How the French Army Compares to the British Army

Army Analysis
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33 Video Views·Jun 3, 2026
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis video analyzes the military capabilities of the UK and France, noting that while France leads in modernization and digitization, both nations suffer from critical shortages in mass and industrial capacity. Despite high professional standards, both armies are ill-equipped for the attrition of high-end conventional warfare against a peer competitor, reflecting a post-Cold War reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Hi, last week I posted a video about the British Army and the video was fairly successful and in
the comments both on YouTube and also on Twitter, people said, hey, this video was really great,
but could you do a comparison of the British Army with the French Army? Well, that's what this video
is. Now, the easiest way of putting it is that the British and the French armies are different in
some ways and similar in others. And honestly, I think that the ways in which they are similar
is more interesting and more important than the ways in which they are different.
Why more important? Because the ways in which they are similar is bad news for both armies
with respect to their ability to do the one thing that's on everybody's mind these days,
which is their ability to fight a major land war and conventional high-end conventional
warfare against a peer or near-peer competitor such as Russia. So, I'm going to divide this
video into four parts. First part, I'm going to talk very briefly about my credentials. Basically,
why should you be listening to me? Second part, I'm going to talk about why or how these two
armies are different. The third part, I'm going to talk about how these armies are similar.
And the fourth part, I'm going to try to wrap it up with some conclusions about where we are
and whether or not the differences and similarities actually even matter and how best both armies
should really move forward. My name is Michael Shurkin and welcome to my YouTube channel,
Pax Americana, a conversation about world affairs, global conflict, military strategy,
and anything else that happens to be on my mind. So, let's get into it. So, first part, credentials.
With regard to the British military, I've been following the British military now for many,
many years. I worked on them both at the RAND Corporation and I also wrote some stuff on my own.
So, I've got some publications at RAND and also have written for things like the Wavell Room about
British military, the British military policy, etc. I also happen to be an associate fellow of
the Royal United Services Institute, which is the preeminent UK defense think tank, and I
participated this summer at their annual Land Warfare Conference in London, which means to say
that I am participating in, albeit from a distance, in the current discussions about the state of the
British army and the future of the British army, etc. As for the French army, I confess I know a
great deal more about the French military and army than I do about the British, simply because I've
focused much more intensively on the French at this point. I think it's fair to say that I'm one
of the, if not the, leading American experts in the French military. And I've written several
studies for RAND Corporation, as well as for publications such as War on the Rocks and the
Texas National Security View, all about the French military. These include, for RAND, I led a study
of French-networked or French approaches to network warfare. I wrote a history of French
coin doctrine. The most important of these, by far, is the study that I co-authored at RAND with
the magnificent Stephanie Pizzard under the title Strong, Allez, Stretch, Thin, which is a study of
the strengths and weaknesses of the French military that was commissioned by the United States
Department of Defense. This study, which, by the way, you can find on the RAND website, and I put
links in the description to that study, as well as everything else, including the study on French
approaches to network warfare. But the Strong, Allez, Stretch, Thin was very well received by
the highest echelons of the French military. General Burkhardt, who is the chair of the joint
staff, told me in person that he thought very highly of the study, and he agreed with the
conclusions. The French think so highly of my work on them, and my work on the French military,
and my efforts to basically be the explainer of the French military to an American audience.
Knight of the Order of Merit, National Order of Merit, which means that from henceforth,
you should refer to me as Sir Michael, or if you are a Monty Python fan, Brave Sir Michael.
I'm joking, of course. So let's talk now about the differences between the two militaries.
The first obvious difference is size. At this point, the French army is roughly
almost twice as large as the British army. The British army has about 73,000 regular soldiers,
plus about 24,000 reservists. The French army has about 130 or 120, depending on what you read,
thousand regular soldiers, plus about 25,000 reservists. Of those regular soldiers,
the French consider the size of its deployable force to be about 77,000. I've read no
comparative number, comparable number in any British army documents I've read in terms of
what they consider their deployable force. I'm not entirely sure what the French even mean by that,
the point simply being that the French army is significantly larger than the British army.
It's also fair to say that the French army is in better shape than the British army. I insist,
it's not better. That's not my argument, but rather it's just in better shape. I think a
classic example of that is the relative success of French army modernization programs compared to
British army modernization programs. In the previous video about the British army, I talked
about the Future Rapid Effects System, or FREZ, which was this major program in the 2000s, which
was designed to replace obsolete British armored vehicles with up-to-date modern armored vehicles,
all of which were supposed to be stuffed to the gills with all the highest technology.
FREZ failed, and the only bit of FREZ, as far as I know, that survives is the Ajax infantry fighting
vehicle, which is expected to enter service soon. I'm sure the Ajax is going to be a phenomenal
vehicle, but the whole story, the saga of its development and production, it was just fraught
with lots of problems and delays, etc. It's very problematic. Now, some people have also said,
for instance, some of the comments to my video said that the Boxer, which is a German-designed
vehicle that the British are also building in, and now is coming into service with the British
army, that Boxer also is a legacy of FREZ. I don't know if that's true. I always thought of
Boxer as being basically something that they resorted to, to replace a capability gap that's
left by the failure of FREZ. Either way, I just want to note that Boxer exists, and there is
apparently some British DNA in the whole program, which arguably dates to FREZ. I don't know. You
should ask Nicholas Drummond, who is the Boxer expert in the UK. Now, the French in general have
done much, much better with their modernization efforts. For instance, France leads the way when
it comes to digitization and the implementation of information networks and network warfare
technologies, and the development of a whole family of armored vehicles. I'm thinking of the VBCI,
which entered into service, I believe, in 2006. The Jaguar, the Griffin, next is going to come
something called Serval, and then in the meantime, they're working on modernizing the Clermont
Battle Tank. They're going to modernize, they're intending to modernize 200 of the repair. I
mentioned that just in contrast, because I believe that the British plans to modernize the Challenger
2. They're only going to modernize something like 140, 149 of them, so they're going to end up with
hopefully they're going to keep the rest, but we're talking roughly the same numbers.
If I'm going to talk about modernization, I also have to talk about something called
the Scorpion Program, which dates to 2014. I mean, French Army network, their implementation
of network warfare technologies predates that by a lot. I wrote about it in my studies,
if you want to learn more about the history of this, please go read that. I think it's very
interesting. But Scorpion represents a scaling up of these efforts, and so the development of a
much more comprehensive all-force kind of effort. Scorpion technically is an acronym. It refers to
the Synergie du Contact renforcée par la Paris Valence et l'Infravalorisation, whatever.
Infravalorisation is completely untranslatable into English, but I'm willing to bet that there's
a single French officer who actually knows that that's what Scorpion stands for, because they
picked the word and then invented a way to say the acronym. Either way, it doesn't really matter.
Just think of it as Scorpion. They've got a cool logo complete with the Scorpion on,
it's pretty cool. Scorpion is a very large program. At the heart of Scorpion is a digital
information architecture, complete with new radios and new battlefield management software,
as well as newly designed vehicles that are basically built around Scorpion. VBCI predates
Scorpion and implements the pre-Scorpion technology, but of course they've adapted
everything and brought it online. So you should think of VBCI as being part of the Scorpion
program, even though technically it predates that. Same is true with Leclerc, which they've
modified it already so that it's got all the latest tech on it. Leclerc is also very much
it's not excluded from Scorpion, even though it's technically not part of it. Lastly, Scorpion is
an effort to rethink force structure and tactics in order to optimize the use of the new technology.
So they're really thinking about how do you redesign a company and how do you fight the
company, etc. Scorpion, by all measures, is successful. And I think it's fair to say that
the French army is really ahead of all of the other NATO armies, including possibly the United
States, when it comes to the development and implementation at a comprehensive level of a
comprehensive modernization program in terms of information technology, network warfare, etc.
I think it's true based on what I read that they are really second only to the Israelis in terms
of the implementation of this stuff. Now, I want to address that Scorpion and the associated
technology can do several neat things. It's got some cool tricks to it. One is something called
The idea is that the network monitors the systems on French army vehicles so that
these vehicles send data to the network regarding the systems on the vehicle. Things that it's going
to run out of, things that are going to break, etc. This is supposed to help the logistical effort
because this enables the army to have a precise understanding of what vehicle is going to need
what kind of parts and when, so that they could get precisely those parts to the right place at
the right time. This means that they can send fewer parts because it can be much more precise.
So this is supposed to help the whole logistical effort. I think that the real star of the show,
though, is the network and the battlefield management software, which, of course,
features Blue Force Tracker and Slew-to-Cue technology. Slew-to-Cue is the ability of
the idea is that your tanker vehicle or whatever, your maybe Caesar howitzer, you get the firing
data from the network. The network tells you the target is there and the cannon on your vehicle
will automatically slew and position itself to aim precisely at that target. It will not fire
automatically. The French, as a matter of policy, do insist that they have what's called the man
in the loop, the idea that somewhere in this chain, there's going to be somebody who has to
press a button or pull a trigger such that, you know, it's not firing automatically. Although I
did ask a French general who was in charge of Scorpion for a while whether or not there was
maybe like maybe on the back of the box in the tank, you can flip a switch and the whole thing
will go fully automatic. He actually did not answer that question, but he did say that he
thought that fully automated warfare was completely inevitable simply because fully automatic warfare,
fully automating the system, would save a lot of time. In some contexts, that kind of time savings,
like squeezing out seconds out of your reaction time, could be critical. Anyways, be that as it
may, all of this is supposed to enable something called collaborative warfare, which is, I think,
you can describe it as the holy grail of all the Western militaries. The idea behind collaborative
warfare is that, you know, you're out on the battlefield and you've got all these different
elements because, of course, everything is combined arms these days. You've got the howitzers
and infantry fighting vehicles and you've got the tanks and you've got drones and fighter jets and
all this kind of stuff and infantry guys and the idea is that all of them are networked, right?
All of them are sharing information and so if there's information about, let's say, a threat
pops up, maybe it's an enemy tank or maybe it's just some guy on a roof with an anti-tank guided
missile who's prepared to take a shot at something, he's seen, he's located, the information is shared
on the network, the network basically delivers to, helps decide very quickly what is the best
weapons platform or weapons system that can take a shot at that threat and neutralize the threat
and then, you know, again with pseudo-Q then, you know, somebody's turret is going to automatically
move over to take a precise shot. Collaborative warfare is something that all militaries are
working on. I believe that with the implementation of Scorpion, the French are now simply ahead of
the game with everybody else. The British are also implementing etc. but the French are simply
ahead at a comprehensive level. Now why has France been more successful? I think that there are two
major reasons. The first reason has to do with the predictability and stability of French military
budgets and it has to do with also how the French manage their budgets and their spending
so that even when the French military was going through severe budget cuts, which was the case up
until about I think 2014-2015 when around then when the French stopped cutting and started to
reverse the curves and started to spend more money on defense, because of the five-year military
programming laws etc. I think that all the people involved in weapons development and weapons
procurement had just better visibility with regard to how much money they had and how much money
they were going to have. I believe that this is a key ingredient to a successful modernization program.
The other major reason why the French have been successful where the British have
failed, at least with FREZ, is that the French have done a much better job of making decisions
about their requirements and then sticking to those decisions. Whereas the British have had a
hard time making decisions and then often after they make a decision they've changed their mind
and changed the requirements mid-course, which is very problematic. Now this does not mean, and I
want to stress this, this does not mean that the French made the right decisions. These decisions
are based on your understanding of not just your current requirements but your future requirements.
They are calculated bets that you're making. As far as I'm aware the decisions that the French
army made, that I'm speaking about here, decisions that they made if not prior to 2014 then at least
prior to 2022. In other words, before the French army shifted its focus to to focus single-mindedly
on high-end conventional warfare and potentially fighting the Russians.
The requirements of the day, what they were thinking when they made the decisions,
which you can now see reflected in their new vehicle fleet, had to do with the French calculus
of where a happy medium was in terms of risk and requirements. They didn't want to tailor
their force to be able to fight. They didn't want to optimize it for the lower end of the
conflict spectrum or the higher end of the conflict spectrum. They aimed instead for
what they call the middle segment or the segment media. So the result is a fleet of vehicles that
they intended to be light enough to be deployed to let's say Africa. Not just deployed to Africa
but also sustained in Africa, particularly given the French military's relatively poor logistical
capabilities, but heavy enough to survive on a battlefield in conventional warfare.
Now the word enough I think is very, very important. The U.S. military does not like to
buy things that are good enough. They want optimal solutions and they can often afford
to have optimal solutions. So they can afford to look for optimal solutions for things.
The French have, I think, much more modest ambitions because they have much more limited
means. So as a result, they're satisfied with enough. Of course, whether or not something is
good enough for a certain context is a risk. It's a risk, they're betting. But that's what
they're thinking of. As a result, the most obvious way you can see this in the new vehicle fleet is
the fact that they're all wheeled. The VBCI is wheeled, the Jaguar, the Griffon, the Cerval,
they all have wheels. The only things now in the French army inventory that still have
Caterpillar trucks, so they're the main battle tank. And I believe that they still have some
of their old AUF-1 self-propelled howitzers from the 1980s. I think they still have some of them
in their inventory, some of them in their patrol units. But those, I believe, are slated to be
phased out by the Caesar howitzer, a self-propelled howitzer, which is on a truck chassis with wheels.
Wheels are optimal for deploying to places like Africa. They are not optimal for slugging out
the Russians in Ukraine. And we've seen this in the Ukraine war, that the wheeled vehicles have
suffered, have not done as well as the truck vehicles, given the snow, given the mud,
the very difficult conditions. But that's what you see. And so when the French now,
they're thinking about restoring their capability to do high-end conventional warfare, they're
trying to do it with a force that ultimately is designed for something else. It's designed for
the middle segment rather than the force that perhaps they would have designed if they had
been focused on conventional warfare 20, 30 years ago, when they're making decisions that
are now reflected in their vehicle fleet. Okay, so let's talk now about how the British and the
French armies are similar. In the previous video about the French army, I talked about the British
army. I talked about how the Ukraine war has revealed certain capabilities to be essential
on the modern battlefield. And these are capabilities that Western armies, including
the British, including the French, either do not really have, because they're new, or have,
but are really more legacies from the Cold War and are capabilities that they've disinvested from,
meaning they don't have a lot of it, or what they have just is simply inadequate or too few,
etc. And so the idea is that all Western militaries are in the same kind of boat,
and they need to boost these capabilities. And they either fill the capability gaps or enhance
the capabilities that they have, and they need to do it really quickly. So what am I talking about?
I'm talking about air defense capabilities. I'm talking about drones, counter-drone capabilities.
I'm talking about ISR, counter-ISR, long-range fires, meaning tube and rocket artillery,
electronic warfare, and I think also certain engineering capabilities like breaching
capabilities and bridging capabilities. These things are equally true of both the British and
French armies. So both of them really are inadequate in this regard. Both, for example,
have howitzers and self-propelled howitzers, but really very few. Both of them have multiple
launch rocket systems, but very few. I think actually the British have more than the French.
Both of them only have a few main battle tanks, roughly about 200. Both of them, by the way,
neither is capable of building new main battle tanks because the assembly lines closed a long
time ago. Both armies also have too little, they don't have enough ammunition, they don't have
enough missiles. The result being that neither would last very long in any kind of war, and both
now I think are struggling both to restore their own stocks while also trying to keep ammunition
in the pipeline for the Ukrainians to use. I believe that the French defense industry is
healthier than the British defense industry simply as a result of long-standing French
industrial policy. That being said, neither defense industry has much in the way of industrial
capacity. They're making things, but they can't really crank them out in very large numbers,
which would be necessary in the event of a major war. To give you an example, the Caesar howitzers,
self-propelled howitzers, right now, after a lot of effort trying to ramp up the capacity,
the manufacturer of the Caesar, which is Nexter, can make 70 of them a year. But that's only now,
just a few years ago, they could make much fewer than that. I don't remember the numbers, but
70 is not really a lot. Now what about 155-millimeter howitzer shells, which we have
all learned, because of the Ukraine war, are absolutely essential. This is like oxygen for
an army engaged in a conventional fight. My source on the French and their ability to
manufacture these shells is Jean-Dominique Merchet, this man here. For those of you who
are not French and probably are not familiar with him, Jean-Dominique Merchet is one of France's
leading journalists, analysts, and commentators on international relations, national security,
and the defense establishment, French military. He's really, really very good. This is a book,
Are We Ready for War?, which came out in January of 2024. Merchet says that he does not know how
many howitzer shells the French can manufacture a year because the number is classified. He does
say that Nexter, which makes these shells for the French army, recently has stated that they
intend to double the rate of shell production to 100,000 per year by 2025, which suggests that
they are now making 50,000 per year. He also reports that the French army itself says that
they can sustain a rate of howitzer fire of at most 9,000 howitzer shells per year,
given the current rate of production, which he notes is roughly the same number of howitzer
shells that the Ukrainian army fires each and every day, meaning that France isn't producing
nearly enough howitzer shells. What about the British? Again, I don't know how many howitzer
shells the British are capable of producing. That number probably is classified. I do know that the
Ministry of Defense has thrown a lot of money recently at the BAE, which is a company that
makes them for the British army, in order to scale up the production of shells. What are the numbers?
I don't know. I suspect they're not really high enough. Another big similarity with the two
armies is that neither really has the means to fight a large war because they just simply lack
in mass. They just don't have numbers. They have too few stuff, right? Too few things. In the last
video, I described the British army as a bonsai tree. The French army is itself a bonsai tree.
It's a better tended bonsai tree. I would argue it's a little bit larger, but it's still a bonsai
tree. So could Britain fight a major ground war? I don't really think so. Could France fight a
major ground war? Yeah. Mercier says that the French army could manage a front of 80 kilometers,
which sounds a lot, but really isn't. It's certainly a far cry from what the French army
was capable of during the Cold War or prior to World War II. Would these armies be of any use?
I think that they would be, but not necessarily for long. I mean, both armies are really counting
on quality over quantity. They're betting over that throwing money at technology or
a training, right, which is going to give them, like, they've got all these really great things
and these very well-trained soldiers. That's going to get them somewhere, and that's really
going to help them. And there's some truth to that, right? You know, like a Caesar howitzer
or an AES-90 or one of these new boxer howitzers that the British army are getting,
they're clearly better than a certain number of inferior howitzers. But what exactly is the ratio?
And is it enough to make up to vastly superior numbers that the enemy might be able to throw at
them? And is it a better invest of the money? It's really very hard to know. Perhaps after
the Ukraine war, we can analyze the data and we could say, you know, because the Ukrainians have
maybe a dozen Caesar, plus they've got some German self-propelled howitzers that are supposed
to be excellent, you know, maybe you can see that, okay, each one of these things is worth
X number of inferior things, and then you could kind of do the math and figure out
which is the better buy. It's really hard to know, but I don't think we know at the moment.
I do strongly believe that pound for pound, both armies are very good, and both armies would cut
the Russians to pieces. I will bet money on any British or French infantry squad or company or
company over nearly any conceivable adversary, just because of their training, their skills.
They're really, really very good, both of them. I think the training and professionalism really
counts for a lot. We saw this in the Falklands war, where in the Falklands war, you had a
relatively small number of highly trained British professionals go up against Argentine conscripts.
That was hardly a fair fight, which is exactly what you want. You don't want a fair fight
in combat. And I also think that the French, with their emphasis on maneuver and speed and having
lower ranking officers take the initiative, I think they would dance around the Russians and
just slaughter them. But then they'd run out of ammunition, and they might run out of ammunition
really very quickly. And then at some point, the Russians could just drown them en masse,
just overwhelm them with the shared numbers. We like to laugh at the images of these,
the Russians sending T-62s into battle in Ukraine. T-62s, of course, being these
ancient Cold War vintage things that are crazily wildly obsolete on the modern battlefield. But
it's not funny anymore if you've got nothing left in your inventory to stop the T-62s,
other than maybe throwing rocks at them. So at that point, the T-62 actually becomes a significant
threat to your own side. The reality is that both armies reflect the fact that between the end of
Cold War, and relatively recently, neither country took seriously the possibility of ending
up in a large war, and certainly not one in Europe. As a result, they're really just not
equipped to do that. So let's agree that neither army can handle a big war, at least for any length
of time. Although I would argue that the French, because of the larger size, would do a little bit
better. But so what? So now we get to part four. Does it really matter in the end? Do they really
need to be able to do this? Nuclear weapons still exist. The Russians still have nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War, the French calculated that even though they had a gigantic army at the time,
that a war with the Soviets sooner rather than later was going to end up going nuclear. So they
didn't need an army that could actually fight the Soviets for the duration, because there would be
no duration. There would be nuclear war, or hopefully there would be some sort of off-ramp
that both sides would find before the thing went nuclear and the world ended.
If the British and French are not fighting the Russians, then who are they actually fighting?
What plausible scenario is there actually that either country would find themselves in a major
land war against whom and where and when? And also, neither country is likely for the foreseeable
future to do what it takes to fix this situation, which is to spend a lot of money, many, many
billions of dollars, to turn their armies into things that are actually capable of getting into
and sustaining and fighting large ground wars in Europe against somebody like the Russians or I
don't know who. It's just not going to happen. So I want to leave you with some concluding remarks
from Jean-Dominique Marchais. And he's, of course, talking about France and the French army,
but I believe that what Jean-Dominique Marchais says is equally applicable to the United Kingdom
and the British army. Marchais calls for not spending more money, but for greater resilience.
And he talks about the French in 1914, and he talks about how France just barely hung on at
the first Battle of the Marne, and then afterwards was able to sort of absorb the horrible losses of
1914 and then to adapt. He says that it adapted, it built up the kind of force and quality and
quantity that it needed. And he says that France's industry and its people also responded
beautifully and with a remarkable sense of unity and purpose. Now France today, he says, and I'm
quoting, we must therefore cultivate our faculty for resilience, but above all for adaptation,
flexibility, and elasticity, first of all, intellectually. To do that, Marchais writes,
we have permanently to encourage, to teach, to debate, and to listen to those who think
outside the box, that comfortable box that ensures good careers and the financing of research
contracts. Further, Marchais concludes, it's not for war that we must be ready, because that is
impossible. Rather, what one must be ready for is, quote, the possibility of having to adapt quickly
and well to a radically new situation. This, he adds, might be war, but it also goes for other
major threats, such as pandemics, natural or technological catastrophes, or economic crashes.
If you like this video, thank you very much. Please like and subscribe. You know the drill.
Also, please check out in the description, I put links to various articles I've written about the
British and the French armies, as well as my LinkedIn, my Twitter, to my website, michaelsharker.com
and my Substack. And if you have any recommendations, if there's something that you'd like
me to talk about in the future, add them to your comments. I've had a lot of good
recommendations, so I've got a lot of stuff in the pipeline as a result. Thank you very much.
