Over the past few years, China’s economy has entered a major recession, yet most people still don’t feel it. The pattern closely mirrors Japan’s post-1991 “lost decades”: a slow, creeping decline that ordinary citizens only recognized years later.
Japan’s bubble burst in 1991, but widespread awareness didn’t hit until 1997–98, when youth unemployment, bank failures, homelessness, and soaring suicides made the crisis impossible to ignore. Early on, falling asset prices and mild deflation even felt like good news to many.
China today shows similar signs: plunging housing prices cheered by some, extreme youth unemployment, persistent deflation, and heavy external trade exposure. Yet CCP messaging and information controls keep the public in denial, dreaming of continued rise.
China’s problems—deeper debt, worse property bubble, higher youth joblessness—suggest the eventual wake-up call could be more severe. When a global shock hits, the hidden recession may suddenly become painfully obvious to everyone.
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. These past couple of years, China's
economy hasn't been great. Pretty much everyone can feel it to some degree. But what exactly does
not great mean? How bad is it really? A lot of people still don't have a clear picture.
We might already be in an unprecedented major recession yet most folks haven't really noticed.
When you mention a major recession, some people jump in right away. You are bashing China again.
If it were really that bad, how could I not know? They say it's just growing pains. We get
that things aren't smooth right now. Data looks rough across the board. But calling it a full
blown major recession? No way. Not in a million years. Even if you are critical, you can't smear
the country like that. It's not fair. Not objective. The thing is, feeling a recession and actually
being in one aren't always directly linked. It's pretty normal not to sense a big downturn right
away. Let me give you an example from Japan. Everyone knows that after Japan's asset bubble
burst in 1991, the country slid into a long economic slump that lasted 30 years and they
are still not fully out of it. So when do you think ordinary Japanese people really started
to feel that 30-year recession? Most would guess right at the start, maybe the first year, or if
they are slow 2 or 3 years. So by 1993 at the latest? But actually, no. The whole process of
going through the crisis, Japanese people felt it extremely slowly. It wasn't until 1998, 7 years
after the bubble popped, that most Japanese really accepted the crisis was happening in their
country. Why so late? We have to trace back how the Japanese bubble actually burst. Japan's crisis
unfolded in four main stages. The first was from 1989 to 1991, right on the eve of the bubble
bursting. What was going on then? Pure economic frenzy. The bubble was about to pop, but nobody
cared. In December 1989, the Nikkei index hit a new high. Housing prices kept climbing. Unlike the
public's wild enthusiasm, the Japanese government stayed pretty calm. They were the first to spot
overheating in assets. So around 1991, they rolled out policies to cool down stock prices and housing.
It worked fast. Stocks and housing crashed almost immediately. That led into the second stage,
1991 to 1993. Japan had already entered its 30-year slump. But outside the super-rich,
most people felt nothing. Some even cheered the downturn. Why? Assets were shrinking fast. The
Nikkei halved in a year. Housing dropped over 20% in a single year. Overall household assets fell
about 30%. But most ordinary Japanese didn't see that as bad. In their eyes, prices and stocks had
risen too fast, and it never benefited regular people anyway. The winners from rising prices
and stocks were early buyers, the wealthy speculators, not average folks. And in that
classic resentment of the rich, and this big drop in asset values wasn't seen as a crisis.
It felt like a redistribution of wealth across society, almost like an economic equality movement.
The Bank of Japan governor who actively pricked the bubble causing stocks and housing to tank
was Yasushi Miyano. People called him Haisei's Onihei. Haisei was the era name back then. Onihei
comes from the Japanese novel Onihei Hankacho. The main character Heisei Gawa is super smart,
punishes criminals, helps the poor get justice. His nickname was Onihei, the demon. So calling
Miyano Haisei's Onihei for triggering the crashes shows how people felt. Japanese folks weren't
scared by the drops, they were thrilled. But as the slump dragged on from 1993,
Japan entered the next stage, the employment ice age. It was unfair though. Only young people
really felt the cold. When the economy slows, companies don't go bankrupt first, they just
slow expansion. And a slowing expansion doesn't mean layoffs, especially in Japan with lifetime
employment, one job for life. So the impact of existing workers was tiny. The real hit landed
on the young. No expansion meant no new jobs, no hiring freshmen. Who needs new hires most?
Young people just entering the job market, especially fresh graduates.
From 1993, youth employment got brutally tough. Youth unemployment shot up. But overall,
national unemployment barely budged. From 1993 to 1997, it rose just a 0.7 percentage point.
Because companies only stopped growing, they didn't collapse. That huge gap meant only
young people sensed the coming winter. Most adults with jobs just ignored the looming
major recession. Someone might ask, were Japanese people blind? Even if only youth jobs were bad,
so many economic indicators were flashing red. Didn't they notice? You can't really blame them.
The data decline felt nothing like their daily lives. Most people don't read data anyway.
They go by what they see. And on the innovation front, they were still dazzled by Japan's
last burst of glory. In tech, Sony launched the first PlayStation at the end of 1994.
It took the world by storm. In 1996, Japan pioneered DVD, changing movies forever.
In culture, Pokemon launched in 1996 and exploded globally, becoming one of the biggest IPs ever.
Japanese people thought creativity was still flowing strong. Japan, the eastern giant,
was still rising. Everyday life was in deflation. CPI peaked at just 1.6%,
never hitting mild inflation's 2%. In 1995, it even went negative, a dangerous signal for
any economy. Deflation is way scarier than inflation. But unlike inflation,
its immediate hit on people is low, even positive at first. Prices don't rise,
plus the yen strengthened so Japanese could buy more abroad. That created a weird scene.
Even 6 years after the bubble burst in 1997, life hadn't suffered much. Some ways, it even
got better. Wages stalled under high deflation, but no unemployment. Prices barely rose or fell
with the housing crash. Add yen appreciation boosting buying power, and most Japanese felt
richer in the early slump, like life was improving. In this phase, only young people
suffered, plus the rich who'd bought houses and stocks. Everyone else was OK. No wonder they
didn't feel the major recession yet. But from 1997, things shifted big. Japan hit its societal
breaking point. Several factors combined. The downturn finally spread from youth to everyone.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis hit. Japan wasn't the main victim, but no nest is safe in a storm.
Japan still took a heavy blow. In the high growth area, a hit might not matter much. But for crisis
deep Japan, it ripped off the fig leaf. Profits fell. Lifetime employment firms started scraping
it. Others, after long decline, just shut down. From late 1997 to mid-1998, national unemployment
jumped from 3.3% to 4.1%, 8 tenths a percent in half a year, more than the prior five years
combined. Now the pain hit all Japanese. Iconic events deepened the sense of crisis.
Japanese banks had poured money into Southeast Asia. Earlier real estate bankruptcies and stock
crashes already left many banks on the brink, technically insolvent. The Asian crisis triggered
mass Southeastern Asian bankruptcies and blew up Japanese banks. In 1997, big institutions failed.
Sanyo Securities, Yamechi Securities collapsed outright. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and others
went under. The government injected capital into 21 banks to stop more failures. Before,
Japan had a myth, banks don't fail. That myth shattered. Like if Chinese civil servants
suddenly faced mass layoffs. The shock was massive. Rising unemployment fueled social
issues. In Tokyo's Shinjuku, a cardboard village appeared, homeless people living in cardboard
boxes, clustering together. Shinjuku is prime Tokyo, packed with commuters every day.
Seeing homeless folks suddenly appear shocked the nation of 100 million middle class.
They realized for the first time their country had become like this. Then suicides spiked. 1998's
rate jumped 40% from 1997. News every day had suicides. With all these layers, recession became
tangible, not just numbers on paper. Japanese finally accepted the economy really crashed.
It became consensus. From 1998, they entered the final stage, post-collapse. Realizing the crash,
habits changed. People cut loans, paid debt early, hiked savings against job loss. Consumption
dropped sharply. Cheap brands like Uniqlo and Daiso exploded. Looking back, Japan's decline
mirrors China's a lot. Triggers differ, but overall pattern and timelines are strikingly
similar. China's 2019 to 2021 real estate peak matches Japan's 1989 to 1991 asset peak. China's
2021 real estate bubble burst matches Japan's 1991. China's burst wasn't from the three red
lines. It was a slowing growth in 2021 that finally popped it. Post-burst, China entered
Japan's slow deflation slump with similar features. Many Chinese still don't see they are
in a major recession. For the same reason, Japanese didn't back them. Falling house prices
eases buying pressures for many. Lots cheer it, blind to the economic disaster it causes.
China has youth-adult unemployment polarization too. Youth unemployment hits records,
adults barely moves. So most think mass unemployment talk is alarmist. Some even
blame young people for not trying hard enough, missing that their era is over, society offers
fewer chances. Plus long deflation, many think it's fine, not scary. Economists warn about
deflation, but I am not unemployed, wages flat is flat, low prices are good, right?
You foreigners saying deflation is terrible are just smearing China. True, the crisis from
deflation comes on very slowly. People who have steady jobs hardly notice it at first.
The biggest impact is that falling house prices shrink people's assets. But many tell themselves,
I bought the house because I need it and I am not planning to sell, so they can keep fooling
themselves. Just like Japan back then, China is in a recession but still shows some innovation,
maybe even more than in recent years. In technology, we have new energy vehicles,
deep-seek and doubao. Yes, some of it involves copying, but there is real progress compared to
before. In culture, labubu became a global hit this year. China is different because the CCP
runs an authoritarian system. Any bad economic news or anything that doesn't praise the country
gets suppressed. When a crisis hits, they just keep playing great power rise videos on repeat,
and the worse things get, the louder they play them. People who don't use VPNs or look for other
sources easily get influenced. Under this kind of information control, ordinary people notice
the recession even less. Birth rates, CPI, and other big economic signs clearly show a recession,
but daily life still doesn't hurt much. And with the CCP's tight controls, many people
deny there is any recession. They keep dreaming about China's rise as a great power. If you tell
them the country is declining, they laugh and call it blind doom-mongering. China's own 1997 moment
will definitely arrive. The problems look worse than Japan's in almost every way. Japan's worst
single-month deflation in 1995 was minus 0.7%. China's recent low reached minus 0.8%. In Japan,
most deflation months stayed positive and peaked at 1.6%. China's numbers are not only lower,
half the deflation months are negative, and the CPI can barely reach 1%, never mind 2%.
Youth unemployment is much worse here. Japan's peak never reached 10%. China often stays above
20%, even after official adjustments. On debt, Japan in the late 1990s raised government debt
from 62% of GDP in 1991 to 145% in 2001 to ease pressure. China's debt is already at 300% of GDP.
The real estate crisis is far bigger. At its peak, Japan's housing cost 11 times annual income.
China's peak reached 35 times. Housing made up 50% of wealth in Japan but 70% in China.
There are many more examples like this. China does have one advantage. It is still a developing
country, with some growth potential left. Japan was already a top-developed nation when its bubble
burst. But under CCP rule, that advantage disappears. The authoritarian system blocks
the path to develop the country's status. On the other hand, if there were no middle-income
trap, curse, and no CCP in power, perhaps the 2021 bubble would never have burst. A democratic
government might have escaped the trap. So that remaining potential doesn't mean much under the
current system. When will most Chinese people finally feel the recession everywhere and accept
that the country is in deep decline? It will probably take a major crisis, one that exposes
China's even bigger weakness in trade. In the 1997 crisis that finally woke Japan,
foreign trade was only 20% of GDP. China's trade dependence is around 35%. So it is much more
vulnerable to global shocks. If China follows Japan's path, the next step is waiting for a
global economic crisis. It might not start in China or be caused by China. But even the after
shocks could break the fragile economy wide open. Many pro-CCP nationalists hope the US,
Europe, and Japan collapse soon. They think if they fall, we will rise. Their exploitation is
what held us back. In reality, those countries could recover quickly, maybe in one or two years
after a crash. But the same event might trigger China's total explosion. Then all the problems
of decline would hit at once. Unemployment would spread from young people to everyone.
Things we now think are impossible could happen. Major state banks collapsing, sudden large-scale
cuts to civil servants, or ending lifetime job security. It is hard to predict exactly what,
but it will be something that 99% of people would not believe today. Only then will most Chinese
finally understand, yes, we are in a recession, a major recession.
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