Japanese Armor Doctrine (1918–1942)
25 Video Views·Sep 29, 2024
Explore the evolution of Japanese armor doctrine from 1918 to 1942 and the role of tanks in Japan's military strategy from 1932 to 1945. Drawing insights from experts like David McCormack, Gordon Rottman, Akira Takizawa, Donald McLean, and Kazunori Yoshikawa, this video examines Japanese tank tactics, anti-tank weapons, and iconic vehicles like the Type 89 and tankettes.
Greetings all, it's time for the next installment of my series of overviews as to how the various
major combatant nations in WW2 came up with their armoured forces with which they started their
wars. Obviously, it is now time for me to delve into the Japanese story. Considering the Japanese
armoured forces in the Pacific war received neither a reputation for insightful tactical use
nor for technological excellence, it may come as a surprise to discover that they actually
had a very modern and effective doctrine, complete with armoured divisions. Despite
having the world's fifth largest tank force at the beginning of the war, they just never
really got around to implementing their doctrine well. This also means that this is going to be a
fairly short video, also affected partially by the fact that there is not much in a language
that I understand. Japan, of course, learned about tanks pretty much at the same time as
the British started using them. Being one of the Allied powers, they had observers on the
western front like many others, and they soon saw the tank's effectiveness. After receiving
the reports, the Japanese sent a bloke named Captain Mizutani Yoshiho to the UK to go buy a tank.
He ended up getting a Mark IV female, which arrived in Yokohama in late October 1918
and forwarded to the Infantry School in Chiba province.
The next year, the Japanese purchased the latest generation of tanks, a half-dozen whippets from
the UK and a baker's dozen of FT's, and there was a new organisation set up to investigate them.
The Mark IV was acquired under the auspices of the Military Motor Vehicle Investigation Committee,
but now, testing of the new tanks was to be performed by the Army Tactical Headquarters,
which was a general weapons R&D organisation, but had a desire to see motorisation alongside
horse and ox power into testing that went. Much as happened elsewhere in the world,
the whippet style of tank was soon enough considered to be a dead end,
but the FT with its turret showed promise.
In the meantime, the Minister of War, a Yamanashi Hanzo, decided to implement a modernisation of
the army, emphasising quality over quantity starting late 1922. Troop strength of the
army would be cut by 65,000, with some of the money saved to be spent on buying tanks.
Unfortunately, nobody really had any tanks to sell. The British and French were still
playing around with the new tank designs which were not yet ready for mass production,
such as the medium Mark I, and the Japanese didn't see any merit in just buying the WWI
designs which were laying fallow. The head of the Army Tactical Bureau was General Teiichi Suzuki,
and he was adamantly against the purchase of any of the foreign tanks for the Japanese use.
Instead, the Japanese would design the things themselves, and a team of four engineers was
given two years to come up with a design which could compete with anything being developed in
Europe. A bit like Italy, the Japanese were hampered a bit by the lack of a domestic
industry. The only vehicles produced in Japan were Mitsubishi Model A sedans between 1917 and 1921,
and a truck built from American parts kits by D.A.T. Jidosha.
Still, under the leadership of a Tomio Hara, they set about producing a tank of their own.
The design goal was about 12 tons, not exceeding 15, railway transportable,
and remember Japanese railway gauge is a bit smaller than the global standard,
a turret with a 57mm gun, and two sub-turrets with a machine gun each, front and rear,
25km an hour road speed from a 120hp engine, and enough armour to stop a 37mm at 500m.
The final product was Experimental Tank No. 1, also known as Type 87,
Chi-E. Ended up at about 18 tons to 20km an hour, but it was still better than anything else on
offer at the time. However, it was a bit unwieldy for the infantry support role envisioned the role
for most tanks around the world at the time, so they were told to go try again.
In the meantime, a Vickers C showed up. This was not one of Vickers success stories,
they only built the 1, and a very similar Vickers D, which ended up in Ireland.
This provided a couple of lessons which were incorporated into Experimental Tank No. 2,
Type 89 Chi-Rho, which bore a similarity to a hybrid of the Mk1 and C.
One observation was made when leaking fuel caught fire in the MkC and badly burned two Vickers
engineers. The Japanese decided that the combination of fire hazard combined with
greater fuel efficiency of diesels, important given the relative lack of petrol resources in
Japan, would lead to their tanks being diesel powered. This would take a couple of years to
reach fruition, however, and the Experimental 2 would go into service as the Type 89 Ego
with a Daimler petrol engine. However, since it obviously would take time to work up production
lines for the things, ten Renault NC-27s were acquired. They were in effect elongated FTs.
They were fitted with a long Type 11 37mm infantry gun, same as would be found on the
very initial build Type 89s. The first Japanese combat use of tanks came in Manchuria in September
1931, the Renaults of the first special tank company being effectively used in the capture
of Harbin, but things went a bit less well in the Shanghai incident. Considering very few nations
in the area had tanks, the Japanese had set up an elaborate amount of anti-tank ditches and mines.
Between those, a fairly resolute defense, the Japanese learned that tanks are not best suited
to cities, and only three were left operational out of 2nd Independent Tank Company's mix of some
15 Type 89s and Renaults by the end of the fight. The Renault in particular suffered
with suspension and overheating problems, being relegated soon afterwards to training units.
It is worth observing that the Japanese Navy also had tanks in Shanghai. The
Special Naval Landing Force had originally vigorous cross-sea armored cars,
later making it tank companies with about a half-dozen Type 89s and a few other armored cars.
They could be visually identified by the Navy's anchor symbol instead of the Army's star,
and oftentimes the rising sun flag with rays. The interesting bit happened in February of 1933.
By this point, the Japanese had set up the Chinese puppet state of Manchukuo. An attempt
to convince the head of the province of Rehe to join Manchukuo failed, so the military option,
under a Lieutenant General Yoshikazu Nishi, was undertaken to change his mind.
The Chinese line was broken in a matter of days, but there was a problem. The Chinese
were withdrawing to create a new defensive line in front of the provincial capital,
Chengde, faster than the predominantly foot-borne Japanese army could catch them.
Nishi had a secret weapon, though, an unofficial ad-hoc formation under Major General
Tadashi Kawahara, which had no name but was centered about the first tank company.
This battle group consisted of the 11 Type 89 tanks, two Type 92 heavy armored cars,
and about 100 trucks, hauling two infantry battalions, an engineer company, a mountain
artillery company, and a radio section. This completely mechanized force, punched through
the Chinese rearguard, did 320 km to Chengde in three days, and captured the town before the
Chinese could react. There is no indication as to where Nishi came up with this organization,
but experiments in combined arms units had been conducted by the UK and US at this point.
Maybe he had heard of them, or maybe it was an independent development, but either way,
it worked out. It provided the ammunition to create the first official combined arms unit,
the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade, in 1934. It consisted of a tank battalion,
second battalion was often added for exercises, a motor infantry regiment of three battalions,
motorized artillery battalion, motorized engineer company, a flamethrower tank platoon,
and a reconnaissance company. The unit tallied some 78 Type 89s and 41 Type 94s.
The Type 89s are now the B model, with the diesel engine, and now of course all the Type
89s are coming with the low velocity 57mm gun. In all, Type 89 production would reach about 113 A's
and 291 B's. Mention of the Type 94, however, now sends me back in time a couple of years to
another line of Japanese development. You may have noted that I mentioned that Nishi's force
included two Type 92 heavy armored cars, which looked suspiciously tank-like. The problem was
that tanks were the purview of the infantry branch, but cavalry were interested in the use of the
things as well, so instead of being named tanks, they were considered a tracked form of armored
car. Type 92 was influenced by the Carden-Lloyd tankette, tested in Japan in the late 1920s,
and after a small detour to an amphibious armored car, a very light, turreted, full-tracked vehicle
was developed for the cavalry. This little 40km an hour, 3 ton light tank with a crew of three
and two machine guns, later on the whole machine gun turned into a 13mm, wasn't massively successful
with only 167 being built before production moved to the Type 94. Technically categorized as a
tankette, the Type 94 really wasn't too far off of the British Mark II light tank, with its four
road wheels, two-man crew, single machine gun in the turret, and somewhat optimistic levels of armor.
It was also one of the first instances of the relatively unique bell-crank suspension
developed by Tomiohara. 823 of these would be built.
Anyway, back to the mixed brigade. The main problem the brigade had was with the tanks being
too slow to keep up with everything else. The Type 89s, fresh from the production line,
already needed a replacing. Before replacements could arrive, however,
barring a platoon of the new Type 95 light tank, the Ha-Go, fighting flared up again in China,
and the brigade was put to work. Well, sort of.
As the tanks had difficulty keeping up, the infantry started to complain about the lack
of tank support. The complaints reached the ear of Army Commander Hideki Tojo.
Tojo was something of a conservative, had no time for independent gallivanting around of tanks,
and ordered the units to basically be detached and placed in the direct infantry support role.
Which, in fairness, did actually match the manuals of the time.
The reality, though, was that the brigade was in effect disbanded,
and shortly afterwards was disbanded in theory, being replaced by the tank-pure,
infantry-support-oriented 1st Tank Group. A tank group basically consisted of three
tank regiments, battalions in effect, a little bit more self-sustaining,
each with three companies of light tanks and a company of heavy tanks or mediums,
plus a bunch of supply trucks and some maintenance assets.
The infantry support role was also the reasoning behind the weapons of the tanks.
Something needed to be able to deal with enemy machine guns which survived the artillery,
which had to stop by the time the Japanese infantry got to within the last 200 meters or so.
The 57mm low-velocity gun, about 350 meters a second, gave a good enough boom to do the job.
Curiously, the low velocity also meant that the tank could fire from complete turret-down
positions behind ridges at suitable distances, aimed in a semi-indirect manner by the commander.
By the late 1930s, the Japanese began to run into Chinese tanks,
but since these tended to be Panzer I's and L3's, they weren't much of a threat and the
lack of a high-velocity gun wasn't a problem. A few towed Pak 36's showed up which were a threat,
but then again the emphasis on a good high-explosive capability was a good counter to this as well.
Not that the Japanese were entirely rigidly kept to the dowdy infantry concept. In 1938,
a detachment under Colonel Yoshiharu Iwanaka, consisting of his 1st Tank Battalion plus some
fully motorized infantry, engineers, and artillery, was sent to go destroy a bridge
that the Chinese would be using in a retreat. As they advanced, Air Recon observed a strong
enemy defense and Iwanaka launched a diversionary attack to draw a portion of the Chinese
defense away. The Japanese army trained heavily in night fighting and that included the tank crews,
so after the diversionary attack, Iwanaka did a night march back to the target bridge,
seized it before the enemy could respond, and then blew the bridge and returned home.
In effect, it was a classic cavalry raid, except powered by internal combustion engines.
Would the Japanese command learn their lessons from this?
Being a mission-oriented task organization, the Iwanaka detachment was disbanded.
Back to the tank issue. Again, I mentioned briefly the Type 95 light tank Ha-Go.
Eventually, 2,300 of these would be built, hitting speed of production in 1935 or so,
making it the most commonly found tank in the Japanese army.
On the plus side, it was a reasonable tank for the time, with good suspension,
engine reliability, and pretty nimble, a factor in East Asian terrain.
On the downside, of the three-man crew, only one of them was in a turret,
and the gun was of questionable utility, even against things like stewards.
Especially against forces such as those without tanks, the Type 95 was plenty good enough,
even into the 1940s. However, the tank would also remain the most commonly found
through to the late war period, proving hopeless against American and Australian armor.
Come 1937, officially, the Type 97 medium tank Chi-Ha entered service,
but production delays meant they were still a bit rare when the Japanese received their wake-up call
Predominantly armed with Type 89s and Type 95s,
a platoon of Type 97s were also present in the Japanese order of battle.
The Type 97 was the most common medium tank of the Japanese war, eventually 2,100 or so would be
built. To give an idea of the Japanese definition of a medium tank, it came in at about 15 tons.
The American M5A1 Stuart light tank also came in at about 15 tons.
The Japanese knew it, but were limited by production issues to keeping this supposedly
stopgap tank in production. That said, again, as far as it went, it wasn't a bad tank with its
four-man crew, although being riveted didn't help it much, nor was the fact that the fourth
was a bow gunner and not a turret crewman. The Japanese, however, were using these tanks
with low-velocity 57mm and medium-velocity 37mm guns against Soviet tanks with 45mm high-velocity
guns. This did not go well for the Japanese. They lost about 75% of their overall strength.
There was a sudden realization that they very well could end up fighting an enemy with more
armor than the Chinese, and that anti-tank capability was required.
Enter the Type 1 47mm gun, a high-velocity anti-tank gun. This was more than a threat
to Stuarts, though it was advisable to shoot only at the flanks of Shermans and Grants.
Somewhere just under half of the production of Chi-Ha came with the 47mm gun. The catch?
Production of this tank with the 47mm started in 1942, meaning that they were a bit thin on
the ground. A handful were present for the Assault and Bataan, but they were a match for
the M3s on the defending side. Together with this shift to a more general-purpose capability,
another influence which showed up before the Japanese expanded the war in late 1941 was the
stunning German success of the Panzer divisions in both Poland and Western Europe.
Not too proud to take another idea from the Europeans, the Japanese realized that they
needed to rethink their concept of armor operations. In April 1941, armor branch was
formed as an independent branch, and cavalry was folded into it. The chief of armor was the former
chief of cavalry, General Shin Yoshida, who was very much a supporter of the role of tanks as a
lead component of the army. He set about creating new doctrine and organization to reflect this.
However, this would have to wait until 1942. There was work to be done in the Pacific.
For this, the Japanese tanks would be operating under the old doctrine, which was primarily
infantry support. However, unlike, say, the French or British concepts of infantry support,
the Japanese were given more flexibility. The primary mission of the tank may have been
direct infantry support, but other roles were also considered suitable.
When performing in the conventional attack role, the Japanese stressed concentration of force,
a mobile mass attacking a weak point of the line. A full regiment of 50 tanks would be assigned a
frontage of 500-800 meters, although a reserve would usually be kept for either exploitation
against enemy rear areas or against just… things that require a reserve.
If there was no feasibility of supporting the infantry in a direct offense,
tanks could be assigned more cavalry roles, such as flank attacks,
with infantry support keeping them company. Long-range raids, such as Iwanaka's, were given
some considerable attention in the doctrine as well, but the best opportunity to use a tank's
abilities was in a pursuit. Japanese pursuits should be, quote,
unremitting and audacious, even if only one tank survives to complete the mission.
So, as you can see, the Japanese may have been officially in the old-school line of thinking,
but the reality was that they were not quite as hidebound as it implies.
After all, if the infantry are tootling along in trucks at 30 km an hour, there is no reason
why their supporting tanks can also tootle along at 30 km an hour as infantry support,
and this was demonstrated well in Malaya with the seizure of Jitra.
A combined arms task force of three companies of tanks, two of motivated infantry, plus some
engineers, medics, and signals under Lieutenant Colonel Shizuo Sakai were told that they were
going to go make a breakthrough, and that the key was speed of action. The instructions were basically
stop for nothing. If something broke down, abandon it. Somebody gets in the way, friend or enemy,
run him over. And it worked. It worked again at Slim River, a small force about battalion size
routing an Indian division during a night attack. There was a catch though. Oftentimes,
charge is indeed the correct answer, but as Custer found out after all his successes,
just because it worked several times before doesn't mean it will work every time. The Indians
were poorly equipped for anti-tank defense, which suited the Japanese tanks fine. Overconfidently
charging into an Australian anti-tank ambush put a bit of a dampener on Japanese audacity, however,
but again, the point is made that just because the Japanese felt a tank was for infantry support
didn't mean that this meant slow operation at foot speed. By the middle of 1942, with the
conquests in the Pacific completed, there was the opportunity for a reset, and a lot of the tanks
were brought back to Manchuria, where two tank divisions were stood up mid-year, with a third
stood up in December. This was the result of the assessment of tank doctrine with the German
success in mind. The tank division was of a reasonable design, if maybe a bit tank heavy.
Two tank brigades, each with two tank regiments, each regiment being a light tank company,
three medium tank companies, a gun tank company, basically assault guns, and a maintenance company.
One mobile infantry regiment, in Type 1 Hokie armoured personnel carriers, or Type 1 Hoha
halftracks. An anti-tank battalion, a recon battalion, a mobile artillery regiment of three
battalions, an anti-aircraft battalion, an engineer battalion, a maintenance battalion,
transportation battalion, a signals unit, and a casualty evacuation company. There were two
catches. The first was that the doctrine had not yet been updated. This would happen in September.
The second was that the two APCs and the assault guns had been invented,
they were not yet in production, so the three 1942 divisions were not exactly up to official
strength. It's worth noting that the reason these three divisions were stood up in China
was that the Asian landmass was the place best suited for the operation of such a unit.
Jungles and small islands, not so much, though eventually second tank division will fight in
the Philippines in about two and a half years. The doctrine itself would be changed in September
of 1942, and the Kiko Sakusa Nyomusho, or notification of armour operations, would
prove to be a massive change in the emphasis of how the Japanese army would officially do business.
Now, the essence of the fight is to raid and destroy the enemy by the great mobility and
offensive power of tanks. Each branch should coordinate in order to assist the tank in
accomplishing its duty. Infantry would support the tank by attacking the enemy with or in advance of
the tank, cover the flanks, and clear the enemy from positions. Anti-tank guns would directly
support tanks and destroy enemy tanks. Artillery would support the tanks and destroy enemy artillery
and positions. Gun tanks would destroy and suppress at close range enemy anti-tank guns and other
weapons which could not be suppressed by artillery. So this is all fantastic. What happened?
This has now been implemented by the time that the Allies start to take the offensive in the
Pacific. Well, in addition to the problems of industrial manufacturing not being capable of
meeting the needs of this new unit design, the other problem is that we just don't hear about
Japanese tank divisions because they were found in China. The armoured units encountered in the
Pacific campaign after this point would have been, at least until late 1944, merely independent
attachments to infantry units, either divisional recon units with Type 94 or Type 97 tankettes,
or independent tank companies or regiments. Further, Japanese doctrine heavily stressed the attack,
which is pretty much what they had been doing up until now in the WW2 channel timeline.
As we proceed forward, however, we will note that the Japanese do not necessarily follow the manual
when on the defence in small islands.
Right, that was basically an overview of how the Japanese ended up with their tank force
to this date on the WW2 channel timeline, which is June or so 1942. So I'm sure we will be
revisiting some of the Japanese vehicles a little bit later on in the course of events.
Which means I think there's only one major power to do now, and that'll be the United States.
And we will attack that when Torch happens.
Right, hope you found that interesting and informative. Take care.

