Chinas Navy- South China Sea Takeover

In late 2025, more than 90 Chinese warships operated in the waters surrounding Taiwan. Fighter jets crossed invisible boundaries that had held for decades, and missiles flew over the island before crashing into the sea beyond. Beijing called it a routine military exercise, but exercises are rehearsals. They test response times, coordination, and readiness for real conflict. Taiwan is not just a disputed island. It is the technological center of the modern world and a strategic position that would give China dominance over the Western Pacific. For decades, China has claimed Taiwan as its own, but today that claim is backed by the largest naval buildup in modern history and a strategy designed to isolate pressure and eventually control the island. The question is no longer whether China wants Taiwan. The question is whether it believes the world would stop it from taking it. The origins of this conflict trace back to the aftermath of World War II and the unresolved outcome of China's civil war, when two competing governments emerged, each claiming to be the legitimate ruler of China. One retreated to Taiwan and survived. The other remained on the mainland and never abandoned its objective of unification. Today, that unfinished conflict has become one of the most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints in the world, with military forces, global supply chains, and the balance of power in the Pacific all tied to the fate of a single island. Why does China want Taiwan? Are they able to take it by force? What are their capabilities? Who would intervene to assist Taiwan? Hello, I'm Colin Heaton, former history professor, Army and Marine Corps veteran, and welcome to this episode of Forgotten History. China's consistent claim to Taiwan has been spurred by their one-China policy, which was endorsed by President Richard Nixon in the Shanghai Communique framework of February 1972. This established perceived legitimacy for China's claim, which exists to this day. This acknowledged, but did not accept, that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. said it does not challenge that position, and reaffirmed a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. Using this as justification, China has been increasingly aggressive in their territorial claims, and not just for Taiwan, but their encroachment throughout Eastern Asia, especially in the South China Sea, Sea of Japan, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific Ocean. They have also built artificial islands for military bases far into contested territorial waters while increasing the size of their navy. Recently, the Philippines experienced the highest tempo and most physical presence and aggression from China. There have been repeated incidents where Chinese Coast Guard ships used water cannons and blocking maneuvers, causing damage to Philippine vessels, both civilian fishing fleets and military vessels. Philippine officials accused Chinese Coast Guard ships and a PLA Navy helicopter of harassment and intimidation. These events have pushed Manila toward tighter U.S. cooperation with U.S. plans to deploy more missiles in the Philippines as part of deterrence. Japan has also felt pressure and intimidation with land-based Chinese aircraft and ships violating their territorial sea and airspace, such as around Senkaku Diaoyu Islands. Japan's Coast Guard has reported Chinese vessels repeatedly chasing Japanese fishing boats. Australia is being harassed by Chinese aircraft conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering as well. The government has publicly protested unsafe and unprofessional interactions, such as when a Chinese fighter released flares close to an Australian P-8A on surveillance patrol over the South China Sea and international waters. The Chinese government, while focused on Taiwan, is not myopic. Their strategy is to keep tensions simmering in various regions without crossing the war line while expanding and normalizing China's presence. These actions are meant to divert global attention away from their primary objective, Taiwan. China's willingness to raise risk in the air and sea incursions, to draw other nations' military assets and focus away from Taiwan reduces any rapid response to any invasion should that occur. They do this while claiming the other side provoked the encounter. These methods are high-pressure, low-signature, and displays China's power and presumed control on the water and in the air without handing rivals a clean Article 5 treaty-trigger moment. So far, China has not committed an aggressive act that would invoke the NATO Article 5 Mutual Assistance Protocol, but that is only until someone gets hurt or a ship sinks. Article 5 is tied to attacks in Europe or North America and other defined areas via Article 6. Taiwan technically is outside that scope, so the Taiwan invasion doesn't trigger Article 5 by itself. However, the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, Article 4 states that an armed attack would have a military response should that nation be attacked. Likewise, Japan's Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 is quite clear. An armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would mean military action. Article 6 of the treaty gives the U.S. use of facilities and areas in Japan for Japan's security and Far East stability, which is the backbone that makes U.S. operations possible. Key point for China-Taiwan. If a Taiwan conflict expands to strikes on Japan or Japan-administered territory or creates a direct Japan territorial scenario, this treaty is the big one. China's naval buildup is no longer coming soon, it's here, and it's increasingly about power projection, blockade, and sea control, especially Taiwan scenarios, rather than just coastal defense. Chinese fleet size and trajectory are reported by the U.S. Navy CRS reporting, citing Department of War Intelligence studies, that state China has a battle force of over 370 ships, with projections of up to 435 by 2030. That number doesn't include some smaller missile craft categories, such as the Type 022 NATO-designation Hubei-class Chinese catamaran missile boats. These smaller missile platforms are inexpensive and quick to produce, allowing China to field large numbers in support of amphibious operations in the Taiwan Strait. China only has three active naval aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian, with a modest complement of about 180 naval fixed-wing strike aircraft. The newest carrier, Fujian, was commissioned in November 2025 and uses electromagnetic catapults, which is a major technological improvement from ski-jump ramps, enabling heavier aircraft and potentially higher sortie rates. Fujian's future air wing likely includes J-35 stealth fighters, KJ-600 carrier AEWs, J-15 variants including electronic warfare aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs. DoD assesses that China claims to produce six carriers by 2035, for a total of nine, as it increases their Blue Water Navy capable of projecting power and protecting its interests beyond its immediate coastal waters. Most analysts expect it'll take at least another year after commissioning to reach full operational capability because everything is new and still being integrated. China started sea trials of its first Type 076 Sichuan amphibious assault ship in late 2025, designed to launch aircraft and landing craft, and features an EM catapult system similar to Fujian's. China commissioned the first Type 054B frigate, bigger than the 054A, with more firepower, able to operate larger helicopters like the Z-20. These join destroyers as a protective screen for a carrier group and anti-submarine operations. China wants to dominate the South China Sea, a 1.4 million square mile expanse, which is not just a geopolitical flashpoint but an economic lifeline, channeling over $3 trillion in annual trade through chokepoints like the Malacca Strait. Remember, every war or conflict has an economic cause, so how does China plan to secure and control these waters? China has launched 10 submarines between 2021 to 2025, outpacing U.S. launches over the same window, a combination of diesel, electric, and nuclear. China's shipbuilding dominance and capacity to produce large numbers of submarines, surface combatants, auxiliaries, and amphibious ships, including new expanded yards, comes at a high cost. Experts agree that China's submarine and surface fleet has outpaced the U.S. and the rest of the world, but they also agree that the numbers do not support their ambitions. First, despite their constant industrial espionage and theft of technology, their ships are not capable of managing a major conflict. American submarines are almost impossible to detect while Chinese subs are noisy by comparison. In addition, China having a large naval fleet does not mean that they are tactically, technically, or even economically capable of using that force effectively against a coalition military power. China's air assets in total number around 3,309 about 1,583 combat aircraft, plus transports, tankers, special missions, trainers, and 900-plus helicopters. They do not have the numbers against a coalition, nor the economic drive or logistics capability to maintain a force in the field for an extended period, especially in the face of a coalition intervention, and they know it. China plans to use blockades as a tool against other nations in the region, as well as Taiwan, to isolate and pressure their economies, to include an air umbrella over their airspace. By keeping their naval forces in the region, they maintain a projected rapid-strike posture. Carrier competence is earned, not purchased. Fujian is a leap in technology, but true carrier strike group mastery takes years of repetitious training and experience, such as deck cycles, pilot training, aircraft and ship maintenance, anti-submarine warfare screen integration, logistics, but experience matters most. It would take China years to master the art of combined naval warfare. Another problem with China's invasion plans is quite simple. China has not fought anything resembling a major conflict since the Korean War, and that was a land-based and air-combat conflict, and China did not do so well. Any large-scale Taiwan invasion lift remains a hard problem, as China would have to sacrifice building their carriers and submarines to build enough amphibious landing ships to accommodate their army should they invade. Like carrier, air and submarine operations, amphibious warfare tactics are not learned overnight, and this is the most complicated of all naval maneuvers. The Chinese know this because, in April 2022, the PLA ran large-scale drills that effectively encircled Taiwan, including live-fire and ballistic missile launches, and some flew over Taiwan, and some of these missiles landed in Japan's exclusion zone. Seeing their limitations, after August 2022, China reduced their profile and returned to regular patrols and pressure operations around the strait instead of treating them as rare crisis events. In late 2025, 90-plus Chinese ships were operating in the region at points consistent with pressure campaigns that looked like blockade rehearsal without declaring an official blockade, which would be an act of war. China's interest in Taiwan has several factors. First, securing Taiwan would guarantee China's dominance in the South China Sea to the Sea of Japan. Second, is technology and economics. Taiwan leads the world in semiconductors, aerospace, and biomedicine, including AR applications and collaboration in defense technologies like drone systems. The U.S. and many nations rely upon these technologies, which China would like to control, but to do so would require occupying and taking over Taiwan's economy and technology with military force. The G7 and Europe, led by the U.S., Japan, U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Australia, has a policy of no-force coercion, but maintains a ready posture of political and economic pressure against China. Japan is the one nation in this group taking the strongest military position. Japan's strategic position makes it the best ally militarily, and the Philippines are just as strategic as a support and deterrence platform. The forced posture reality is the U.S.-Philippines cooperation is expanding, with excess exercises and deployments like advanced missile systems. That matters, because the northern Philippines sits right under key Taiwan contingencies. Australia and New Zealand state their strong deterrence messaging, fewer explicit commitments, but tend to avoid public promises about automatic combat involvement. They keep their options open while supporting U.S.-led deterrence. The U.K. and Canada are outspoken diplomatically, but their military role would be limited, but not zero. The near-universal political stances don't change the status quo by force or coercion. The regional allies are positioning forces and access to make intervention feasible fast, especially with Japan and the Philippines. In the event of a Chinese attack, the United States would lead a coalition response. Rapid air and naval strikes, C-denial, ISR and targeting cyberspace, and a massive logistics munitions flow to Taiwan, plus global sanctions and diplomatic isolation. A U.S. naval presence alone would eliminate such a threat should hostilities ensue. The most likely scenario is that Japan would be attacked, even if as a diversion from their main thrust against Taiwan, due to full logistical enablement, such as bases, fuel repair, ISR, rear area defense, missile defense, and potentially combat operations. Japan's recent security overhaul messaging points to higher readiness and reduced constraints on using military force. Australia provides high-value support, such as submarines, P-8 surveillance aircraft, cyber, logistics, niche naval and air assets as support if the U.S. intervenes. The Canberra government has publicly pushed back on committing an advance, while AUSMIN frameworks deepen interoperability and integrated defense work with the United States. The United Kingdom would provide superb intelligence, cyber warfare, sanctions, naval presence, and limited strike and support assets, but not the main combat weight. Canada's military is quite limited in capacity and capability, but their assistance could be provided in the form of sanctions, export controls, diplomatic alignment, intelligence cooperation, limited naval presence, and escort tasks, depending upon deployment cycles. The European Union would be rather ineffective in a military role, but could provide similar support assets, such as intelligence, but not even strategic thinkers are counting on Germany or France making any serious military contributions. In essence, China is in no position to attack Taiwan or any other nation in the theater. They do not have the economic or military capabilities despite their numbers on paper. They do not have the training, experience, or tactical methods to pursue their great ambitions. One test of that theory was this, if China felt that it had a good chance of invading Taiwan, they would have done so during the ineffective and incompetent Biden administration. The EU was also feckless and weak, and China's only support could have come from Russia, which itself has major economic and morale problems and has been drastically weakened by the war in Ukraine. Only Russian and Iranian oil keeps China moving, and with embargoes, sanctions, and blockades that would be imposed should Russia side with China, their military may have three months of operational capability if they survived the coalition military response. China's approach toward Taiwan relies upon sustained military presence and strategic positioning. Its actions expand influence in the region while avoiding direct conflict. Taiwan remains outside Beijing's control because any attempt to seize it could trigger a wider military response. The island's location and technological importance make it central to the balance of power in the Pacific, if not the world. China continues to develop the capability to act while reinforcing its claim over time. Whether that capability will be used remains unknown. The future of Taiwan will be determined by political decisions, military readiness, and the willingness of other nations to respond if that moment comes. 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