Is God All Knowing? | Episode 604 | Closer To Truth

Truth exists
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If I believe that God exists and that God knows everything,
what, in fact, do I actually believe?
What does it mean for God to be all-knowing,
to be omniscient?
Why does it matter?
Because if I want to know God,
then I must ask what God knows.
Does it even make sense for God to be knowing all?
Because if not, then perhaps the whole concept of God is flawed.
Is God all-knowing?
I'm Robert Lawrence Kuhn,
and Closer to Truth is my journey to find out.
I start with Christian philosopher and debater,
William Lane Craig.
I'll not likely buy Bill's basket of beliefs,
but I am taken by his lifelong devotion
to exploring God's profound characteristics.
Bill, I'm not sure whether I believe in God,
but if I do, understanding God's characteristics,
to me, is very important.
And one of the most interesting ones is that God is,
this word, omniscient, knowing everything, right?
What does that mean?
An omniscient person would be someone
who knows only and all truths.
The idea of omniscience is that there is no fact of the matter,
there is no true information that this person does not know,
and he believes no false proposition.
So, he would know only and all facts.
But there are more things in the world than just pure facts.
Well, that is a very interesting point.
I think you're right about that.
But there is another type of knowledge
that we could call non-propositional knowledge.
And this would be knowledge, for example,
how to ride a bicycle, or how a watermelon tastes,
or things of that sort.
But omniscience isn't typically defined in terms of...
How it feels to have an interview together.
That's right.
Or, for example, how it feels to be a sinner.
God wouldn't have that sort of feeling.
And therefore, omniscience is defined
in terms of propositional knowledge,
of knowing only and all truths,
but not necessarily having all non-propositional knowledge.
To have all non-propositional knowledge
would actually be a negative.
So, what you're telling me is to know everything
is not to know everything.
Right. When we say to know everything,
what we mean is knowing all truths,
knowing all true propositions,
and believing no false proposition.
The idea of omniscience flows out of the perfection of God.
St. Anselm defined God as the greatest conceivable being.
Well, the greatest conceivable being would know all truth,
and he would have appropriate non-propositional knowledge.
He would know, I am God, I am omnipotent, I am omniscient.
But he wouldn't know, I am Ronald Reagan.
That would be an imperfection.
But he would know what Ronald Reagan felt
being Ronald Reagan.
Exactly, and that's a propositional truth,
that Ronald Reagan knows that he is a movie star,
that he is the president, that he has dealt with Gorbachev.
All of those propositions God would know.
He would know, for example,
that it feels lousy to be a sinner,
that sinners feel guilty and condemned,
things of that sort.
He would know all those propositions,
but he wouldn't have that non-propositional knowledge
of believing that he is himself Ronald Reagan,
or that he is tasting a watermelon,
or something of that sort.
So, it's a subtle idea.
I'm shocked, quite honestly,
at how quickly you unearth this.
Normally, most people would just say,
yeah, he knows only in all truth,
and that's the end of it.
But you're right.
To be cognitively perfect,
you actually have to be more than omniscient.
You have to have all...
Selective.
Yes, that's right.
You have to have all propositional knowledge,
and then you have to have, in addition to that,
the appropriate non-propositional knowledge,
appropriate to yourself.
And both of those elements will be part
of God's cognitive perfection.
So, God is actually greater than omniscient.
And I remember when I first realized this,
I was just stunned at the idea
that God is even more cognitively perfect
than being omniscient.
I thought omniscience was the ultimate,
and it's not.
God is even more than omniscient.
True omniscience in the sense of knowing everything
would be total confusion.
Yes, that would be an imperfection,
not a perfection,
and therefore wouldn't be part of God's character
as the most perfect being.
Bill describes what God knows
in terms of propositional knowledge,
where God knows all and only true propositions.
If one believes in the traditional God,
that would seem standard.
But hold on.
Let me follow the trail here.
I'd have no problem with God's knowledge
being incomprehensibly vast.
But could God know infinite things?
Could God know every possible thing?
Moreover, is there a difference
between God knowing infinite things
and God knowing every possible thing?
I should discuss this with philosopher John Leslie,
my co-editor of a forthcoming book
on the puzzle of existence.
I asked John what it would mean
if God were truly all-knowing.
John, theologians have traditionally talked about
a God that knows everything, has infinite knowledge.
But if you think about infinite knowledge
and you're thinking about knowing everything,
isn't there a difference?
I think there is a very clear difference.
A God who knew the weight of every cabbage
in an infinite line of cabbages would know infinitely much,
but might be ignorant of the existence of carrots
and so wouldn't know everything.
A God who knew everything would have a mind cluttered up
with all sorts of rubbishy and unpleasant facts.
A God who knew everything would know exactly
how it would feel to be tortured to death
in all possible ways,
not just in this universe, but in all other universes
which were in any sense possible.
The God would have to feel the experience
of being tortured to death in those ways
because otherwise he wouldn't really know what it was like.
And that's a case of the sort of knowledge
which I rather hope wouldn't be in an ideal divine mind.
Well, you've also talked about more trivial examples
which actually have its own richness,
like what would God have to know about all the different ways
that bad art could be made?
How many different ways can one make bad art?
An infinite number of different ways,
and if God knew everything,
he'd have to consider every possible bad painting
and all the rubbishy radio plays and all the TV shows
which are much worse than this one, and so on.
So, basically what you're saying, bluntly,
is that God cannot know everything.
Is that what you're saying?
No, I'm saying that God, if God's mind were the ideal mind,
would not have this rubbish in there.
But, of course, you could define God as knowing everything
and you could think that there were special religious reasons
or philosophical reasons for believing
that God has to know everything.
For example, there's a God who knew everything was simple,
whereas a God who knew only a limited number of things
was in some way more complicated.
Because the God that would know only certain things
and exclude even this explosion of possibility
would then have to select.
And selection is more complicated than non-selection.
Either the God would have to do the selection
or the principle which made God's mind
of this particular sort would have to do
this complicated selecting.
And some people think, look, it's obviously simpler
to have a God who knows everything.
Look, I can express that in a very simple sentence.
God knows everything.
Whereas if you have all these restrictions on what God knows,
those are going to be complicated restrictions.
Is one then forced to hypothesize that God has some,
would have some selector principle
that he could know everything
but has some filter, to use a simple word,
so that only those things which are germane or relevant
would come in?
I think you're talking about God's seeing
some of these possible facts which he might think about
and then deciding I'm not going to think about those.
But in order to do that, he first had to think about them.
I'd prefer the picture, if you are going to talk
about the divine mind, which is ideally good,
then you could say that it's the principle of goodness itself
which just limits the nature of the divine mind,
just as God couldn't have an evil mind,
so God couldn't have a mind which was filled with rubbish.
God's mind thinks about everything worth thinking,
but some things are not worth thinking.
So, the concept that God knows everything worth knowing
then puts the concept of worth knowing,
in a sense, at a higher plane than God's existence.
I think that's a bit of a wrong way to look on it.
Some people think that a God who was, for example,
subjected to the rules of morality
would have something outside God dictating God's nature.
If I were a believer in God, which we haven't even discussed
yet, if I were, then I would prefer the view
that God's nature is eternally such
that he could not have evil thoughts in it.
God's nature is eternally such that it could not have
rubbishy thoughts in it, thoughts about things
which simply aren't worth thinking.
This isn't a matter of a deliberate decision
which has been made by God.
It's part of God's nature.
It's part of what makes God's nature so wonderful
that the rubbish isn't there,
the evil thoughts aren't there, and so on.
John electrifies me by probing the nature of God's knowledge.
Why am I so moved?
Because I can think about God in new ways.
In classic theology, God's omniscience, God knowing all,
is one of God's perfections.
Not so simple, says John, because God knows vastly less
than every possible thing, because every possible thing
is infinitely greater than infinite things.
And because infinities of infinities of knowledge
are not worth knowing.
John limits God to knowing only everything worth knowing.
Phew, this God business gets complicated.
Are there other ways to classify God's knowledge?
I go to Notre Dame and ask Catholic philosopher
Thomas Flint, editor of the journal Faith and Philosophy.
Why does Tom classify God's knowledge into three categories?
I think most people who think of God as omniscient
would agree that God knows all truths.
But then the issue is, what kinds of truths are there,
or how do we best characterize them?
And I think it's most helpful to characterize them
in three different ways.
First of all, there's what's often called natural knowledge.
God's knowledge of necessary truths,
knowledge over which he has no control.
Truths which couldn't have been other than true.
So mathematical truths would be examples of that.
Two plus two equals four.
On the other extreme, you'd have what's often
called free knowledge.
This would be God's knowledge of contingent truths
over which he does have some control.
So take, for example, the truth that South Bend
is smaller than Chicago.
This is a truth.
It might not have been true, though.
We can imagine ways in which things might have turned out
so that South Bend was actually much larger than Chicago.
And I think theists would believe that God could have
brought that about if he had wanted to.
Now, it's somewhat controversial,
but I would think that there's a third category as well
of what's traditionally called middle knowledge.
This would be knowledge of contingent truths
over which God has no control whatsoever.
The primary example there that people give
would be conditionals talking about what free beings,
such as we are, would freely do in various different situations.
They're not going to be necessary truths.
At least, many of us would think they're not necessary
because there's no necessity to a being acting in a certain way
if that being is free.
On the other hand, they're also not going to be
under God's control because God can't make a being
do something freely.
If God has all three kinds of knowledge,
given his natural knowledge,
he's going to know everything that's necessary,
which is going to entail that he knows all possibilities.
If something is possible, then presumably it has to be possible.
And therefore, his natural knowledge would give him
knowledge of all possibilities of anything that could possibly be.
Making a possibility actual becomes a contingent.
That's right. That's right.
That it is a possibility is a necessary.
Is a necessary one, and therefore,
presumably not under God's free control.
It's not as if he decides which the possibilities are.
So, God is confronted or overwhelmed
with this enormity of possibilities.
Right.
And then he has no control over them because they're there.
That's right.
Okay.
There's a vast range of options that are open to him.
So, he's now confronting these possibilities
as natural knowledge.
Right.
Some people would view the very possibilities themselves
as flowing out of God's nature.
I mean, the crucial thing is that they're all there,
and he doesn't have any choice with regard
to which things are possible,
because his free creatures wouldn't cooperate with him
in bringing them about.
And if he wanted a world that included that,
then that's not a possible world that he would actualize.
It's not a possible world that he could actualize.
There's no way he could bring it about.
If there's something I wouldn't freely do,
well, then there's a possibility
that he can't bring about in any way.
Okay, so now God knows that,
and this is the middle knowledge in this logical order.
That's right.
The knowledge of which worlds are feasible,
as I like to say.
So, we distinguish between possible and feasible worlds.
And then he chooses one...
That's right.
...to actualize.
That's right.
To make real.
That's right.
And then that's where his free knowledge comes in?
That's exactly right.
Yeah, God decides which beings he's going to create
and which situations he's going to put them in.
And once he makes that decision,
then free knowledge just sort of flows out of that.
Gives us a picture of how God can act providentially,
how he can govern his universe,
govern it knowingly, knowing what he's doing,
what world is going to result from his own actions,
and yet do that without robbing people of their freedom.
So, it gives us a much richer picture
of the way in which divine providence operates.
I like Tom's notion that not even God
could change knowledge of possibilities,
because possibilities must always exist as possibilities.
Of course, God could change anything real.
Get that?
Tom provides a consistent way of thinking
But while consistency is necessary for knowledge
to be true, it is not sufficient.
What about God's supposed knowledge of the future?
The future would have to be part of God knowing all, right?
To find out, I go to Berkeley,
to speak with the founder of the Center for Theology
and the Natural Sciences, Robert John Russell.
Bob is an ordained minister with a doctorate in physics.
Bob, do you believe that God knows everything?
Sure.
It follows from God being the creator of everything.
If God is intimate to everything as the ground of being,
there wouldn't be without God.
Then God knows what God's intimate to,
what God's creating.
So, it follows that God is omniscient, knows everything.
Does he know all the possible kinds of human suffering
that people can do to one another?
Well, God's knowledge of possible circumstances
is a really subtle issue in philosophy of religion.
But actual events, God knows.
God knows actual suffering.
I believe God suffers with us as we suffer.
But the real question underlying that,
I think with the word possible,
is does God know possible worlds?
Does God know the future as a set of possibilities?
Some people would simply say God knows the future,
even though it's future for us, right?
So, God knows what I'll have for dinner tonight,
even though I haven't had it yet.
The other extreme end is God can't know the future
because the future isn't yet.
So, God can't know what I'm going to have for dinner.
Now, between those is that sense of possibilities.
It's possible I have a hamburger.
It's possible I have a veggie burger.
God, can God know those possibilities?
Sure, I just said them, God can know them.
Can God know them only as possibilities?
That's the issue.
Well, I find this interesting because when I look at that,
I don't see it as a spectrum.
I see two possibilities which are simple to understand.
One, God knows the actual future,
which is a finite set of things.
It's a lot, but they're finite.
The other is that the future hasn't happened.
But if God knows every possibility,
there's virtually an infinite number of possibilities
in the enormity of what God has to keep in his celestial mind
becomes incredible.
Does it get confused?
I think the last sentence is where we part company
because you're making God into a super person with a huge mind.
And God is not a person.
The person analogy that God is like us and knows the way we
know and he keeps in mind what we like we keep in mind
breaks down on these kind of questions.
It's helpful in a way.
I mean, you pray to God, God responds personally
in a certain sense, but there's always a tension
between a kind of ground to being ontology of God
and a personal view of God as a kind of supra person.
And it's hard to find a balance between those two.
But the key question is, how strongly do you and I want to
take the scientific evidence for the present being real
and the future not yet or the whole thing being there
in a kind of block universe?
People like Einstein, relativity essentially convinced him
that the block universe is real, that the past, present,
and future are equally real.
Other scientists like John Polkinghorne
are convinced that God cannot know the future because
the future simply isn't there.
But if you say God can know the future and maybe Einstein
was right, it sounds like our freedom isn't real
because those events are really going to happen the way God
knows them to happen.
And it also sounds like there's no real sense
of our being in time.
It sort of undercuts our human experience.
That doesn't seem very helpful.
If you say with other side that flowing time is so real
that God can't know the future, well,
this goes against the biblical and Quranic hope for redemption,
for eschatology, for a new creation,
for God to be victorious over evil.
The way a lot of people have done it,
at least in contemporary Christian theology,
is to try to say both and through a strategy of talking
about Trinity and time.
Trinity being not timelessness as it was for Augustine,
nor just being time sort of flowing forever as the
temporalists want to see it.
But as the source of time.
So, Trinity would be more than time.
It'd be super temporal.
It'd be a way in which God embraces past,
present, and future timelessly, but still allows for flowing
time in creation.
God knows the present in which I yet have not had dinner.
So, from the point of view of now,
God knows the future as undetermined.
Yet, God also knows that moment when I have dinner as present
to God as well.
Right now.
No, in eternity.
In God's eternity.
Yes, because eternity contains all of time in all of his
possibilities and all of his actualities.
So, God's knowledge of what I have is genuine knowledge in
God's relation to that dinner time,
eternally, whereas God's knowledge of it now is in
relation to my freedom to choose.
The bottom line is you start with one of two points of view.
Either eternity is so atemporal that for God to be eternal means
there's no real ambiguity of the future for God,
even though it is for us.
Or you start with such an assistance that science has
shown that time is really flowing,
or our experience is so profoundly flowing,
I really don't know the future, that God really doesn't know the
future either.
Both of them have some truth to them because the latter sort of
honors God's experience of me in time and our interaction
through prayer, let's say, or through God's grace.
The former offers us hope that God's promise of victory,
God's promise of grace and transcendence is grounded.
Now, the challenge is how do you bring them together?
It's a challenge.
The simple statement, God knows everything,
masks profound problems.
The solution could glorify God as majestic and awesome,
or repudiate God as inconsistent and contradictory.
Some claim that God knows the truth value of all propositions,
including past and future possibilities,
which vastly outnumber all realities.
But to truly know every possible thing,
God would have to know infinities of nonsensical
and terrible things.
God may have three kinds of knowledge.
One, natural knowledge, like numbers and logic and all
possibilities, over which God has no control.
Two, free knowledge, such as God creating the universe,
over which God has total control.
Three, middle knowledge, free actions of free creatures,
which God knows but cannot control.
Middle knowledge is clever, probably too clever.
If God exists, God's omniscience highlights God's perfections.
If God does not exist, God's omniscience suggests that God is
fallacy and folly.
Either way, closer to truth.
For complete interviews and for further information,
please visit closertotruth.com.
