"The situation in Beijing right now is highly unusual. Some analysts argue that if Xi Jinping had truly consolidated full control—if, for instance, Zhang Youxia had already been completely dealt with—then the propaganda machine would have long since shifted into overdrive. The entire Party, the military, and the nation would be awash in slogans proclaiming loyalty to a single supreme authority. But that is not what we are seeing. On the other hand, if the anti-Xi faction had achieved a major breakthrough, it would be hard to explain Xi Jinping’s frequent and prominent appearances in the media. His repeated public visibility seems to send only one message: “I’m still here.” NOTE: Thumbnail for illustration purpose only! Be sure to subscribe for more in-depth content about China! https://www.youtube.com/@ChinaInsider-tv/?sub_confirmation=1 00:00 - Intro 01:06 - Is the military splitting into “two central commands”? 04:58 - Does Xi Jinping Have Reason to Be Wary of Liu Yuan? #xijinping#zhangyouxia"
The situation in Beijing right now is highly unusual.
Some analysts argue that if Xi Jinping had truly consolidated full control,
if, for instance, Jiang Yuxia had already been completely dealt with,
then the propaganda machine would have long since shifted into overdrive.
The entire party, the military, and the nation would be awash in slogans
proclaiming loyalty to a single supreme authority.
But that is not what we are seeing.
On the other hand, if the anti-Xi faction had achieved a major breakthrough,
it would be hard to explain Xi Jinping's frequent and prominent appearances in the media.
His repeated public visibility seems to send only one message,
I'm still here.
So the real question is not whether anyone opposes Xi,
but whether anyone truly dares to make a move.
And at this critical juncture,
one name has once again been thrust into the spotlight,
Liu Yuan.
How long can this stalemate continue?
And will Liu Yuan dare to take an all-or-nothing gamble?
Let's dive into the analysis in today's program.
Is the military splitting into two central commands?
According to a domestic self-media commentator
known as Ordinary People Inside the Wall,
Qianmei Putongren, a phrase has recently been circulating
within the Chinese Communist Party's military,
Chuxi, remove Xi.
It's a play on words.
Chuxi, New Year's Eve,
traditionally means driving out the old year's bad luck
and welcoming good fortune in the new one.
But here it suggests eliminating Xi on New Year's Eve.
The full saying goes,
On New Year's Eve, remove Xi,
and all under heaven will be greatly blessed.
The implication is clear.
Xi Jinping stepping down would carry away the old year's misfortune
and restore peace to the realm.
The very spread of such a phrase
hints at the depth of dissatisfaction with Xi inside the military.
Putongren also claims that
while Xi's faction currently holds the upper hand
at the Party's central level,
he does not truly command the military.
Xi reportedly made a move some time ago.
Through the Beijing garrison, firmly under his control,
with Commander Chen Yuan considered loyal to him,
he took over the Baiyi building.
However, when the garrison attempted to assume control
of the Xishan Military Command Center in Beijing's western suburbs,
they were blocked by the 82nd Group Army.
If true, this would mean the PLA has effectively split
into two centers of gravity,
the Baiyi building on one side
and the Xishan Command Center on the other.
Politically, it mirrors what some describe as
two central authorities locked in struggle,
a division that has now extended into the military itself.
At present, the armed force directly in Xi's hands,
his gun barrel,
appears largely limited to the Beijing garrison,
along with the knife handle of the political-legal apparatus.
He still controls significant resources.
Meanwhile, the anti-Xi camp seems, on the surface,
to enjoy certain advantages—
princelings, party elders, and parts of the military.
Yet that camp reportedly suffers from serious internal divisions,
particularly over whether to use force to bring Xi down,
leading to prolonged hesitation.
Of course, the claims made by Pu Tom-Ren
cannot currently be independently verified.
On February 13, another noteworthy development emerged.
Xinhua News Agency published a notice stating that
the Xi leadership had extended Lunar New Year greetings
to veteran comrades in various forms.
The announcement listed many retired senior officials.
Most strikingly, it officially confirmed that
figures such as Hu Jintao and Zhu Rongji are still alive.
For Xi, that may not be entirely good news.
It signals that anti-Xi elders remain present,
and that Xi has not dared to move against them.
Whether out of caution or insufficient strength,
the very fact that he has not dared to act
suggests he is constrained,
unable to unleash sweeping purges.
In short, although Xi Jinping may have used force
in a surprise move to detain Jiang Yuxia,
his inability to fully command the military limits his power.
At the same time, the anti-Xi camp appears
wary of shattering the system outright,
hesitant to escalate into open-armed confrontation.
The struggle has shifted, in colloquial terms,
from military combat back to political sparring.
Outwardly, the surface remains unbroken.
Beneath it, tensions are stretched to the limit,
locked in stalemate.
So when will the deadlock be broken?
Much may depend on how the cases involving
Jiang and Liu are ultimately defined,
tried, and adjudicated.
That could be the decisive turning point.
If Jiang and Liu were to appear publicly even once,
it would resolve many uncertainties.
The question is, will there be a catalyst
powerful enough to change the balance?
Does Xi Jinping have reason to be wary of Liu Yuan?
In the current high-stakes political chess game
within the Chinese Communist Party,
four major forces are locked in a life-and-death struggle.
The first is Xi Jinping's own faction.
The second is the military.
The third consists of anti-Xi Party elders,
including figures such as Hu Jintao,
Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, and others.
The fourth is the so-called princelings,
the second generation of Communist revolutionary leaders.
Commentator Tang Jingyuan argues that
when Xi and the anti-Xi elders clash,
the princelings have largely remained on the sidelines.
But this time, they appear to have truly entered the arena,
and the catalyst is said to be the Jiang Yuxia affair.
What we are seeing now, he suggests,
is a tentative alignment.
Anti-Xi elders plus princelings plus elements of the military
forming a potential coalition in opposition to Xi Jinping's faction.
At the center of this possible three-way alliance stands Liu Yuan.
Liu Yuan is almost uniquely positioned.
He is a princeling, the son of a senior revolutionary leader,
giving him deep ties to retired Party elders.
At the same time, he comes from a military background.
He is the only senior figure
who simultaneously embodies all three circles of power,
making him an ideal bridge among them.
Some voices have suggested that he should step forward to lead the military.
Australian-based scholar Yuan Hongbing
has claimed that the Crown Prince Party
is preparing to make a move at the 21st Party Congress in 2027.
Liu Yuan, Deng Pufang, and other Red descendants
are reportedly seen as key figures with a clear objective
to prevent Xi Jinping from securing another term.
Rumors have circulated online
that Liu Yuan has received full backing from Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao,
that all five theater commands support him,
and that the military is loyal to him
as a potential acting vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.
It is also said that Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua
secretly visited the Southern Theater Command to express support.
Whether Liu Yuan can truly rewrite history remains uncertain,
but the very emergence of such calls
reflects an extraordinary political moment.
Liu Yuan once said,
Today I must stand up for the people.
Will that sentence remain a relic of history,
or prove to have been prophetic?
Hu Ping, editor-in-chief of the magazine Beijing Spring,
once posted on the platform X,
recalling a speech Liu Yuan delivered in 1980.
In that speech, Liu declared,
Today we must stand up and speak on behalf of the people.
The speech was later included
in the 1990 Hong Kong publication Exploration,
selected writings from the Peking University student movement.
In 1980, during a movement advocating freer elections at Beijing universities,
when early signs of democratizing activity were emerging on campus,
Liu Yuan, then a student at Beijing Normal University,
ran as an independent candidate.
At that time, genuine elections still existed in limited form.
During a debate explaining his personal motivation for running,
Liu said that over the previous decade,
he and the entire nation had endured a devastating catastrophe.
Four members of his family had died.
Six had been imprisoned.
He himself had suffered as much as anyone.
He did not even dare to fully revisit those memories
because they were too horrifying.
Yet the scenes were etched into his heart
and constantly resurfaced in his mind, denying him peace.
He said any child who had silently witnessed
the forced separation from their parents
in life and death would feel the same.
Everyone knew that Liu Shaoqi,
once the second-ranking leader of the Communist Party,
had been persecuted to death.
Liu Yuan described walking a narrow road
drenched in spit and humiliation,
being thrown into prison multiple times,
and burying his youth there.
In days of maddening hunger, he lived like an orphan,
hating the world like a wolf.
He clenched his teeth and survived those years.
Who, he asked, had ever seen their parents
publicly humiliated on a struggle stage,
beaten, and then forced into farewell?
Who had seen a lit firecracker
shoved into the mouth of a nine-year-old girl?
Could anyone imagine what he felt at such moments?
He bit his teeth and remained silent.
From adolescence onward,
he endured forced labor under whips,
blood flowing beneath shackles.
For years, every hour, his heart bled tears and blood
as he endured inhuman treatment and crushing pressure,
struggling not to lose his sanity.
Why? Because he wanted to see the day
when truth triumphed over evil.
Looking back at the suffering of those years,
he said he could never allow others,
or future generations, to endure the same fate.
I must stand up and speak for the people.
To prevent such tragedies from recurring,
the soil that breeds feudal fascism must be uprooted,
and democracy must be realized.
No matter how difficult the road,
or how long the journey,
the struggle for democracy must begin now.
The current situation is volatile and difficult to predict.
From time to time, rumors surface
that Liu Yuan is being valued and elevated
by the Crown Prince Party.
But if that's the case,
why has he never truly entered the core
of the CCP's power structure?
Hu Ping has said that, to his knowledge,
Liu Yuan expressed sympathy for the 1989 student movement.
Because of that stance,
after June 4th, his political career was obstructed.
China News Service once noted that
Liu Yuan's position on June 4th
made Deng Xiaoping wary, even disappointed.
And as a result, the Party never dared
to allow him to genuinely inherit power.
In 1989, during the Beijing student movement,
Liu Yuan had just been elected,
with a high vote count,
as Vice Governor of Henan Province.
He spent days and nights in the square
and at train stations,
urging students to remain rational,
successfully persuading many Henan students
to return home.
When Premier Li Peng declared martial law,
Liu opposed the crackdown.
The Henan Provincial Party Committee
and government were also among
the few local authorities
that objected to the measure.
The Tiananmen Movement ultimately ended in suppression,
and the top leadership changed,
including Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.
Liu Yuan's stance, along with that
of the Henan Provincial leadership,
dealt a heavy blow to his political future.
Deng Xiaoping reassigned him from Henan
to serve as Second Political Commissar
of the Hydropower Armed Police Force,
effectively blocking his political path.
The central leadership's intention was merely
to temper him,
not to entrust him with real power.
Deng and other elders reportedly shared
the consensus that he could not be fully trusted,
fearing he might one day challenge
Party rule itself.
It was not until 2003 that Hu Jintao
promoted Liu Yuan, transferring him
to become Deputy Political Commissar
of the PLA General Logistics Department.
In 2010, he was elevated to Political Commissar
and awarded the rank of General.
At that time, Hu Jintao reportedly hoped
to use Liu's prestige within the military
to help balance the next generation of leadership.
After Xi Jinping used Liu Yuan
to bring down Gu Zhenshan,
Guo Boxiong, and Xu Kaihu
in the military anti-corruption campaign,
Liu was quickly sidelined.
The ex-platform account Asia Lens suggests
that Xi's wariness of Liu may date back
as far as 1988.
That year, during local elections,
two startling events occurred.
Xi Jinping, then the sole candidate
appointed by the Party Committee
to serve as acting mayor,
reportedly failed to receive a single vote
from people's Congress delegates.
In the end, he left and accepted
the post of Party Secretary
of the Ningde region.
Meanwhile, in Henan, Liu Yuan,
then Vice Mayor of Zhengzhou,
was not on the Central Authority's
nomination list, but was unexpectedly
nominated by delegates and elected
vice governor.
The Henan Provincial Party Committee
sought instructions from Beijing overnight.
Does this result count?
Zhao Ziyan reportedly replied,
Respect the will of the people's delegates.
Liu Yuan became the youngest
vice governor in China
during the 1980s.
Both he and Xi were princelings.
Yet Liu rose through delegate support,
while Xi advanced through internal
party appointment, carrying the blemish
of an electoral defeat.
Perhaps that episode has lingered as a shadow
in Xi's mind.
Now, at this historical juncture,
Liu Yuan once again stands at the center
of attention. Not necessarily
because he is certain to make a move,
but because voices calling for change
are placing their hopes on him.
If that sentence remains only history,
Beijing will continue in stalemate.
But if it becomes reality,
the balance in Zhongnanhai
could be shattered overnight.
And at that point, what is decided
will no longer be a debate over policy
lines, but the survival of power
itself.
What do you think about the possibility of Liu Yuan
rising up?
Leave your thoughts in the comments below.
Thank you, and see you next time.