Is the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) a global currency or a sophisticated state-managed "voucher"? While the yuan often appears strong on international exchanges, this video pulls back the curtain on the mechanics behind its valuation. By tracing the RMB’s evolution from its origins to the modern era, the analysis explores how China’s reliance on the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) has created a parallel financial environment that bypasses traditional international oversight.
The discussion examines how strict capital controls, the repression of free convertibility, and opaque settlement practices allow Beijing to maintain a performative exchange rate. By analyzing recent data showing a contraction in offshore settlement volumes, the video challenges the narrative of the RMB as a maturing global asset, instead proposing that it is becoming an increasingly isolated tool for geopolitical strategy rather than a transparent, market-driven medium of exchange.
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. Following the initiation of the trade
war by the Trump administration, and particularly as the international community erected barriers
against Chinese goods and supply chains began to decouple, a prevailing consensus emerged.
The RMB was poised for a significant devaluation. Many analysts anticipated a sharp decline,
with projections suggesting the exchange rate could sink to 8, or perhaps even 11 or 12 yuan
to the dollar. Yet, we find ourselves in a different reality. The RMB has demonstrated
resilience, strengthening to approximately 6.8 against the dollar. This presents a compelling
puzzle. Why is the yuan maintaining its valuation and even appreciating? This phenomenon warrants
a rigorous examination. One might argue that the RMB is increasingly shedding the attributes of
a traditional freely circulating currency. It lacks the hallmark of liquidity, namely,
free convertibility, unrestricted circulation, and the ease of storage or withdrawal. However,
a more profound logic governs its performance against the dollar and other global benchmarks.
Today, I intend to walk you through the structural causes and the resulting effects of this
situation. To understand the present, we must examine the past. Prior to 1972, the RMB did
not function as a currency in any conventional sense. It operated essentially as a closed
system shopping voucher with no connectivity to the global monetary order. Outside the borders
of mainland China, it possesses no intrinsic value, a reality that extended even to the Soviet Union.
The People's Republic's accession to the United Nations in 1972 provided the first legal framework
for international exchange. Following this development, between 1972 and 1980, the official
exchange rate was pegged at approximately 1.5 RMB to the dollar. While this suggested a parity,
the rate was purely nominal, a facade accessible only to select institutions and individuals with
government authorization. In the shadow economy, however, the disparity was stark. $1 commanded
10 to 20 RMB, while the official rate remained fixed at 1 to 1.5. After 1981, the official rate
began a steady climb, reflecting a theoretical decline in the RMB's value, reaching 1.7 in 1981,
1.89 in 1982, 1.97 in 1983, 2.32 in 1984, and 2.93 in 1985. While the official statistics favored
the dollar, the black market continued to reflect a different reality until roughly 2006, when the
official and shadow rates converged around 8 yuan to 1 dollar. This period marked the onset of
China's exchange rate reform. In 2007, Chinese citizens were granted limited annual quotas for
conversion at banks, with the rate fluctuating between 7.3 and 7.8. This signaled a fundamental
shift. The RMB was transcending its role as a purely domestic medium and acquiring genuine
international financial utility. A watershed moment arrived in July 2009, when Beijing launched
a pilot program for RMB settlement in cross-border trade. This is widely considered the first year
of RMB internationalization. When its formal entry into the SWIFT system, global financial
institutions could finally exchange RMB officially. This was a historical shift. The RMB was finally
beginning to function as a legitimate currency. Before 2009, the RMB was effectively a shopping
voucher issued by the CCP's national store. Its face value, 1.5 RMB per dollar, looked expensive
on paper, but it was meaningless to foreigners who had no intention of spending in the mainland.
Even for those who did visit China, special stores accepted dollars directly, rendering the need for
exchange non-existent. The RMB possessed no financial properties. It was purely a voucher,
and access to dollars was strictly rationed by the state.
The landscape shifted after China's 2001 WTO accession. As the country became the world's
factory, massive trade surpluses led to an accumulation of dollar reserves. To maintain
stability, the CCP ran a fixed exchange rate system, printing RMB based on their dollar holdings.
This transitioned the RMB from a mere voucher to a functioning monetary unit,
providing the foundation for subsequent exchange rate reform.
In 2010, Beijing established the first offshore RMB market in Hong Kong, aka
CNH, imbuing the currency with both trade and financial utility. However,
the system remained bifurcated, with the onshore and offshore sectors separated by rigid walls
that prevented free conversion. For international business, the convenience was significant.
Foreign firms could maintain RMB accounts for settlement, eliminating the need to use the
dollar as a middleman. Consequently, demand for offshore RMB surged, and the currency began to
Between 2010 and 2015, the RMB appeared to be on an irreversible trajectory towards becoming a
fully convertible global currency. However, the political climate shifted significantly
after Xi Jinping. Because every transaction through the SWIFT system is subject to
international monitoring and audit, the CCP faced obstacles in this effort to expand trade
with rogue states and sanctioned entities. To bypass this oversight, China developed the
Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, CIPS, in 2015. CIPS operates entirely outside the purview
of SWIFT and is largely populated by financial institutions under international sanctions.
As a result, CIPS provides a haven for gray and black market transactions involving entities in
Russia, Iran, Mexico, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand. These trades remain invisible to
international auditors. Consequently, the RMB has increasingly become a settlement tool for these
industries. As a result of this pivot, the RMB's share in the SWIFT system has dwindled,
peaking around 5% in 2023 and dropping to roughly 2% today. This does not indicate a drop in overall
offshore RMB usage, but rather a sharp decline in legitimate, above-board international financial
activity. Because the bulk of trade volume is now channeled through CIPS, the currency's
financial properties have weakened significantly. Currently, if an overseas Chinese individual
attempts to convert the RMB at a bank, such as the Bank of China's New York branch,
they are often met with refusal or offered rates as poor as 8 to 1. The RMB is increasingly viewed
as a voucher rather than a store of value. It is useful only for those conducting business within
the CIPS ecosystem. For everyone else, it is a currency with nowhere to go. The RMB is now a
different kind of voucher than it was 40 years ago, because China's national store now produces
goods that are essential to global gray and black market industries. The CCP retains leverage over
the voucher's price. Furthermore, the low liquidity of the RMB makes it extremely difficult for
market participants to short the currency. The CCP holds vast reserves and can effectively
neutralize speculative pressure, keeping the exchange rate under tight state control.
Current data highlights this trend. According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's Currency
and Financial Stability Half-Yearly Report, published in March 2026, the daily average
RMB settlement in Hong Kong for all of 2025 was $2.5 trillion, down from $3 trillion in 2024,
a 19% drop. This follows a 15% decline from the previous year. In January 2026, clearing value
fell another 12% year over year. These consecutive double-digit declines confirm that the global
market is disengaging from the RMB's financial utility. Even though the CCP can control trade,
without real monetary properties, the RMB risks being kicked back to the status of
not recognized as real money by the world. So they still have to keep some minimal activity in SWIFT.
To maintain some volume in SWIFT, especially for those big bilateral currency swap deals,
the CCP recently had its six major banks, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank, Industrial and
Commercial Bank, Construction Bank, Bank of Communications, and CITIC, set up an RMB
international exchange center in Shanghai. Here is how it works. They pre-sign contracts
with the major international financial institutions. If those institutions receive RMB,
the six Chinese banks will convert it back into major international currencies at the pre-agreed
rates, or through put agreements. This lets big global banks continue accepting RMB within the
agreements, instead of turning it away. The banks get a quota and can earn the spread.
Essentially, the CCP is opening a controlled window, not in Hong Kong, but in Shanghai,
their own backyard, where they can't be audited. A lot of these deals are grey,
and the pricing wouldn't pass international regulatory scrutiny. At a current rate of 6.8
to $1, the RMB looks strong on paper for trade. It's the official rate printed on the voucher.
They can't set it too high, or international institutions will worry about the default
risk. So they keep it relatively elevated. But there is a huge risk here. If mainland
citizens and quota-holding companies go crazy trying to exchange into dollars because the RMB
looks valuable, the CCP stands to lose big. So on the surface, they allow people to exchange
up to $50,000 a year. In practice, they've tightened everything. Want more than $1,000?
You need detailed documentation and a clear reason. They are forcing Chinese investments
in the US to come back home, pulling money out of Hong Kong banks, bringing all overseas
funds back. If you are a Chinese citizen without a second passport, opening a bank account almost
anywhere else in the world is nearly impossible unless you have legitimate overseas employment.
Planning to travel? You need to submit detailed reports explaining exactly what you will spend on.
They scrutinize even small tourism amounts. So all this dramatically reduces the ability of
ordinary Chinese to convert to dollars. The CCP has plugged all the capital outflow channels on
one side while setting an offshore RMB price on the other. This keeps the system going.
Financial properties keep weakening, trade and voucher properties keep strengthening.
That official exchange rate printed on the voucher? It's mostly for show. As an individual
or company, you can't actually use it for free conversion. If you really need to exchange,
you go to the black market. And these days, in many places in China, people are already using
black market rates for dollars. Because the dollar is still king, black market rates are much higher
than the official ones. That, my friend, is the real story behind the RMB exchange rate.
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