Near Peer: Russia (Understanding the Russian Military)

Army Analysis
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Subject matter experts discuss Russian history, current affairs, and military doctrine. Putin’s declarations, advances in military technology, and Russia’s remembrance of the Great Patriotic War are also addressed. “Near Peer: Russia” is the second film in a four-part series exploring America’s global competitors.
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I can tell you a funny family story. This might not go in, but I can tell you.
When my older brother was in kindergarten, he, of course, was taught the Pledge of Allegiance.
And he came home very proudly to our mother to recite it.
And he said, one nation under guard.
And my mother says, what do you mean under guard? It's under God.
And my brother said, no, that's what all the missiles are for.
Smart kid.
I believe it's important that the Army is focused right now on teaching its students about Russia,
the Russian military, and their background, because it's relevant.
It's what we're facing today.
As the Army transitions away from a counterinsurgency coin environment,
we're focusing more on large-scale combat operations.
And one of the two countries that we would potentially face in a large-scale combat operation would be Russia.
So it's important for us to get into the mindset to understand how they operate, their doctrine,
what motivates the Russian military during combat operations.
The value of knowing Russian history for the U.S. military can't be overstated.
It's vitally important that we recognize that the historical past of Russia
shapes its conception of its security interests
and shapes how it thinks about the geopolitical order and its place in that order.
So it's important for U.S. Army folks to know that Russian history is steeped in invasion, in Russian expansion,
and the fact that Russia has a geography that is susceptible to being invaded.
It has no natural borders, no geographic, no borders formed by geography that will keep invading forces out.
And Russians have experienced centuries of invasions from outside groups,
from the Mongols to the Ottomans to the French, the Germans.
The list goes on.
The Poles, the Lithuanians, pretty much every neighbor that Russia has
has tried to take a bite out of the Russian Empire at one point in what time.
The Russians, in terms of history, they frame almost everything they do looking back into their history.
If we look at what President Putin has been saying about Ukraine going back to July of this year
when he published a very lengthy article, he goes way back into history.
We're not talking about just World War II.
We're not just talking about the Soviet Union even.
It goes back to the time of Catherine the Great.
So they're very historically minded, so so much of what they do they will frame in terms of history.
Long ago, the inhabitants of the south-western, historical, ancient Russian lands called themselves Russian and Orthodox.
This was the case until the 17th century, when part of these territories joined the Russian state, and after that.
It seems to us that, in principle, we know everything about this, that we are talking about well-known facts,
but at the same time, in order to understand what is happening today,
to explain the motives of Russia's actions and the goals that we have set for ourselves,
we need to say at least a few words about the history of the issue.
When the Russian Empire had existed for many centuries, it seemed to be stable, conservative,
and even though there was a lot of dissent, a lot of discontent under the surface,
the idea that somehow Lenin's dream of a communist revolution could be achieved seemed very far away.
Of course, World War I changed that.
It caused the collapse not only of the Russian Empire, but the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German Empire.
It could very well have caused the collapse of France and Great Britain as well.
It certainly contributed to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
So, that really changed the landscape, and Lenin was able to capitalize on the discontent,
especially after February 1917, when people took to the streets,
starting with the women, interestingly enough, to demand that the government satisfy their needs.
With the collapse of the czarist regime, that really provided an opening for Lenin and the Bolsheviks,
because they knew how to take advantage of the popular mood.
They were able to establish themselves ultimately through a very difficult and bloody civil war,
because more than any of the other different factions within Russia during the civil war,
they were the ones who were able to convince the most people that they would actually meet their needs.
And we ended up with a union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
with the constituent republics being officially autonomous,
officially part of the union voluntarily,
but actually under the authority of the government in Moscow,
which itself was under the authority of the Communist Party.
Well, Stalin was one of the old Bolsheviks.
He joined the party before the revolution.
He was himself an ethnic Georgian.
In his younger days, he had actually been a seminarian at an Orthodox church institution,
which meant that he understood about a hierarchical structure.
So when Lenin was still alive, Stalin held important positions in the Bolshevik leadership,
and one of them was party secretary.
That is, the person who kept the list of the ranks of who was and was not a member of the party,
which was not a mere secretarial role,
but really something that allowed Stalin to manipulate
what the Communist Party was going to look like in the coming years.
But Lenin consolidated power and aided by a number of key aides,
such as Stalin, Trotsky, and others,
and developed basically a socialist government within Russia at the time.
He had a stroke and died by 1924,
which got to a succession struggle,
which is somewhat informative of what's going on today,
because we look at Putin and say,
who's the designated successor?
Nobody really knows.
We see the same thing happening when Lenin dies.
And so upon his death, Stalin becomes the preeminent power,
and then he will take the Soviet Union forward
in terms of industrializing the Soviet Union very, very rapidly,
collectivizing agriculture,
and then getting them through the Second World War.
Well, Stalin, of course, as both a Bolshevik
and somebody who was attuned to geopolitics,
understood that Nazi Germany was a danger.
He knew that from ideology that fascism, in his view,
was a most dangerous, aggressive form of capitalism.
And, of course, Hitler made no attempt to hide the idea
that he was prepared for conquest,
particularly to the east of Germany and into the Soviet Union.
And for that reason, I think that Stalin really wanted to,
you know, prepare for war.
And it's not really until 1933 that the United States
establishes diplomatic relations with the USSR.
It's a momentous visit.
1918 is welcoming Mr. Litvinov this time.
In Washington, he is met at the station by Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State and other dignitaries.
It's a significant meeting,
and a veritable army of reporters and cameramen are here to record it.
President Roosevelt has sent his personal automobile down
for Mr. Litvinov's use, as well as a fleet of motorcycle cops.
Get to World War II, and there was this marriage of convenience,
if you will, to fight the Nazis.
I ask this Congress for authority and for funds
sufficient to manufacture additional munitions
and war supplies of many kinds to be turned over to those nations
which are now in actual war with aggressor nations.
Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for them
as well as for ourselves.
We shall send in ever-increasing numbers ships, planes, tanks, guns.
That is our purpose and our pledge.
By an overwhelming majority, Congress passed Lend-Lease.
In that case, we see the United States providing significant military aid
to the Soviets under Lend-Lease, much as we did with Great Britain,
moving supplies up into Murmansk way up in the north
to supply the Russians as well.
There's that cooperative period, and it's interesting.
That's a point the Russians will make now, Putin and others will make.
Look how we cooperated so well in fighting Nazism in World War II.
Why can't we have that kind of relationship now?
But they did have a common enemy who was the most immediate threat,
and so the alliance was concluded.
For the most part, the Americans and the Soviets fought in different arenas.
The Americans were fighting in the south, coming in from Italy.
They were fighting in Africa.
They were fighting in Western Europe, landing in Normandy.
They were not fighting on the Eastern Front,
and there was certainly some American help to the Soviet Union in terms of material.
Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the Americans were the ones who were fighting Japan.
In fact, that was another area in which the Americans were carrying all the burden
and the Soviets were carrying none of it.
But on the Eastern Front, the Soviets were the ones who were carrying virtually all the burden,
and it was the Eastern Front that was the most bloody, the most destructive.
From that, the Soviets have come to the conclusion
that they were the ones that really bore the burden of defeating fascism,
and they were the ones who made the most sacrifice.
Those who crushed Nazism in the years of the Great Patriotic War
showed us an example of heroism for all times.
This is the generation of winners, and we will always be equal to them.
Glory to our valiant armed forces!
For Russia! For victory! Hurray!
If they didn't see the statistics, they got surprised.
Dr. Wright, did you mean thousands? No, millions, 27 million people.
It's a combined military and civilian casualties.
During the Stalingrad Battle, which lasted from 1942 to 1943 in the course of six months,
and my father was in that battle for a short period of time
because he was wounded and transported to somewhere else,
one million people died in one single battle.
And as you can imagine, that had a massive impact on the Russian people.
Every single family was affected by losing a family member, multiple family members.
Huge parts of the Soviet Union were wrecked in the process of fighting over the territory.
But the end result, with the Soviet Union actually being on the winning side
and taking over Berlin, capturing Berlin, ending World War II,
has been a huge monumental effort for the Russian people and Soviet people,
and it's propelled Russia into the territory of being a superpower.
After World War II, Russia and the Soviet Union could claim, along with the United States,
to be the two centers of power that helped shape the geopolitical order.
After World War II, countries that were allies, so the Soviet Union on the one side
and the United States, Britain, France, and other Western allies on the other side,
unfortunately their alliance quickly broke down in that the Soviet Union
aggressively asserted its area of influence and started exercising new forms of repression.
As Winston Churchill famously put in the speech that he delivered in Fulton, Missouri,
an iron curtain descended from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea.
And this is a rivalry that escalated in the context of nuclear armaments.
So we have the nuclear arms race and the space race between the Western world,
led by the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc on the other.
We have added another stone to our small pile of knowledge about the complex nucleus of the atom.
We have gained important offensive and defensive knowledge
on the effects of atomic blasts on military equipment.
We have also learned necessary realistic lessons for our own protection.
We have studied defense for the individual, defense for the nation.
As a result of atomic tests, such as Operation Greenhouse,
we are gathering the know-how, the strength to defend that which we prize so highly,
the land that is our heritage, this land that is our home.
And tensions got very, very high, and we've had several really frightening cases,
the Cuban Missile Crisis obviously being the most famous one,
when the world came very close to being annihilated in a nuclear Armageddon.
Of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis is probably the most dangerous point in the U.S. relationship with the USSR,
the closest we may have come to a nuclear conflict.
And as a result of that, we see a little bit of a stepping back,
and that's when we start to see negotiations that lead to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, for instance.
We shall now proceed with the signature of the second agreement,
Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
A hotline is established between Washington and Moscow,
and then other nuclear weapons agreements as a way to manage that competition,
to manage that hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union.
And then there's the detente period in the 1970s when this opens up even more.
Again, we see Nixon not only dealing with China, but we see Nixon dealing with the Soviets as well,
to better manage the relationship, I would say.
And then this all culminates with Gorbachev's ascension to power in the mid-1980s,
where it takes a while for, I think, the U.S. administrations to sort it out,
but they realize something significant is happening here,
and we can attempt to have a whole new type of relationship with Moscow, with the Soviet Union,
then later with the Russian Federation and the successor states.
Mr. Reagan, how's the meeting going?
We haven't started.
Well, how did it go yesterday?
Fine.
Are you getting along?
You can see that, can't you?
And then the period called Perestroika begins,
which means restructuring and transformation in Russia,
and the reforms spill out of control.
And then in August of 1991, there is an attempt at a coup to bring USSR back to its more authoritarian traditions.
That coup fails, and shortly within that time, sort of by the end of 1991,
the Soviet Union crumbles, and out of its crumbling emerge 15 independent states,
which used to be union republics in the Soviet Union.
And in the case of Russia, it already has a legitimate elected president, Boris Yeltsin,
because there were presidential elections on the Russian Federation level.
The talks were held at a history-making time for both countries.
Old habits and stereotypes fade away.
We're searching for new things in Russia and in America.
And what becomes clear is that, well, Yeltsin's going to leave power,
and what he needs is protection for himself and his family for any misdeeds that may have occurred during his rule.
So he gets that from Putin.
And then by New Year's Eve in 1999, Yeltsin resigns the presidency.
Putin, as the prime minister, becomes the president.
And then later in 2000, Putin is actually elected president.
Well, it turned out that in some ways Putin really was a capable successor.
One of the things that he was able to do that Yeltsin was not was to stabilize the economy.
And another thing he was able to do was to rein in the oligarchs.
During this time, he also very shrewdly, gradually was able to engineer total control of this fear of mass communication and the media.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
So Russia—and it happened gradually, almost perceptively.
So it's like, you know, that frog, you know, on the pot on a slow boil that all of media basically by now is fully under Russian government control.
So the last remaining independent outlets after February of 2022 basically ceased to exist or now exist in rudimentary fashion as websites.
So the control of the public sphere, the control of the public sphere through mass media, through official narratives, has been very effective.
I think this really reaches its pinnacle this year when a law is passed.
If you even—if you say the wrong thing about the special military operation, as they call it in Ukraine, you're five years in prison.
You're going to prison.
If you criticize it, you're going to prison for five years.
So he becomes less and less tolerant, if he ever really was tolerant, and he becomes over time more and more isolated from the government and from the people.
My sense is that Putin was a quiet opportunist, that he had made his career fairly successfully, but not overwhelmingly so in the Soviet era, that he had come up to sort of mid-level.
And I think that many of his compatriots of his generation who had been within the ranks of the Communist Party, within the ranks of the Soviet bureaucracy, the KGB, were not able to make that transition.
Putin was.
I swear by the authority of the President of the Russian Federation.
That was lost immediately after the Cold War ended.
And Putin has gradually tried to reconstruct that over time since he's been in power to try to regain that legacy of Russia being a major geostrategic power.
And in some ways, he's been successful at it.
In many other ways, he's actually set the Russians backward.
But Putin's memories of Russia as a great power during the Cold War continue to influence all of his decisions as he tries to reconstruct that power in a very revanchist way.
My sense is that Putin is not trying to reestablish the Soviet Union.
He's trying to reestablish the Russian Empire.
Putin has been talking more and more about a larger empire, talking about how Eastern Europe in general ought to be part of the Russian sphere or possibly even part of their territory.
But I could see that kind of thinking is developing more.
It's as though Putin and his spokespeople are trying to prepare the Russian population to dream about that kind of reestablishment of a Russian empire.
I guess one thing that we could also talk about is Russian shrewdness on global discourse as to finding people that in the Soviet days they used to call useful idiots.
Thank you to the Crimeans and Sevastopolis for their consistent, resolute position, for their clearly expressed will to be together with Russia.
We have done a lot together, but we have to do even more.
We have to solve a lot of problems, but I know, I'm sure, we will overcome everything, we will solve everything, because we are together. Glory to Russia!
Putin's KGB background and KGB's knowledge on how to work slowly and to build those kind of things gradually is very important for us to understand.
Putin's geopolitical goals from the very beginning have been basically threefold.
One is he wants to return Russia to a place on the stage where Russia is a great power and a great power in which all the perks and responsibilities of great power that come with it.
Another component to his geopolitical goals is, and it goes hand in hand, restoring Russian greatness along with the second goal of dissolving the Western powers and dissolving their grip on their position in the global world order.
And then number three is he's also looking to ensure that there is no organized block of nations on Russia's periphery that can threaten Russia.
So those are his three big political geostrategic goals, is return Russia to a great power status, reduce the U.S. influence as a unipolar leader of the global world order, and weaken those organized blocks around its periphery.
Politically, it's going to be a challenge to deal with Putin for the West.
And it could be this comes to the absolutely horrifying things we're seeing the Russian armed forces doing against the Ukrainian people.
It gets down to, can you really sit down with this person, with this government that's doing such things?
So I think there's going to be a need to rebuild or somehow restructure political relationships between the two competitors, rivals, whatever you want to call them.
I don't know if I would call it a cold war, because I don't know if this has all the aspects of a cold war.
And I'm not sure if it's so much an iron curtain that's coming down, but there certainly is a new dividing line of sorts that we're seeing coming into place.
One of the major things that Russia has always looked at is its internal security.
Throughout their history, they felt that they've always been attacked, or foreign adversaries have been looking at that country to attack.
It's such a vast geographic landscape, which covers 11 different time zones.
So it's no surprise that they felt this way.
So with that sense of security or possibly insecurity, depending on how you look at it, that's formed the basis for Russia again throughout history to have such a strong security apparatus, such a strong military.
He's had varying levels of success in attempting to do that.
When you talk about our transition in Afghanistan and Iraq from the counterinsurgency now to the training up for the near-peer fight, has Russia done the same thing?
I would say absolutely. The problem with Russia is because of what they have both internally and then on their borders, they have to be poised to fight both wars.
They have to be ready to fight that counterinsurgency in Chechnya and other parts of the country, potentially in the Caucasus with the instability there.
And then, of course, in their mind at least, NATO was always looking to attack them through various means, and you've got China on the other side.
So they have to prepare really for both fights, which is extremely taxing on their military.
So as we look at Russia and what their training model is for how they want to employ their force, most of the Russian exercises that we see, and they do big exercises.
Every year they do a combined exercise that brings in up to over 100,000-plus troops, and they exercise their operational commands.
So when we see the Russians training and we see what their expectations are for how they can employ their force to secure their national objectives,
they're looking at combining the joint forces of their operational districts to blunt an invasion,
and then as an invasion is blunted, to be able to counterattack and repel invaders from Russian territory.
So the Russian command structure differs slightly from, especially in terminology, from the U.S. doctrine.
So they start and they have their chief of defense, and then they have their general staff and their chief of the general staff, and then down into their services.
They have several services, the land forces, the air forces.
The airborne services are a separate branch of the military for them.
They have their strategic rocket force, and then their national guardsmen.
From there, they're broken into military districts.
There's five military districts spread throughout Russia, and under the military districts then start to fall their armies, their tank armies, their combined arms armies,
and under that then they have army corps, regiments, battalions, and so forth.
So in terminology, they have kind of the same structure.
In general, Russian units are about two-thirds of what a U.S. unit would be in comparable size.
So if you look at a Russian battalion tactical group, it may be anywhere from 400 to 500 soldiers,
about two-thirds the size of a standard U.S. combat battalion.
Same with brigades, same with divisions, and so forth.
And when you get up into the higher echelons, a combined arms army is almost the equivalent of a U.S. corps.
A Russian army itself is about the equivalent of a division, and a Russian brigade is not that much bigger than a couple U.S. battalions.
In the past, they had vast numbers of units that were manned to a certain percentage,
with the expectation that there would be time to mobilize and fill out those units as time dictated.
Now they have realized the importance of having ready units that are immediately available on a permanent ready status,
so they've tried to convert several of their units into what we call battalion tactical groups
and make sure that they have a set of battalion tactical groups that are permanently ready with conscripted soldiers,
professional soldiers who are paid and not reliant upon conscripted soldiers who are there for a year.
And is what we're seeing is that they're not as flexible.
And this really gets into some of the difference between how the U.S. Army and the Russian Army's command structure works.
So in the Russian military, they're very top brass heavy.
There's over 900 generals throughout their ministry of defense, compared to about 653 U.S. generals or flag officers.
What ends up happening at the lower ranks is Russian officers do most of the work of what U.S. non-commissioned officers do.
The doctrine for the Russian air defense systems is that it's integrated down to the battalion tactical group.
And that way, these battalion tactical groups have an umbrella of air defense over them from long range, medium and short range.
This is, in theory, supposed to give these battalion commanders the ability to keep moving under this umbrella to negate NATO's air assets.
Russia has a number of weapons systems that are capable, equal or even outpace the U.S. military's ground weapons systems.
And to start, I would focus on their small arms.
So the AK-47, AK-74 variants, their small arms are a larger caliber than our M4 weapons.
Additionally, they don't take a lot of maintenance.
So this is important because of the quality of soldiers that the Russian military has.
In an army that's mainly made up of conscripts that don't receive a lot of training,
having a weapon system that they don't have to really know or take care of too much gives them a little bit of an advantage.
Additionally, the Russian anti-tank weapons have been seen to be pretty on par with the American javelin.
The cornet was used by Hezbollah exclusively in their war with Israel to great effect
and had, I believe it was more than a 50% success rate in penetrating the Israeli armor.
In the field of air defense, Russia's been really good at developing systems like the S-400 or the Buk system, which have been proven to be very capable.
Russia is among the world's largest satellite launchers.
It's actually completed the GLONASS program, which is Satellite Navigation System.
So it is developing its own fifth generation jet fighter, which is the so-called Su-57, or Sukhoi, Sukhoi-57.
And it's built the biggest floating nuclear power plant.
As well as, they've been bragging about their hypersonic missiles at different times.
And Putin has recently announced that they successfully test-launched the so-called Satan-2 Sarmat missile, which the Russian military will deploy by the end of the year.
And they even mentioned about the fact that that can reach the United States and England.
They're very proud of their tanks, so the T-14 Armata, at least in theory, should be pretty close to our Abrams or other type of tanks.
And finally, in artillery, I mean, that is a major part of their military doctrine, is using those long-range fires.
So that, I would say, is still at least close to a near-peer type of equipment that they have.
Russia has poured their energies into tactical nuclear weapons.
They've also devised a number of exotic weapons.
They've tried to create hypersonic weapons that can defeat our ballistic missile systems.
And they also have some of these systems that we're not sure work very well, but they have some nuclear-powered cruise missiles.
And they're developing a nuclear-powered torpedo that has potentially unlimited range and can loiter and maneuver in ways that get around our anti-ballistic missile defenses in ways that we can't defend.
Russia possesses, as of 2022, about 6,000 nuclear warheads.
It's the largest stockpile in the world as of this year.
If the Russian homeland specifically is at threat, or if major pieces of the Russian military in Russia have been defeated or are subject to defeat,
they plan to use nuclear weapons, tactical or otherwise, even on their own homeland, to destroy any type of threat to the potential downfall of the Russian regime.
So, most definitely, we think that Russian nuclear doctrine is associated with territorial defense, security of the regime, and the security of the Russian homeland itself.
We have corps commanders, we have battalion commanders, we have regimental commanders, we have company commanders.
What starts to make the difference is, as I had said earlier, is their ability to actually command.
So, the Russian army is very focused, heavy on a centralized command, that that army commander sends his order down, and it's filtered to the corps who sends it down the line.
What I believe they miss is their ability to really have the commanders underneath understand their higher commander's intent.
That's lacking in the Russian military.
In the U.S. military, we believe it's the old adage of everybody two levels down understands your job in order to step up if the need arises.
All that being said, what the Russians have developed in terms of their capability gives them the opportunity to invade countries on their periphery.
Several of those countries are NATO members, which could get us into a conflict because it triggers an Article 5 response for NATO.
So, we have to be mindful all the time that Russia, for whatever reason, it concocts, and some of it may be pretext, some of it may be misunderstandings.
But any series or cascade of misunderstandings or mistakes that could lead us into a conflict in Europe, and potentially this is mostly centered around the Baltic nations where Russia has massive numbers of troops and force and has close proximity.
We have to prepare for that type of conflict, what we call fait accompli type of scenario in which the Russians can mass potentially 100,000 troops with its concomitant number of mechanized vehicles and so forth.
And within 24, 48, or 72 hours, they might be able to overrun a chunk or all of one of the Baltic nations.
And that's the scenario that I think the United States and NATO are preparing for most importantly and place the highest priority on.
Because NATO may take days, weeks, months to marshal a force that could remove Russia from a NATO nation, but that would be very costly and it could result in a nuclear exchange, and that type of scenario is fraught with a lot of risk.
This also means that we have now in a situation of a new Iron Curtain, whether it has been officially called that or not is at this point immaterial.
What is important is that we have again a situation where travel and free flow of ideas between Russia and the rest of the world has become very difficult, if not impossible.
Russia is actively seeking to isolate itself and the satellites it controls from the rest of the world.
So yes, very much so, we have the Iron Curtain back unfortunately.
I think the most important thing to understand about Russia for the U.S. military is that Russia is an enduring power.
It's had its ups and downs, it's been up against the ropes, it's been a major global power, but Russia is a resilient nation.
It's got vast territory, it's got immense human capital, it has natural resources, it has a rich history of surviving and exerting its influence across the world.
Those are just part of Russia's DNA that just have to be accounted for.
So we can never wish Russia away.
There are a lot of indicators that show Russia is getting weaker and maybe should not be as much of a priority,
but we can't take Russia off the table when it comes to considering what they are capable of doing and the kinds of things that they can bring to the table.
We have to be mindful that they are an enduring threat and they will continue to be a threat and that threat will fluctuate over time,
but they have the capacity, the capability to resurrect themselves at any moment.
And we need to be prepared for it and not wish away the Russia threat because that will come back to haunt us in a big way.
It's hard to say what's going to happen because Putin really does have all the reins of power in his hands.
It does, in many ways, come down to what he wants.
It doesn't mean necessarily that if he were to give orders, they will necessarily be carried out.
I'm thinking about extreme orders to use nuclear weapons, let's say.
But Putin is not prepared to lose.
It was unprovoked, but this is what Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed on Ukraine.
As the sun came up this morning.
A missile striking an industrial park in western Ukraine.
A helicopter assault on an airport outside of Kiev.
Close, intense fighting.
And there are civilian casualties.
The Russian military has begun a brutal assault on the people of Ukraine.
Without provocation, without justification, without necessity.
This is a premeditated attack.
The history of this area is written.
Putin's choice to make a totally unjustifiable war on Ukraine will have left Russia weaker and the rest of the world stronger.
Volunteer fighters, civilians armed with assault rifles patrolling central Kiev, ready to defend their country and protect their families.
As Russia increases its airstrikes on Ukraine this week, the U.S. continues to support Ukraine through military aid and providing warships to Poland.
A neighboring country to Ukraine and a NATO member.
The U.S. has been very clear that they will support Ukraine, but will only provide military personnel to NATO allies.
A destroyer from the U.S. Navy being in the port of Gdynia.
I assure you of that. It's meant to send a clear message.
On the collapse of Russian ground forces in northeastern Ukraine.
Kiev's blistering counteroffensive pushes on, but these troops not far from the border with Russia, well, they seem to have a message there from Moscow.
The Russian retreat is one of their biggest defeats since the war began in February.
Ukraine's president says so far this month, 6,000 square kilometers of once-occupied territory has been retaken from Russian forces.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is calling up reservists to fight in the war in Ukraine.
He made the announcement during a rare address to the nation.
The defense minister says the partial mobilization will involve drafting about 300,000 personnel.
The decision comes as Russian troops lose ground to Ukraine's counteroffensive in the northeast.
Meanwhile, Moscow-backed separatists in four Ukrainian regions have said they'll hold a referendum to become part of Russia.
President Putin has announced the annexation of four regions of Ukraine that are controlled by Russian forces.
In the biggest seizure of territory in Europe since the Second World War.
His declaration follows staged referendums in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Luhansk and Donetsk.
They were denounced by Ukraine and its allies.
President Putin warned the West he would protect the territories with all forces and means at Russia's disposal.
Putin said he had given an order to his military to be prepared to increase the readiness of his nuclear forces
if the U.S. and NATO tried to block his takeover of Crimea.
Now retired, General Philip Breedlove was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe when Russia took over Crimea.
Was there ever any indication that Vladimir Putin was prepared to use his nuclear weapons in any way?
Vladimir Putin said himself that he considered raising the alert status of his nuclear force.
He had considered it. He said it himself.
He wants to be taken seriously. He wants people to pay attention to him.
I think that his posturing for months before the invasion of Ukraine was an attempt to get the West to take him seriously.
He hoped that the West would sell out Ukraine because they were afraid of Putin.
But that didn't happen. Well, he's gotten the world to take him seriously.
