The Nelson-class battleships of the Royal Navy stand among the most distinctive capital ships ever built. Designed in the aftermath of the First World War and shaped by the limits of the Washington Naval Treaty, HMS Nelson and her sister ship HMS Rodney represented a bold and unconventional approach to battleship design.
In this extended guide, we explore the origins, design philosophy, and service history of HMS Nelson—from her unique all-forward main armament layout to her role in major naval operations during the Second World War. The episode examines how innovation, treaty restrictions, and wartime necessity combined to create a class that left a lasting mark on naval architecture.
Through detailed analysis and historical context, this guide reveals why the Nelson class remains a subject of fascination for naval historians and warship enthusiasts alike.
⚓ Topic: Royal Navy Battleships 📘 Series: Guide 108 (Extended) 📆 Era: Interwar Period & World War II 🇬🇧 Navy: Royal Navy
The Nelson class were the most heavily armed British battleships ever actually built,
and for the interwar period they formed the most powerful part of the Royal Navy's battleship
fleet. But their origins for such a powerful unit were a product of compromise and a little bit too
much of a rush job. They would also be the only British battleships built between the Revenge
class in the mid-1910s and the King George V class of the mid-1930s, assuming of course that
you count Hood as a battlecruiser and not a vast battleship. The ships were never originally meant
to be. The Royal Navy had designed the G3 and N3 battlecruisers and battleships respectively
when the Washington Treaty put a screaming halt to both. The N3's 18-inch guns would breach the
new treaty limits, and both designs were well over the new 35,000 tonne displacement limit.
However, with the First World War pausing British battleship construction, the Imperial Japanese
Navy and United States Navy had the Negatos and Colorados under construction, which would leave
those navies with 16-inch armed ships, whereas the most powerful Royal Navy ship would be either Hood
or one of the Queen Elizabeths with 15-inch guns. So the British managed to argue that they should
also be allowed to build a pair of 16-inch armed battleships, and this was accepted by the other
major powers. The big issue then was what to build. The G3's 16-inch guns complied with the treaty,
but the ship itself, as we said, was more than 10,000 tonnes too heavy. In very basic terms,
they took the N3 design layout, with the triple 18s swapped for triple 16s,
and then scaled the whole thing down in size to yield what was effectively a miniaturized G3 that
in theory, with a bit of tweaking, might just about be able to scrape through the 35,000 tonne limit.
This design would eventually become known as O3, since it was to be a battleship following on from
the N3 designation sequence. Unlike some nations, later on, who would flat out lie or cheat their
way past the treaty limits, the British seemed strangely obsessed with sticking to the limits,
and being seen to do so. This did not, though, prevent them from making sure the limits themselves
were defined in ways that they could legitimately exploit. Prior to the treaty, a ship's displacement
was usually cited as two figures. Normal displacement, which generally consisted of
the ship at peacetime levels of operation, hence normal, with partially filled tanks,
a few stores, and a bit of ammunition, etc, etc. This was then accompanied by full or maximum
displacement, which would reflect a ship at full wartime status about to depart port, with a full
crew, full fuel tanks, full water tanks, maximum stores, maximum full magazines, etc, etc, etc.
The British argued that defining the displacement limit using either of these would be unfair to
them, since with a global empire to protect, their ships would have to devote far more of
their overall displacement to fuel and water tanks, and things like this, to enable them to
have the needed range to operate across the globe, whilst a nation like Italy, France, or Japan,
with very limited overseas commitments, and much more commitments closer to home,
could afford to devote more of the displacement of a ship to the war-making parts of the ship,
simply by cutting down on long-range fuel and water provisions. And so a new standard displacement
was created, which was effectively normal displacement, with a few minor tweaks here and
there, and one major change, which was that it excluded the weight of fuel and water stored
aboard completely. This in and of itself was relatively fair, as it meant you could measure
a ship's displacement in terms of its war-making potential, but then the first thing the British
would put into the ship's design was a very effective system of water-filled internal
torpedo bulges, far superior to air-filled spaces, but whose significant weight, compared to
traditional systems, didn't count towards the limit, because although they were defensive systems
and should have been counted towards displacement like the armour of the ship was, since the main
element of it was on-board liquid, in terms of the water-filled bulge, it could be excluded from
standard displacement calculations. However, this little bit of cheating was not the only thing that
would be needed to bring the ships in under standard displacement. The main armament would
be grouped all forward, which shortened the ship's overall citadel space and reduced the weight of
armour needed, as the belt could be shorter. The ships would also adopt the all-or-nothing approach
to armour, in order to further maximise possible protection over the smallest necessary area.
The main gun turrets were also revised, with the design that had been prepared for the G3s
having significant structural elements to both the turret and barbette either removed or thinned
down, in order to keep the turret armour up to spec, but minimise the overall weight of the main
battery. This would lead to considerable problems in the future, as the turrets were now too heavy
and produced far too much shock for their own mountings and runners, which would eventually lead
to numerous jams and reliability issues over the first decade of service, which would only
eventually be fixed by a series of workarounds, and effectively slowly reintroducing a lot of
the removed elements, which would obviously gradually increase the ship's overall displacement.
Due to the slower speed of a battleship as compared to a battlecruiser, and again for
weight-saving reasons, the traditional four-screw arrangement was replaced by two larger screws,
which used the engine output of around 45,000 shaft horsepower to reach 23 knots. This put the
ships between the Colorados and Negatos in terms of speed. The engines and boilers were further
rearranged to reduce overall citadel length, and the hull was modified using lessons from the G3
layout into a very efficient hydrodynamic form, which maximised the speed that the ship could
achieve using what was really a very small powerplant. All of these efforts, and more,
allowed the ship to mount three triple turrets carrying 16-inch guns for a total of nine weapons,
with all the turrets forward, as we said, and the second turret superfiring over the first.
To allow all the turrets to train together, sufficient space was left between the second
and third turrets to allow the guns of the third turret to swing past the second.
Following tests conducted with German capital ships that had been captured during WW1 and their
guns, the 16-inch gun was designed to fire a slightly lighter shell than was typical of
British practice, but at a fairly high velocity, even for a naval gun. Due to this and other
experimentation carried out, which included using different rifling on different guns in the same
turret, their initial service can be charitably described as less than stellar, with significant
barrel wear and inaccuracy to a level that would have made even BT take a step or two back.
As with the turret mounts themselves, these issues would need almost a decade to work out,
but would be mostly solved by the time 1930 rolled around, again largely consisting of putting the
whole setup back to roughly what had been intended for the G3 class in the first place,
although doing so in a somewhat haphazard and patchy manner which made the guns and turrets
something of a maintenance nightmare for the rest of the ship's careers. It would also turn out that
the initial tests of German guns were flawed and the lighter shell higher velocity didn't offer
quite as many benefits as had been thought previously, but the ammo hoist systems were
now fixed and it was too late to redesign the shells to be larger and therefore heavier.
Further issues would go on to plague the ships during their gun tests,
the blast of the guns damaged light fittings on deck and transmitted their shock through
the mess decks and some of the bridge windows. One officer observing the trials found the blast so
powerful that even below the foredeck he suffered concussion to the eyeballs that made his vision
flare red with every salvo. However most of the areas affected were supposed to be clear during
a battle and the physical damage to the ship was more irritating and cosmetic than vital,
so whilst the guns were restricted to broadside firing in peacetime it was generally accepted
that this kind of damage would occur in a wartime battle with the only major alterations being
to try and stop the windows of the bridge from blowing up. It turned out that the blast was much
stronger than any glass they could reasonably make and so the size of the windows had to be reduced
with blast deflectors installed underneath each window. The secondary battery consisted of six
twin 6-inch gun turrets, three per side, laid out in a similar manner to the main turrets
with a central turret higher than those on either side of it. The whole secondary battery was
concentrated right at the back of the ship with the intervening space taken up by an initial
anti-aircraft armament of six single 4.7-inch guns, a handful of saluting guns and a smattering
of two-pounder light AA weapons. A pair of underwater torpedo tubes for heavy 24.5-inch
torpedoes was also installed. Over the interwar years the anti-aircraft battery was upgraded with
the saluting guns and the initial two-pounders being replaced by various pom-pom mounts that
used a similar two-pounder or 40mm gun and a few .50 cal machine guns, and then with the
inevitable arrival of the Bofors and Oerlikons as the war progressed. By mid-war the Nelson,
for example, was carrying six octuple 40mm pom-poms for a total of 48 guns, plus 16 Bofors 40mm
cannon in quad mounts, and no less than 61 of the 20mm Oerlikons for a total of 131 anti-aircraft
barrels including the 4.7-inch weapons, which was a positively American level of anti-aircraft
firepower. A brief appearance was also made by a battery of unguided anti-aircraft rocket launchers
to nobody's particular delight. The torpedo armament would prove to be a bit of a mixed
blessing. In her action with the Bismarck, Rodney fired her portside torpedo tubes claiming one hit,
which would be the first and only instance of a battleship actually successfully torpedoing
another battleship if this claim is accurate, albeit that the shots from the portside torpedo
tube were needed because a near miss from Bismarck had jammed the starboard torpedo tube shut.
Conversely, while operating in the Mediterranean, an Italian torpedo bomber hit Nelson
just behind one of the major torpedo compartments, which flooded, letting in almost 4,000 tons of
water. Although unlike the Lutzau at Jutland, Nelson's pumps and damage control teams managed
to keep up with and then reduce the flooding, upon inspection it was found that many of the
torpedo's compressed air canisters had breached and they'd torn through the torpedo room destroying
practically everything in sight, but fortunately none of the warheads had exploded. The inspecting
officer mainly lamented the loss of a particularly large and nice cheese that he had acquired on
shore leave and which had been in the store room immediately behind the torpedo room, which had
taken the brunt of the blow, and unfortunately the cheese was now thoroughly inedible due to
salt water contamination. Armor on the ships consisted of an internal sloped belt, which was
borrowed in design from the G3 class, that was angled at around 18 degrees from vertical, with a
maximum thickness of 14 inches. This reflected a design that was based around giving and receiving
long-range fire, as the same idea with almost the same angle, albeit with two inches less thickness,
was adopted for the South Dakota and Iowa classes of the United States Navy a couple of decades
later. This armor scheme was very strong where it was present and complemented by a deck that was
just over six inches thick at its strongest, however the armor scheme has been criticized
for being somewhat too shallow as its lower edge sat only just below the water line at the ship's
There are a few mitigating factors to this criticism though.
The primary threat to such a shallow belt layout is diving shells, which weren't actually developed
at the time and so you can't design armor to resist a weapon that doesn't exist. Shells that
impact the water moreover at the time would initiate detonation upon contact with the water,
unless they were duds, and most shells into World War II would also possess this feature.
Further, to bypass the belt from a strike at the water line, which would obviously then avoid
hitting the water before the ship, would require a hit that was coming in at a fairly steep angle,
about 25,000 yards plus for most guns in service at the time from things like the Nagato class,
the Colorados, the Standards, or the Pusos, which was unlikely based on pure mathematics,
and as World War II would point out was actually almost impossible based on reality.
Finally, the belt armor sat inside the layered torpedo defenses, which included that water-filled
layer we mentioned earlier, and whilst the torpedo defenses themselves were not armored in the same
way that the belt was, the designed intent of the overall defense system was to initiate the
detonation of incoming shells early, before reaching the armor, and in the event of a shell
somehow striking and detonating below the armor belt, given that it would explode in the torpedo
defense system which was designed to withstand an explosion of a torpedo that was carrying several
hundred pounds of explosive on board, the relatively pedestrian 30 to 50 pound bursting
charges of naval shells should be relatively easily absorbed by the system, assuming that the
shell fuse had been initiated on or shortly after impact with either the outer hull or the water of
the sea itself. Obviously a diving shell, as we said earlier, would be capable of bypassing most,
if not all, of this system, so in World War II they were at risk from certain Japanese warships,
but overall it was a good idea in theory for the time it was designed, and in the event it was
never actually put to the test, so the final analysis as to the wisdom of this particular
design feature and choice must of course be left to the viewer. The class also introduced the common
feature of all future British capital ships from this point onwards, the octopoidal tower
superstructure, also known as the Queen Anne's Mansions, although unlike later designs it would
retain a fully armored conning tower as well, just in case someone might want to break with tradition
and actually use the blasted thing. Due to the extensive space given in this superstructure,
all daily ship operations necessary in and around the bridge could take place under cover,
with exposed positions being a matter of choice rather than necessity, something that was very
useful when operating mainly in the North Atlantic and the North Sea, where sea conditions were often
described as just a little bit rough. Despite an early reputation for being a bit clumsy,
largely thanks to wind action on the superstructure, which being well after the ship's centre line
would have a much greater effect than normal and would slew the ship out of line if the helm
and the helmsman was not experienced, they would eventually prove to be surprisingly agile ships
once their crews were used to their unique handling characteristics, and proved able to
avoid most minor bumps and scrapes that almost every other British battleship would encounter
at least once in the most common fleet anchorages. Their appearance however was something of a
marmite issue, with some appreciating their technological advances and unique appearance,
whilst others taking cues more from the fact that they resembled oil tankers more than traditional
battleships, to grant them the nicknames Nelsol and Rodol, after a series of early 20th century
oilers whose names had all ended in ol. As Rodney will be getting its own video at some point in the
near future, we will cover the ship's service histories only briefly here, with the main
focus being on Nelson. Both ships were ordered and laid down in December 1922, launched in late 1925
and commissioned into the fleet in 1927. Nelson would make use of some prepared materials from
various cancelled battlecruisers to assist in her construction, and would become the flagship
of the home fleet until King George V took over the role in 1941. In 1931 both ships would be
part of the Invergordon Mutiny, which was a very British protest over a series of large pay cuts
to the sailors' salaries, and instead of random violence, vandalism, things being set on fire,
and the occasional explosion, it was instead a protest where plenty of speeches and songs were
sung, but ships were maintained at basic levels, and the officers and men, although they rather
disagreed on the whole obeying orders thing, tended to otherwise get along relatively well,
without any major violence between the two parties. In part it has to be admitted this was thanks to
pretty much every non-admiralty officer, and even some of those, actually agreeing in principle that
the government's pay cuts were ridiculous, an issue that was eventually resolved by the government
backing down on most of its demands. Also, to prove that it isn't just American warships who
are sometimes unclear as to the depth of their own home waters, Nelson would dutifully run itself
aground just outside Portsmouth in 1934 while on its way to the Caribbean. As the newest battleships
in the fleet, the two would receive relatively little in terms of refits or upgrades compared
to older warships that needed it more in the years leading up to WWII, with most efforts being
centred around adding a few more anti-aircraft guns and later on some radar arrays, since much
of the rest of this period was spent sorting out the main guns and trying to get them to actually
work properly. Nelson's early operational deployments during WWII included pursuing
German cruisers and the Scharnhorsts, but whilst these latter ships had no desire to engage her,
the slow speed of the Nelson-class meant that they were also very easily able to evade her.
She would then burn up an awful lot of her luck when U-56 scored three direct torpedo hits,
but every single torpedo malfunctioned and failed to explode. Whilst her luck meter was
presumably regenerating, she would run into a magnetic mine which did explode and resulted
in the need for six months of repairs. During the height of worries about German invasion,
she was deployed closer and closer to the Channel as part of the Royal Navy's plans to sail
what amounted to practically the entire battle fleet into melee range of any German invasion
force that might hazard a crossing. With this threat receding, she took a turn on convoy escort
and would narrowly miss out joining her sister in the pursuit of the Bismarck. In mid-1941 she
would join Force H operating out of Gibraltar and escort a number of important convoys,
during the course of which she would receive the aerial torpedo hit mentioned earlier,
which needed another six months of repairs, before heading back out for more convoy escort
duties in the Mediterranean. As the war began to turn against the Axis, she would also support
Operation Torch, Operation Husky and Operation Avalanche, other landings in North Africa,
Sicily and Italy respectively, using her main battery to provide short bombardment support,
which turned out to be highly effective against some rather surprised tanks at one point.
She would then be refitted, receiving the maximum amount of anti-aircraft firepower,
before supporting the D-Day landings, but running into yet more sea mines and needing yet another
six months of repairs. Overall, she seemed to be somewhat blessed to be hit by no enemy shells,
but consistently run into almost every variety of underwater threat imaginable.
Coming back into action at the start of 1945, she would see action in the Pacific,
supporting operations against Japan in the Indian Ocean and around the Malayan Peninsula.
According to Winston Churchill, a major modernisation for Nelson had been discussed
to keep her in service after the war, but the combination of very little available money,
and the fact that ultimately she was far too slow to operate with a carrier,
meant that this never got off the ground. Accordingly, after the war, she would be
used as a training ship from July 1946, before being taken out of service in February 1948,
when she would be used as a target for various bombing exercises, testing out new weapons.
Having survived this, she would then be scrapped in March 1949.
Don't forget to comment on the pinned post for drydock questions.