The Three Gorges Dam in China: Troubles, Risks, and Government Secrecy | TDTV

Recently, according to Chinese media, the United States has stated that if a war breaks out over Taiwan, it will launch airstrikes against China with the Three Gorges Dam becoming a target of attack. As we all know, the Taiwan issue has long been one of the most sensitive and tense issues in China-US relations. Searching on Baidu, we can find lots of articles saying that senior US officials have made a series of shocking remarks, claiming that if a war breaks out over Taiwan, the US will launch airstrikes against China and target the Three Gorges Dam. This info has caused tremendous concern and controversy in international public opinion, leaving people in suspense. Does this mean an escalation of the Taiwan Strait crisis and the outbreak of war? First of all, we must take a few steps back. This information cannot be found on mainstream media, so this might as well be CCP's propaganda. But even without military intervention, the dam in itself caused so much trouble to Chinese people as well as it will collapse on its own. Structural flaws and shoddy construction of Three Gorges Dam. While exact details on the dam's construction are scarce due to government secrecy, multiple red flags suggest severe engineering shortcomings. According to The Guardian, nearly 100 cases of corruption bribery and embezzlement related to the project were discovered and inferior materials were used in the concrete mixture. Satellite imagery has revealed over 80 cracks in the dam wall just 14 years after completion. Compared to large dams in developed nations which remain crack-free for over 50 years, this is a dire sign of structural issues. There are also signs of uneven settling, tilted elevators and poor welding quality. Geologic studies have also confirmed the dam was built on an active fault zone. According to the China Earthquake Administration, reservoir-induced seismicity has increased the area's earthquake risk tenfold. The weight of the enormous reservoir has engendered over 3,500 earthquakes since construction. The government has admitted that a 6.5 magnitude quake could cause a catastrophic dam failure. Silt accumulation. The Three Gorges Dam was built to control flooding on the notoriously turbulent Yangtze River. However, the dam's giant reservoir is being rapidly filled with silt at a rate of 530 million tonnes per year. Not to mention, 17 years after its completion, the Three Gorges Dam has deposited 1.8 billion tonnes of sediment. The problem of sediment accumulation at its base is becoming an increasingly undeniable issue. Due to severe soil erosion in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River and intense human activities, a massive amount of sediment has been discharged into the middle and lower reaches of the river, eventually accumulating in the Three Gorges Reservoir area. Expert Mr. Chen Zuotang points out, sediment accumulation not only reduces reservoir capacity and lowers power generation efficiency, but may also cause difficulties in the operation of ship locks. Historical experiences show that other reservoirs that did not take effective measures in similar situations eventually faced severe consequences. The question of whether the Three Gorges Dam should have been built is once again brought to the forefront. Some argue that its economic benefits and flood control effects are not as expected, while others point out that national construction plans need to consider more environmental protection factors. But flood risks. The total capacity of the Three Gorges Reservoir is 39.3 billion cubic metres, with a flood control capacity of 22.15 billion cubic metres. However, the inflow from upstream reaches around 450 billion cubic metres annually, making the flood control capacity of the reservoir less than 5% of the total inflow. Since June 29 this year, the Three Gorges Reservoir has opened its spillways multiple times to relieve water level pressure. Michael Orslin, a Distinguished Research Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, believes that relying solely on the Three Gorges Reservoir is insufficient to cope with severe flooding. The effectiveness of other small reservoirs and flood control infrastructure is also difficult to assess. He states, these floods are to release pressure on the dam and they must allow controlled flooding. The question is if the rains continue as predicted, and if older, smaller dams upstream fail, can the Three Gorges alone control everything? Or must they release uncontrolled floods? That could be catastrophic. David Shankman, a Professor of Geography at the University of Alabama who specializes in the study of Yangtze River floods, also observed that the Three Gorges Reservoir cannot handle floods of this year's severity. He notes, the total flood control capacity of the Three Gorges Reservoir is only a small part of the total flood volume downstream and in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. So, can it contain part of the flood? Yes. But in severe situations like the current one, it is not effective. Pollution and ecological damage. The reservoir acts as a cesspool for industrial and agricultural pollution, containing 40 times more lead, 80 times more nitrogen, and 20 times more algae than the river. This contamination harms 400 million residents downstream while also clogging turbines and further reducing reservoir capacity. Additionally, reduced flow has allowed saltwater intrusion to permanently alter the river's chemistry for over 250 miles inland. The ecosystem impacts are equally alarming. The flooded areas contained vital fish breeding grounds and over 100 unique species have disappeared. Pollution and habitat loss have decimated commercial fisheries. With heavier siltation, experts believe the river may become unfit for large vessels within 10 years, crippling commerce. The Three Gorges Dam is not the only dam that The Four Dams on the Lower Jinsha River. While the Three Gorges Dam is the most famous, a series of dams have been built on the Jinsha River, a major upstream tributary. The Lower Jinsha River contains four massive dams, Wudongde, Baihitan, Siluodu, and Xiangjiaba. Together, they have a total storage capacity of 45.9 billion cubic meters and a flood control capacity of 15.5 billion cubic meters. The downstream Xiangjiaba Dam is located approximately 1,000 kem upstream from the Three Gorges Dam. Our main focus will be the Wudongde Dam. It is located on the Jinsha River between Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. It ranks as the fourth largest dam in China and seventh largest in the world. The dam is a 327 meter long and 270 meter high concrete double curvature arch, notable for its thin profile and innovative low heat cement. Its purpose is hydropower generation and flood control. The dam's normal water storage level is 975 meters with a capacity of 7.4 billion cubic meters. The flood control level is 952 meters. The massive reservoir stretches up to 26.7 km and is located just 7 km upstream from the city of Panxihua. Impacts of raising the Wudongde water level. In October, the Wudongde Reservoir's normal water level was raised by 10 meters to 975 meters for the first time. According to official statements, this still meets class 2 water quality standards. However, the move has concerning environmental impacts. Geological disasters. The steep unstable terrain in the Wudongde Reservoir area makes it prone to landslides and slope collapses. Raising water levels further inundated and destabilizes vulnerable slopes, reactivating dormant landslide zones. Historical incidents show the riverbanks here are high risk areas for dangerous landslides blocking the river channel. Moreover, thousands of regional mines using chaotic extraction methods have created an extremely precarious local geology. Yang Yong, former deputy chief engineer of the Three Gorges Corporation, acknowledged that the Wudongde, Baihetan, and Siliudu dams are all located in areas where potential earthquakes could exceed magnitude 7. This highlights the risk of cascading failures if one dam is impacted. Water quality impacts. Despite claims that raised water levels meet class 2 standards, experts remain concerned about water quality deterioration. Higher water storage reduces flow velocity, hampering the river's ability to self-purify. But, meanwhile, urban sewage and industrial wastewater discharges from Panshua's factories and mines will become These influences can lead to eutrophication, algae blooms, loss of dissolved oxygen, and overall degradation of water quality in the reservoir. Reduced water flow may also worsen water quality issues further downstream in Three Gorges Reservoir. Climate change impacts. The expanded Wudongde Reservoir surface area will substantially increase evaporation. This alters humidity, temperature, and precipitation locally. Experts warn it can reduce rainfall in the reservoir region by 2027 percent, while increasing the frequency and severity of heat waves above 40 degi around Chongqing downstream. Habitat and species effect. Raising water levels enlarges the drawdown zone along the reservoir's banks. This compresses habitats for fish species and riverside birds that nest in bankside cavities. The increased erosion and weathering also destabilizes the reservoir banks. Exacerbating sedimentation, up and up, nor erosion and landslides due to the area's unstable geology and altered flow regimes will worsen sedimentation issues. Extra sediment deposition may gradually reduce the reservoir's capacity over time and impair the dam's effectiveness. This underscores concerns that the dam was misguided from the start. Comparisons to the Three Gorges Dam Project The construction of the Wudongde and other major dams on the Jinsha River has highlighted comparisons and contrasts with China's most famous hydropower project, the Three Gorges Dam. In one sense, the upstream Jinsha Dams act to protect the Three Gorges Dam by intercepting sediment, alleviating accumulation issues in the Three Gorges Reservoir. Sedimentation was not adequately accounted for in the original Three Gorges plans and remains a chronic challenge. Yes, however, many experts critique this rationale of upstream dams shielding Three Gorges as an attempt to cover up flaws in the original Three Gorges project. More broadly, the cascade of mammoth dams on the Jinsha reinforces a trend where the Yangtze watershed has become intensely developed with ever-larger hydropower stations. But Three Gorges retains a unique political symbolism in China that elevates its significance above any practical considerations. The Three Gorges Dam has been glorified by the CCP as a monument representing the party's conquering of nature and ability to reshape China's environment on a grand scale. As such, any problems with Three Gorges threaten this narrative and ideological mythos around the project. This explains the SDA reluctance to admit shortcomings. Meanwhile, the Jinsha Dams have not been imbued with the same political mythology despite Wudongdei's high-level endorsement from Xi Jinping. This enables a more pragmatic, flexible approach to operating and adjusting aspects like water storage levels without the same burden of face-saving that constrains Three Gorges. In essence, the development of Wudongdei and other Jinsha river hydropower projects in relation to Three Gorges illustrates a tension between political optics and practical engineering. The CCP's myth-making around Three Gorges forces a commitment to protecting the dam's image at the expense of properly managing its floors. Addressing this bias remains an ongoing challenge. Roots of the problems tell. The problems and biases surrounding massive infrastructure projects like Wudongdei Dam Tai into a broader public skepticism in China about the reliability of government statements and initiatives promoted by the Chinese Communist Party. This credibility deficit has deep roots. The CCP has a long history of cover-ups, opaque decision-making, and misinformation on issues from public health crises to industrial accidents. Traumatic events like the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square crackdown also profoundly disillusioned the populace. Meanwhile, the state maintains a tight grip on information flow, further obscuring motives and truths. Daily individual experiences have compounded doubts. The CCP's relentless development campaigns have disrupted lives and livelihoods through displacement, pollution, and unsafe conditions despite rhetoric about building a harmonious society. To many, grand infrastructure projects like the massive Wudongdei Dam represent not prosperity, but CCP arrogance and indifference to common struggles. Most importantly, the lack of checks on government power means citizens have no recourse to demand transparency or accountability when official statements whitewash reality. The absence of independent civil society and protections for free speech entrenches public helplessness. This power imbalance naturally degrades trust in leaders' words. Consequently, the CICP faces an uphill battle to convince the public of its sincerity. The party can issue elaborate promises about addressing environmental and community impacts, but these statements ring hollow when policies continue prioritizing unrestrained growth. Only through real transparency, civic engagement, and balancing development with quality-of-life concerns can authorities hope to repair their credibility deficit. Otherwise, pervasive cynicism seems inevitable. In the end, trust cannot be imposed through propaganda alone. It must be actively cultivated through listening, empathy, and fulfilling one's word. For the CCP, that process requires major reforms. But the first step is acknowledging the deeply-rooted credibility crisis it faces after decades of disconnect between speech and action.