世界航海/海軍歷史 原汁生肉 Loss of the USS Arizona - Examining the Evidence
王者风范
22粉絲
14 次觀看·2025年8月9日
大家好,歡迎收看這個星期五的視頻,由Skillshare贊助播出。
你可能已經看過或聽過了,但以防萬一你沒有看過,Skillshare是一個在網上學習的社群,
其中包含了各式各樣的技術改進課程,所有人都可以從中獲益。
如果你想學習新技術,進一步研究舊的技術,或者看看其他人如何製作技術,
我們會為你製作一段視頻。
對於其他航空興奮者,例如我自己,有關圖像,攝影,電影和視頻等主題,
所以無論你想製作船隻,拍攝船隻,或製作船隻的視頻,
我們會為你提供一些建議,技巧和技術。
這個月有兩個重要的項目幫助了我。
有些人可能在這個月之前已經看過了,我參加了HMS Victory,
重新舉辦了Trafalgar的戰鬥,是的,Trafalgar,也就是Nelson的第三部,
它將在今年後推出,
我意識到我必須學習如何製作一些燈光,
因為當然,大航空航空艙並不是為了視頻製作而設計的,
因為它是在18世紀建造的,
所以這次的課程是由Jordi van der Poort,
他非常有幫助告訴我如何設置燈光,
而Masuk Sakhar-Batista的課程在Sony Vegas,
雖然是為了Pro 15,也非常有用,
因為我使用Vegas製作這些視頻,
我必須做更多精細的編輯,
在這部視頻中,你正在觀看,
比我認為在我其他的視頻中,
當然,它應該是有幫助的,
一些Victory的直播。
網站上沒有廣告,
如果你想去看看,
或許有些東西可以使用,
第一千人,
在下面的描述中點擊連結,
可以獲得一個月免費的Skillshare試驗,
所以你今天可以開始探索你的創意。
再次感謝Skillshare贊助這部視頻,
現在開始我們的節目。
美國亞洲的損失,
在1941年12月7日,
可能是那場事件最有名和著名的一部分,
並不是,
正如我經常認為,
這張照片所代表的,
這其實是美國沙灘爆炸,
在浮游的乾涸島上。
亞洲的爆炸,
然而,
是在電影中拍攝的,
雖然電影本身有點短暫,
而且在錄影中,
似乎含有至少兩個空隙。
但是,
亞洲的事件,
實際發生在了一些討論,
在二次世界大戰後,
當然,
事件發生在最普遍的情況下,
華盛頓郵報爆炸,
是有點明顯的。
但是,
那是怎麼發生的,
還有那艘船的其他損失,
發生在那之前,
是某種程度上,
仍然有爭議的,
這並不是HMS Hood的毀滅問題,
但是,
無論如何,
我被要求看一看,
所以我會看一看。
在她的損失後的一年中,
美國軍隊至少看了三次,
這件事是怎麼發生的,
這件事,
加上幾個損失報告,
數量的文件,
物品,
和七分鐘的影片,
成為了大多數的歷史學家的分析基礎,
究竟發生了什麼事件在亞洲,
這是我們今天要跟進的相似的過程。
在珍珠港的直接後果中,
在亞洲的殲滅工作,
並沒有被視為優先,
由於明顯的原因,
相比起像加州,
納瓦多,
或釋放船隻,
例如馬利蘭,
然而,
一些殲滅工作已經完成了,
各種槍械被撤走,
並且大量的彈藥,
尤其是14吋彈藥彈,
也被撤走,
在1942年開幕的月份中。
現在,
我們必須強調,
沒有人在任何時候,
有任何概念,
把亞洲帶回到軍事上。
這對任何人,
在12月7日結束時,
無法再航行。
然而,
在3月中,
1942年,
仍然存在兩個
整體的考慮選項。
首先,
要建造一個礦洞,
圍繞船隻,
以一種類似
美國東北維吉尼亞的方式,
或在那段時間,
美國東北維吉尼亞計劃的方式。
這會允許他們
切斷船隻的前面部分,
也就是船隻的航行部分。
但是,
船隧的後端,
在相對較好的狀況下,
理論上,
可以被遮住,
遮住,
並被推開,
以便更容易清理。
另一個選項,
就是把亞洲帶回到軍事上,
清理其他船隻的東西,
否則,
把她帶回到她的位置。
另一個選項,
顯然是航道的路徑,
這大致是因為
Nimitz總統的意見,
任何航班
來自 Oklahoma,
Utah,
或Arizona,
都會花費大量的金錢和資源,
並對美國軍隊造成很小的利益。
事實上,
無論是Utah,
還是Arizona,
航班都不會來自那裡,
雖然,
後來 Oklahoma 也會來自那裡。
說到這,
在三月中的同樣建議中,
航班部門,
不如說,
他們當時可能擁有
世界上最偉大的經濟學家,
因為他們的回應是這樣的。
在亞洲的情況下,
該部門認為
在此時,
她的最後決定
無法實現。
她認為
船上的實際狀況
需要進一步研究。
文章爆炸
毫無疑問造成了巨大的損害,
但只有一個導彈擊中,
導致幾個炸彈擊中。
文章爆炸造成了
煙囪前面的上層工藝,
但這個損害的真實程度,
至於船的結構性,
仍然不清晰。
經驗顯示,
航班受到嚴重損害後
是更容易解決的,
甚至更遙遠地可能
在挖掘行動中。
雖然他們堅持承認
無可救藥的想法
可能會被遺棄,
但這篇文章顯示
有人寫了這篇文章
可能沒有去澳門
看過這艘船。
因為,如您所見,
他們是一個孤獨的聲音
在森林中提出
也許,
也許亞洲
可能不會處於這麼差的狀況,
也可能可以重新調整,
也就是重新設置
再次使用
在服務上,
您知道,
儘管他們承認
航班的文章爆炸。
這次辯論
在1942年
在7月份,
所有人都說
基本上
無可救藥
從此 ,
亞洲人
會寫
兩起
寫
一起
但討論究竟該如何處理這艘運輸艦
被分成兩部分
來分析這艘運輸艦的結局
第一次嘗試處理這艘運輸艦
在1月1942年
不足兩個月後
亞利桑那已經被破壞
由船長Alfred Hohmann寫下
其他報告中
他寫了一封短信
寫給船局
講述了亞利桑那受損的損失
以及他能夠從生存者的報告中
得知亞利桑那
在她的毀滅前幾分鐘
在我讀完這封信之前
我們知道現在
所有在第一波的炸彈
都揹著1,760磅
由16吋鎧甲砍下的炸彈
1月28日 1942年
他們並不知道
所以當他們描述了
各種炸彈重量
請記住這是他們的最佳估算
而我們其實是在講
適應的16吋鎧甲砍下的炸彈
這封信寫下
亞利桑那
以目前的數據來看
支撐了8次炸彈傷害
和1次炸彈傷害
這完全破壞了
F-88的航母
因炸彈和炸彈文章爆炸
炸彈終於被燒毀
2天後
據說
F-90後的相當的裝備
終於可以被燒毀
詳細資訊
根據C參考
是這樣的
總結
所有戰爭傷害
美國亞利桑那
在7月5日
洛杉磯海拔7.5公尺
發生炸彈
在7月5日
1941年12月7日
在炸彈前
大約是這樣的
前面32呎
6吋
後面33呎
炸彈擊中
1
一枚500盎司炸彈
擊中了
星期四航母的
從星期四航母的
穿過了
123號船
星期四航母的
中間
和星期四航母的
爆炸在船舶
破壞了
船舶
和總部船舶
發生了小火
結果
很快就被燒毀了
2
一枚500盎司炸彈
擊中了
85號船
船舶
破壞了
96號船
7號船
1萬500盎司炸彈
擊中了
爆炸
破壞了
解決了
6號船
1枚500盎司炸彈
擊中了
1000萬500盎司炸彈
擊中了
爆炸
在船舶前面破壞的爆炸
由於船舶附近的無煙的爆炸文件
將導致船舶前面的爆炸
從美國航空公司的船艦指示
附近的亞洲紐約到港邊的船艦
亞洲紐約似乎撐住了一波火箭
在港邊的35度左右
這波火箭造成的傷害
無法被決定
因為這艘船在該範圍已經完全被破壞
有機油氣水載艇
在這波火箭造成的傷害範圍內
已達到95%的能力
這艘船在發動戰爭的開始時
是在物理狀態X-ray
通常是在第三艘船下
除了在海岸上的航空公司
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態X-ray
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
在發動戰爭前
物理狀態Z
雖然後來檢查證明這並非如此
最後我們看到了這份報紙爆炸的原因
尤其是這個炸彈射進了黑粉封
封住了煙燻粉封
這封封是主要的報紙
導致炸彈爆炸
亞利桑那州當時擁有黑粉和煙燻粉的原因
是因為當時的火力導致炸彈爆炸
當時的火力射擊手用煙燻粉作主導
但這封封是難以導致炸彈爆炸的
所以黑粉是用作爆炸或發射
或其他任何名稱
以防止火力輸出
在後來的戰艦
如果有去過南卡羅來納州
南卡羅來納州
或亞利桑那州的戰艦
你會注意到
炸彈射擊手
射擊手是加入了主導射擊的
但在舊的戰艦
這並不是常見的
有計劃將射擊手轉換
但原本
黑粉射擊手
是分別給主導射擊手
而因為黑粉射擊手
比較敏感
射擊手被儲存在不同的雜誌
但我稍後會說更多
另一份報告
是在1月28日
1942年
是關於傷亡控制
這份報告是
在7月7日1941年
發生的空襲
要求
文章標題是
A
這份報告是
第一
這份報告的唯一資訊
是從
幾名傷亡者的聲明
在空襲中
到目前為止
這份報告的研究
只涵蓋了主艦和第二艘航母
並不涵蓋航母的重要部分
有些結論可以從
船員的習慣和習慣
來判斷
第二
幾乎所有X門和裝飾
在早上
早上7時55分
都關閉了
很多Y門
和裝飾
也在前一夜
關閉了
許多工程空間
都在Z狀態
包括船塘
引擎室
火箱
但不包括氧氣機
和氮氣機
第一部分
這次攻擊
發生在
Z狀態
之前
破壞了
整艘F88
第二部分
從傷亡者的聲明
我們認為
Z狀態
在三艘航母
和四艘航母
但不完全
在三艘航母
和四艘航母
中
第三部分
我們認為
三艘航母的
三艘航母
在攻擊開始
或在破壞
的一艘航母
第四部分
從破壞的
傷亡者的聲明
和研究
我們可以確定
Z狀態
在三艘航母中
並不是完全
在三艘航母
這部分
可以進一步提升
研究進一步
G. No information available.
H. Many fires were started by the bomb hits and the whole forward part of the ship was set ablaze after the magazine explosion.
The decks burned readily and lots of floating oil increased the fire.
I. The wind carried the smoke forward in a black cloud, obscuring everything forward.
Fumes and yellow smoke issued for some time from the bomb holes.
J, K, L and M.
An early bomb hit down the stack disrupted the main fire main and bilge pumps and there was no water with which to fight the fires.
CO2 was used on the quarter deck to stem small fires but the general conflagration forward was completely out of hand.
There was no opportunity to observe the effectiveness of the firefighting equipment.
N. The early destruction of the engineering spaces took all power, light and telephone services from the ship.
O. Flashlights were used effectively in the turrets but the supply was not adequate to meet the emergency.
P. Many men were badly burned, even to death, by the blast from the magazines.
Flash-proof clothes might have minimized these losses.
So we can see here that a few things are attributed to this supposed bomb down the stack, which as we'll see later on didn't actually happen,
but overall they don't contribute materially to how the ship was lost.
To be honest, by the time the magazine sets off, as it notes in another section,
everything in the engineering spaces was dead and broken anyway, so firefighting equipment wouldn't have been of any use, whatever the case.
Now as far as those X, Y and Z terms that are contained in this report,
obviously for those of you who are either in the US Navy or have been in the US Navy, you'll know exactly what they mean.
For those of you who might not,
Condition X is the way the ship is set up when the ship is not in any danger of attack or any natural hazards.
There are various doors within a ship and they should be marked with an X, Y or Z.
So during Condition X, i.e. normal procedure in peacetime, doors with an X should remain closed, but doors with a Y or Z can be open.
Condition Y is set when the ship is either at sea, entering or leaving a port, or in port and could potentially get underway, so it's an additional level.
So at that point, all doors with an X or a Y should remain closed when not in use.
And then Condition Z involves closing all the doors marked X, Y or Z.
And Condition Z is specified as what you need to set during general quarters, when you have shipwide casualties, when entering or leaving a port during wartime, or any time the ship is in danger against fire, flooding or other damage.
So effectively what the report is saying is that in terms of its ability to resist incoming damage, the Arizona was most of the way to being fully ready for receiving that damage.
I almost at Condition Z, but not quite.
She was partway between Y and Z at the time of the detonation.
And based on the reports from everywhere else in the ship where there were survivors, there's no particular reason to assume that the forward portion of the ship would have been any further advanced in that process.
So they would have had some Condition Z doors shut, but perhaps not all.
So that's what the U.S. Navy thought at the beginning of 1942.
One of the things that we mentioned is that Black Powder Magazine and some people have said, oh well, actually no, Arizona would have been using the newer design charges where the black powder bags are part of the charge rather than separate.
And so this detonation of the Black Powder Magazines couldn't have happened.
But this is flatly contradicted by the U.S. Navy's own investigations in 1943.
Because following the initial analysis, which we've just looked at in 1942, a much deeper analysis was undertaken in 1943, at least in terms of evaluating what exactly had been on the ship and therefore what might have happened.
The request for this analysis was made in early summer, and the report was delivered in October 1943, submitted by one Captain R.W. Payne.
Now the first three sections of the report detail the efforts made by divers and where they went and what conditions they faced and so forth.
And whilst interesting reading, they are not relevant particularly to what we're looking at, which is the damage and the cause of the loss.
So we're going to pick up this particular narrative at Section 4, Part A.
Due to the structural damage and debris in the forward part of the ship, it has been impractical to determine the path of entry of the bomb that is reported in Reference B
to have struck the ship near Turret 2.
It appears probable, due to the greater structural damage forward of Turret 1, especially on the port side, that the bomb may have penetrated on the port side of Turret 1.
B. It is believed from conversations with personnel that were attached to the ship at the time, and the contents of the forward magazines prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, that they contained as follows.
1. 308 14-inch shells in each turret.
2. 616 cans of smokeless powder for each turret, Numbers 1 and 2, distributed in six accommodating magazines, A424M, A420M, A414M, A413M, A421M, and A423M on the first platform.
3. 25 25-pound cans and 150 Number 3 charges of black powder between Numbers 1 and 2 turrets in the black powder magazine A415M on the first platform.
3,500 cans of 5-inch 51-caliber smokeless powder in the 5-inch powder magazines forward, powder about equally distributed between the magazines on the first and second platforms, A423M, A431M, and A324M.
5. Approximately 300,000 rounds of .50-caliber anti-aircraft ammunition in forward .50-caliber magazine A408M.
6. Approximately 3,500 5-inch 51-caliber projectiles in ammunition passages amid ships, B504M and B505M on the third deck.
7. Small arms ammunition, approximately 100,000 rounds of .30-caliber, 5,000 rounds of .45-caliber, and 1,000 service primers in A417M on the first platform.
8. 75 14-inch primers in each turret, Numbers 1 and 2 in the gun chamber.
9. 50 electrical detonators in trunk A511-2-T on the third deck.
So, briefly interrupting here, what Captain Payne had done is he talked to the survivors, he'd looked at what the manifest for the ship said in the immediate run-up to December 7th,
and he had deduced that, in fact, the magazine A415M did contain quite a significant quantity of black powder.
Just the 25-pound cans present amounted to about a third of a tonne of gunpowder, so say nothing of the 150-odd Number 3 charges.
Resuming the report, Section C, it appears that the explosion in the forward magazines was vented through the sides of the ship from about frame 10 to about frame 70, and went upward through the decks forward of turret Number 1.
Due to the general extent of interior damage between frames 10 and 70, it is difficult to determine the exact magazines in which high-order detonation took place, although the most severe damage is between frames 10 and 33.
D. The following remnants of ammunition were found on, or in, the vicinity of the ship.
D. A 14-inch powder can was found in the bottom of the conning tower tube above the hatch opening.
D. Exploded 5-inch .51-caliber powder cans were found along the beach on Ford Island, a distance of 350 to 400 feet, on top of the forward key F7S to which the ship was moored, and in the mud around the sides of the ship.
D. Unexploded 5-inch .51-caliber projectiles were found in the mud over the starboard side opposite frames 54 to 65, and in the aft portion of compartments B504M and B505M.
E. No intact ammunition has been recovered from the forward part of the ship.
Part 5
As requested in paragraph 1E of reference A, enclosures 1, 2 and 3 are forwarded to indicate the major damage resulting from the bomb hits and the subsequent explosion of the forward magazines.
The following supplementary information relative to the damage is furnished from divers reports, proceeding generally from the aft forward.
A. Except for the interior damage, indicated on enclosure 2, the ship aft of frame 78 is essentially intact.
B. No evidence of torpedo hits has been found, although the condition of the flat of the bottom forward inboard of the areas searched as described in paragraph 2A is not known.
The bottom structure in the forward part of the ship is not accessible from inside, and is embedded in the mud outside.
C. The armour belt and blister are essentially in place except for the damage indicated on enclosure 2.
D. In connection with the interior diving listed in paragraph 2B above, because of the wreckage, the divers were not able to penetrate further forward than frame 76 on the main and second decks, and not forward of bulkhead 78 below the third deck.
However, on the third deck in ammunition passageways A504M and A505M, access was possible as far forward as frame 66.
In these spaces, the second deck sloped down forward, and the third deck was split and blown upward generally.
No access could be gained to the fireman's passage C501 on the third deck.
E. Beginning at about frame 62 port and starboard, the sides of the ship from the top of the armour to the upper deck began to bulge outward, and proceeding forward, this bulging and tearing away from the internal structure is increased,
so that between frames 50 and 10, the sides were blown outward almost to a horizontal position, with portions of the upper and main decks attached in some areas between frames 34 and 10.
F. The decks have collapsed and sloped downward from about frame 70 forward to about frame 34.
Between frames 45 and 34, the upper deck is about 3 feet below the top of the armour on the starboard side, and approximately at the top of the armour on the port side.
G. Divers located, but, due to wreckage below were unable to enter, the hatch at frame 41 on the starboard side of the upper deck.
They were able to reach the second deck through the corresponding hatch on the port side, but could not leave the immediate vicinity on either the main or second deck due to wreckage and floating lumber.
H. The uptake armour, conning tower and armour tube, and turrets number 1 and number 2, have dropped from their normal positions as indicated on enclosure 2.
I. The uptake armour grating in the main deck was examined as far as the wreckage of the uptakes would permit, and is believed to be intact.
J. The wreckage below the hatch in the bottom of the conning tower armour tube prevented the diver from leaving the immediate vicinity.
Access to the hatch was gained down the inside of the tube after removal of the conning tower.
K. No damage was found in the gun chamber and gun pit in turret 2 when they were unwatered by pumping in connection with the removal of the guns, slides and related equipment.
L. The upper deck between frames 10 and 34, including wildcats and shafts, was rolled forward and otherwise blown out as indicated on enclosure 2.
Portions of the main and second decks from about frames 10 to 20 were blown forward with the upper deck.
Otherwise, due to the poor underwater visibility, it has not been practicable to identify the various structural members.
What appears to be a portion of the second deck plating is about 8ft below the top of the armour on the starboard side, and on the port side, the general level of the wreckage is considerably lower.
At the centre line, at the forward edge of number 1 barbette, the level of the wreckage is about 28ft below the top of the barbette.
The worm and wheel assemblies for the starboard and centre windlasses were found still bolted to a portion of the third deck, and the port assembly was missing.
Now, apart from the rather dry description of the horrific damage in the forward part of the Arizona, there are three main takeaways from this.
One, there was no evidence of a torpedo hit. In fact, it appears that was probably a near miss from a bomb dropped at the same time, or near enough at the same time as the bomb that actually destroyed the Arizona.
And it just landed so close to the Arizona that people in the vestal thought it was a torpedo striking the ship.
Secondly, the grating, bearing in mind that before they thought a bomb had gone down the funnel, was examined and found to be intact.
So, there was no bomb down the funnel and into the engine spaces.
And third, generally speaking, there appears to be somewhat more damage to the port side of the ship than the starboard, which indicates that perhaps the explosion was more intense on that side, and therefore potentially started on that side.
Another interesting note, although not a primary one, is the nature of the unexploded ordnance discovered.
And secondly, various bits of unburnt 14-inch smokeless powder being found gave a potential hint that maybe the 14-inch smokeless magazine hadn't been, again, the primary initiator.
Which did tend to square somewhat with the previous report, which pointed to the 15-inch black powder magazines as the primary culprits.
Now, that brings us up to late 1944, when Commander E.C. Holtzworth submits the Analysis of Loss of Arizona on the 31st of October.
During this report, he makes reference to a film, the film of Arizona being destroyed.
Now, the film, as you'll find on the U.S. National Archives, is playing above you at the moment, albeit in slow motion.
Now, the one thing you'll realize is Vestal is on the outside of Arizona, and therefore this is being taken from the Ford Island side of Arizona, although not necessarily on Ford Island itself, which means the alignment is completely wrong.
For whatever reason, when this was digitized, it was digitized horizontally flipped.
And so in this video, I've flipped this particular bit of film to show the correct orientation, and this is what we'll be using to refer to from now on.
Now, one note, they make reference in this report and in a subsequent one we're going to read to various frames of footage.
Now, I'm going to try and match as best I can, but obviously they had access to the individual celluloid frames, so they can make very precise estimates.
Whereas with digital, I can only advance step by step and hope that I've got approximately the right frame.
So, if there are any minor errors, they are entirely my own.
Now, in this report, Sections 1 and 2 are basically scene setting, telling the reader where Arizona was, and that it was partly between Condition Y and Condition Z, but we're going to skip those again for obvious reasons.
So, starting at Part 3, it says the attack started at 0755 with dive bombers over the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.
At this time, the measures referred to in Paragraph 2 were started. This is going from Condition Y to Condition Z.
Almost simultaneously, a torpedo attack on Battleship Row occurred.
The commanding officer of Vestal in Reference E stated that at about 0820, a torpedo was seen to pass astern of the Vestal, and this torpedo apparently hit the Arizona, whose bow extended almost 100 feet beyond the stern of Vestal.
He further states that the Arizona received a bomb hit forward almost simultaneously, and that Arizona's forward magazine exploded.
Reference B lists eight bomb hits on the Vestal, one of which apparently was large and of the armor-piercing type, Reference B being the 1942 analysis.
This one was reported by Reference B to have hit the Vestal by number two turret. In any event, the magazine explosion destroyed the ship almost completely forward of the foremast structure.
Part 4. Reference A found evidence of only five bomb hits, all of which were aft of the foremast structure.
At the same time, the ship was so seriously broken up forward of the foremast structure that evidence of a heavy bomb hit in the vicinity of turret two would be certain to have been completely obliterated.
On the other hand, the armor belt was substantially intact, and Pearl Harbor found absolutely no evidence of a torpedo hit in or just below the armor.
It can therefore be accepted as a fact that a torpedo did not hit Arizona.
Times in all the references of the various sequences of events check reasonably well, that is, within four or five minutes.
It appears that Arizona escaped torpedo damage during the initial torpedo attack, which occurred at about 0800.
It will be recalled that Nevada was hit by a torpedo between 0800 and 0810, and that West Virginia was torpedoed at about the same time.
Following this attack, the dive-bombing attack on the battleship started.
This was about 0815 to 0820.
All the references agree that the bombs which struck Arizona fell between 0815 and 0820.
For example, it appears that West Virginia was struck by bombs at about this time, as was Tennessee.
It appears that the dive-bombing continued from about 0810 to 0830 in this phase of the attack.
Reference F, of which a 3-inch by 5-inch movie strip is available, comprises about 400 pictures taken at the rate of 24 per second.
The location of the camera in these pictures apparently was a point on the northwest shore of Kauhua Island, where a supply base was under construction at the time.
The precise location cannot be determined, but the general location can be spotted on a map of Pearl Harbor, which is also available.
The first 45 of these pictures show the Arizona and Vestal, and include the bow of Nevada and the stern of West Virginia.
There seems to be no damage to Arizona in these pictures, but evidence of the fire on Vestal's Vauxhall, which she was struck by a bomb apparently prior to 0820, is faintly visible.
West Virginia's main mast is also in these pictures, and shows a definite list, indicating that West Virginia had already been torpedoed prior to the pictures.
This is consistent with the times reported.
Picture 46 definitely shows an explosion on the bow of Arizona.
It is estimated that picture 46 was taken within 0.5 seconds of the detonation.
As the pictures proceed, the fire gets worse, finally engulfing the entire ship forward of the main mast.
This series continues until picture 208.
Between pictures 46 and 208, the development of a jet of black smoke from Arizona's stack can be noted.
It is this jet of black smoke which apparently gave rise to the rumor that a bomb went down her stack.
Actually, Pearl Harbor could find no damage to the armor gratings, although there was bomb damage both forward and port of the uptakes.
These bombs unquestionably damaged the intakes in the steaming fire room, not identified, although some evidence indicates that number 6 was in use.
The smoke issuing from the stack was quite obviously the result of incomplete combustion, rather than an explosion or fire.
Beginning with the pictures in the vicinity of 106,
the characteristics of the conflagration shown are somewhat similar to those of an oil fire.
At various places between pictures 46 and 208, minor explosions on the fo'c'sle of Arizona and possibly on the stern of Tennessee can be seen.
In this connection, see pictures 99 and 136.
Picture 208 definitely shows the magazine explosion in which the dense black smoke of the previous picture changes to white and luminous objects can be seen.
Toward the end of the reel, the sagged forward superstructure becomes apparent, although the smoke and flame obscure the entire foremast structure in the series of pictures following 208.
Picture 208 occurred approximately 7 seconds, 24 frames per second, after the detonation shown in picture 46.
There is no evidence that cameras stopped at any time between pictures 46 and 208.
The above evidence leads to the conclusion that there was a bomb detonation on or about the fo'c'sle,
which caused a bad fire involving some manner of oil from tanks forward of the midships.
This fire spread rapidly over a large area and increased rapidly in intensity.
It was followed in 7 seconds by a magazine explosion.
In examining the causes of the magazine explosions, characteristics of smokeless powder and black powder were investigated.
Pertinent information from the Ordnance Safety Manual, published in 1 September 1941 by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, U.S. Army, are quoted below.
Small amounts of unconfined smokeless powder burn with little smoke or ash and without explosion.
When confined or in large quantities, the rate of burning increases with the temperature and pressure.
Under certain conditions, with sufficient initiation, smokeless powder has been known to detonate.
When smokeless powder is stored in magazines in containers or propelling charges,
there is no evidence to indicate that fires will give rise to any unusual hazard.
Cases in which pressure is great enough to result in structural damage have occurred,
involve the burning or explosion of smokeless powder under circumstances not ordinarily encountered in the storage of the material in containers.
There is, however, incontrovertible evidence that explosions of nitrocellulose powders up to large sizes are capable of being propagated from box to box
when they are initiated by the detonation of high explosive charges.
It can be concluded from the above conditions that smokeless powder is difficult to detonate as a result of fire.
It is also certain that with sufficient initiation, smokeless powder will detonate.
With respect to the properties of black powder, the following pertinent information is quoted from the same manual.
Black powder is regarded as one of the worst known explosive hazards.
When ignited unconfined, it burns with explosive violence and will explode if ignited under even slight confinement.
It can be ignited easily by very small sparks, heat and friction.
Most black powder fires start from sparks, and ignition results in an explosion so quickly that no attempt can be made to fight the fire.
Most explosions of black powder originate from sparks, and loose black powder is extremely dangerous.
It can be seen from the above that the ignition of black powder will almost inevitably result in an explosion.
From reference A, the Arizona had on board her a full allowance of smokeless powder,
arranged in three magazines on each side of the vessel between frames 31 and 48 on the first platform.
These six magazines supply both turrets 1 and 2.
The black powder magazine is located on the first platform on the center line between frames 37 and 39.
It contained 1,075 pounds of black powder.
It will be realized that the black powder magazine is surrounded by the smokeless powder magazines.
After the magazine explosion occurred, reference A reports that exploded 5-inch .51 caliber powder cans
were found along the beach on Ford Island, a distance of 350 to 400 feet from the starboard side of the vessel.
The 5-inch .51 caliber powder magazines are located on the first platform
after the 14-inch smokeless powder magazines between frames 50 and 58, port and starboard.
There is no doubt that the smokeless powder magazines detonated.
It is not clear, however, what initiated the smokeless powder detonation.
A bomb detonation within the smokeless powder magazine presumably could cause a detonation,
although smokeless powder as such is not an unusually severe hazard.
The Army's experience indicates that it is difficult to detonate smokeless powder as a result of a fire
unless confinement, temperature, pressure, and high density of loading are present.
Our own war experience has indicated that an appreciable interval of time, longer than 7 seconds,
is required for these factors to build up and create a mass detonation following a fire.
A fire could reach the magazines through hatches left open on the third deck.
There are five such hatches in the vicinity of barbettes 1 and 2,
one of which is almost directly above the black powder magazine.
It is a possibility that one of the modified 16-inch armor-piercing projectiles,
which the Japanese used for bombs, might have penetrated the 4-inch STS armored deck
and initiated a fire followed by detonation of the smokeless powder magazines.
This seems rather improbable, though, considering the small charge of explosive,
less than 70 pounds of TNT, in this type of bomb
and the fact, pictures 46 through 208,
that the initial fire was definitely above the waterline and of a large-scale proportion.
On the other hand, the detonation of 1,000 pounds of black powder
could easily initiate a detonation of the 14-inch smokeless powder.
The black powder could have detonated either as the result of a bomb detonation
below the third deck or a fire above the third deck
passing down to the black powder magazines through open hatches in the armored deck.
From the evidence, it is believed the latter is more probable.
In any event, the six 14-inch and two 5-inch smokeless powder magazines detonated.
The collapse of the foremast structure was not due, amongst other curious things,
to the main magazine detonation.
A bomb, which hit and detonated close to the port leg of the tripod
at the superstructure deck level, severed the port leg,
and the starboard leg was insufficient to prevent forward collapse.
Turret 1, with its barbette, fell vertically approximately 22 feet,
and turret 2, with its barbette, fell approximately 23 feet.
All other structure above the top edge of the side armor
between frames 10 and 70 was completely demolished.
In fact, most of it was missing.
The armor belt remained substantially in place.
There were short pieces of the shell projecting almost horizontally outward
at the top of the armor belt on both sides.
Summarizing, there seems to be no doubt that at least one bomb struck
and penetrated the Focsall deck in the vicinity of either turret 1 or turret 2.
This bomb, and possibly others, caused an intense fire
which shortly covered the entire Focsall.
Oil on the surface of the water was ignited.
Approximately 7 seconds after the start of this fire
and after the initial bomb detonation,
the main magazines exploded,
almost completely destroying the ship forward of frame 70.
Undoubtedly, the smokeless powder magazines detonated en masse.
Whether this mass detonation resulted from a bomb detonation
within either the smokeless powder or black powder magazines,
or whether it was initiated by fire
traveling down through open hatches to the black powder magazine,
is unknown.
But the time involved between the first bomb detonation
and the detonation of the main magazines,
approximately 7 seconds,
and the visible intense fire above the water line,
makes the latter supposition more reasonable.
When opportunity permits, this case will be discussed
with representatives of the Bureau of Ordnance.
With that said,
there are a couple of issues with this report.
As was pointed out in the article
The U.S. Navy's Study of the Loss of the Battleship Arizona
by Chris Wright and Bill Juerens,
which was published in Warship International
Volume 39, Number 3, in 2002.
They point out that
a recent review of paragraph 14 above,
which is about the collapse of the foremast,
indicates a full explanation for the collapse forward
of the foremast and superstructure.
The armoured conning tower and tube together
weighed about 400 tonnes
and were rigidly attached to the superstructure decks.
Study of damaged photographs
shows that the conning tower dropped vertically
after the supporting bulkheads underneath
were blown away.
The weight of the armoured conning tower
pulled the superstructure down with it
with the tripod mast following.
All the superstructure aft of the tower
tipped forward because that structure
remained attached at its back end
as the forward structure fell downwards.
In turn, the two bridge levels
above the conning tower,
together about 15 feet high,
collapsed into a space roughly 6 feet high
above the conning tower.
These two deck levels comprised
the admiral's bridge and the pilot house.
The main vertical leg of the forward tripod mast
was fully capable of supporting
the control tops above.
This main mast incorporated
an internal vertical access trunk
as well as cabling runs
for the gunfire control systems in the tops
and thus also was larger than it needed to be
solely for structural support purposes.
The side legs were added
to prevent the main leg from collapsing sideways
due to the ship rolling motion
or to a lesser extent
to prevent it from collapsing forward or aft
due to pitching loads.
Thus, damage to one of the lateral supporting mast legs
did not cause the foremast to fall forward.
The mast system remained substantially intact
as it fell forward
despite the severe whipping motion
incurred in the forward tripod mast
immediately following the main forward magazine conflagration.
There is also some contradiction
in the report as it attributes
some of the fire to oil tanks
breached in the ship
but also potentially that the bomb
doesn't reach the magazines
and that fire spreads from above
down through hatches.
Now, whether those hatches were open or not
exactly how far along the ship
was to be in Condition Z
obviously, as mentioned earlier, we don't know.
But if the bomb didn't penetrate
the armour deck above and started a fire
which spread through the hatches
then it couldn't have set off the oil
which was in tanks which were even further down in the ship.
Conversely, if the oil tanks
were set on fire, that would suggest
the bomb had actually gone through
pretty much all of the ship
and detonated in the oil tanks
or close to them.
So, there is a little bit of inconsistency there.
Now, the final piece of evidence
from the US Navy's analysis
that we're going to look at
is a memorandum that was filed
in November 1947
by Commander Menifee
I think that's how you pronounce his name anyway.
And once again
there's some scene setting in the initial paragraphs
which we're going to skip.
So, we pick up with
In the first 45 pictures, there is no apparent damage
to Arizona. However, there is some evidence
that she may have already been hit by bombs.
Just forward of turret 1, smoke is visible
and at the foot of the forward king post
on Vestal, there is some evidence of smoke.
Just off Arizona's bow
and in line with West Virginia
is a white wisp on the water
which may be spray from a bomb near miss.
West Virginia has already taken
a considerable port list.
Smoke from the fire on West Virginia
is very apparent.
Between pictures 45 and 46,
there was an indefinite period of time.
This period of time is indicated
by the hand that appears
on the right side of picture 46,
the disappearance of the obstruction
on the left side of the pictures,
the movement of the piling at the stern of the tug
at the foreground relative to Vestal,
and the appearance of smoke from Vestal's smokestack.
Tennessee appears in picture 46
for the first time,
while West Virginia is practically obscured
by the fire at Arizona's bow.
Picture 46 definitely shows an explosion
on the bow of Arizona.
The flame appears to be just as high as the mast
and very little smoke is associated with the flame.
In picture 53, black smoke
is just starting to rise vertically
out of Arizona's stack.
Between pictures 53 and 110,
the black smoke from the stack rises vertically
to a height about three times that of the foremast
in about two and a half seconds.
The effect is believed to be similar
to that noted at Crossroads,
the 1946 atomic bomb experiments with ship targets,
after Test A,
when soot was shaken loose
and drawn out of the stacks of dead ships.
If so, it is evidence that picture 46
was taken very soon after the explosion
on the bow of Arizona,
and that this explosion was of considerable magnitude.
The report then goes on
to look at various details in specific frames,
but we pick it up again
at paragraph 15.
The evidence is not clear as to whether
the bomb penetrated the third deck
or a fire started by the bomb detonation
passed through an open hatch in the third deck
into the magazines.
Reference A stated that most of the armored hatches
on the main deck were probably open at the time,
and reference A indicated that fragments
of four of five bombs,
of which definite evidence was found
having hit Arizona,
penetrated the third deck.
The fifth bomb hit the faceplate of turret 4,
which may account for its detonation
above the second deck.
It appears that there was an interval
of several seconds between the bomb hit
and the magazine explosion.
In the statement of Ensign Heim,
reference A noted that the quartermaster
had time to report the bomb hit on turret 2
before a magazine explosion.
The shaking of the ship
is definite evidence of a magazine explosion
rather than the detonation of an armor-piercing bomb.
From the known characteristics
of smokeless and black powder
enumerated in paragraph 10 of reference A,
it is believed that the 1,075 pounds
of black powder in magazine A-415M
detonated.
It is believed that this detonation
is shown in picture 46.
Ensign Heim reported that he was able to leave the bridge
after the magazine explosion
and make his way down to the four-mast superstructure
to the quarter deck.
This would have been impossible
through the fire shown in picture 208.
The smoke that rapidly rose out of the stack
beginning at picture 53
is evidence of an explosion of major proportions.
Very shortly after
the explosion of the black powder,
a fire started in one of the smokeless powder magazines.
Evidence of this fire
is seen on the forward side of the fire
beginning at picture 61.
Pictures 99 through 140
indicate further development of this fire.
By picture 160, the fire appears
to have become stabilised
and remains so through to picture 207,
a period of about two seconds.
After an interval of indefinite length,
picture 208 shows the smokeless powder fire
after it had spread throughout
the smokeless powder magazine.
It is noted that some evidence of a time interval
between the bomb detonation
and initiation of the magazine explosion.
There is very definite evidence
of a period of over seven seconds
between the initiation of the magazine explosion
shown in picture 46
and the general conflagration
of the smokeless powder shown in picture 208.
These time intervals suggest that
if an automatic magazine sprinkling apparatus
had been installed,
the magazine explosion might have been avoided
or after the magazine explosion,
the spread of the fire to the smokeless powder
might have been controlled.
Now, this report, when it couples with the other reports,
does contain a few bits of key information.
Firstly,
it points out that
out of the other bomb hits
which could be accounted for
in the aft part of Arizona,
four out of five of them
did manage to penetrate the armour deck.
The only one that didn't
was one that ricocheted off a turret face,
so it had already lost a bunch of energy
and possibly even its armour-piercing cap.
So it would appear that,
generally speaking,
the heavy bombs that the Japanese were using
were capable of going through the armour deck.
This would tend to rule out
the 1944 suggestion
that perhaps the bomb detonated
above there started a fire
and this fire spread down into the magazines
because there's no indication
that the bomb hit anything
like a turret faceplate on the way down
and so, in common with every other bomb
that hit the deck directly,
it should have gone through,
which then indicates that this bomb
would have fetched up in the magazines.
So whilst, of course,
it cannot be definitively proven
one way or the other
thanks to the lack of existence
of most of the part of Arizona
that you need to prove it,
it would appear that the
most plausible scenario
for the destruction of the Arizona
is that an adapted
16-inch armour-piercing shell
turned into a bomb is dropped,
it hits the Arizona in the vicinity
of the forward turrets,
goes down to the level of the armour deck,
penetrates that armour deck
and fetches up deep in the ship.
Now, because it's obviously
been dropped at a slight angle,
not perfectly vertical,
this allows it to travel a little bit
compared to its point of impact.
And most likely,
this bomb either fetches up in
or very close to
the black powder magazine.
Its detonation sets off
the just over 1,000 pounds
of black powder contained
within said magazine,
and the force of this detonation
both starts all the soot
built up in the funnel,
hence you get the plume of soot
coming out of the funnel of the Arizona,
and also starts a sympathetic
detonation of some
of the smokeless powder
in the rest of the ship's magazines.
There is a slight delay
in all of this occurring,
and so what you get in the film
is you actually see
what's effectively two magazine detonations.
You have the initial surge,
which is the black powder detonation,
followed shortly thereafter
as the effect spreads,
by the detonation
of the smokeless powder.
This chucks more
smokeless powder,because it's not complete detonation,
out,and you see some of it exploding
on nearby ships,some of it landing
on other nearby ships,
and some of it landing on the island,
etc.,as described in the previous reports.
And as the ship
is opened up by the explosion,
what's left of the smokeless powder
by this point continues to burn
or deflagrate at this point,
because it's no longer confined,
and that contributes to an ongoing
fairly intense fire
that over the course of
a few seconds will gradually
die down,because this is
a fairly energetic deflagration,
and leave you with the more general fires
that have left on the ship.
And as that happens,obviously,
a good chunk of the ship's bow ceases to exist.
The explosion is somewhat
directed by the
mostly intact armor deck above it,
and the weight of the turrets
and the barbettes,and obviously,in fact,
there's quite a lot of armor there as well,
which is why the fireball
tends to jet out of
the bow of Arizona,as well as
up and around.
And because of the cessation of existence
of a good chunk of the Arizona's bow,
the heavy stuff that's above it,
the conning tower,the superstructure,etc.,
collapses down into the void,
along with the turrets and barbettes,
and this drags down
the foremast,
which results in the rather famous
pictures that are seen in the immediate aftermath
of the sinking of the Arizona.
So,that
sums up
what is the most likely sequence of events
for the destruction of USS Arizona
and how the U.S. Navy arrived
at it.
As for the big question of whether or not
this would have occurred had that black powder magazine
not been there,i.e.,had Arizona moved over
to the newer types of charges,
well,it's not entirely
possible to prove without a full-scale experiment.
On the one hand,you wouldn't have
the sheer concentration of black powder
that you had on Arizona.
On the other hand,if the bomb
is fetching up in a conventional
smokeless powder magazine and
each of the charges there has its own
integrated black powder
primer,
then
it's anyone's guess as to
whether you'll get a slow deflagration
of some of the charges
or whether the force of the bomb
would actually set off the primer patches
within the smokeless powder charges,
which would then set off the smokeless powder charges
as if they were in a gun barrel,
which would then set off the magazine anyway.
You'd get a slightly different explosion,
a more continuous one rather than
a two-stage one that you got with Arizona.
But whether or not
that would destroy the ship,
whether or not it would occur at all,
fortunately,
no one on a US fast battleship
has ever been in a position to find out.
That's it for this video.
Thanks for watching.
If you have a comment or suggestion
for a ship to review,
let us know in the comments below.
Don't forget to comment on the pinned post
for dry-doc questions.
