Inside the US Army report on how Russia is fighting in Ukraine

Army Analysis
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3 Video Views·Feb 20, 2026
In this video, we break down how Russia has integrated drones and signal jamming into every level of its military operations—from frontline infantry to strategic targeting. Based on a newly released U.S. Army report titled "How Russia Fights," this analysis reveals how uncrewed systems and electromagnetic warfare are being used to shape the battlefield before a single shot is fired.
The U.S. Army is watching how Russia fights in Ukraine, and they are taking notes.
We received an embargoed report titled How Russia Fights on July 17th from U.S. Army Europe and
Africa that was put together by the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth.
In it, leaders detailed what is being learned about how Russia is fighting this war.
The embargo lifted on the 21st, so we are good to talk about it now,
What it found was that Russia may look disorganized on the surface,
but underneath the rusted tanks and chaotic mobilization is a military and a state that
has adapted to fight a long, grinding war. They are fusing drones, jammers, artillery,
and sheer manpower into a model of modern warfare that's not pretty, but it is effective.
This is not the Red Army from the Cold War field manuals,
it's something newer and more difficult to define.
So, the Foreign Military Studies Office, which is tasked with studying foreign threats and
operational trends, produced this 170-page report. It's not doctrine, it does not speak
for the entire army, but it does offer a clear view into how one part of the U.S. military
is interpreting the war in Ukraine and what lessons they think are worth learning.
Other parts of the military may be taking different lessons from the same conflict.
The Air Force, for instance, may be more focused on the vulnerabilities of GPS-guided munitions
than they are with trench warfare, and the Navy is probably more interested in how the
Russian Black Sea Fleet was essentially neutralized by a country with barely any ships.
Marines are waiting for the book on tape to come out,
and the Space Force is still trying to figure out their dress pants.
But this report gives us a deep look into what the army, or at least one component of it, is seeing.
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It opens with a basic but important idea.
Russia isn't just fighting with its military, it's fighting with its entire state.
Government ministries, civilian industries, universities, and even city governments are
being pulled into the war effort.
The lines between civilian and military logistics are blurry by design, and that gives them
more flexibility and makes it harder for outsiders to know where the war effort ends
and normal society begins.
One of the examples cited is a bread factory in Tambov, which was just a normal bread factory
that would make delicious breads, but is now retooled to build FPV drones.
They also mention how towns and cities will raise money for equipment, like vans outfitted
to service field ambulances or personal gear for soldiers.
For a special military operation, it sure looks like a full-fledged mobilization.
The U.S. hasn't fought like this since at least World War II, when companies like Ford
and GM were cranking out tanks and bombers, and even typewriter manufacturers like Remington
Rand were making 1911 handguns like this one that I have in my personal collection.
No big deal.
And in some ways, we're no longer built to do that.
But the point the Army analysis is making is that Russia's improvisational whole-of-society
approach is working.
It's not flawless, and it's not really efficient, but it's effective enough to sustain a large
scale war for more than two years, while the country's population is only about 148 million
people.
One of the clearest points in the report is the extent to which drones have become a core
part of Russia's war.
They are used for, well, practically everything.
Reconnaissance, targeting, artillery, fire correction, electronic warfare, direct attack,
and damage assessment, among other things.
This capability is not limited to elite units.
As we see quite often now, regular infantry formations are fielding large numbers of first
person view FPV drones equipped with thermal sights and improvised explosives.
Some are modified to carry anti-armor grenades like the RKG-3, while others are designed
to drop fragmentation or even thermobaric payloads onto enemy positions.
Drone production has been scaled up massively through a mix of formal and informal channels
like the bread factory, and of course, it includes civilian manufacturing networks.
The report highlights how Russian units treat drone losses as routine, and FPV systems are
produced and consumed at a pace comparable to expendable munitions.
Analysts at RUSI and CSIS have estimated that Russian forces may be using tens of thousands
of drones per month.
The integration of drones into command and fire support systems is broad.
Fixed wing platforms like the Orlen 10 and 30 are used to conduct wide area ISR.
Once a target is identified, coordinates are passed to artillery units or FPV drone teams.
Artillery units usually engage first, and then drone teams often follow up to target
any survivors or unconfirmed positions.
Subsequent ISR flights are then used to document the effects of the strike.
Drones have largely taken over roles that were previously filled by manned forward observers.
Their use has made Russian artillery more responsive and flexible,
especially in areas where terrain limits line of sight engagement.
Within the US Army, drone employment has traditionally been more centralized.
Most units below the battalion level do not have dedicated drone operators or organic systems,
although efforts are underway right now to change that.
The report points out that Russia's implementation has developed quickly under combat conditions,
and the combination of technical adaptation and operational learning
has allowed them to close the gap in a very short period of time.
The report also makes clear that electronic warfare is central to how Russia fights,
and not just as a support function.
Russian forces are using EW to shape the battlefield
well before the first artillery shell or drone even hits a target.
In doctrinal terms, that means using electronic warfare to set conditions for success.
Whether that means jamming Ukrainian communications, degrading GPS guidance,
suppressing drone operations, and exposing the location of enemy emitters.
All of this happens before major kinetic actions even begin.
The Army's Foreign Military Studies Office describes Russian EW integration as layered and persistent.
Buckle up for this pronunciation, because I am going to destroy it.
But systems like the Borisoklovsk-2 and LIR-3 are deployed at multiple levels
down to battalion command and are used to jam UAVs, spoof navigation signals,
intercept radio traffic, and feed targeting data into Russia's broader strike system.
This shaping role is one reason that Western-supplied precision-guided munitions
have struggled in certain sectors.
During the winter of 2022 and 2023, reports from RUSI and CSIS describe Russian EW
effectively neutralizing the guidance systems on JDAM ERs, Excalibur rounds,
and in some cases, even HIMARS-launched GMLRS.
But not all of this capability comes from high-end gear.
Russian units are increasingly using cheap, commercially available Chinese jammers
that you can even buy on AliExpress like this $24 one,
or this one being marketed specifically for FPV drones.
Many civilian drones, like a lot of the commercial off-the-shelf ones that we see a lot of in Ukraine,
operate on 2.4 or 5.8 GHz bands, which are the same as Wi-Fi,
and what many of these cheap jammers target.
I have here something called a HackRF,
which can generate any signal up to 6 GHz by simply setting the frequency and hitting start.
This can be bought on AliExpress and lots of other online vendors,
and it's relatively easy to get and set up.
You can really go hard into the antennas and stuff like amplifiers and all this other thing,
so it's really not that hard.
But I will say, legal note time, you know,
in the US, interfering with radio signals is illegal.
Under FCC Title 47 Sections 302a, b, and 333,
penalties include fines up to $112,500 per violation and up to one year in prison.
These jammers are being used in Ukraine because there's no regulatory oversight in a war zone.
Don't do this in the United States.
We have regulatory oversight, what's left of it,
and if you make the wrong people mad, you're gonna go down pretty hard.
The report also discusses leadership, discipline, and training across Russian units,
a part of the war that's easy to overlook when focusing on drones and artillery.
Russian formations vary widely.
Some, like airborne and Spetsnaz units, are better trained and retain a core of professional cohesion.
Others, especially mobilized conscripts and penal units,
which are just prisoners they pluck out of jail and say,
go do this and you'll be free, they mostly end up dying,
they suffer from poor morale and leadership.
But, according to the Army's analysis, even these lower-tier units are improving.
Training pipelines have become more efficient.
Frontline cohesion increases naturally over time,
especially when and if units survive long enough to build experience.
And, while Russia still lacks a strong NCO Corps like the US has,
junior officers have adapted with an ad hoc leadership structure.
This is not a highly disciplined or well-managed force, but it's a learning force,
and that's what makes it dangerous,
along with their complete disregard for human life, especially their own soldiers.
They also dig into the fact that Russia is now fighting with an artillery-first doctrine
and not maneuver warfare.
They've created Army artillery groups,
which are formations designed to integrate long-range strike capability with drone ISR.
These groups are often the first to engage, not the last.
The model is simple.
Drone spots target, artillery fires, and another drone confirms destruction,
and then you repeat.
This kind of mass fires model contrasts with the US Army's traditional emphasis
on maneuver, speed, and initiative.
And the Army is aware of it.
New doctrine and acquisitions are starting to tilt back toward volume of fire,
not just precision strikes.
The side that can sustain accurate fire over time,
especially with drones doing the spotting, has the advantage.
This brings into sharp focus our ability to produce ammo,
something that has gotten a lot of attention in the last few years,
because it is obvious that at current levels,
we could not sustain a full-fledged fight for very long.
This report is not a rewrite of Army doctrine,
but it does reflect growing concern that the next war may look a lot more like Ukraine
than it does Iraq or Afghanistan.
And across the Army, there are signs that those lessons are starting to drive change.
One of the most immediate areas of reform is in training.
In 2024, the Army began incorporating small drones,
counter drone tactics, and low visibility concealment techniques
into enlisted training pipelines at Fort Moore, Fort Jackson, and Fort Leonard Wood.
Soldiers are now being trained to operate in environments
where overhead drone surveillance is constant,
and where signature management, which is hiding from sensors
that can detect like your radios or any little thing,
is as important as traditional camouflage.
This shift came after Army leaders reviewed battlefield footage from Ukraine
and realized that many standard U.S. infantry movements
would likely be spotted and targeted within minutes.
That realization is now reshaping how the Army trains its force.
At the modernization level, there's a lot of programs happening,
but there's two key ones that are helping to retool the Army's ability
to fight in contested high-tech environments.
Project Lynchpin is developing AI-enabled targeting pipelines
to speed up kill chains, automate threat detection,
and prioritize targets from ISR feeds.
Titan nodes are mobile command and control platforms
designed to integrate satellite data, drone video, radar tracking,
and battlefield sensors into a single picture for fires and maneuver units.
These initiatives are part of a larger effort to adapt to a world
where battlefield transparency is increasing
and decision speed is more important than ever.
Meanwhile, like we mentioned before,
other branches are interpreting the same war in different ways.
The Air Force is dealing with the implications of GPS-guided munitions
failing in contested electromagnetic environments.
That's forcing a rethink of how long-range strike works
when satellites and data links can't be trusted.
The Navy is watching how Ukraine has used drones and long-range missiles
to push back the Russian Black Sea Fleet into near-irrelevance,
despite having no functioning Navy of its own.
That reality is shaping thinking around ship survivability,
autonomous surface vessels, which we have a video coming out on very soon,
and logistics under fire.
Each service is drawing different conclusions,
but there's growing agreement that the battlefield is evolving
faster than legacy institutions can adapt or have been adapting,
and that the tools and tactics that worked over the past two decades
may not hold up against a peer adversary
that's willing to trade blood for adaptation.
Russia's way of war is disorganized, it's brutal, and it's very costly,
but it's also proven to be adaptable,
and that's the part we should be paying attention to.
Because if this is what Russia can do under sanctions,
international isolation, and internal dysfunction,
imagine what a more capable adversary with better logistics and leadership
could accomplish with the same toolkit.
I wrote the script and Savi edited the video.
I wanted to give a special thank you to US Army Europe and Africa Command,
which sent me this embargoed report,
which was extremely helpful and honestly made the video possible.
By the time this comes out, the report will have been published,
and you'll be able to go to taskandpurpose.com
to read the article that we will most definitely have on this.
At least we'll have the video article that you can read,
and it'll be linked there, so go check that out once it's up.
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Other than that, I'm Kyle, your friendly ginger producer man.
You are all dismissed, and I will see you next time.
