Is God Necessary? | Episode 607 | Closer To Truth

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Me, I am not religious,
but I am consumed with wonder about God.
Does God exist?
The answer, I think,
may depend upon whether God is necessary.
What do I mean, is God necessary?
I do not mean, is God necessary to explain things like the world.
I do mean, could it ever be possible,
if there is a God, for God not to exist?
In other words, even if God does exist,
could it have been otherwise?
Stick with me here,
because whether God would be, in theory, necessary,
impacts whether God, in fact, exists.
I'm Robert Lawrence Kuhn,
and Closer to Truth is my journey to find out.
I begin in Notre Dame,
with the philosopher who reinvigorated Christian philosophy,
Alvin Plantinga.
I see Al first, because God's necessity
undergirds Al's whole concept of God.
Al, in trying to discern the nature of God,
to determine whether I believe there is a God,
one of the questions that always comes up is,
is God necessary, a necessary being?
What does that mean?
A necessary being is one that can't fail to exist,
no matter how things have been.
Or we could say a necessary being
is one that exists in every possible world,
where a possible world is a way things could have been,
a sort of total way things could have been,
that says something about everything.
One of these possible worlds is actual,
the rest of them aren't.
You and I exist in all those possible worlds
which are such that if they had been actual,
then we would have existed.
And the necessary being is one such that for any world at all,
if it had been actual, it would have existed.
Now, how can you go from defining it
to believing that that's the case?
The being worthy of worship
would have to be a really remarkable being,
one that is unsurpassable, you might say.
And for a being to be such that no being could be greater,
it would have to have such properties
as being all-powerful, being all-knowing,
being perfectly good, having created whatever there is,
and the like of that would have to have those properties.
But to be truly top of the line,
such a being would have to have those properties
not just in the actual world, not just in fact,
but in the other possible worlds as well.
So, this being would have to have such properties
in all the possible worlds,
in which case it would itself have to exist
in all the possible worlds
and therefore be a necessary being.
So, I can conceive of possible worlds
in which there is no God.
Doesn't that make it logically difficult
to have a God in every world
since you can conceive of worlds without God?
Well, the suggestion that's sort of implicit
in what you say is that if something is necessary,
then we can see that it is.
And it's true for many things that are necessary,
but not for nearly all.
I mean, consider some of the great debates in philosophy,
for example, about universals,
whether there really are such things as properties,
states of affairs and the like,
whether they exist independent of human beings.
If there are such things,
it'll be necessary that there are.
And if there aren't, it'll be necessary
that there aren't.
But it seems that both are in some sense conceivable.
So, it's not the case that if something is conceivable,
it follows that it's actually possible.
There is a famous ontological argument
and some suggested way back in the 11th century.
If it's even possible that there is such a being as God,
then it's true that there is
and indeed necessary that there is.
So, if you find yourself thinking,
well, yeah, it's possible
that there'd be a greatest possible being,
one that has to exist and have all these properties
in all possible worlds,
then you're really committed to the idea
that there is such a necessary being.
What about the atheists that claim
that any reference to God
just elevates the problem one step up,
because you could always ask the question,
why does God exist?
If, in fact, God is a necessary being,
as theists think he is or as theists typically thought,
then in a way, that question is a sort of non-starter.
It's like asking, why is it that 7 plus 5 equals 12?
I mean, it's got to be that way.
There's no choice about it, so to speak.
And there's also no other answer to the question
other than, well, that's just a necessary truth.
And the same thing would hold for God.
Everything that exists is either necessary,
which means impossible to have been otherwise,
like 2 plus 2 equals 4,
or contingent, which means possible to have been otherwise,
like the universe and all it contains.
God being necessary means that God would have to exist
in every possible world,
that in every way reality could have been,
there would have to have been God.
But Al goes further,
arguing that whether God is necessary
affects whether God exists.
Wait a second.
Wouldn't God's existence have to be determined first,
then God's necessity?
Perhaps not, because whether God exists
may be a different kind of question
than whether, say, UFOs or ghosts exist.
But God's necessity is hard-going.
I need more help.
Happily, I'm at Notre Dame's Department of Philosophy,
so I go meet one of my favorite philosophers,
Peter van Inwagen.
Peter believes in God,
but he's rigorous and tough-minded
and does not succumb to simplistic proofs of God.
Peter, I'm not sure I fully understand
the depth of what being necessary means.
We all know that it's true about us
that we might not have existed.
I, for example, would not exist if my parents had never met.
Everybody can say the same thing.
And that makes us all contingent beings,
things that might not have existed.
A necessary being is just a being you can't say that.
There's no way, if God indeed is a necessary being,
then you simply can't say about him
that he might not have existed.
If you like, you can put that by saying he had to exist.
To say he had to exist and it's false
that he might not have existed
are two ways of saying the same thing.
The thesis is that one of the things
that's part of the concept of God
is supposed to be that it exists necessarily.
And we can put your question this way, why?
Why would anyone want to build that into the concept of God?
Well, consider the old thought
that's often directed against the religious believer,
well, who made God?
If God is a necessary being,
of course, there's no need to answer that question
because nobody made God, nothing made God.
He didn't come into existence.
There's no more, you might as well ask,
well, who made two and two equal to four?
Two and two has to be equal to four.
There's no question of who made it that way.
If God's existence isn't necessary,
on the other hand, we can ask a more general form
of the question, who made God?
Where did he come from?
What's the explanation for the fact
that he exists in the world?
Well, either he depends on something else,
in which case he's a dependent being, or he doesn't.
If he does depend on something else
and his existence isn't necessary,
then it's an accident, all right?
It depends on chance.
It's just a matter of luck.
There'll be other possible worlds where God doesn't exist.
Maybe there are people in those worlds
who their atheism is true, even though it's false here.
A theist might take that view.
Or I might say, well, they'd have to be empty,
because if there's no God, there's no nothing.
Still, we can ask, well, why isn't that world actual?
That's a way the world might have been,
that there was nothing.
None of those questions can even be asked
if God is a necessary being.
Could we say, alternatively,
that God is the ultimate brute fact,
but not a logically necessary being,
because I can conceive of worlds in which God does not exist?
The ultimate brute fact,
meaning the ultimate brute contingent fact.
A brute fact is a fact that has no explanation whatever, right?
A contingent fact is one that might not have been a fact.
Of course, two plus two equals four is a brute fact,
but it's not a contingent fact.
It doesn't need an explanation being necessary.
Suppose, according to an atheist, say,
that the physical universe exists.
Perhaps that's the ultimate brute fact.
But if it's possible, then,
for there to be no physical universe,
if it's not necessary,
that there just isn't any explanation,
there might have been nothing, there is something,
we're just lucky, I suppose.
I haven't been discussing arguments
for the existence of a necessary being,
just why one might want to suppose that God was one.
One thing I suggested is that it answers all the questions
of the form, where did God come from,
or who created God, or something like that.
They're just out of court.
The other is, of course, that provided a necessary being
is possible, then it seems likely that you would want to
say that the greatest possible being was a necessary being,
rather than a contingent one.
One whose existence followed from its own nature,
rather than was the gift of either external circumstances
or chance.
I like how Peter uses God's necessity
to throw out the classic atheist taunt,
so where did God come from?
But then I'm used, is God's necessity
the believer's last bastion of defense?
Is it all wordplay, tricks with language,
to erect a preemptive wall of rationalization,
so that believers can avoid that noisome question,
so who created God?
God's necessity could seem like a theological artifice
constructed in layers.
How to peel back the layers?
I ask Richard Swinburne, a foremost Christian philosopher.
Richard's on a lecture tour of the U.S.
We meet in Washington, in an Orthodox church.
You've said that God is factually necessary,
but logically contingent.
What does that mean?
Yes, some people's answer to why is there a God is,
well, his existence is logically necessary.
Now, something is logically necessary,
the normal thing said to be logically necessary
are propositions, logically necessary
if their negation, that is the proposition
which says not the first proposition,
entails a contradiction.
For example, all squares have four sides
is logically necessary,
because the definition of square is a figure
with four equal sides, four equal angles.
But if one talks of a being,
such as God is logically necessary,
what one means in terms of propositions
is that the proposition which says that being exists
is logically necessary.
Now, Hume said, and I think he was right in this,
that for any supposition about the world,
we can conceive of the contrary of it.
That is to say, when you're dealing
with existential propositions
about the existence of concrete entities,
substances, real things in the world
which make a causal difference to things,
there is no such proposition is logically necessary,
because there is a universe is not logically necessary,
because there is not a universe,
does not entail a contradiction.
And whatever item you think of in the universe,
it makes sense to say it exists,
it makes sense to say it doesn't exist,
and there's no contradiction in either supposition.
And that includes God?
Well, it's a natural generalization
to suppose it does include God,
because God is like the universe and things in it,
in that he's a causal agent.
He makes a difference to things.
Therefore, it rather looks as if there is no God,
does not entail a contradiction,
and so there is a God,
he's not a logically necessary proposition.
Now, what does it mean to be factually necessary?
Well, factually necessary is the top
of the explanatory ladder.
That is to say, nothing explains his existence,
nothing could explain his existence.
It's part of the ultimate structure of reality
that the factually necessary exists.
Given that there is a God,
there are not going to be any other factually necessary
beings, so he will be the only one.
And that is certainly what I think the theist
ought to maintain, simply that he's factually necessary,
he is the ultimate determinants of explanation.
Some theists are apt to say that it would be
theologically more satisfactory
if God was a logically necessary being.
But I don't think so, because it would mean
that the reason why there was a God would be
that some principle of logic brought about his existence.
And that, again, would be putting something above God.
God is the ultimate cause of all things,
and no principle of logic dictates his existence.
Can we go further than that and talk about
God's properties?
Are these also factually necessary,
or are those almost accidental properties
that we're fortunate that God has?
For every entity in the world, there are essential properties
and non-essential properties.
An essential property of a thing is a property such that
if the thing ceased to have that thing,
the thing would cease to exist.
Everything has essential properties.
This chair has an essential property.
Among the essential properties of this chair
are occupying space.
If the chair ceased to occupy space,
it would cease to exist for God.
Therefore, also, there are to be essential properties.
But the traditional view is that omnipotence,
omniscience, and perfect freedom,
from which I believe all the other divine properties follow,
are essential to God in the sense that God couldn't lose
his omnipotence and cease to be.
That is to say, he couldn't abdicate his position and take a
lower position in the universe.
If you thought, as it were, well,
God is at the moment omnipotent, but he could get fed up with the
job and give it up, there would then be an issue of what would
happen subsequently because if he'd given up his omnipotence,
then something else would have to determine what would happen
thereafter.
And so, there must be, in that case,
some super-principle of the universe which dictates what
would happen if God were to cease to be omnipotent.
But if that was the case, then God wouldn't be the supreme
terminus of explanation because there would be other principles
which would determine what would happen if he abdicated.
So, for that reason, omnipotence and,
analogously, the connected properties of omniscience and
perfect freedom are essential to God.
But he wouldn't be God unless he had these properties,
and I should add, also, everlastingness.
Is any property, personality characteristic of God,
not essential to his existence?
The properties of doing this now and doing that tomorrow,
these are certainly, in my view, not essential to his existence.
So, it wasn't necessary for God to create this universe?
No, indeed not.
He chose to do so.
Though a strong believer, Richard admits that God is not
logically necessary, in that there is no contradiction in
the proposition God does not exist.
Good for Richard.
Though it hardly matters, I see no other conclusion.
Now, because he does believe in God,
and that God must be the top of the explanatory ladder,
Richard claims that God is factually necessary.
Factually necessary?
What does that mean?
How does it differ from the claim of atheists that the
universe is a brute fact without explanation?
That's why I go to Oxford to visit the atheistic philosopher
Bede Rundle.
Bede suggests that what's fundamental is not an imaginary
God, but good old matter in the real world.
There are two conceptions of necessary being that are
relevant here.
One that you find in Aquinas makes up God's necessity to be
a matter of his eternal, unlimited,
indestructible character, right?
He's there for the duration.
You can't do anything to get him out of existence.
If there is such a being, then he can't cease to exist,
perhaps, but that doesn't prove that there is such a being at
all, so we're left with the basic existential question.
Now, the other notion of a necessary being is a being
whose existence is logically necessary.
That one has been rather harder to make sense of because people
have complained that you can't have any statements of existence
that are logically true.
Well, something like this has been said,
that God is logically contingent,
meaning that it's possible to conceive that God might not
exist, which I think you may think,
but he is factually necessary.
Is that coherent?
Well, traditionally it wouldn't be because they wouldn't leave
open the possibility of any such limitation on God, I think.
But of course, you get different characterizations of God,
and so it might make sense under some,
if not under all.
The way I looked at it is as follows.
You get the traditional notion that God exists of necessity,
and that answers the question why there's anything at all.
All right, but a weaker statement answers that
question, that is, there has to be something.
Now, so you've got two statements.
There is some being who has to be,
and there has to be some being, right?
Or there has to be something.
But if your initial worry was why is there anything at all,
it's answered by the much weaker statement,
well, there has to be something.
Even if something is necessary, it doesn't mean that God has to
be necessary.
That's right.
It's like if you have a lottery,
then somebody's got to win if all the tickets have been sold.
But there's no particular person of whom you can say he must win.
So, it is not necessary that God must win this lottery?
That's the way it's looking.
Bede believes there has to be something or other,
which does not have to be God.
In fact, he says the existence of God is highly unlikely.
There's a lot going on here.
Why does there have to be something or other?
There could have been nothing.
Absolute nothing is not impossible.
But even if there has to be something or other,
why select physical matter and laws?
Well, it's all we see.
Hardly satisfying, that.
But so what?
Reality need not satisfy me.
I have to sort this out.
So, I go to New York.
Stern College for Women at Yeshiva University
to speak with a philosopher and a rabbi, David Schatz.
David, can you imagine a possible world,
can you imagine it, in which God does not exist?
I can.
I can imagine it.
Okay, all right.
Because my conceptual powers may be limited.
I may not realize why he's necessary.
I think the issue is not whether we can imagine
that God doesn't exist.
I mean, everybody can do that.
I mean, the issue is whether there is really
some argument that will establish
that there is this, quote, necessary being, namely God.
Now, there seem to be two different avenues
to arrive at this notion of necessary being,
and I don't think that the definition of necessary being
in the two cases will necessarily be the same.
The first that comes out of certain forms
of the ontological argument, which roughly is the idea
that because God is a perfect being,
then if he exists in one possible world,
in other words, if it's even possible for him to exist,
then he must exist in all possible worlds,
because otherwise he would not be maximally great.
Now, of course, some people say,
well, it's impossible for God.
God doesn't exist in any possible world,
but because it's possible that he doesn't exist,
therefore, you know, maybe it's impossible
that there be a necessary being.
My question about this is whether being a necessary being
and existing in all possible worlds
is really a quality that somehow enhances your greatness
or enhances your perfection.
The other path comes from the cosmological argument,
the idea that every event has a cause
or every fact has a cause, and then you keep going,
and then eventually you hit,
it must be that you hit some being or some force
or whatever that is a self-existent, right?
A sort of self-existent, a cause of itself.
And people have tried to understand
what does it mean it's a cause of itself?
The being has to exist before it can cause itself,
so how does it come into being?
And here, you know, quite a few philosophers have said,
well, the way to understand this
is by the notion of the necessary being,
that yes, it's a necessary truth that God exists
or God is a necessary being,
but it's a brute fact that he's necessary.
In other words, it could have been,
it's possible for him not to have been necessary.
But again, it's difficult to make sense
of what self-existent means.
And perhaps the only way to cash it in
is in terms of necessary being.
Is God a necessary being?
If there is a God,
is it impossible for such a God not to exist?
At stake, I think, is whether or not God really exists.
Here's my bottom line.
To explain existence,
I'd venture that something is necessary.
I'm troubled by the only alternative,
that everything is contingent,
that all existence is a brute fact without explanation,
that all existence is mere good fortune,
just good old luck.
As for the something which could be necessary,
I give myself three choices.
One, the laws of physics,
especially deeper, unifying laws still unknown.
Two, consciousness in one form or another.
Three, God of one kind or another.
Laws of physics, consciousness, God,
as to which I've got a hunch,
but I'm not telling.
Your opinion is as good as mine.
That's Closer to Truth.
For complete interviews and for further information,
please visit closertotruth.com.
