Milton Friedman debates a protectionist
I'm Linda Chavez. Welcome to Free to Choose. Joining Dr. Friedman tonight for discussion
of free trade are Michael Walker of the Fraser Institute in Vancouver, British Columbia,
and Stephen Cohen of the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Cohen, is Dr. Friedman right?
Should we keep government totally out of it and allow Adam Smith's invisible hand to operate?
It's not even a question of right. It's a question of impossible. We've been trying
to keep government out of our economy now for several hundred years.
Have we?
Oh, I think we definitely have. The last ten years have witnessed the greatest crusade
to pull government out of the economy in this country in many, many years. The net result
is we have much more of it. This is a way of being...
Alexander Hamilton, in his report on manufacturing, came out in favor of government involvement.
And tariffs on steel were introduced early in the 19th century because steel was said
to be an infant industry.
And it was.
It was, and it still is.
Are you saying that there's more government control because we've been trying to get it
out?
No, of course not. What I'm trying to say is we're fighting against the unreal. We're
appealing at the level of ideology right now that government should go away and stay
out of the economy. And we're talking as though in the United States we can determine our
own future. For instance, if you take Japan, which has been the most successful competitor
to the United States, they came from, frankly, nowhere a couple of generations ago, to now
have wages that are higher than ours. They produce superior products, and they've done
this with very active government involvement.
Maybe they were wrong to do that. Maybe they were right. Maybe, as Professor Friedman said,
had the government butted out, they would have done it yet better. The fact remains,
if we say, take the government out, it's like saying, let's play football with sneakers
and t-shirts and touch, which is a game I like. And the other guys are still using hardshell
helmets. You can't do it yourself.
That's the fundamental problem with your analogy, is that the competition that we have in trade
is not a competition which somebody loses and somebody wins. It's a competition in which
everybody wins. And this idea that the Japanese, that as a competitor to the Americans, that
the Japanese in some sense won, is nonsense. Look at all the Japanese automobiles on American
roads. Everybody who drives a Japanese automobile or uses a Japanese product is a winner as
a result of this competition that there has been between the Japanese and the Americans
for the sympathies of the American consumer. So it's quite wrong to take this sort of military
or combative notion.
That might be right if the whole world did that sort of thing, and that Japanese consumers
would have had the choice during the 60s and 70s to drive Fords or Volkswagens.
That's a fallacy.
They didn't.
A fallacy.
It's a fallacy.
Any individual country by itself, on the average, tends to benefit from free trade regardless
of what the other countries do.
What you seem to be saying in your argument against free trade is that the customer is
always right unless they pick an imported item.
No.
And if they pick an imported item, if they pick an imported item, then they require the
help of the government to assist them, to tell them, look, you've made an unwise choice
here and therefore we're going to put a tariff or a quota on to prevent you from selecting
the imported article, whether it's a Japanese automobile or a Korean television set or whatever,
because you don't have the ability to make this kind of choice yourself.
That is not what I'm saying.
Well, what are you saying, Dr. Cohen?
Now, I'm saying there's a problem here.
We gain in the very short run.
If we assume that this whole place is going to have an earthquake and we're going to be
out of business in a year and a half, this is a brilliant idea.
We gain in the long run.
We send them paper, they send us cars.
Let me finish.
If, however, we go in the long run, the first round is Japanese semiconductors come in.
Terrific.
Let's even assume the Japanese are dumping them.
They're subsidizing, they're putting them in your market.
Absolutely, absolutely.
The first thing, we get a lot of cheap semiconductors, terrific.
This wonderful fictional person called the consumer has a gain.
However, the same person happens to be a producer.
That's how he gets his income, to become his consumer.
He's suddenly put out of business.
Two things occur.
Turns out you can't suddenly go back in the semiconductor business.
That is, we've been put out, but we're going to rally and go back in.
It takes a long time to develop the skills, the know-how, the scale, so you're pushed
out of that business.
Steve, neither one of us knows what the future will hold, and we don't know whether it's
wise for us to accept these free, or almost free, semiconductors and use them to develop
our industries and so on.
We do.
But we can stand back and ask what is going on?
What are these Japanese who you apparently think know the future and are taking a competitive
position that says, well, we're going to invest in subsidizing these things and shipping them
to the United States to destroy their industry?
Where are they investing?
Where are they who take such a long-term view?
They're investing in the United States, and they're investing in the United States because
they realize that, for example, in the industry that you selected, the consumer electronics
industry, they realize that anybody can make a VCR.
But it takes a good, well-developed service industry, for example, to develop the software
that's played on a VCR.
And that's why they're buying...
Excuse me.
Nobody can make a VCR except the Japanese.
That's why Sony...
I know.
There are no American VCRs.
But who cares?
Sony is just buying MGM.
Yes.
So Sony is buying MGM because they realize that the product that's produced by a VCR
is not the machine.
That's a $200 item.
There's a $1,000 item that's made up of the software, namely the films that are going
to be played on that VCR.
And they're investing in America because America produces the software.
Let me interject here for a second because I want to ask Dr. Friedman a question.
Dr. Friedman, maybe VCRs aren't that important, but what about the defense industry?
Should we really keep hands off there, or should we step in and protect it?
Even Adam Smith made national defense with exception.
But I think that while in principle it's an exception, in practice it's an excuse.
I think one of the greatest statements I've heard about this whole problem was by Colin
Clarke, a famous economist, who said, you know, people say that the trouble with...
that free trade is fine in theory, that's what Mr. Cohen is saying, but it doesn't work
in practice.
He says they're absolutely just wrong.
It's just the opposite.
Any half-baked graduate student can give you a half a dozen special cases for tariffs,
infant industry arguments, the problem of getting back in, the kind of thing you've
mentioned and so on.
The trouble is that those arguments don't work in practice.
In practice we put on the wrong tariffs in the wrong places in the wrong way.
The same thing is true of Japan.
You're talking about Japan's great success, but let me ask you, does the average Japanese
citizen, you say his wages are higher than they are in the United States.
That's only because of an artificial exchange rate.
There is no Japanese who will tell you that the standard of living in Japan is higher
than the standard of living in the United States.
It is not.
And why not?
Why not?
Because of the Japanese protectionist policies with respect to rice and with respect to land.
The average Japanese pays something like six to seven times the world price for rice.
We do the same thing in the United States.
The average American citizen pays two to three times the world price for sugar.
How does the United States benefit from that?
We put on the wrong, once we adopt your policy, we move in a direction whose only outcome
is a waste of national resources through centralized direction of our activities.
Germany's industrialization went like an express train all through that last quarter of the
19th century and the first part of the 20th century.
German industrialization did not follow what was then the dominant ideology of free trade.
It said, look, the British, well, please, come on.
There was the marriage of rye and iron when Bismarck came in.
They were targeted industries.
Well, but what was the first thing that they did?
What was the first thing the Germans did?
They copied all the possible British technologies.
They eliminated, no, but they first of all eliminated all the internal tariffs.
I mean, Germany was an archetypally, an archetypally, yeah, by eliminating tariffs.
They opened up markets, and between the German nation and the rest of the world, they had
lots and lots of trade, but they had targeted development.
They had strategic policies, not stupid mass government inhibitions.
They said, look, the future, chemical industry.
We go.
We push resources and we help the chemical industry and we protect it for a while because
the British are well ahead.
They did the same thing in steel, in chemicals, in machines.
But the British look at it.
Nobody's ahead of the Germans in chemicals right now.
But if you look at it, the problem is we lose our sense of perspective.
By today's standard, what Germany did in the period you're talking about, we would today
call free trade.
They did it.
Ah, well, I don't know what you mean.
Whereas, and that's exactly the same thing that you're doing with respect to Japan.
You are not allowing for the extent to which Japan's, see, what happened in Japan is between
1914 and 1939, Japan shifted policy and became a highly protectionist, a highly centralized,
a highly controlled, and its real income went down.
In 1939, it went into war, and after the war, it did abolish.
In fact, Japan since World War II has been much less of a centralized and protectionist
state than it was between the wars.
That is probably very true.
But since World War II...
And by comparison with the United States, in my, by my judgment, the United States is
every bit as protectionist as Japan is.
I'm not saying the United States is Snow White.
I think we have a lot of protectionism, but we have stupid protectionism.
The question is, is there any other kind?
Yes.
There is.
Take a look at Japan, in post-war Japan.
Take the concrete industry, automobiles, because they're important, and everyone can understand
that.
Which, strategically, many, don't forget, try to suppress.
Don't forget that.
When you're talking about this wonderfully intelligent policy pursued by the Japanese
government, that they actively try to suppress the exportation of automobiles because they
felt that it was silly for the Japanese to compete in the world.
The Japanese government has not batted a thousand in its policy.
I'd say they've been hitting about 465.
You use the example of automobiles.
One minute, I will.
Which, a 465 hitter is Nobel Prize baseball.
But I don't believe they've been batting.
I believe that the development, the post-war development of Japan, is a tribute to the
force of free markets in opposition to METI.
I think you cannot attribute it to METI.
This is all true, but it has no concreteness.
This is ideology.
Let's look at automobiles.
It is not ideology.
Automobiles are concrete.
I can understand them.
I can count them.
I can drive them.
If you look at the automobile market in Japan in 1962, the year I was getting out of college,
so I remember the year, Detroit produced more cars in a week than Japan produced in
a year.
That's true.
There was no way on earth Toyota or Nissan could have competed with Ford.
And if we want to argue that Ford was too foolish to sell into Japan, there was Fiat,
there was Volkswagen, there was Renault, and then there's the list of the dead, Austin
and the other British.
There's also very low Japanese real incomes, which is...
It was a smallish market.
How many cars were imported into Japan in 1962?
Zippo.
They go to 1965?
Zippo.
1970?
Zippo.
1975?
Zippo.
1980?
Pretty much nothing.
A couple of BMWs with the steering wheel on the wrong side of the road.
During all that period, there was no way the outside automobile makers could get into the
Japanese market, either by selling product or by setting up a wholly owned subsidiary,
making the product in the Japan market.
That is what I call a protected market.
It sure is.
And what happened as a result is the Japanese automobile industry now makes more cars than
the American automobile industry.
Not as a result of that.
Far from it.
You mean despite that?
Despite that, of course.
That is, if the government policy, they would have been producing twice as many cars now.
I don't know about twice as many.
I don't even know if they've been producing as many.
But they would have had a more productive automobile industry.
Had they not protected it?
If they had contributed more to the well-being of the people of Japan.
Who could be against progress?
That's not what we're talking about.
But you're against it.
Quite the contrary.
Well, Milton, I think there is an important point that we're missing here, though, Milton,
and that is that we're talking about this as though it were an economic problem.
I don't think protectionism is an economic problem.
It isn't.
Protectionism is a political disease.
It follows the well-known pattern suggested by H.L. Menckel when he said that elections
are a kind of a futures market and stolen property.
And who is being stolen from here?
It's the consumers who have to pay a higher price for the product.
And who benefits?
It's the manufacturers who get the higher, who get that, as it were, that tax that's
levied on consumers.
And the problem is that even if they know about it, consumers have no interest in going
about and engaging in political action to stop it.
Because for them, it means a few dollars more on a car or a few dollars more on a VCR or
whatever.
And they have no incentives to go out and engage in the political action to get the
tariffs taken down or get the quotas removed.
And it's so, therefore, a very insidious and difficult thing.
It's nothing to do with economics.
It's a political problem.
Dr. Cohen, I understand what you're against.
You think that free trade doesn't work in practice.
What are you for?
Well, it's not a question of free trade not just working in practice.
It does not work in theory.
Let's be very clear.
This film you've been showing.
I have never seen anything with quite the ideological content of that, as I said, outside
the Middle East.
You live a sheltered life.
I have been fortunate.
It assumes a set of assumptions that have been proven wrong.
American economics sits around spinning on the basis of its assumption, admitting of
no facts, admitting of no foreign intervention.
I beg your pardon.
You simply are demonstrating the parochialism of your knowledge.
The facts in that film are absolutely correct.
Japan did progress very much under free trade from 1868 to 1914.
India has remained relatively stagnant under a system, a policy of protection.
Those facts are correct.
Those are what we used to call glittering half-truths.
The other half of those truths are Germany in the late 19th century progressed splendidly
under strategic policy.
And Germany in the last half of the 19th century progressed greatly.
It progressed greatly.
And that Japan progressed very greatly.
As Mike was saying earlier, because it eliminated tariffs within the country, it got a large
free trade area in the same way the common market has been moving, in the same way the
U.S.-Canada agreement has been moving.
It progressed greatly despite the fact that it introduced some tariffs toward the external
world.
That's the two cases of the most successful rich country progress, Germany in the early
20th century and late 19th century, Japan in the post-war period.
No, Japan in the...
In the post-war, World War II period.
One minute.
I haven't finished my sentence.
Japan in the post-war period are the two most startling and impressive examples of truly
muscular and impressive industrial...
Both, you claim, were achieved despite the fact that they used strategic development
policies.
I would like to say England and the United States have, despite the fact they've tried
to use free market policies and have not, we've had tons of protectionism in this country,
but the intellectual climate that says protectionism, you only have one word, protectionism.
It's like people in Florida talking about snow.
There's one word, snow.
Eskimos have a hundred words for snow.
We have one word for protectionism.
Just like in Canada.
Don't forget that.
You know that.
The Japanese have a hundred words, despite the fact that these two countries have succeeded
so well.
You say, well, had they only done it our way, they would have done better.
But I have been...
I find that really hard to believe.
You've had the last word, Dr. Cohen.

