated, and we describe it with correct language. The language is,
Slavoj is angry, Slavoj is talking to me, I like Slavoj, I don't like that.
That's an appropriate language. If I wanted a different language,
all the atoms and all the photons and all things, I can't because it's far too complicated. In
principle I couldn't, but it would be stupid, right? If your car breaks and you bring it to
the mechanics, you don't bring it to a particle physicist to fix it, you bring it to mechanics.
That's the right level of knowledge to understand your car. The right level of
knowledge to understand with Slavoj is just talking with him. But there's no contradiction
between mechanics being able to fix my car and the particle physics that makes my car
function in that way, and there's no contradiction between the very complicated physical picture,
which is relational, it's intricate, it's difficult, quantum fields, quantum space,
we don't know it, and Slavoj as a human being with the complexity that we assign to human beings.
Slavoj, do you want to come in on this?
Would you agree, and I'll answer both. You know, the problem with Chalmers and guys like him is,
of course, as you said, they mystify the question. They first dig a gap and then they are surprised,
oh my god, but I cannot jump.
Yeah, but you dig up there.
You build a gap and then you're surprised that there is a gap. That's exactly the diagnosis.
Yeah. So, don't tell me how much I will pay you for agreeing with me. Sorry. Then,
would you agree with this? I have a great trust in cognitivism, brain sciences,
that maybe, now I will make a very precise point, that maybe they will discover some strange shift
in our brain, neuronal, biological mechanism, which gave birth to awareness. But I don't think
there was any teleology with it. My sympathy is with those, there are a couple of them,
neurologists, who, I love this theory, who claim something went wrong biologically.
And then the brain developed, not as an adaptation, but what Stephen Jay Gould called
exaptation. Something went, you know, it's like, to give you a popular example that I like to use,
like French cuisine. Why do we love it? Because it's all based on failures, you know.
You do wine, the wine goes wrong, fermented, you say, oh my God, champagne, you know,
no, it was a mistake. Or those bad smelling cheese, they ruined it. Like, you know,
I like this idea that if we will come at the origin of what triggered consciousness,
there will not be a deep divine intervention or any teleology. Something very stupid,
probably even malfunctioning happened, which then triggered a process well beyond it.
I don't believe in teleology here.
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