Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979 (Documentary)

Army Analysis
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Christmas 1979. Soviet armor pours across the Afghan border towards Kabul as helicopters secure the mountain passes through the Hindukush mountains. In Moscow, the Politburo has decided to save Afghanistan’s communist government from collapse. Afghan rebels have taken up arms against the unpopular regime and control most of the countryside. But the Red Army leadership doubts it can pacify the country - so why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?
Christmas 1979. Soviet armor pours across the Afghan border towards Kabul
as helicopters secure the mountain passes through the Hindu Kush mountains.
In Moscow, the Politburo has decided to save Afghanistan's communist government from collapse.
Afghan rebels have taken up arms against the unpopular regime and control most of the
countryside. But the Red Army leadership doubts it can pacify the country.
So why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?
Afghanistan in the 1970s is a country with a long history as a crossroads of empire
and of internal instability. After World War II, there's a period of relative stability
under King Zahir Shah, whose government introduces moderate reforms to avoid
angering conservatives. He also suppresses those demanding too much change,
including Afghan communists who already have contact with the Soviet KGB.
In 1964, King Zahir introduces a more liberal constitution that allows political parties.
At the same time, Kabul universities become a hotbed of political activity,
from moderates to monarchists to Islamists and communists.
The communists create the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, or PDPA. Among their founding
members are Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, and Nur Muhammad Taraki, all of whom work with the KGB.
They have strong admiration for the Soviet transformation of its Central Asian republics.
They want radical change, but project a more moderate line in public, and still only attract
support from a few urban elites and Soviet-trained army officers. The few communists there were
also split along ethnic and ideological lines in 1967, with a more hardline group under Taraki
and a more moderate group under Karmal. While some Afghans look to socialism,
others look to political Islam. Not necessarily radical Islam either. Educated Islamist Afghans
debate what a modern Islamic society should be like. The King even encourages Islamic activities
to contain Marxist influence. The most important Islamic group is also founded at a university,
Jamiat-e-Islami, which preaches a conservative form of Islam inspired by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.
Afghanistan's relations with the wider world are also in flux after 1945. In 1960, Soviet-equipped
Afghan forces clash with neighbouring Pakistan over the status of cross-border territory
inhabited by Afghanistan's biggest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Pakistan wants a stable and neutral
Afghanistan so it can focus on its conflict with India. Kabul also looks abroad for humanitarian
aid from both sides of the Cold War. Officially non-aligned, Afghanistan leans heavily on Soviet
aid, including for infrastructure, but engineers and other advisors from the US, West Germany,
and elsewhere also work in the country. American scholar Louis Dupree writes of a privileged
American-Soviet role in Afghanistan. In towns outside Kabul where Russians had major projects,
their technicians lived as well as, if not better than, the Americans. They had spacious hotel and
apartment accommodations, lavish commissaries, private theatres, Olympic-sized swimming pools.
Many Soviet technicians genuinely felt disturbed when ordered home after a tour of duty.
Like their American counterparts, they'd never had it so good.
The modernization program and international aid helped create a small urban middle class
in Afghan cities. The countryside accepts new infrastructure but resists social changes
that make some headway in cities, like women's education and rights. By the 1960s,
Afghanistan's modernization is falling behind other developing states, and King Zahir is still
reluctant to further democratize the country, partly due to his fear of communism. In 1973,
Mohammad Dawood Khan takes power in an army-backed coup. At first, he works with the
moderate communists but soon excludes them and rules as a strongman, silencing any opposition
and purging the civil service and officer corps. Afghan Islamists oppose Dawood's progressive
policies and harsh rule, and Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, provides them
with training and equipment for armed resistance. After an ISI-supported Islamist attack against
Afghan government buildings in 1975, Dawood imprisons, executes, or forces them into exile.
Many Islamists flee to Pakistan, where President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government
allows them to settle in the hopes of creating a thorn in Kabul's side.
Former engineering student Mohammad Ishaq remembers the escape to Pakistan.
We took part in an operation in the Panjshir Valley in 1975, and we were defeated. Then we
had to retreat into the mountains, and it was very dark. We had to stay at the top of the mountain.
We did not have enough clothes because we were coming from a warm area, and I think I got sick.
We could not get warm, but we could not move because of the enemy.
The Islamists are split into several groups based on ideological disagreements,
but they claim legitimacy among hundreds of thousands of Afghans
who also flee into Pakistan in the following years. Meanwhile, Dawood reaches out to many
states for development and military aid, and asks the US for intel on Soviet intentions
even as he strikes an economic deal with Moscow and starts to improve relations with Pakistan
and Iran. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev wants to maintain decades of Soviet investment and
influence in Afghanistan, and advises Dawood during a Moscow meeting in April 1977.
Some NATO personnel in northern Afghanistan who are spies and are a security risk to the USSR
should be removed. But Dawood brushes him off.
Afghanistan is a free and independent country, and we will not tolerate anyone telling us
who to allow and who not to allow to work for us.
In April 1978, demonstrations break out at the funeral of a prominent Afghan communist.
In response, Dawood arrests PDPA leaders. Now though, the Afghan communists are better organized,
have united the rival factions, and enjoy KGB support. They've infiltrated some state
institutions, including the army. Dawood's regime has lost support among the middle classes,
and communist army officers rally troops loyal to the PDPA. Tanks roll into Kabul while jet
fighters scream overhead, and PDPA troops kill Dawood and more than a thousand of his followers
in fierce fighting. A 15-year-old Afghan remembers
the announcement of the Sauer Revolution on April 27, 1978.
We could hear Radio Afghanistan playing revolutionary songs and the repeated statement
The revolution of 7th Sauer has been victorious and the armed forces of the country are in control.
We congratulate the people of Afghanistan. The teachers told us to clap and then go into class.
After only a few hours we went home. My father asked why I'd come home early,
and I explained it all to him. God bless us, he said. The future is not good.
The coup comes as a surprise to both the Soviets and the Americans,
and each thinks the other is behind it. But the Afghan communists have seized power on their own,
and under a revolutionary council led by Taraki and Amin, they implement a radical
program – land reform, including forced expropriations, and equal rights for women.
They also suppress any opposition with mass executions, torture, and imprisonments.
Publicly, Taraki proclaims that the new democratic republic of Afghanistan
will remain part of the non-aligned movement.
Our relationship – you all should be attentive here – our relationship with all the countries,
including the Soviet Union, and all our neighbors throughout the world, will be based
will depend on the amount of their support to our revolutionary government.
But Pakistan is skeptical about the coup as it fears another hostile neighbor,
along with India and the USSR. The Shah's Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US are concerned as well,
and all three countries support Pakistan-based training of various Afghan Islamic groups,
loosely referred to as Mujahideen, or those fighting for God.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, cautiously welcomes a communist Afghanistan,
and the two states soon agree to more Soviet advisors and $250 million in military aid.
But Taraki and Amin want more, and the Soviets are concerned about the PDPA's actions.
The party strains under infighting as the radical faction purges the ranks and exiles
moderates like Karmal. It also struggles with a deeply religious population and
traditional social structures. PDPA thinkers believe clergy and tribal leaders are feudalists
holding back progress, but the Soviets advise them to carefully divide and conquer their class
enemies. Taraki, though, maintains a hard line. These agents of colonialism who hatch conspiracy
under the mask of religion and faith have been plotting for many years against progressive
movements in different countries. They should be uprooted like a cancer tumor from the body
of a patient. The PDPA launches an all-out offensive, arresting or killing mullahs and
their families. The population turns even more against the communists, and the Islamists position
themselves as saviors of Islam and the Afghan people. Local uprisings lead to Mujahideen
control in much of the north and east. The PDPA responds with more violence, carried out by the
secret police, the KGB-supported intel agency, and Sarandoi paramilitaries. All the while, the
internal split between Taraki and his ambitious protege Amin deepens. The PDPA's grip further
weakens in 1979. In February, unknown militants kidnap US Ambassador Adolf Dubs and hold him
in central Kabul. Then Afghan government forces, with KGB involvement, botch an attempted rescue,
Dubs is killed, and the US stops aid programs. In March, a week-long uprising begins in Herat.
An entire army division mutinies after being ordered to quell protests. Kabul sends in more
troops. The protesters then kill those suspected of connections to the PDPA and lynch Soviet civilian
advisors and their families. The government puts down the uprising at a cost of between 3,000 and
25,000 dead. Another revolt in Kunar province ends with 640 deaths in Kerala village,
witnessed by 16-year-old Mohammad Ashok.
My father told me to get up and run, and I ran to the mosque. Behind me, I heard the sound of
gunfire. From the mosque, I saw soldiers take more men to another field and shoot them.
A worried Taraki asks Moscow to intervene to shore up the Afghan government.
Almost nobody does support the government. In Kabul, we have no workers, only craftsmen.
If Herat falls, the revolution is doomed. Uprisings have emerged throughout the
entire country, and the army is too small to be able to pacify the insurgents everywhere.
The Politburo is shocked at Kabul's brutal reaction to the Herat uprising.
We gave them everything, and what had come of it? Nothing of any value. After all, it was they who
executed innocent people for no reason, and told us that we also executed people in Lenin's time.
You see what kind of Marxists we found?
Moscow begins to consider military intervention to keep Afghanistan within its sphere of influence,
but not all agree. Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, is among the sceptics. He worries
that Afghanistan is too underdeveloped to solve its problems with socialism,
and only through force could the USSR prevent a revolution there – a risk he advises against.
After the Herat uprising, Amin becomes prime minister,
and although he and Taraki are still at odds, both request more Soviet aid.
Moscow somewhat reluctantly agrees to send equipment, including T-62 tanks and Mi-24A
helicopters, and more military advisors, but they refuse to send troops.
Even so, the Mujahideen have already noticed the limited Soviet presence.
The Soviets want Amin out since they hold him responsible for the massacres and policy failures,
and are suspicious because he previously studied in the US.
They inform Taraki in September 1979, after which he tries to capture and probably kill Amin.
But Amin escapes and has Taraki murdered with a pillow and takes over.
The insurgency gains momentum quickly. 40% of the Afghan army deserts,
leaving it with just 60,000 men, and about 40,000 Afghan men join the Mujahideen.
The insurgents control four provinces and the countryside in a dozen others.
Amin reaches out to the US and UK and says he wants to deepen ties,
though both countries are suspicious of his motives. This move inflames Soviet worries.
The KGB even suspects incorrectly that he might be a CIA agent.
The Politburo sends more officers to train Afghan troops, an additional airborne battalion
to Bagram airfield, and some troops to Kabul, officially for protection.
By early December, Andropov leans towards intervention.
A military operation would allow us to decide the question of defending the gains of the April
Revolution, establishing Leninist principles in the party and state leadership of Afghanistan,
and securing our positions in this country. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo secretly
decides on regime change. Amin will be toppled and replaced with moderate Afghan communist
Babrak Karmal. To help the new Afghan government, they will also carry out a limited military
deployment against Islamists and possible Iranian or Pakistani intervention. At the
decisive meeting, Soviet Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov warns against it.
We will alienate the entire Muslim East and suffer political damage globally.
Andropov interrupts him. Focus on military matters. Leave political decisions to us.
The Party and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev
Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov gives verbal orders to prepare an invasion force.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be carried out by the newly created Soviet 40th Army.
Two motor rifle divisions, an air assault regiment, all in all about 52,000 men in the initial force.
Additionally, in Operation Baikal 79, one airborne division plus one airborne regiment
will directly airlift into Kabul and Bagram airfields,
then seize key buildings in and around the Afghan capital. Military transports will
land 7,700 men, 894 vehicles, and 1,062 tons of ammunition in the first wave.
A further 2,000 men are already present in Kabul and Bagram from earlier deployments.
The Red Army incursion is meant as a show of force for six months, and the new Afghan government
is to do most of the fighting. Soviet Ambassador Fikriyat Tabeev tells Amin on December 22
that the USSR will officially send troops within days – news which Amin welcomes
as he's requested them four times already. Amin is confident.
Comrade Stalin showed us how to build socialism in a backward country.
It's painful to begin with, but afterwards, everything turns out just fine.
The Soviet force will enter Afghanistan from the northwest and northeast,
and advance along the ring road connecting the main cities,
and which had been built by the US and USSR years before.
On December 25, the first Soviet troops cross the border. One pincer secures Mazar-i-Sharif,
Kunduz, and continues towards Kabul. Helicopters escort the ground troops
and drop advanced guards to secure the crucial Salang Pass tunnel.
The other Soviet group sets out on December 27, via Herat, Shindan, and then to Kandahar.
Simultaneously, the airborne forces secure key buildings across Kabul.
But that's not all that happens in Kabul that day.
For weeks, Soviet special forces have assembled in Kabul, preparing to eliminate Amin.
The invasion will be portrayed as friendly assistance, but nothing could be left to chance.
GRU Colonel Vasily Kolesnik is in charge of the plan. Soviet military intelligence's
Muslim battalion flew into Kabul on December 10, supposedly to protect Amin.
There are also two KGB teams, Zenit and Grom,
and a company of air assault troops, all in all about 560 men. Amin and Taraki had suggested
the creation of the Muslim battalion to allow Soviet troops to keep a lower profile.
It consists of soldiers from Soviet Central Asian republics to appear more familiar to locals,
and they wear Afghan uniforms to blend in with Afghan government troops.
The initial plan has to be redrawn after Amin moves to the Tajbeg palace on December 16,
although since the Soviets are providing part of his security,
they get detailed plans of the arrangements at the palace.
Still, the Tajbeg is a tough nut to crack. It's on a hill, the surrounding area is mined,
and there are Afghan army barracks and three dug-in T-54 tanks nearby.
More Afghan troops with tanks and anti-aircraft guns are in the vicinity as well,
bringing the total to 2,500 men defending the palace.
The Soviet attack force is split into 12 groups.
BG-1 will neutralize the in-place tanks. BG-2 is the main assault force.
With 6 BMPs, they'll storm the palace via the main road and take out guard posts along the way.
BG-3 will outflank the palace from the west. The other groups will pin down Afghan troops,
take out Afghan anti-aircraft guns, and provide fire support, including with four ZSU-23-4
Shilka self-propelled radar-guided anti-aircraft weapons and grenade launchers.
Command, recovery, and medical teams are also nearby.
Operation Storm 333 begins on December 27, and Amin still believes the Soviets are on his side.
The Soviet divisions are already on the way here. Paratroopers have landed in Kabul.
All is going well. I'm constantly on the telephone, communicating with Comrade Gromyko,
and we are discussing the best way to inform the world about this Soviet military assistance.
Just after Amin gives this speech, the KGB tries to kill him with poisoned cola, but he survives.
Meanwhile, Soviet teams launch sabotage operations across the city to confuse Afghan forces,
including Soviet advisors removing batteries from tanks or KGB agents crippling the telephone
network. Still more Soviet units quickly take important government and infrastructure buildings
like a prison, the post office, DRA General Staff building, the TV and radio center,
secret police headquarters, and defense and interior ministries.
Colonel Yevgeny Chernyshov records his impressions in his diary.
The movement of the paratroopers' convoy through the city could be tracked by the sound of gunfire.
As our units approached the targets, gunfire erupted, and tracer rounds streaked across the
sky. The Afghan guards were ready to defend themselves.
At the palace, Kalashnikov's force runs into trouble. Although Amin believes that first the
Soviets are on his side, Afghan forces are on guard after the failed cola poisoning.
BG-1 engages, but the shooting causes DRA forces to raise a general alert at 7.15 pm,
so Kalashnikov orders a general assault with fire support.
DRA troops knock out several Soviet BMPs of BG-2, so the Red Army troops continue on foot
and reach the palace at 7.40 pm. They storm the lower floor, and heavy fighting ensues.
Meanwhile, BG-3 takes losses approaching the other side of the palace,
but eventually reaches the palace under the cover of the Shilkas.
Other groups successfully pin down Afghan units outside the palace,
and two groups help the stalled BG-1 to eliminate the dug-in tanks.
Colonel V.G. Salkeen remembers the attack.
First, KGB special units stormed the palace. Then some Spetsnaz troops followed. In an
attempt to scare the defenders, or perhaps out of fear, the attackers shouted loudly,
mostly profanities. The fighting inside the palace immediately became fierce and uncompromising.
If no one came from a room with their hands raised, the doors were broken down,
grenades were thrown in. Then the attackers opened fire with automatic weapons indiscriminately.
BG-2 and 3 make it upstairs in the palace, but they're down to 50 men.
They kill most of Amin's bodyguards, and find and kill Amin and his two sons.
The whole operation lasts 43 minutes. At least 9 Soviet troops are killed,
though some claim up to 100, and 69 are badly wounded,
while around 200 Afghans are killed and hundreds taken prisoner.
Soviet military brass decorates nearly all Storm 333 participants,
including Kalestnik, who's made a hero of the Soviet Union.
Storm 333 also leaves a legacy as a daring and successful special operation. Years later,
some in Russia will look at it as a bright spot in the Afghan war, and it becomes a staple of
the Russian Airborne Officer Academy, including the hybrid combination with sabotage, disinformation,
and subversion. The day after the raid on December 28,
Karmal arrives in Kabul and promises the public he'll stop the torture and executions,
and unite the PDPA. Not included in the pre-recorded broadcast message is the
ongoing execution of Amin's closest followers. Many Afghans don't believe Karmal's public
reassurances, and 430,000 flee to Pakistan by January 1980. Within 72 hours, the USSR
has installed a new Afghan leader, even though the invasion and regime change plans
were hatched mere weeks before. More than 40 years later, historians still debate why
exactly the Soviets decided to invade. Operation Baikal 79 was a gamble given
Afghanistan's unstable history and the fact that the USSR was not militarily, economically,
or politically prepared to nation-build. The Soviets lacked local expertise and
skills, and it's still unclear exactly how much influence they really had on the PDPA
after the invasion. Soviet leaders knew it would damage their projected image as
allies of anti-colonial movements as well. At a March meeting, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
made the danger clear. Who will the Soviet army fight against? Against the Afghan people
first and foremost, and they'll have to be fired on. Everything that we created in recent years
in terms of détente, arms control, and many other things will be thrown back. Of course,
it will be a good present for China. All the non-aligned countries will be against us.
And yet, the Soviets had reasons to be confident. They had successfully intervened in Czechoslovakia
in 1968, in Ethiopia from 1974, and in Angola from 1975. In Angola, local communists even
functioned as a vanguard party that led the revolution themselves. Moscow hoped the PDPA
would play a similar role in Afghanistan. Even before the Sour Revolution, Moscow sent thousands
of civilian advisors, including Communist Youth League members, to work with young Afghans.
Some historians point to the potential influence of Soviet officials like Ambassador to Afghanistan
Alexander Puzanov and KGB Lieutenant General Boris Ivanov, who was long stationed in the country.
Both strongly argued for intervention, and Puzanov was a close friend of Taraki.
They and others close to him may have influenced Andropov, who was initially sceptical of an
invasion, but available sources are incomplete. What is clear is that Amin's seizure of power
tipped the balance. Moscow concluded he was not loyal to the Soviet Union and planned to shift
away from the USSR. In the end, the Cold War fear of losing Afghanistan, even indirectly to US
influence, outweighed the risks. Back in December 1979, just as Gromyko fears, Moscow's
roll of the dice in Afghanistan provokes a flurry of international reactions that spell trouble.
The US and UK worry about Soviet control in Afghanistan,
and President Jimmy Carter announces global Soviet expansionism must be stopped.
The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions. Will it help promote a
stable international environment in which its own legitimate peaceful concerns can be pursued,
or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs
and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to
use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship
Some in the Carter administration hope the conflict might turn into a Soviet Vietnam.
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, though, worries the Mujahideen are too weak
and disorganized, and lack foreign support, unlike North Vietnam. He also thinks the Soviets will
act more decisively than the US did in Vietnam. The US still decides to increase financial and
military support for the Mujahideen, and encourages the Chinese and Muslim countries
to help them as well. But the biggest change is US policy towards Pakistan.
We must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels.
This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid,
and, alas, a decision that our security policy towards Pakistan cannot be dictated by our
non-proliferation policy. From now on, the US will be much closer to Pakistan, and look the other way
on nuclear weapons and questions of democracy. Pakistan-based CIA agent Howard Hart argues that
the existing support for the Mujahideen should be expanded to include weapons. The Pakistanis
also strengthen cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Head of Saudi intelligence Turki al-Faisal sees
Pakistan as the best option to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East, and soon provides the
ISI with funds matching US contributions. The United Nations General Assembly condemns
the Soviet invasion, as many voting member states with a colonial past are uncomfortable
with a great power invading a country that claimed to be non-aligned and anti-imperial.
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, ironically a former Nazi from Austria, tries to negotiate
a settlement, but the USSR, the new Afghan government, and neighbours Pakistan and
revolutionary Iran are not interested. There will be no quick and easy peace in Afghanistan.
Soviet troops have marched into what will become a longer, costlier, and bloodier war
than any have imagined. We hope you enjoyed this breakdown of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
We are going to cover the entire history of the Soviet-Afghan war and the aftermath until
the US invasion in 2001 in a multi-part series. Such ambitious multi-part projects are only
possible because of your ongoing support on Patreon. If you go to patreon.com slash realtime
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footage, map animations, and produce more detailed documentaries.
We want to thank Sofia Shirogorova for her support with this documentary.
If you want to learn more about the Vietnam War, check out our almost 3 hour long documentary on
that. As usual, you can find all the sources for this video in the description below.
I'm Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History,
the only history channel that won't drink KGB cola.
